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ABSTRACT
Culture jamming is a form of contentious politics in which activists utilize ironic
frames to challenge a dominant set of social relationships and institutions. Despite its
contestational nature, scholars rarely apply the insights of social movement theory to
explain this curious phenomenon. The main concerns of this project are to provide an
empirical analysis of culture jamming organizations and to develop a theoretical approach
to explaining repertoire change and tactical choice. The primary thesis mediating these
empirical and theoretical concerns is that a close relation exists between the development
of twentieth century art in advanced Western democracies and culture jamming.
Developing this argument and addressing these concerns entails three basic tasks. First, in
view of the failure of the literature to provide a robust concept, I develop a rigorous
conceptualization of culture jamming as an oppositional tactic. Second, I present an
approach to theory that begins to integrate the macro- and micro-levels of analysis. This
task involves both a dialogue between sociologists Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu and
their reconciliation with collective action theory, the application of rational choice theory
to social movements and protest. Although multi-faceted, this synthesis focuses on
collective identities and resources as explanations of the evaluations of tactical
alternatives. Third, I improve on previous efforts to study culture jamming empirically by
applying the most rigorous methodological techniques available under significant data and
sampling constraints. I compare and contrast the data from a sample of twelve culture
jamming organizations to generate the most comprehensive empirical portrait of such
groups in the literature.
x

INTRODUCTION
A small group of young men and women sit in supermarket aisles and pray to the
products before them. At a tourist site a crowd gathers around a man playing with a train
and harasses security personnel that threaten to arrest him. A group of performers enact a
play directed at a particular audience: the surveillance camera recording them. The
subtitles of old martial arts films are replaced with radical leftist propaganda.
Impersonators of ExxonMobil representatives give an ‘honest’ presentation of energy
policy at an oil conference. An individual exchanges e-mails with a Nike representative
over his request for a customized shoe with the word ‘sweatshop’ on its side. Activists
swap the voice boxes of G.I. Joe and Barbie toys and place them back on the shelves for
customers to purchase for their children. Entire city streets are suddenly overwhelmed by
dance parties that turn the functional accoutrements of the road into festive decor. A small
group of people climb atop a billboard and turn an advertisement against itself.
These eccentric acts are protests, performances of resistance that traverse a rich
terrain of politics, art, economics, culture, pleasure, and everyday life. Their claims are
numerous: anti-consumerism, anti-sexism, anti-road, the right to privacy, corporate social
responsibility, freedom of speech, and opposition to the privatization of public space, to
name a few. Such contentious actions have a storied history from the early artistic avantgarde to the turmoil of the 1960s to contemporary environmental, global justice, and other
movements. The practitioners of this art of protest are culture jammers. Product sabotage,
plagiarism, space reclamation, “shopdropping”, ad subversion, street theater, countersurveillance, media pranks, and other acts of mischief, creativity, and resistance constitute
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the culture jamming repertoire of contention or the available means of protest (Tarrow
1998; Tilly 1977; 1978; 1986; 1995a; 1995b; 2006a; 2008).
Research Questions
The study of social movements, protest, and resistance seeks to answer three broad
questions concerning the determinants of specific clusters of dependent variables. The
first question, mobilization, concerns the mechanisms and conditions involved in the
decision to participate in protest. The second, strategy, considers those factors that
influence the form that activism takes once the decision is made to protest. In other words,
what are the determinants and mechanisms that are relevant to the choice in how to
protest? The third, outcomes, seeks to determine the effects of protest once it has
transpired.
This dissertation engages the study of strategy from two angles. The first is
problem-driven. How can we explain the particular character of the culture jamming
repertoire of contention? Why do activists decide to engage in contentious politics using these
methods of contestation? At bottom, this concerns a series of curious observations. First,
as noted above, culture jamming takes a number of bizarre forms. To the casual observer,
it is not always obvious what is intended and thus what constitutes effective action.
Second, culture jamming as a form of ironic rhetoric (Chapter One) suggests a puzzle: Why
would activists utilize forms of rhetoric and performance that increase the cognitive
demands on audiences relative to straightforward communication? Why would activists do
so in the context of democratic regimes, under which the penalties for open dissent are
(mostly) comparatively mild, and given that a wide range of alternatives are available?
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In approaching this broader question of culture jamming and some of the
precipitating observations, I entertain a host of others. What is culture jamming? How do
culture jammers make sense of their actions and the actions of their opponents and allies?
What skills, competencies, and resources do they draw on in their contentious
performances? What are their grievances and goals? Which organizational forms do they
utilize? What are the strategic logics that culture jammers use to organize, explain, and
justify their actions? What are their targets and issues? What are their subjective
evaluations of the range of tactics available to them? What is the relation of repression and
facilitation to culture jamming? Answering these questions and others should provide
some leverage in tackling the second angle of this project: theoretical development. While
this research is motivated by an interest in explaining culture jamming, that is not the sole
objective. The central theoretical concern is this: How do we explain change in social
movement tactics over time? Throughout this dissertation I avoid what Lofland (1996, 117)
calls “theory bashing” in favor of what Lichbach (1998) calls “lumping” by developing a
synthetic approach to explaining protest tactics. This approach integrates macrosociology
and behavioral rational choice theory with existing explanations of protest and resistance.
I thus engage diverse and often antagonistic strains of social movement theory in an effort
to guide my empirical analysis of culture jamming and to further theoretical development.
Studies of protest tactics generally engage one of two approaches: the study of
tactical variation across populations and long temporal horizons and the study of tactical
choices among organizations and within protest events in shorter temporal horizons. This
study contributes to a small body of work that seeks to link these two perspectives (Tarrow
1989; 1998). First, this dissertation contributes to the literature on repertoire change: how
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do the available means of protest of a population change over time? However, a proper
answer to the question of repertoire change necessitates the posing of a second question
concerning tactical choice: what factors influence the selection of tactics from the available
means of contention? In other words, explaining changes in repertoires requires that we
understand the conditions and calculus of tactical choice. It is ultimately the diffusion of
specific choices in contentious interaction that constitutes a change in repertoires of
contention. Likewise, explaining choices in tactics requires a grasp of the range of actions
available to activists; specifying the range of actions available ultimately resolves into an
historical analysis, for repertoires are always shaped by their history.
To some degree, these questions are addressed elsewhere in relation to culture
jamming. Within the social movement literature, culture jammers and culture jamming in
general are often described as akin to or adjuncts to new social movements (Binay 2005;
Kozinets and Handelman 2004; Wettergren 2005). New social movement (NSM) theory is
a loose collection of scholarship purporting to explain the development of new forms of
activism like the peace, women’s, and environmental movements that sprang up in the
second half of the twentieth century (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Castells 1997; Habermas
1981; Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; 1985). NSM theorists typically
develop a holistic view of the social system by focusing on fundamental shifts in the nature
of social organization over this period of time. These shifts in turn facilitate new conflicts
over self-determination, the environment, identity, and other post-materialist issues. The
repertoire that unfolds in such struggles, including efforts to fashion identities and achieve
novel goals, are specific to the conditions of contemporary society.
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NSM theory offers a wealth of expectations about culture jamming organizations
(CJO). In several instances over the course of this dissertation I draw on this approach to
structure my theoretical developments and empirical analyses. However, only a handful
(or fewer) of NSM studies deal with culture jamming in particular. One especially relevant
application of NSM theory is Wettergren’s (2005; 2009) study of culture jamming.
Wettergren explains culture jamming in part as conditioned by the emotional culture or
regime of late capitalism, the sets of prescribed and proscribed emotions and behaviors
that maintain the hedonic structure of consumerism. In order to resist this structure,
culture jammers seek to develop an alternative emotional regime based on genuine or
authentic pleasure and freedom. In explaining the choice to engage in culture jamming as
the means to fashion this regime, Wettergren relies on a variant of the micro-foundational
approach Flam (2000) calls, in contrast to homo economicus and homo sociologicus, the
“emotional man.” Collins’ (2004) theory of interaction ritual chains serves as the
theoretical template for Wettergren’s (2005) analysis. In this theory, individuals and
groups accrue or expend emotional energy through social interactions. Such energy can
range from a high of confidence and happiness to lows of depression and a lack of initiative.
Actions are chosen principally for their contribution to an individual or group’s level of
emotional energy.
Wettergren’s emotional explanation of culture jamming as a tactical choice is the
most thorough in the literature on culture jamming. Her observations provide numerous
valuable insights that are referenced throughout this text, but they also provide points of
comparison. However, this project is not a strict comparison of the utility of an emotional
versus a rational explanation of social movement activity.
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Art and Protest
The explanatory emphasis of this dissertation is placed on the development of
twentieth century art. In From Mobilization to Revolution, Charles Tilly (1978, 143)
states,“collective action usually takes well-defined forms already familiar to the
participants, in the same sense that most of an era’s art takes on a small number of
established forms.” If we entertain the analogy further, a number of activist works on
culture jamming provide possible insights. In his seminal pamphlet on culture jamming,
Mark Dery (1993) defines it as a form of art. For him, culture jammers engage in a wide
variety of actions that consist in some motley concoction of humor, protest, and art. David
Cox’s (2005) quasi-autobiography also considers culture jamming as a set of tactics specific
to artists. While both employ general definitions of art and artists, I argue that the
perceived relation between art and culture jamming indicated in these and other works
requires more detailed theoretical and empirical attention.
Many important works in the study of social movements and protest emphasize the
significance of cultural production among oppositional agents and their opponents
(Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Gramsci 1971; Jasper 1997; Johnston 2009; Johnston and
Klandermans 1995; Klandermans 1997; McAdam 1999; Melucci 1989; 1996; Rochon 1998;
Snow and Benford 1988; Snow Rochford, Jr., Worden, and Benford 1986; Tarrow 1998).
However, art as a specific type of cultural production, including music, visual arts,
performance, etc. has gathered relatively sparse attention. Despite this paucity of research,
some studies do find support for a relationship between art and protest. First, art appears
to play a valuable role in the mobilization process in some movements. For example, some
studies show that it contributes to processes of consciousness-raising and preference
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formation in a variety of movement contexts (Chaffe 1993; Eyerman and Jamison 1998;
Kaplan 1992; Neustadter 1992; Pratt 1992; Wicke 1992), as well as the formation of
collective identity (Adams 2002; Eyerman and Jamison 1998; Jasper 1997; Kaplan 1992;
Neustadter 1992; Pratt 1992; Reed 2005). Art contributes to the subsistence of
movements through emotion management and value reinforcement (Adams 2002; Jasper
1997; Reed 2005), as well as commitment maintenance and solidarity (Adams 2002; Chaffe
1993; Eyerman and Jamison 1998; Jasper 1997). One understudied area, surprisingly, is
the use of aesthetic practices and artifacts to frame appeals for recruitment (Adams 2002).
Second, art also appears to play a number of roles in shaping the strategic
approaches of movements. All of the above mentioned processes are often the result of
strategic efforts by activists to increase mobilization. In addition, art is itself a form that
action takes (Eyerman and Jamison 1998; Reed 2005; Teune 2005). Film, performance,
literature, poetry, graffiti, music, painting, etc. are all part of the repertoire that activists
can choose from in achieving objectives. For example, art can also play an important role in
strategic framing processes (Adams 2002; Chaffe 1993; Eyerman and Jamison 1998),
shaping intra-organizational relations, (Roy 2010) and can help generate or accumulate
resources and external support for activism (Adams 2002; Sanger 1997).
Third, art also helps shape the outcomes of and is itself an outcome of activism.
Forms of art and expression associated with a movement can diffuse into the broader
culture and continue to shape values and practices long after the movement has dissipated
(Eyerman and Jamison 1998).
Of particular interest for this dissertation is the work of Rolfe (2005) and Teune
(2005). They argue implicitly and explicitly that art as a social practice endows artists with
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unique sets of skills and perceptual schemas. Rolfe suggests that “innovative hothouses,”
small groups that are exceptionally experimental and creative, generate tactical
innovations that social movements appropriate. These groups are predominantly artist
collectives. Teune considers the role of art in protest from the 1960’s to the movements
against global capitalism. He suggests that various art movements performed the critical
function of elaborating certain ideas and practices that were absorbed into the protest
activities of these periods. Specifically, he argues that these ideas and practices
dramatically shaped the tactical behavior of activists in these movements by providing
unique sets of perceptual schemas that interpreted reality and everyday life as aesthetically
exploitable, as “raw material for self-expression” (2005, 5).
This study contributes to the growing literature on the relation between art and
protest by conceptualizing art as a historical practice and as a social field that endows
actors with practical dispositions for perception, appreciation, and action specific to the
field. Like Teune, I consider whether the artistic avant-garde performs the critical work
associated with critical communities in the sense intended by Rochon (1998). In addition,
this dissertation builds on the work of Teune (2005) and Rolfe (2005) by attending to the
specialized sets of skills and competencies available to artists, but goes further by situating
this analysis within a broader theoretical framework. It applies Bourdieu’s (1984; 1993;
1996) sociology of art in an effort to explain the culture jamming repertoire of contention
as a consequence of changes in everyday social organization, the history of conflict, and the
practical agency of artists.

8

Organization of Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into three parts. Part I establishes the broad contours
by clarifying its conceptual, theoretical, and methodological dimensions. In Chapter One, I
argue that a lack of consensus and rigor in the relevant literature necessitates a more
systematic effort at conceptualizing culture jamming. Chapter Two is the theoretical core
of this study. First, I review the three approaches to explaining repertoire change. Second,
I contrast and compare the contributions of sociologists Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu
to a conceptualization of everyday life and an explanation of contentious politics. Informed
by this comparison, Chapter Three develops an incomplete model of tactical choice that
incorporates macro- and meso-level variables. In order to more effectively link these levels
of analysis and specify mechanisms of choice, I enlist collective action theory. I construct a
model of tactical choice and focus on twin effects of socialization: the distribution of
familiarity and the attribution of effectiveness. Chapter Four establishes the
methodological challenges and opportunities encountered in this research project,
especially procedures for data collection and sampling. It also introduces the twelve CJOs
that constitute this study’s sample.
Part II begins the empirical focus of this dissertation by identifying the major
explanatory variables that I argue are essential in explaining the culture jamming
repertoire of contention. In Chapter Five, I explore the structure of, and growth in, the field
of cultural production, including the incentives, skills, and competencies specific to the
field, especially the aesthetic disposition. Chapter Six presents data identifying three
critical communities in the development of a politicized aesthetic disposition by attending
to three artistic avant-garde movements: Dada, Surrealism, and the Situationist
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International. In Chapter Seven, I establish the relationship between the sample of CJOs
and the field of artistic production. This entails both descriptions of the content of their
collective identities and of the academic and occupational resources at their disposal.
Chapter Eight concludes the analysis of everyday social organization by identifying the
social networks and resources that CJOs possess and utilize in contention, including the
structure of their organization.
Part III concludes the empirical focus of this dissertation by linking the field and
practices of cultural production to the strategic and tactical approaches of CJOs. Chapter
Nine presents descriptions of the goals, strategies, and issues of CJOs. Chapter Ten
develops theoretical relationships between collective identities and strategic orientations
by specifying two concepts: ideologies and opportunity structures. This chapter also
provides descriptions of the ideologies and targets of CJOs. In Chapter Eleven, I construct a
relationship between goals, identities, and strategies that helps explains the attribution of
effectiveness across the repertoire of contention. In addition, I present descriptions of the
tactical repertoires of CJOs, their attribution of effectiveness, the distribution of familiarity
and its relationship to skills and uncertainty. Finally, Chapter Twelve considers the
importance of the variety of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives that may affect tactical
choice. This entails in part a consideration of the dynamics of tactical interaction.
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PART I:
PROBLEM AND THEORY

11

CHAPTER 1. CULTURE JAMMING
While debates heated up in the last few decades over various methodological
concerns in political science and the social sciences in general (Brady and Collier 2010;
George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2001; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Ragin 1989), a
small body of work developed to explore the difficulties associated with conceptualization
(Bevir and Kedar 2008; Brady and Collier 2010; Collier and Mahon 1993; Gerring 1999;
2001; 2003; Goertz 2005; Ragin 2000; Sartori 1970; 1984). The fundamental problem
driving this literature is the inability to establish intersubjective agreement on basic
concepts like democracy and power. I argue that this problem is also, to a lesser extent,
symptomatic of work on culture jamming. Thus, the first challenge this work presents is
conceptual. Competing definitions of culture jamming necessitate a conceptualization both
sufficiently rigorous to satisfy social scientific inquiry and consistent with the discourse
among culture jamming activists and theorists.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify the conceptual approach of this work.
First, in order to mark the boundaries of the concept, or to increase conceptual coherence
(Gerring 1999; 2001), the definition proposed here establishes a set of analytic properties
that together classify a phenomenon as culture jamming.
Second, I find it imperative that the concept I construct draw extensively from
current usage and prominent cases. Gerring (2001) refers to resonance, or the degree to
which a concept comports with existing usage in ordinary language and existing research,
and validity, or the degree of fit between the intension (properties) and the extension
(cases) of a concept. The more a concept departs from the existing lexicon, the more
confusing it is likely to be. Thus, I sample from existing definitions from academics and

12

activists and check these definitions and my own against cases of culture jamming almost
universally identified as representative.
Finally, I seek to achieve coherence in part by considering the semantic field
surrounding culture jamming, or by establishing the field utility of the concept (Gerring
2001). This entails a series of clarifications regarding the boundaries between culture
jamming and numerous other related concepts, including resistance, contentious politics,
tactical media, framing, irony, and others.
The broad goal of this chapter is to provide a relatively rigorous definition of culture
jamming and to delineate the conceptual contours of this study. This effort ultimately falls
short of a strict delineation of the concept. Instead, I aim to unfold and explore the
contours of culture jamming and ruminate on the particular conceptual challenges it
provides. I first review academic works on culture jamming in order to contextualize this
research project within the existing literature. Second, I survey the academic and activist
literatures on culture jamming in order to identify the issues associated with defining this
concept and to tease out an appropriate definition. Next, I present the definition that will
guide this work and carefully consider the utility of each analytic property. I then carefully
distinguish culture jamming from a number of potentially overlapping concepts. Finally, I
explore culture jamming as a form of ironic framing.
1.1. Culture Jamming and Social Movement Theory
Few studies of social movements and protest engage the subject of culture jamming.
Existing research tends to briefly survey culture jamming within a broader discussion of
alternative media or activism (Carroll and Hackett 2006; Downing 2001; Heath and Potter
2004; Jordan 2002; Jordan and Taylor 2004; Lievrouw 2003; Meikle 2002; Strangelove
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2005), regard it as a particular expression of anti-consumer or global justice movements
(Binay 2005; Carty 2002; Kozinets and Handelman 2004; Rumbo 2002), or focus on a
single action or organization (Binay 2005; Farrar and Warner 2008; Haiven 2007; Hynes et
al 2007; Peretti and Micheletti 2004; Rumbo 2002). A great deal of literature critiques it as
an oppositional practice, meaning they consider the outcomes of culture jamming (Binay
2005; Carducci 2006; Haiven 2007; Harold 2004; 2007; Heath and Potter 2004).
Only a handful of works focus on culture jamming as a specific contentious practice.
Some describe the strategies and consider the outcomes of culture jamming from a political
communication or rhetorical perspective. Cammaerts (2007) analyzes culture jamming as
a nomadic discourse that critiques the status quo by flowing from counterpublic discourse
into the mainstream public sphere. Harold (2004; 2007) determines the rhetorical logic of
different forms of culture jamming: ad parodies, pranking, and appropriation, and
evaluates their outcomes. Others seek to identify the origins of culture jamming in the
sociological tradition of expressionism (Carducci 2006) or the literary techniques of
William S. Burroughs (Tietchen 2001). Sandlin and Milam (2008) explore the utility of
conceptualizing culture jamming as critical public pedagogy. Sandlin and Callahan (2009)
illustrate an emotion cycle of resistance through two case studies of culture jamming
groups. Woodside (2001) evaluates the relationship of humor to culture jamming.
The most directly relevant academic work to this dissertation aims to identify some
of the conditions and mechanisms that shape the strategic and tactical approaches of
culture jammers. The most consistent finding is the relation between the novel forms of
collective action forged by various twentieth century art movements and the culture
jamming repertoire of contention (Binay 2005; Cammaerts 2007; Day 2008; Meikle 2007;
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Nomai 2008). Movements that are frequently cited as particularly influential include Dada,
Surrealism, and the Situationists.
The work of Nomai (2008) and Wettergren (2003; 2005) are also relevant to this
dissertation. Nomai identifies the strategic and tactical approaches of three CJOs as
practical manifestations of critical theory from the Frankfurt School to more recent works
by Frederic Jameson and David Harvey. Through interviews with nine CJOs and the
sociology of emotions, Wettergren establishes the emotional constraints or regime unique
to late capitalism and the emotional dynamics and strategies of culture jamming within this
context. She argues that culture jammers engage in their particular style of activism
because it provides them with higher levels of emotional energy than other forms of
political activity.
Although it has not received a great deal of attention among social movement
scholars, a study of culture jamming does offer the field a number of benefits. First, I
expand on a small literature that aims to explain culture jamming as a contentious practice
utilizing the tools of social movement theory. Second, culture jamming is a challenge to
institutions and authority (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Snow 2004). As such there is
an intrinsic value to its study. Third, analyses of the conditions and mechanisms associated
with this form of contention are conducive to generalizations, as I will argue in the
conclusion of this dissertation. For example, this study draws from and contributes
directly to the study of culture in social movement studies. Fourth, although culture
jamming may or may not be a social movement, culture jammers are often (though not
exclusively) associated with the anti-consumer and global justice movements. The latter
especially has captured the attention of movement scholars (Della Porta 2006; 2007;
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Hadden and Tarrow 2007; Smith 2001). Finally, as demonstrated below, culture jamming
often deals with a range of issues: the privatization and rationalization of public space, the
effects of media concentration on public discourse, personal autonomy and creativity, and
many others. Thus, this study contributes to the literature exploring issues and challenges
focused on institutions beyond the state (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Snow 2004;
Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004; Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 2004; Walker, Martin, and
McCarthy 2008; Zald 2000).
1.2. Conceptual Review
There is no consensual definition of culture jamming within the academic literature.
I suspect that this condition is in part a consequence of the paucity of studies and the lack
of such a definition in the activist literature (see below). Still, various scholars have crafted
definitions from prevailing scholarship, the texts of culture jammers and their critics, and
the particular constraints and imperatives of research. Before reviewing this literature, I
briefly consider the origins and component terms of the concept to provide some direction.
The term ‘culture jamming’ was coined by the group Negativland on their 1984
album Jamcon ‘84. This early definition was minimalist in its focus on subversive
alterations of billboards, though it was clear that it was intended more generally. Indeed,
once broken in two, the term harbors significant possibilities (Branwyn 1997; Cox 2005;
Meikle 2007). First, jamming is appropriated from the concept of radio jamming, which
refers to the transmission of radio signals in order to disrupt or obstruct communications.
Jamming also refers to playful improvisation and collaborative spontaneity, usually in the
context of musical performance. The term culture thus refers to that which is jammed and
the means by which it is jammed.
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A number of academic works do attempt to define culture jamming. Table 1.1
provides a sample of some of the most significant offerings. Most share at least three
common themes. First, they emphasize that the target and the means of action are roughly
the same: mass media or culture. For example, the terrain of action includes mass media
messages, mass culture, cultural codes, dominant discourses, and dominant cultural
expression. Second, they focus on the anti-consumerist claims often associated with
culture jammers. Third, all of these definitions emphasize the use of culture jamming as an
oppositional practice and not as a tactic available to targets or other actors.
Each of these themes is problematic for a satisfactory conceptualization of culture
jamming. First, emphases on the media and consumerism exclude some action or
organization generally acknowledged to represent or practice culture jamming. 1 For
example, any exclusive focus on the media as means and/or targets ignores a great deal of
performance-based culture jamming by organizations like the Critical Art Ensemble, the
Yes Men, or the Billionaires for Bush (or Gore). The focus on anti-consumerism in some
definitions does not permit analysis of culture jamming groups like the Surveillance
Camera Players, the Yes Men, and the Barbie Liberation Front (Meikle 2007). Even
Strangelove’s emphasis on anti-commercialism is likely too restrictive. Moreover, if tactics
are defined as exclusive to a specific class of claims (anti-consumerism) and targets (mass
media), then the risk of crafting narrow concepts ill-equipped to travel seems significant,
especially when a body of work explores the appropriation of the tactic by opponents and
others (Cammaerts 2007; Harold 2007; Klein 2000). Other shortcomings plague a fewer
number of these definitions. Woodside forecloses a number of interesting
Many groups often purposefully engage the media, but this does not distinguish their action from other
forms of protest.
1
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Table 1.1. A Sample of Academic Definitions of Culture Jamming
“The practice of critiquing mass media messages and their influence on culture by
subverting their messages through artistic desire” (Binay 2005, 1).
“The re-purposing, deconstructing, or hijacking of mass culture, using the media as a means
to critique the media” (Day 2008).
“An attempt to reverse and transgress the meaning of cultural codes whose primary aim is
to persuade us to buy something or be someone” (Jordan 2002, 12).
“An organized, social activist effort that aims to counter the bombardment of consumptionoriented messages in the mass media” (Kozinets and Handelman 2007).
“A practice that insinuates itself within some form of dominant cultural expression in an
effort to critique it and promote change” (Nomai 2008, 21).
“An investigation into the apparatus of representation in late modernity, as it relates to
both images and discourses of the media and commodity systems, and the expression of
political will” (Carducci 2006, 116).
“The destruction of commercially produced meanings” (Strangelove 2005, 104).
“An interruption, a sabotage, a hoax, a prank, a banditry, or a blockage of what are seen as
monolithic power structures governing media and culture” (Harold 2007, xxv).
“A symbolic form of protest in the sense that it targets a central symbol of dominant
discourses, deconstructs the discourses, and reintroduces the symbols in alternative
contexts” (Wettergren 2003, 29).
“The practice of taking familiar signs and trying to transform them into question marks”
(Meikle 2007, 167; 2002).
“An activity aimed at countering the continuous, recombinant barrage of capitalist laden
messages fed through the mass media” (Sandlin and Callahan 2009, 81).
“The innovative and alternative ways in which people are offering a form of creative, nonviolent resistance against the way we view the world, either for the sake of the interruption
or for getting an alternative message across” (Woodside 2001, 9).
empirical questions, such as the relation of creativity and innovation to culture jamming.
His insistence on non-violence, however, I take up below.
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The activist literature is more diverse and ambiguous in its efforts at
conceptualization. Table 1.2 samples from among the most prominent definitions. Three
texts in particular are generally ascribed a prominent role in this literature: Naomi Klein’s
(2000) No Logo, Kalle Lasn’s (1999) Culture Jam, and Mark Dery’s (1993) seminal pamphlet
Culture Jamming. Klein’s minimalism contrasts sharply with Lasn, the founder of the
seminal culture jamming publication Adbusters. Dery’s pamphlet offers a conceptualization
without a succinct definition, hence his omission from Table 1.2. However, his conception
of culture jamming is highly inclusive as well, consisting of nearly any project or
performance that welds art, protest, and humor together in a sort of “guerrilla semiotics,” a
hijacking of dominant signals.
Table 1.2 A Sample of Activist Definitions of Culture Jamming
“The practice of parodying advertisements and hijacking billboards in order to drastically
alter their messages” (Klein 2000, 280).
“Rerouting [of] spectacular images, environments, ambiences, and events to reverse or
subvert their meaning, thus reclaiming them” (Lasn 1999, 103).
“The process of taking bits of the media out there in the mainstream: its screens, its
airwaves, its networks, and its pages, and re-infusing them with new types of messages –
political ones, which aim to lay bare the true nature of the times in which we live (Cox
2005, 3).”
“Any form of media sabotage designed to call attention to the media environment and how
it’s used to manipulate us” (Branywn 1997, 42).
“A strategy that turns corporate power against itself by co-opting, hacking, mocking, and
re-contextualizing meanings” (Peretti 2001).
“The creative disruption of everyday human activities and environments” (Stern n.d., 1).
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Aside from Lasn, Dery, and Stern, activist conceptions again emphasize the media
(or in the case of Peretti, corporations) as well as the oppositional use of culture jamming.
Though these three exceptions are more general, they remain insufficiently rigorous to
provide proper conceptual boundaries.
1.3. Conceptualization
1.3.1. Definition
I begin with a broad conception of culture jamming: (D.1) an act involving the
disruptive re-contextualization of a particular practice, object, or discourse of an ensemble of
representation that is constrained by the elements of that particular representation.
It is imperative to make some careful distinctions for the purposes of this study.
First, this definition does not distinguish between individual or collective forms of action.
Some well-known culture jammers engage in individual actions. However, this study
considers only collective culture jamming actions, meaning the involvement of more than
one person in the planning or execution of actions in their common interest.
Second, this definition does not assume that the action is contentious, meaning that
the interests of two parties in interaction conflict (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001;
Tarrow 1998). Indeed, a culture jam may well be crafted in order to further the interests of
both parties, as when corporations hire advertising agencies to engage in innovative
marketing campaigns (Klein 2000). For this study, however, attention is focused only on
contentious culture jamming. However, the definition of contention crafted by McAdam et
al (2001, 5) in which claims made by some subject on an object, such as a social movement
organization (SMO), “would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants,”
fails to tackle an important question: does the object of the claim recognize the act as
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contentious? Presumably, McAdam et al (2001) assume the condition of mutual
recognition. With contentious culture jamming, whether some actions are recognized as
oppositional by most audiences is debated (Binay 2005). Still, the intention is for targets to
recognize the culture jam as oppositional.
Third, this dissertation is a study of oppositional culture jamming. While definition
D.1) is neutral in terms of the claims or ideology driving the action, this project focuses on
those contentious collective actions that aim to disrupt dominant ensembles of
representation in society, however it is perceived. It is thus political in a broad sense,
meaning it is concerned with social relations of power or authority. Thus, this dissertation
considers a more restricted population of actions than is initially suggested by the above
definition. Altogether, these considerations yield a more specific definition of culture
jamming: (D.2) a contentious collective act involving the disruptive re-contextualization of a
particular practice, object, or discourse of a dominant ensemble of representation that is
constrained by the elements of that particular representation.
1.3.2. Resistance and Contentious Politics
It is helpful to think of culture jamming from this perspective as a form of protest or
resistance. Like so many concepts in the social sciences, these are also contested.
However, we can begin by thinking of resistance as constituting a basic concept; protest is
thus a form of resistance. In their efforts at clarifying the conceptual issues associated with
resistance, Hollander and Einwohner (2004) find a consensual core: opposition and action
(included in D.2). In order to organize the issues of conceptualization, they identify three
dimensions upon which scholars seem to disagree: whether actors intend their acts as
resistance (intentionality), whether targets recognize the act as resistance, and whether
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observers recognize the action as resistance. Actions that are positive on all three are
defined as overt resistance. Overt resistance includes, but is not restricted to, public acts of
opposition like social movements and revolutions. If we further distinguish between
collective and individual acts of resistance, then we can preliminarily describe protest as
collective overt resistance.
Within the social movement literature, a debate has erupted over the implications
for conceptualization and research following two recent trends: 1) protest event coding
and 2) the effort by leading scholars in the field to develop a consensual research agenda.
The methodological staple of quantitative research in this field is protest event analysis, or
the content coding of collective action events found in newspapers (Kriesi, Koopmans,
Duyvendak, and Guigni 1995; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1983; 1999; Olzak 1992;
2008; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975). These events generally must satisfy a number of criteria
specific to the constraints of the data source. At the least, they must be public, collective
(generally beyond some threshold regarding the number of participants), and expressive of
a grievance or claim. In addition to the widespread use of this approach, some of the
leading scholars in the field have developed a dynamics of contention (DOC) agenda for
studying protest (McAdam et al 2001). Specifically, they define the broader object of study
as contentious politics:
Episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at
least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or party to the claims and (b) the
claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants (McAdam et al
2000,5).

The criterion of episodicity excludes continuous or regularly scheduled interactions like
elections and meetings. Politics refers to the government as a party in the conflict, whether
as a third party or a central party in contention. Criterion (b) clarifies that the interactions
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are contentious. All action is intended as such and recognized as such by all parties, thus
satisfying Hollander and Winwohner’s criteria for overt resistance.
The success of protest event analysis and the conceptualization of contentious
politics together spurred a round of criticisms and proposals for alternative approaches
(Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Crossley 2002b; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Snow 2004;
Snow et al 2004; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004; Zald 2000). First, because of source
constraints specific to newspapers, event analysis systematically over-represents certain
contentious phenomena like strikes and demonstrations and underrepresents less
conspicuous tactics (Mueller 1997; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). In other words, publicity is
operationalized as reported and newsworthy events. Such an operationalization (and
conceptualization) excludes most instances of culture jamming.
Second, many critics judge the definition of politics utilized by DOC scholars – “at
least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or party to the claims” (McAdam et
al 2001, 5) – as too restricted (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Crossley 2002b; Snow 2004;
Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). Instead, these critics propose a broader, inclusive conception
of protest. This emerging multi-institutional approach attends to forms of opposition to
social relations of power and authority in institutional settings like the military, the family,
corporations, church, the mass media, and many others. Some instances of culture
jamming are likely to apply to the state-centered perspective, for example actions by
Billionaires for Bush (or Gore), the Surveillance Camera Players, and Negativland.
However, it is likely that most culture jams do not involve any form of regime intervention.
While this broader conception of politics and activism is inclusive of culture
jamming, it may in some instances lack the Hollander and Winwohner criterion of

23

recognition by the target. Still, the intention is for targets to recognize the culture jam as
oppositional. Whether they fail to do so is a matter not addressed in this
conceptualization.2 Thus, culture jamming, as defined here (D.2) satisfies all three criteria.
Contentious collective action is by this definition intentional and recognized by targets.
Finally, the question remains as to whether culture jamming is a social movement.
While there is a lively debate on precisely what constitutes a social movement
(Staggenborg and Taylor 2005), I have clearly and unambiguously defined culture jamming
as a tactical approach. Moreover, I find it more useful to describe those who practice
culture jamming as a “loose network” (Lasn 1999) of activists who engage in activities that
I define as culture jamming. While some organizations occasionally engage in culture
jamming, I focus on those organizations that are generally regarded as CJOs and those
organizations that primarily engage in this form of action.
1.3.3. Analytic Properties
I now complete the intensional analysis of the definition of culture jamming utilized
here (D.2) in order to further interrogate its scope and utility. First, to reiterate the above
discussion, as a contentious collective act a culture jam is an interaction involving more
than one individual whose claim would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the
claimants. This excludes individual actions and those actions in which there are no claims
or in which claims do not affect the interests of any of the claimaints.
Second, culture jamming is a contentious collective action involving disruptive recontextualization. The definitions presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 utilize a series of verbs to
clarify the meaning of culture jamming: re-purpose, critique, counter, subvert, deconstruct,
Nor is it addressed in the alternative conceptualization of tactical repertoires offered by Taylor and Van
Dyke (2004; Taylor, Van Dyke, Kimport, and Anderson 2009).
2
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hijack, reverse, destroy, interrupt, block, reintroduce, transform, parody, reroute, re-infuse,
co-opt, hack, mock, re-contextualize, and disrupt. I argue that some of these are
inappropriate. Destruction, blocking, and reversing do not speak accurately to the full
intended process of culture jamming. Transforming and mocking are too vague. Though
appropriate for (D.2.), subverting, countering, and critiquing are oppositional in nature and
thus inappropriate for the more general definition (D.1). Some are redundant: interrupt
and disrupt; re-introduce and re-contextualize; co-opt, hack, re-purpose, and hijack.
Wading through this list yields several possible routes for definition. However,
careful review of the literature leads me to the phrase, disruptive re-contextualization.
Merriam-Webster defines the verb disrupt as “to break apart: to throw into disorder” and
“to interrupt the normal course or unity of” (“Disrupt” 2011, def. 1, def. 2). Disruption
assumes first a relative state of unity, order, or coherence in some object or intention. The
act of interrupting or throwing is thus a process that unfolds into disunity. There is also
the connotation of throwing off course from an initial course or intention. Culture jamming
is precisely this diversion, a throwing or shifting off from some initial course or intention.
Yet, as I define it, culture jamming is also a re-contextualization. This suggests that
the initial unity or intention is disrupted through its diversion into a new context. The
process of re-contextualizing, of situating within a set of relationships that brings sense to
an object, is not in itself disruptive; the initial unity of the object may be maintained if there
is sufficient similarity in contexts. However, a disruptive re-contextualization is a diversion
that repurposes, or shifts the sense or meaning of an object away from its original path or
intention. This disruption is not total, for always the debris of prior intention leaves a
trace, a contamination, a fragment of the original unity that speaks to its former course. In
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other words, the object is pregnant and riven with both its former unity or intention and its
new intention. The original intention or meaning is thus not destroyed or blocked, but
rather positioned adjacent some other intention or meaning, thus opening up the object to
fresh readings. It is a set of juxtapositions, a tangling of contexts that expresses a claim
that, if realized, would affect the interests of the original object.
Third, culture jamming operates on the plane of representation, of signs and
symbols, of culture. It assumes the validity of the thesis that all practices, objects, and
discourses, even the mundane, are saturated with a surplus of meaning, of significance
through signification. In addition, it assumes that there is no single total system of
meaning. Rather, each society houses multiple ensembles of representation.3 Each of these
ensembles is relatively coherent, meaning that each object refers to a wider set of objects
that together constitute a totality of meaning. In a sense, I am referring to something like
Wittgensteinian language games. However, I do not assume there is a high degree of
incommensurability between two ensembles; they may have more or less permeable
boundaries. The point is that internally they are relatively dense with references.
With definition (D.2), ensembles of representation take on a political sense. Some
ensembles organize meaning in such a way as to legitimate, rationalize, and perpetuate
some set of social relations that favor one group(s) in society over others. A classic
example is Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Through various institutions like the family,
schools, and religion, the dominant interests in a society organize the production and
maintenance of consent. It is the task of the subordinate classes to fashion a counterhegemonic system of values and beliefs. However, I raise three objections to this example
I chose this concept rather than culture to emphasize degrees of heterogeneity, internal coherence, and
external differentiation.
3
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that should further clarify my terminology. First, Gramsci’s concept suggests that there are
only two ensembles; definition (D.2) makes no a priori claims about the number, status, or
nature of particular ensembles. Instead, activists draw the lines and name the names.
Second, like Gramsci’s hegemony, the concept of an ensemble of representation
seems strikingly similar to ideology. Indeed, Nomai (2008) argues that culture jamming
operates on the plane of ideology. However, I chose this broad concept to be inclusive of
not only ideology and challenges to ideology, but also of whatever activists may determine
they are criticizing or struggling against: frames, narratives, hegemony, codes, etc. Thus, I
make no a priori claims about whether culture jams engage ideology.
I also make no a priori claims about the scope or content of ensembles. They may be
grand or narrow, political, cultural, economic, scientific, etc. I simply assume that culture
jammers perceive themselves to engage some ensemble of representation, which maintains
some minimal level of internal coherence (D.1) and is perceived as dominant (D.2).
Definition (D.2) further clarifies that only a particular practice, object, or discourse of
a dominant ensemble of representation suffers disruptive re-contextualization. To offer
some examples drawn from the opening paragraph of the introduction, some of these
practices, objects, and discourses would include supermarket aisles and consumer
products, the police and security practices, surveillance cameras, martial arts films, energy
policy, tennis shoes and corporate brands, and many others. Culture jamming (D.2)
assumes that each of these examples is expressive of a dominant ensemble of
representation in their original intended context. However, through disruptive recontextualization this intention is diverted into juxtaposition in order to confront the very
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question of its position in relations of power. Thus, each particular expression refers to
and implicates the ensemble and the social relations it implicates
However, a significant objection arises: does not all action operate on the plane of
representation, including the actions of protesters? As I will show in more detail in Chapter
Ten, some efforts to build typologies of goals emphasize certain goal dichotomies:
expressive or symbolic and instrumental; identity and strategy; culture and politics (Cohen
1985; Jenkins 1983; Melucci 1989; 1996; Rucht 1988; Touraine 1981). However, several
scholars have argued that activism employs both logics, though it may stress one or
another at any given time (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Bernstein 1997; Breines 1982;
Ennis 1987; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; McAdam 1996; Polletta 2002; Turner and Killian
1987). Moreover, culture jamming often seeks a number of seemingly instrumental goals,
such as increasing the salience of an issue, shaping preferences, and occupying spaces.
These goals involve significant symbolic and expressive dimensions.
While all action does convey meaning, culture jamming is an intentional disruptive
re-contextualization of dominant representations. It involves the diversion of some initial
representation from its original intention into a collision with a politically contrasting
representation. Moreover, the operation of a culture jam on dominant ensembles of
representation is a tactical emphasis. The goal may be instrumental, but the process of
jamming culture is an explicit intentional process of crafting meaning.4 It is in this sense a
form of framing, of meaning or signifying work (Gamson 1992; Johnston and Noakes 2005;
Snow and Benford 1988; 2000a; Snow et al 1986).

4

I consider differences in goals in Chapters Three and Nine.
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Finally, culture jamming involves a particular constraint: the elements of the
particular representation. A culture jam is performed within the dominant ensemble. It
does not refer to it from without, but rather nests itself inside the representation or a
replication of the representation. Thus, the position of criticism is established within and
unfolds through the perception of contrast. In this way, the representation becomes the
vehicle for its own criticism; in this sense, power is less spoken to than made to testify
against itself. The original representation is made to “speak” its own damnation.
Moreover, the unfolding criticism is always structured as such by the dominant
representation; the form imposed by the dominant representation, though it can be
structurally deformed or broken, as in collage, always predominates. In this sense, the
content hijacks the form. One means of clarifying this point is through comparison. While
a group like Negativland re-assembles the sonic fragments of consumer culture into critical
music tracks, groups like Public Enemy launch largely direct social and political criticism
within sonic structures assembled from elements themselves largely immune to these
criticisms.
Before considering concepts related to culture jamming, I briefly elaborate. First, I
provide an extended definition (D.2) of culture jamming:
A form of overt resistance constituted by an interaction (a) involving more than one
person in the planning or execution of the action in their common interest; (b)
whose claim would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants;
(c) which shifts the sense or meaning of an object away from its original path or
intention, thereby re-positioning this intention or meaning adjacent some other
intention or meaning (d) within the original object itself or a reproduction of that
object such that the form of the original representation dominates but the content is
bifurcated (d) in order to oppose a set of referents (of which the original object is a
component) that organizes meaning in such a way as to legitimate, rationalize, and
perpetuate some set of social relations that favor some group(s) in society over
others.
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Second, figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 provide concrete examples of culture jams. The first, a jam
of a caution sign, exemplifies those actions included within definition (D.1) but excluded by
definition (D.2). It is not oppositional or contentious, though it may well be collective or
individual. Figure 1.2 is a classic example of a culture jam as defined by (D.2). Produced
and published in the culture jamming publication Adbusters, this jam replicates a marketing
campaign for Absolut Vodka in order to juxtapose the preferred interpretation of the
corporation (virility, sexy, stylish) with the well-known association of alcohol consumption
with male sexual impotence. The jam targets the advertising campaign, the corporation,
alcoholism, and ultimately an ethic of consumerism and commercialism. Finally, Figure 1.3
portrays a performance from the Billionaires for Bush (now the Billionaires for
Wealthcare). In this action, the group stages a satirical counter-protest of opponents of the
Bush administration’s tax policies. Like all culture jams, this performance works through
disruptive re-contextualization: the initial intention or representation (the wealthy
[activists impersonating their garb and mannerisms] in support of the Bush
administration) is confronted with opposing intentions or representations (statements and
signs expressing presumably unpopular but sincere framings of their support).
1.3.4. Semantic Field
In order to achieve conceptual coherence, it is imperative to explore the semantic
field which culture jamming inhabits (Gerring 2001). Indeed, culture jamming is often
discussed within the context of other forms of action. Such an effort should draw out some
of the challenges and limitations of conceptualizing culture jamming. First, as my
discussion of the literature on culture jamming suggests, many activists and academics
equate culture jamming with a form of media activism. At least four concepts are relevant:

30

Figure 1.1. Culture Jam. A simple culture jam
involving the motion picture 300 and a
common daily item conveying a message of
caution regarding the slippery floor.
Source: http://itaysworld.com/blog/2008/
07/04/funny-signs-graffiti-hand-written/

Figure 1.2. Adbusters Absolut Impotence. A
culture jam involving an advertising
campaign forAbsolut Vodka and the
relationship between alcohol consumption
and male sexual impotence.
Source: http//www.adbusters.
org/content/absolut-impotence

Figure 1.3. The Billionaires for Bush. Activists dress as the wealthy and ‘support’ the tax
policies of the Bush administration by ‘protesting’ opponents of these policies.
Source: http://www.fungagement.org/pro-others/billionairsforbush.htm

31

oppositional media (Lievrouw 2003), alternative media (Atton 2002; Downing 2001),
tactical media (Braman 2002; Garcia and Lovink 1997; Raley 2009), and hacktivism or
cyberactivism (Jordan 2002; Jordan and Taylor 2004). The first two are very general terms
that seek, depending on the formulation, to encompass forms of media whose production
and dissemination represent a challenge or alternative to the mainstream media. Many
culture jams are self-reflexive media practices. Under definition (D.2) these would fall
under a conception of alternative or oppositional media that encompasses the disruptive
re-contextualization of practices and products of the mass media, though it is of no
importance whether a culture jam is presented in an alternative outlet (as in Adbusters).
However, I argued above that this emphasis on media limits the scope of the concept.
The same argument concerns hacktivism or cyberactivism. Though variously
defined, hacktivism involves the integration of activism with computer hacking, or “the
nonviolent use of illegal or legally ambiguous digital tools in pursuit of political ends”
(Samuel 2004, 2). This form of activism is exclusive to online activity, while culture
jamming can occur online or offline. However, not all forms of hacktivism can be classified
as culture jamming; actions like data theft, virtual sabotage, virtual sit-ins, and denial-ofservice attacks are basically translations of civil disobedience into the online context.
Others, however, can be classified as culture jamming, such as a number of website
parodies and site defacements. These involve oppositional disruptive re-contextualization.
This discussion does bring out two issues of significance in conceptualizing culture
jamming: violence and legality. First, like hacktivism, culture jamming is a nonviolent form
of action; while it may deface property it is not in principle a form of action that brings
physical harm to a person. Second, culture jamming can be legal or illegal. It often
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operates on public or private forms of property, including intellectual property, in such a
way as to deface or violate the property. In principle (and often in practice), these
replications enjoy the protections offered by U.S. copyright law due to their status as satire
or parody.
Tactical media, however, is a more difficult concept. Raley (2009, 6) defines it as
“the intervention and disruption of a dominant semiotic regime, the temporary creation of
a situation in which signs, messages, and narratives are set into play and critical thinking
becomes possible.” This definition could sit comfortably in Table 1.1. Although some
discussions aim to distinguish the two, I contend that in practice there is little difference
between culture jamming as broadly understood and tactical media.
The common equation of tactical media with Michel de Certeau’s concept of tactics
provides no clear conceptual boundaries (Garcia and Lovink 1997; Raley 2009). De
Certeau (1984) argues that tactics are the myriad everyday ways in which users
temporarily exploit for their own purposes strategies, or rationalizing structures of power
(types of ensembles of representation). Culture jamming can be described as a set of
tactics in that it also exploits some manifestation of a dominant ensemble. For de Certeau,
tactics are primarily temporal in that they must operate within the space of strategies. For
theorists and practitioners, tactical media has a ‘hit-and-run’ quality. For example, Raley
(2009) and Garcia and Lovink (1997) identify its unique temporality (swift and temporary)
as one of its core characteristics. However, this does not distinguish tactical media from
culture jamming. First, some prominent tactical media actions do not bear out this
temporal structure; Ubermorgen’s Google Will Eat Itself (n.d.), though invasive and covert,
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had a more sustained temporality. Second, culture jamming can be as swift and temporal
as any tactical media action.
Even the emphasis on media does not capture the full range of actions often
described by tactical media practitioners. The Critical Art Ensemble, self-professed tactical
media artists and likely the single most cited example of the practice, employ a wider
tactical repertoire than an emphasis on media would suggest. Thus, I argue that under
definition (D.2), culture jamming encompasses tactical media.
Next, I consider the relation between culture jamming, protest art, and artistic
appropriation. To be succinct, protest art is the use of artistic practices and works to
convey an intentional political message of opposition. However, defining the concept of art,
or defining particular works as art, is a highly contentious affair in the field of aesthetics
and among artists (Carroll 2000; Davies 1991). There is little value in reviewing the
myriad approaches to defining this most contested of concepts. However, what is clear is
that the process of definition is contested. Defining art in general and categorizing specific
works as art is always a rolling confrontation and a staking of positions. Attempts to define
art are, in this understanding, boundaries that beg transgression. Thus, it is clear that
defining art is a social process. For the purposes of this work, I argue that the conferral of
the status of artwork on specific objects, practices, and discourses is essentially contestable.
The object, practice, or discourse is thus always potentially artistic. Empirically, I rely on
the framing of the practices and products of culture jammers; they may identify an action
or such as artistic or aesthetic, or they may not. Particular culture jams are, as a tactic of
oppositional representations, only an instance of (potential) protest art if they are
recognized as art by practitioners or observers.
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I make the same claim with respect to artistic appropriation. This artistic method
shares an important structural affinity with culture jamming; it re-contextualizes an
existing representation. However, artistic appropriation need not be oppositional. Thus, if
we consider oppositional artistic appropriation, we consider a specific class of protest art.
Finally, other terms are frequently cited as synonyms of culture jamming. Umberto
Eco (1986, 138, 140, 143) proposes “semiological guerrilla warfare,” the use of the
“residual freedom” abundant in the ambiguity of mass communication to “control the
message and its multiple possibilities of interpretation.” Activist organization Autonome
A.F.R.I.K.A. (1999, 310) describes guerrilla communication thus:
It is direct action in the space of social communication. But different from other militant
positions (stone meets shop window), it doesn't aim to destroy the codes and signs of
power and control, but to distort and disfigure their meanings as a means of counteracting
the omnipotent prattling of power. Communication guerrillas do not intend to occupy,
interrupt or destroy the dominant channels of communication, but to detourn and subvert
the messages transported.

Indeed, Dery (1993) defines culture jamming as “guerrilla semiotics.” The emphasis on the
channels of (mass) communication (in other words, mass media) is criticized above, though
both concepts, if extended to other means of organizing and projecting ensembles of
representation, speaks to an assumption within culture jamming that all particular objects,
practices, and discourses can tell multiple tales, including critical ones.
1.3.5. Ironic Framing
As I noted above, culture jamming is a framing process in which two competing
frames are made to speak to each other directly. In particular, under definition (D.2) the
original frame is made to “speak” its own damnation. This structure bears a striking
resemblance to that of irony. This opens the question: what is the relation of culture
jamming to irony?
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Attention to frames and framing processes in the study of social movements has
grown dramatically and is today a staple of the field (Gamson 1992; Johnston and Noakes
2005; Snow and Benford 1988; 2000a; Snow et al 1986). A frame is a cognitive schema of
interpretation that selectively represents a social situation. Frames are the practical means
of organizing experience and perception in a complex social reality such that we can
capably navigate this reality. As in everyday life, frames are put into play in the course of
contentious collective interaction in texts, images, speeches, and even actions (McAdam
1996). Whether in discussion or contention, the definitions of social reality represented in
such contentious frames can define a social situation as unjust, attribute blame and
responsibility, identify victims, clarify threats and urgency, suggest courses of action, and
motivate individuals to engage in action, among others. Framing is thus a significant part
of the ‘meaning work’ involved in generating and sustaining a sense of common interest in
particular courses of collective action.
Frames are often couched in rhetorical appeals in order to persuade actors to adopt
some definition of reality. Actors can employ different rhetorical devices like metaphor
and irony. However, little research has focused on strategies of rhetorical appeal in
collective action framing. A number of scholars have noted that the repressive opportunity
structure in authoritarian regimes makes more overt contentious frames too risky
(Thornton 2002; Wedeen 1999). Instead, activists in these situations often use more subtle
rhetorical devices involving irony and ambiguity. Some works have explored the use of
irony in more democratic contexts. Without referring to framing, Stewart, Smith, and
Denton Jr. (2007, 195) identify rhetorical strategies in social movements that contribute to
the construction of ridicule, including the use of irony. Some works consider the role of
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irony in culture jamming. Day (2008; 2011) argues that irony helps to create stronger
feelings of collective identity by appealing to a sympathizer’s sense of humor. Wettergren
(2005) finds that most culture jammers do not define their activities as ironic. Instead,
they define it as a persuasive use of humor, because for them it breaks down barriers to
communication. Irony, as they define it, can generate significant negative emotional
reactions. Harold (2004; 2007) explores the rhetorical strategies utilized in three forms of
culture jamming: subvertisements, pranks, and appropriation. The first emphasizes what
she describes as the negating impulse of the parodist, while the latter two are more
affirmative.
As Dery’s conceptualization suggests, many people argue that culture jamming is
inherently humorous or playful in its reliance on rhetorical techniques of irony. Indeed, to
disruptively re-contextualize a representation in such a way as to simultaneously present
prior and new meanings does suggest irony. As Linda Hutcheon (1994, 30) observes, “It is
the superimposition or rubbing created by a difference of context that makes irony
happen.” It speaks with two voices though one mouth, expressing beyond expected or
obvious intention. Irony in this sense is characterized by a certain semantic structure, one
of difference, or as I call it, disruptive re-contextualization.
Culture jamming as defined in both (D.1) and (D.2) is thus a rhetorical (including
performative) strategy of irony. Though Wettergren (2005, 123) initially agreed with her
interviewees that culture jammers relied more on humor than irony, she eventually
distinguishes between the means and ends of culture jamming in this elaboration. Here,
she notes that while culture jammer’s unease with irony is rooted in the goals of action, it
nonetheless characterizes their actions.
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What is common to…[culture jammer’s] accounts of irony is that irony seems to be
connected to the telos of an action, rather than considered as a means to an end. If
something is intentionally ironic, it is also not sincere. The sincerity of the cause of culture
jammers notwithstanding, irony seems to be an outcome of the “hide-and-seek” character of
culture jamming, which often appears from the inside of a discourse but reveals itself as a
critique of the very same discourse. In doing what the opponents do, just doing it a little bit
more extreme, irony is produced as an unintended effect (original emphasis, Wettergren
2005, 123)

Irony is thus the means, however subtle or unintended, of drawing a discourse or
representation into conversation with itself in order to critique itself.
1.4. Conclusion
Culture jamming is a concept that prior to this work had undergone little systematic
conceptual analysis. This chapter both reviews the academic literature on culture jamming
and endeavors to craft a relatively rigorous conceptualization for the purposes of social
science research. To advance the goals of this chapter, I collect samples of definitions from
academic and activists sources, provide a broad definition (D.1) and a working definition
(D.2) for this project, probe the analytic properties of these definitions, draw out the
semantic field within which culture jamming relates to other concepts, and consider
culture jamming as a form of ironic framing.
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CHAPTER 2. TILLY AND BOURDIEU
This chapter and the following have as their central purpose the elaboration of a
theoretical explanation of both repertoire change and tactical choice. This focus calls for
three successive discussions. The first involves a concise review of the major approaches
to explaining tactical change. Chapter Eleven provides the occasion for a thorough review
of the theoretical approaches to explaining tactical choice. The second involves the
presentation of the general argument of this dissertation. Third, I develop theoretical
instruments that contribute to an explanation of repertoire change and tactical choice.
This latter effort is broken down into two tasks. First, I consider the basic
contributions of the sociologists Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu to an analysis of
contentious politics. While the former is renowned for his work in the field, the latter is
primarily regarded as a scholar of culture and social stratification. I thus conclude this
chapter with a dialogue between these two eminent scholars and develop a robust
conception of everyday social organization in the process. Chapter Three considers the
relation between the socializing structures of everyday social organization and tactical
behavior through the lens of collective action theory. Parts II and III of this dissertation
utilize these theoretical developments in an exploration of culture jamming as an
oppositional tactical approach. More specific theoretical instruments are developed in
later chapters.
2.1. Repertoire Change
Studies of tactics rely on at least one of three broad approaches to explaining change
in the available means of protest among populations over time: Tilly’s relatively general
model, cycles of protest, and NSM theory. One of Tilly’s driving concerns is the question of
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repertoire change (1977; 1978; 1986; 1995a; 1995b; 2006a; 2008). Much of this work has
focused especially on Great Britain, though he has also applied his insights to the United
States and France, among others. In particular, he identifies and aims to explain a shift in
the means of collective action from the 1750s into the first quarter of the nineteenth
century, in which localized direct actions gave way to more modular campaigns directed at
national political institutions.
Although the particular specifications have changed over the years, in general he
attributes the shape of a repertoire in a particular society to three broad factors (Tilly,
2006a). The first, the everyday social organization of a given population, refers to the array
of collective identities, social networks, and organizational forms that organize the rhythms
of daily life. Together, these inform the claims and house the resources for potential
collective action. The second, the cumulative experience of contention, emphasizes that the
history of contention in a given population shapes conflict by providing important
examples or representations of actions, issues, goals, and frames. This history shapes the
expectations that activists have in contention by generating a signaling system actors use to
make sense of claims. Finally, the intervention of the political regime specifies the
arrangement of threats and opportunities offered by the various actors in a political
regime, including the government, political parties, labor unions, corporations, media
organizations, and religious organizations, among others. These actors are especially
important insofar as they contribute to the degree of access, facilitation, and repression
meted out to challengers.
The development of new forms of collective action is a gradual process that occurs
at the margins of established forms as a result of changes in these three factors and their
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interactions. For example, shifts in demographic patterns and the nature of the economy
can alter such factors as: communication and transportation systems, the distribution of
resources, the relationship between domestic and occupational life, etc. Such changes
reconfigure the relations of power in society and the organizational bases of collective
action by shifting populations and resources. Changes in the political regime, such as a
transition from dictatorship to democracy or the incorporation of the working class into
the political process, can also dramatically reshape the nature of conflict by redistributing
resources and power. The contentious interactions that unfold under these conditions thus
diffuse new forms of contentious politics and regime responses.
The change that Tilly identifies in his model is gradual and cumulative in nature;
innovations form at the margins of established actions. In contrast, scholars have
developed conceptions and mechanisms of repertoire change involving much more rapid
innovation and diffusion. Sewell (1996) argues that transformative events like the
storming of the Bastille can quickly reshape prevailing conceptions of collective action.
Zolberg (1972) argues that the effervescence of sudden and widespread social unrest
weakens previous constraints on contentious action and thus contributes to widespread
experimentation. Tarrow (1989; 1998) provides a more refined variant of this approach of
this explanation: cycles of protest. Protest cycles form when movement activities and
successes generate externalities that indicate to other movements and activists an unusual
degree of responsiveness in the political system. He refers to this phenomenon as a shift in
political opportunities. Activists mobilize to take advantage of these newfound
opportunities. The ensuing escalation of interactions between activists and political
authorities involves the mobilization of previously quiescent sectors of society as political
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entrepreneurs anticipate decreased risks for protest organization and collective action.
These conditions facilitate the increased development of tactical, framing, and
organizational innovations and thus the diffusion of collective action. In this sense,
Tarrow’s protest cycle differs from Tilly’s general model only in its temporality; rapid
changes in the strategies utilized by political authorities and the mobilization of everyday
networks, identities, and organizations together produce a relatively rapid change in
repertoires of contention.
Though diverse, NSM theorists share a common observation: a significant change in
the repertoire associated with the arrival of new movements like the women’s,
environmental, and gay rights movements over the last half of the twentieth century
(Barnes and Kaase 1979; Castells 1997; Habermas 1981; Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985;
Touraine 1981; 1985). In order to explain this shift in tactics, they turn to what many
sociologists have identified as a fundamental shift in the nature of social organization. The
most popular of these conceptions concerns differences between industrial and postindustrial society. Characterized by tremendous social changes like industrialization,
urbanization, and glaring inequality, industrial society is split by the industrial cleavage
between workers and employers. Forged on the basis of established solidarities like class,
forms of collective action like the labor movement addressed central issues of economic
well-being and physical security.
NSM theorists argue that contemporary forms of collective action developed in
response to the emergence of new patterns of organization in post-industrial society. With
the general prosperity of postwar democracies, material considerations receded in
significance. New or modified mechanisms of control – a growing state tasked with
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extensive regulatory and social insurance imperatives alongside a global market eroding
the state’s capacity and will to meet these imperatives – increase the depth of intervention
of political and economic interests into private everyday life. Such developments facilitate
new conflicts over self-determination, the environment, identity, and other post-materialist
issues. Unlike the movements of industrial society, new social movements forge new
solidarities based on values and lifestyles, while they engage in collective actions oriented
towards shaping autonomous institution and practices. The repertoire that unfolds in such
struggles, including efforts to fashion identities and achieve novel goals, are specific to the
conditions of postindustrial society.
The approach taken in this dissertation is primarily informed by Tilly’s general
approach to explaining repertoire change. Below I develop my argument and situate the
primary theses of this dissertation in relation to the approaches to repertoire change.
2.2. Summary
2.2.1. Integrated Theory
Efforts in the social movement literature to synthesize, integrate, or otherwise bring
together in ad hoc fashion various theoretical perspectives are numerous (Dalton 1994;
Klandermans 1997; Jasper 1997; Lichbach 1998; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996;
McAdam et al 2001; Opp 2009; Passy 2001; Tarrow 1998). The approach adopted here
contributes to an explanation of repertoire change and tactical choice by integrating the
major theoretical perspectives prevalent not only in the study of protest, but in sociology
and political science in general. Considering structural, cultural, and rational approaches
together involves attention to the role of institutions and networks, resources and
incentives, and collective identities in shaping social conflict. The primary theoretical
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imperatives of this dissertation are to identify the sets of relationships between the core
endogenous variables of a rational choice approach and exogenous variables like
opportunities and identities. An example of this model is Opp’s (2009, 328) structuralcognitive model of social movement mobilization (see Figure 2.1). A brief description will
suffice. The model is synthetic; it develops a causal argument by linking the macro to the
micro level and integrating the relevant insights of various theoretical approaches.
Analysis begins by identifying the cognitive structures of actors: their beliefs, values, and
frames. Next, an array of explanatory variables are identified: macro-level variables, such
as changes in state repression, or economic prosperity, meso-level factors such as
organizational structures and group characteristics, and finally micro-level variables such
as social interaction. These factors are considered principally for their relation to changes
in these cognitions. The key mechanism in the model is the relation of these cognitions to
incentives; changed cognitions result in changes in incentives. From Opp’s perspective,
shifts in costs and benefits lead to the decision to protest or to remain inactive. Collective
action is ultimately an aggregation of these individual decisions. In other words, only those
conditions that systematically affect subjective perceptions alter the rate of protest.
As Opp repeatedly notes, none of the existing social movement theories, including
the foundation of his approach, collective action theory, have a well-developed theory of
Macro Factors

Macro Protest

Cognitive Framing
Processes

Individual
Protest

∣
Other Factors

Incentives

Other Factors
Figure 2.1. Opp’s Structural-Cognitive Model of Mobilization

44

tactical choice. Neither does he offer such a theory. This study is thus a tentative and
exploratory effort to gather the relevant explanatory variables into a single model. While
Opp’s model of mobilization and the partial model presented in this chapter and the next
are causal models, this study is modest in that it primarily seeks to explore the utility of the
constituent explanatory instruments with respect to a sample of positive cases of CJOs. It
thus has a strong illustrative character. I begin with a concise presentation of the central
argument and theses of this dissertation.
2.2.2. Basic Argument
This project is oriented by two basic concerns: 1) a problem-driven effort to explain
culture jamming as a set of oppositional tactics, and 2) a theory-driven effort to develop a
more robust synthetic approach to explaining repertoire change and tactical choice. This
chapter and the following are concerned primarily with developing more refined
theoretical instruments. It is important, however, to briefly consider the nexus of these
complementary priorities in order to anchor the remaining more abstract considerations.
The primary argument of this dissertation is that a close relation exists between the
development of twentieth century art in advanced Western democracies and certain novel
forms of collective action called culture jamming. Figure 2.2 schematizes the basic but
incomplete argument. I consider art as a property of everyday social organization: a 1)
social field or institution, 2) situated within networks of durable social interaction, and 3)
generative of sets of identities. These generate the incentives for various forms of collective
action, here considered as a 1) repertoire of contention available to a population at a given
time and as 2) contentious performances specific to certain organizations. I reduce the
basic relation between art and contentious politics to at least three key arguments.
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Figure 2.2. General Argument: Art and Protest
1. The development of art as a social field is a gradual development in the everyday
social organization of advanced Western democracies.
2. Culture jamming organizations are associated with the social fields, social
networks, and collective identities of artistic production.
3. These social fields, social networks, and collective identities shape the
preferences and incentives for contentious performances.
This set of theses involves movement from the macro to the meso-level (1 and 2) as well as
a series of relations between structural, cultural, and rational variables in an effort to
explain the culture jamming repertoire of contention (2 and 3).
This argument can be fleshed out in a number of preliminary but essential ways.
First, I utilize the basic framework of Tilly’s explanation of repertoire change with special
attention to the concept of everyday social organization. I consider the remaining two
approaches to repertoire change, once broken into their constituent parts, partially
reducible to Tilly’s basic model. In contrast to Tilly, NSM theorists rely on holistic
conceptualizations of social systems to posit changes in repertoires over time. Focusing on
changes in the everyday social organization, political regimes, and signaling systems of
advanced Western democracies over time should offer a more rigorous and empirical
approach to considering whether new forms of domination and resistance have emerged.
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Additionally, the cycles of protest thesis is fundamentally compatible with a focus on
change in everyday social organization, political regimes, and/or signaling systems (Tilly
2006a). Specifically, the cycle of protest is the result of shifting opportunities as well as the
mobilization of previously quiescent sectors of everyday social organization.
A second point involves the temporality of change. I am not trying to distinguish
between whether or not the set of contentious performances I am focusing on were
developed in a relatively brief period of heightened conflict (cycle of protest) or gradually
over the longue durée of the twentieth century. Teune (2005) argues that these tactics and
other related sets of tactics, germinated by various avant-garde groups, diffused in the
ferment of the 1960s and appeared again in the anti-globalization movements of the 1990s
and 2000s. My argument is more modest, yet supplementary. I emphasize changes in
everyday social organization and a novel history of collective action to explain repertoire
change in the advanced Western democracies over the second half of the twentieth century.
Third, the concepts presented in Figure 2.2 concern relations among different levels
of analysis. At the macro-level are fields and repertoires; at the meso-level are networks,
identities, incentives, and contentious performances. This argument thus attempts to
relate macro- and meso-level structures to meso-level phenomena. This exclusion of the
micro-level contrasts with Opp’s macro-to micro-level model in which objective structural
features and processes shape individual perceptions and evaluations of action. The
primary reason for this truncation of the model is the assumption that the collective action
problem has already been solved. In Chapter One I define culture jamming (D.2) as a
collective action. Chapter Four concludes this consideration by specifying the CJO as the
principal focus of this study. Because the question here is strategy and not mobilization,
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the micro-level recedes into the meso-level under the assumption that individuals in CJOs
are sufficiently organized to operate as a unit.5 When appropriate, differences in
distributions of characteristics are treated as meso-level group characteristics.
In order to flesh out these arguments, I first clarify the concept of a repertoire of
contention and its relation to performances in Tilly’s work. Second, I consider the concepts
of field, capital, and habitus in the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Third, in order to approach
a fuller conceptualization of everyday social organization I compare and contrast these
approaches. Fourth, in the following chapter I develop an approach translating the
socialization effects of these macro- and meso-level structures into a rational choice
perspective. In so doing, I detail two socialization factors relating everyday life to tactical
choice: identity and familiarity. Together, these shape the preferences for certain forms of
action, reduce the costs of some actions but not others, and reduce the uncertainties
associated with some actions but not others. These processes form the core of a synthetic
approach: I relate the structures and cognitions of everyday life to choices in contentious
performances through an analysis of the preferences and incentives for tactics.
2.3. Tilly and Bourdieu
2.3.1. Tillyian Repertoires and Performances
Charles Tilly’s concept of a repertoire of contention has drawn significant attention
as a useful device for analyzing the diversity of forms of contentious behavior.67 Since its

This is not to argue that the question of strategy must operate at the organizational level of analysis. Rather,
important questions regarding intra-organizational dynamics, inter-organizational relations, and tactical
repertoires are simply not covered here.
6See Auyero 2004; Beissinger 1998; Biggs 2005; Chabot 2001; Chabot and Duyvendak 2002; Crossley 2002a;
Ennis 1987; Hayes 2006; Johnston and Mueller 2001; McCammon 2003; Mueller 1999; Munro 2005; O’Brien
and Lianjiang 2006; Plows, Wall, and Doherty 2004; Rucht 1990; Steinberg 1995; 1998; 1999a; 1999b; Szabó
1996; Tarrow 1998; Traugott 1995. This review draws primarily from Tilly (1977; 1978; 1986; 1995a;
1995b; 2006a; 2008).
5
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inception, the core of most conceptualizations has been the totality of available forms of
contention, described as a set of well-defined and familiar forms of collective action (Tilly
1978, 143), “the ways that people act together in pursuit of shared interests” (Tilly 1995b,
41) and, more recently, as “ensembles of mutual claim-making routines available to
particular pairs of identities” (McAdam et al 2001, 138). At a given time and place a
population makes use of a limited set of means in its efforts to project contentious claims.
Though they do diverge on some points, in general these definitions and others
stress at least three key points. First, the repertoire is Tilly’s most celebrated cultural
concept; it is conceived as a cultural creation with structural constraints, for “at any
particular point in history… [people] learn only a rather small number of alternative ways
to act collectively” (Tilly 1995a, 26). While theoretically actors may choose to utilize any
potentially conceivable tactic, the number of observable types of collective actions is
relatively limited and exhibits significant continuity across time. The means that actors
find most familiar, feasible, and efficacious are the tactics most likely to find repeated and
diffuse use and thus form a repertoire. Such actions are “learned, understood, sometimes
planned and rehearsed by the participants” (Tilly 1986, 207). As Crossley notes (2002a,
48-9), an implicit assumption of moral economy informs much of this work. Cognitive
skills and shared understandings are essential for actors to act and make sense of their
action and the action of others. The limits of these cognitions and understandings
constitute constraints on the forms of action available to potential actors.

All of this despite his claim made roughly a decade ago that the concept has not been a resounding success.
Although it is frequently used as a heuristic device, Tilly (1995a) bemoaned the lack of efforts to empirically
test the hypothesis of a repertoire of contention. At its most general and rigorous, this dissertation cannot
contribute such a test.
7
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Second, the theatrical metaphor is instructive. Tilly identifies contentious
interactions as performances, as expressive actions that communicate the claims, demands,
or grievances of collective actors. In their discussion of repertoires, McAdam et al (2001,
138, 49) refer to “adopting scripts,” “ritual,” and the limits to feasibility and intelligibility.
The analogy serves to illustrate the relational core of the concept; actors are not only
constrained by their cognitive capacities, but also by the cognitive capacities and
understandings of their audiences. Performances must be interpreted by multiple parties
in order to convey the claims of each party. Furthermore, it highlights the “learned
character of the performance and the limits of that learning, yet allows for variation and
even continuous change from one performance to the next…[It] typically leaves plenty of
room for improvisation, innovation, and unexpected endings” (Tilly 1986, 307). Themes
like drama, symbolism, innovation, bargaining, and deliberation are common throughout
Tilly’s discussion of the repertoire. In general, repertoires of contention are the available
sets of performances that actors enact and improvise in their contentious interactions.
Third, repertoires are distinct from everyday life. Everyday life is social structure,
the rhythms of quotidian existence organized by work, education, family, and other
mundane concerns and pursuits. Of particular importance are the formal and informal
social networks, or sets of durable social ties, that house the identities and resources of
populations (Tilly 1991; 2005; 2008). These social ties are the products of repeated social
transactions, abiding interactions between actors. Unlike episodes of contentious politics,
networks maintain an enduring temporal structure that provides valuable predictability in
social life. Such durable relations are the foundations of larger social processes and
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structures. For Tilly the individual is not the fundamental unit in social inquiry because
individuals, like structures, are an emergent property of interactions.
In order to navigate this everyday social milieu, people draw on scripts (Tilly 2005)
or repertoires of everyday life (McAdam et al 2001, 140).8 Social interactions vary along
two dimensions; performances are both scripted and improvised. Scripts draw on general
and available models of action specific to certain relations and situations. They are the
sedimented result of prior social transactions. Because few situations are repeated
perfectly, scripts cannot perfectly anticipate the consequences of action. Interaction also
relies on local working knowledge that supplements the gaps between scripts and actual
unfolding interactions. This allows for degrees of improvisation and learning in order to
grapple with the exigencies of situations (Tilly 2005). Though inevitable, errors and
unintended consequences are often opportunities for learning and correction, and thus
accumulations of local knowledge and, over time, the refinement of scripts (Tilly 1996).
Performances are the scripts or repertoires enacted and improvised in context; they are the
structured but situational relationship between various actors and their environment.
2.3.2. Bourdieusian Fields and Habitus
Of critical importance in any effort to grapple with Bourdieu are the concepts of
field, capital, and habitus.9 Fields are plural; they presume the internal differentiation of a
society into various institutionalized spheres of social activity. They distinguish a level of
analysis above that of organizations or networks and below that of the whole social

Descriptions of these sets of non-contentious performances are reminiscent of the rich analyses of everyday
behavior offered by Erving Goffman (Collins 2010).
9
This review draws primarily from Bourdieu (1997; 1984; 1990; 1993; 1996; 1998; Bourdieu and Wacquant
1992).
8
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arena.10 The characteristics of fields induce independent constraining effects on individual
or organizational behavior. These effects typically involve the socialization of attitudes,
values, and preferences, as well as the structuring of incentives and resource endowments.
Some describe these effects as governed by a central orienting or “institutional logic” that
guides this social activity within the field (Friedland and Alford 1991; Thornton 2004).
Bourdieu’s approach to field theory has found favor in a number of studies of social
movement activity (Auyero 2003; Bilic 2010; Crossley 2001; 2002a; 2003; 2006; Edelman,
Leachman, and McAdam 2010; Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005; Epstein 1996; Haluza-Daley
2008; Jasper 1997; Ray 1999). This study contributes to this growing literature by
considering how Bourdieu’s sociology, specifically his sociology of art, provides a robust
supplement to Tilly’s emphasis on everyday social organization.
For Bourdieu, modern industrial societies are characterized by numerous relatively
autonomous and highly distinct fields, or “social microcosms,” e.g. the literary, political,
religious, etc (Bourdieu 1998, 83; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97). Through successive
struggles to mark off social terrain distinct from the dominant field of power and economy,
fields accrue their own resources and practices that institutionalize these struggles. Fields
are thus delineated cultural and structural contexts, institutionalized spheres of social
activity that shape behavior through the construction of ways of seeing and acting, of
behaving, but most importantly, of classifying and differentiating. Such organization is not
neutral, however, for fields are the products of power, or inequalities in resources. Indeed,

Similar concepts are not alien to social movement theory. Early efforts in resource mobilization theory
specified the organizational structure of a movement as a social movement industry (McCarthy and Zald
1977; 1987b). Others defined multi-organizational fields as the population of organizations relevant to a
social movement (Curtis and Zurcher 1973; Klandermans 1997). Today, work in organizational ecology
approaches has blossomed (Minkoff 1995; Olzak and Ryo 2007; Soule and King 2008).
10
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Bourdieu uses two metaphors to capture the general concept of fields: games and markets.
Like a game, fields are sites of struggle, with the caveat that even the rules themselves are
ultimately stakes in the game. Like a market, fields are sites of the production and
consumption of products (services, goods, knowledge, status) where agents struggle over
profits (different forms of capital). Capital is any resource which is the object of action in a
social field. It includes material or economic capital (money and material assets), cultural
capital (knowledge, skills), social capital (networks and influence), and symbolic capital
(status, prestige) (Bourdieu 1986). One’s endowment of capital is a marker of one’s
position in social space. The unequal distribution of the different forms of capital
structures society, or the universe of social fields, as well as each distinct field. Fields are
thus the durable organization of power in each sphere of social activity.
In this struggle, agents occupy positions. The concept of positions points to the
relational core of Bourdieu’s theory of practice; positions in a field are constituted by their
relationship to other positions. Actors occupy positions by virtue of the structure of the
field, which is structured as such by the unequal distribution of capital. Thus, the
distribution of capital and the positions of other actors determine particular positions in
social space. Bourdieu’s favored method of graphically representing fields and their
positions is correspondence analysis, which plots positions along indicators of capital in ndimensional space, though the space is usually organized by two variables: the total
amount of capital and the ratio of cultural capital to economic capital.11 Concrete social
interaction is secondary in this analysis; capital defines position, and thus social meaning
and resource endowments, not the networks of relations among actors. Networks are

11

Chapter Five presents a fuller analysis of the structure of fields, specifically the field of cultural production.
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merely a social resource for the acquisition, preservation, and deployment of other forms
of capital, strategies that are structured by the field. In addition, fields are dynamic;
positions are constantly in flux as actors employ strategies to acquire, utilize, or conserve
the capital relevant to the field, new actors emerge in the field, and other actors recede
from the field, thereby redefining every position. Hence, fields are sites of struggle where
actors pursue the maximization of capital in order to improve their position in the field.
At the micro-level, Bourdieu (1998, 25) conceives of individuals as, “active and
knowing agents endowed with a practical sense.” This sense:
which does not burden itself with rules or principles…still less with calculations or
deductions, which are in any case excluded by the urgency of action ‘which brooks no delay,’
is what makes it possible to appreciate the meaning of the situation instantly, at a glance, in
the heat of the action, and to produce at once the opportune response

is characteristic of the relation between habitus and field (Bourdieu 1990, 103-4). It is
what allows us to navigate the highly complex but seemingly simple rhythms of everyday
life. This instantaneous and non-calculative sense of an unfolding situation is pre-reflexive
and non-intentional. Action is a structured phenomenon; it is habitual and unconscious,
yet it follows a logic that is contextual and situational, not universal and abstract. In
addition, action is practical and directional. Actors are always interested and strategic;
“practices never cease to comply with an economic logic” in the pursuit of clear objectives
(Bourdieu 1990, 123). Talk, walking, tastes in dress and arts: all of these actions and more
are actions of impression management, of a constant and unfolding process of locating
oneself and others in a social space organized by power.
Habitus refers to the matrices of dispositions, structures of schemas, habits, and
know-how which actors acquire in the navigation of social fields. Through action in the
social world - what Bourdieu variously calls one’s social trajectory or individual history 54

agents acquire dispositions. The dispositions generated through this process together
constitute the habitus. Dispositions structure the ability to practically (unconsciously)
perceive a situation and its distinct attributes, classify and render meaningful each
attribute and the situation in general, and act on the perception and appreciation of the
situation in a manner that furthers one’s practical objectives. Dispositions refer to the tacit
knowledge and skills embodied and applied in the practical movement of an actor through
social interactions. Habitus are thus the incorporated structures of social life, of ways of
judging and acting prescribed and proscribed by the field.
The sense of the game that animates practical action and thus the habitus is a
practical sense of the lines, means, and stakes of conflict specific to each field. Conflict is
symbolic in Bourdieu’s sociology; habitus is a set of classificatory schemas that both judges
the actions of others and allows one to anticipate the perception and judgment of one’s
own actions by others. When employed in social relations, these incorporated structures of
symbolic differentiation confer on forms of capital (social, cultural, economic) an additional
element of prestige or status. Like all species of power, this symbolic capital is unequally
distributed; some actors are able to draw on their resource endowments in order to define
the struggle and its objects in their interest. Symbolic capital thus allows for the definition
of what constitutes cultural capital in a field, and thus confers the power to define the social
world through categories of perception and action. Practices are the production and
consumption of these sets of symbolic classifications, all of which are organized by the field
and habitus in concrete social interaction. In other words, action is subordinated to the
logic of dominant social classifications that identify objects and actors as good/evil,
profane/sacred, ugly/beautiful, efficient/wasteful, clean/dirty, etc. Even subversive or
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heterodox action within the field often merely inverts the dominant classification schemes.
Social identity itself is the position of an actor in social space, the set of representations
that classify and position them. It is through strategies of distinction, the carving of
identity through symbolic conflict, that actors strive to maximize their resource
endowments in order to authoritatively define social reality (Bourdieu 1984).
Social fields contribute to the accomplishment of the habitus, and thus the structure
of its dispositions, through their distribution of capital and the position of the actor. Fields
require actors to acquire different skills, competencies, and resources or capital specific to
the field in order to maximize their standing. These acquisitions are classified and
classifying actions, practices generated by the habitus. In other words, the friction between
habitus and field is generally minimal, because practical action acquires a “feel for the
game,” the subtle sense of the contours of the field that ensures an investment in the stakes.
This sense of the conflict is a practical sense of the possibilities of action within the field, of
the threats, opportunities, and constraints offered at any given time. Such a sense of the
field is conditioned by one’s position in the field and the nature of the conflicts endemic to
the field. For example, the artistic field operates according to the conflict between the logic
of its fundamental law, “art for art’s sake,” for which the acquisition of material or
economic capital is anathema, and the logic of the market, for which financial and popular
success are lauded. The acquisition of field-specific attributes - the “internalization of an
objectively selected system of signs, indices, and sanctions,” of systems of classification - is
the process of socialization to this conflict of values (Bourdieu 1993, 133).
Deposited practical infra-conscious schemes or dispositions - the sets of symbolic
classifications that actors use to name the social world - are the source of social structure
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as well. As noted in the right side of Figure 2.2 above, while agents continually perform a
process of acquisition, they simultaneously perform a process of reproduction. This
process is the key to understanding the continuity of social relations and structures.
Individual actions are in truth collective or relational efforts reconstructing or reactivating
the social fields that in turn generate and reinforce the habitus (Bourdieu 1990, 73).
2.3.3. Bourdieu and Social Movements
Though Bourdieu himself was active in the various movements against global
capitalism in France, his theoretical writings on protest are minimal. His most noted
concept of relevance is crisis (Bourdieu and Wacquiant 1992, 131). He describes it thus:
The critique which brings the undiscussed into discussion, the unformulated into
formulation, has as the condition of its possibility objective crisis, which, in
breaking the immediate fit between the subjective structures and the objective
structures, destroys self-evidence practically (Bourdieu 1977, 169).
At its most essential, crisis is a moment of reflexivity. Reflexivity refers generally to the
ability to think about the conditions of thought and action (Bourdieu and Wacquiant 1992,
40). If the reproduction of social structures is a pre-reflexive loop of habitus and field,
crises are breaks in the loop, disjunctures between the habitus and its social field. When
one’s expectations or one’s sense of the game is dashed by unfolding events, the flow of
action is interrupted. Bourdieu seems to suggest that reflexivity and deliberation
substantially shape practice when pre-reflexive practical sense is unable to adequately
navigate such dissonant situations.
Bourdieu’s (1998) polemical work argues that reflexivity figures decisively into the
importance of intellectuals for the progress of social movements. For him, some fields,
specially the scientific fields, socialize agents through the incorporation of dispositions of
reflexivity; reflexivity then becomes another element of pre-conscious practical sense.
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Social scientists, for example, through practical pre-reflective strategies must acquire the
cultural capital associated with reflexivity to advance their positions in their native field.
As a scientist, the reflexive agent par excellence, Bourdieu has incorporated through action
the particular conditions of the French field of academia, one of which is the habitual
capacity to reflect on these very conditions and those of other fields.
In contrast to the dominant emphasis on supply theories and their focus on the
capacities for mobilization (opportunities, resources, etc), Bourdieu’s implicit theory of
social movements is a demand theory of mobilization. It focuses on the conditions for the
emergence of a consciousness of injustice, for “cognitive liberation,” the recognition or
realization that collective actions can shape outcomes in a group’s favor (McAdam 1999).12
However, this study focuses on the question of strategy and tactics. Below, I explore how
Bourdieu can contribute to an explanation of strategic and tactical choice.
2.4. Dialogue
2.4.1. Networks and Fields
The core of the argument guiding this dissertation is the notion of everyday social
organization. Tilly’s unpacking of the concept into identities, networks, and resources is in
part a recognition of the voluminous and cumulative work done in the study of social
movements to specify the most important causal variables outside of political institutions.
Bourdieu’s sociology offers a somewhat different conception of everyday life and social
organization that privileges the influence of social fields, habitus, and capital in the shaping
of social interaction. The following engagement with Tilly and Bourdieu is not exhaustive;

Bourdieu (1998, 11) does suggest the hint of a supply theory when he briefly discusses the preconditions
for group mobilization: proximity in social space. However, this is not much of an advance over existing
social movement theory.
12
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it is guided by their contributions to the study of everyday life and contentious politics. I
do not consider resources here, though they are certainly important for an understanding
of everyday social organization. Instead, I take them up in Chapter Eight.
The key theoretical disagreement between these eminent sociologists lies in their
differing emphases on structure and interaction (Emirbayer 2010). Bourdieu prioritizes
the social field in explaining social life. Objective relations among actors are mutually
constitutive and determinative of patterns of social behavior and meaning. Interactions
among discrete units or actors are not causally significant. More significantly, he regards a
focus on interaction without pre-eminent attention to objective relations as misguided;
social ties are an effect of position-takings within the field, and thus more broadly of the
structure of power in society (Bottero and Crossley 2011; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992,
113-114; Nooy 2003). Structure is thus prior to interaction. In contrast, for Tilly, patterns
of social transactions are at the core of social life. Structures and individuals are an
emergent property of durable social relations.
Whatever a strict interpretation of Bourdieu may entail, fields, social interaction,
and agents are not locked in a simple reproductive process in which only exogenous factors
modify the structure of the field. Several authors have noted that while he espoused a
structural as opposed to an interactional relationalism, Bourdieu was inconsistent in his
empirical work (Bottero and Crossley 2011; Nooy 2003).13 The chorus of criticisms
especially problematizes the assumption that dispositions are internally consistent.
Bottero (2009) argues that Bourdieu’s assumption of homophily in social relations – the
tendency for people to associate with others most like themselves – can be relaxed in favor
A critical defense of Bourdieu, beyond the scope of this chapter, would charge that Bourdieu’s theoretical
developments are always derived from, and subordinate to, the play in the data.
13
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of variable network structures. While a homophilous structure is likely to generate a
strong social reproductive process between field and habitus, more diverse networks are
more likely to problematize simple social reproduction over time by producing potentially
contrasting or novel ways of seeing and acting. Nooy (2003) and King (2000) argue that
Bourdieu’s theory of practice is distinct from his theory of habitus. In essence, practical
theory stresses the strategic and virtuosic interactions of individuals and groups, while
habitus emphasizes the structures of the social world and their incorporation into the
bodily dispositions of actors. At the core of Nooy’s argument is the assumption that the
structure of a field is partly constituted by unfolding practices. Practice is not entirely
determined by fields as a rigidly structuralist rendering of habitus would suggest.
Considering these criticisms, social interaction can lead to the systematic production of
dispositions that are imperfectly tuned to their field, thus introducing elements of
improvisation and error into the social reproductive process. This study thus presupposes
that fields, networks, and identities (to be elaborated in relation to Bourdieu below) are
mutually constitutive, while each produces independent effects.
2.4.2. Identities
Conspicuously absent from Figure 2.2 is the concept of habitus. Instead, the model
relates identities to networks and fields. Both Tilly and Bourdieu work with conceptions
of collective or social identity. For Bourdieu, habitus is social identity, the sense of
positioning that an actor develops through immersion in a field, meaning participation in
symbolic conflict. Identity is established through the struggle to confer classifications on
objects and actors in the field. These sets of classifications are both constitutive of the
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dispositions that form the habitus and made sensible as a property of the social field they
reproduce through classifying and classifiable practices.
For Tilly (2002, 2006b), social identity is grounded in social relations. Through
concrete and durable social transactions among pairs of actors, the rights, obligations,
expectations, and other binding and shared understandings that animate social interaction
are forged. Such relations are characterized by a particular structural characteristic:
boundaries. All actors or entities erect boundaries in order to distinguish themselves from
others. However, the process is uneven. Some are able to employ their definitions more
effectively than others. Political authorities in particular are prone to crafting and
imposing identities upon previously heterogeneous groups. In this sense, some actors can
be routinely ‘called out’ or ‘called to’ by the organization of their everyday experience
(repression, institutional forms of identification, etc.) Such boundaries are constructed
discursively in a social process involving the adoption, elaboration, and modification of
what he calls shared stories. Shared stories are explanatory accounts of human action that
represent social relations and their binding understandings of these relations in the
construction of actors. Such stories “typically include names for the sites [actors or
entities] on either side of the line, accounts of where they came from and imputations of
shared attributes to the entities on each side of the line” (Tilly 2002, 11). Stories represent
the cultural content of relationships by classifying actors across and within boundaries.
Social identities are thus composed of relations, boundaries, and stories. They are the
social experience of these relations and the public representation of these experiences in
the form of boundary stories (Tilly 2002, 49).
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First, I note a point of convergence. Both Tilly and Bourdieu describe identity as a
contested and unequal social process of classification. Tilly (2005, 61), for example,
identifies, though not exhaustively, “contested representations of crucial actors as worthy
or unworthy, unified or fragmented, large or small, committed or uncommitted, powerful
or weak, well connected or isolated, durable or evanescent, reasonable or irrational, greedy
or generous.” Stories narrate these properties often as intrinsic characteristics of entities.
Actors are thus constructed with positive or negative attributes. Bourdieu’s entire
sociology rests on the importance of schemas of appreciation, perception, and action in the
classification of actors and actions to the advantage of the classifying agent. Like Tilly,
identity is a contested process, because “only in and through the struggle do the
internalized limits become boundaries, barriers that have to be moved” (Bourdieu 1984,
480). The symbolic conflict that organizes the activity of each field is thus, in effect, a
struggle over the means or resources to establish the classificatory schemas most
advantageous to each group’s interests.
Tilly and Bourdieu differ ultimately on the grounding of identity: interaction or
structure. This is particularly notable with respect to the origins of schemas of
classification. For Bourdieu, they are the distinguishing features of social fields, the unique
products of accumulated, and thus historical, symbolic struggles over various definitions of
religion, art, politics, etc. For Tilly (2002, 49), the materials of identity are specific to each
actor’s sets of social relations, though constrained by collective memory and available
cultural means.14

In part, this difference of approach with respect to the origins of cultural distinctions is a consequence of
their attitudes towards Durkheim. Durkheim’s emphasis on social forces in the formation of categories is
clearly relevant to Bourdieu. Tilly (1981) has openly expressed his disdain for Durkheim’s sociology.
14
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2.4.3. Performances
Both Tilly and Bourdieu stress conceptions of action that aim to balance constraints
and agency. As noted above, Tilly identifies a repertoire of everyday life. Like repertoires
of contention, these available performances differentiate along sets of social relations; pairs
of actors with durable relations obtain their own routine sets of interactions that
accumulate shared understandings. Such routine performances, or scripts, vary in the
degree to which local knowledge can empower improvisation. Bourdieu’s concept of
habitus likewise aims to captures the available means of action, the schemas of perception,
appreciation and action acquired in social fields, and like Tilly, the employment of these
schemas is situational, constantly assessing the environment and relations in order to
determine proper (advantageous) action. This analogy between repertoires of everyday
life and habitus may seem strained unless one considers the importance of Erving Goffman
for both accounts. As Collins (2010) notes, despite Tilly’s distance from symbolic
interactionism, the last decade of his life was marked by a Goffmanesque concern for
performances and interactions. In Why? (2006b), Tilly addresses Goffman on affable terms,
appropriating his analyses and identifying him as a fellow relational sociologist. For his
part, Bourdieu makes frequent references to Goffman, to the point of describing his
analysis of strategies in social fields as Goffman applied in the context of struggles over the
power to impose definitions of reality (Bourdieu 2000, 187).
The essential difference in relation to their conceptions of action is the importance
for Bourdieu of the social field. Habitus are always more or less tuned to the contours of
the field of their making, while for Tilly repertoires or scripts and local knowledge are
acquired in social contexts determined more by social interaction than by objective
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structures of power. It is my argument that Bourdieu offers a significantly richer analysis
of everyday behavior than Tilly offers in nearly all of his works. This is likely a reflection of
not only his interest in pragmatism, which Tilly shares, but also phenomenology and
psychology, which Tilly does not. However, as Nooy (2003) observes an insistent emphasis
on Bourdieu’s theory of practical action provides a more robust model of action. Such a
conception puts a stronger premium on interaction as an independent level of analysis,
while suggesting that action involves confronting multiple possible courses of action with
variable outcomes, all of which are constrained by the social context. Throughout this
dissertation, I employ an understanding of agency along these lines using the language of
performances so amenable to both Bourdieu and Tilly.
2.5. Conclusion
In this chapter I present my general argument and lay the groundwork for
theoretical development by interrogating some of the similarities and differences between
Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu. The ultimate goal of this development is to elaborate a
conception of everyday social organization and its relation to contentious performances.
The following chapter utilizes collective action theory to clarify the relation between
macro-variables, motivation, and action.
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CHAPTER 3: SOCIALIZATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY
The principle goal of this chapter is to present a set of theoretical instruments for
explaining tactical choice. In Chapter Two I discuss the contributions of Charles Tilly and
Pierre Bourdieu to a model incorporating social fields, social networks, identities, and
models of action as key constraints on action. In this chapter this model is supplemented
with the incorporation of collective action theory and bounded rationality. I focus on two
basic effects derived from variation in socialization across a population of SMO members.
First, I consider the importance of collective identity in establishing basic constraints on
the expectations generated for a set of tactics. Special attention is given to the evaluation of
tactics on a scale of effectiveness. Second, I consider how these expectations may vary in
the degree of confidence with which they are held by an SMO. I suggest that this variation
can be explained as a consequence of their familiarity with the everyday correlates of
tactics. In general, the two chapters together argue that the effects of the socializing
structures of everyday life – the networks and fields that organize activities and the shared
understandings that they generate – can be translated into a consideration of the effects of
a variety of costs and benefits on choice among a variety of tactics.
3.1. Socialization
This chapter further explicates the relationship between everyday life ad
contentious politics by turning to a revealing analogy:
Just as thoroughly bilingual friends often switch from one language to the other when
signaling a shift of mood, subject, or context, they move into an alternative mode of
communication. They do so because the social networks and shared understandings at
hand channel participants into available definitions of what is happening, available means
of communication and cooperation, available practices of conflict resolution, and available
cultural idioms (McAdam et al 2001, 140).
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The means are provided by existing social infrastructure - durable sets of social relations
and their attendant shared understandings but also material conditions that facilitate
communication and render resources available. The available models and practices are the
scripts of everyday life and previous collective performances. It is precisely this availability
I hope to consider below.
In order to specify this relationship between everyday social organization and
contentious performances, I consider two basic sets of socialization effects on the process
of selecting tactics. Figure 3.1 schematizes these processes. The first process involves
collective identities. The shared understandings of social relations contribute to the
definition of the salient properties of actions, including the effectiveness of tactics. Such
properties contribute towards the estimation of expected outcomes and utilities among a
choice set of tactics. The second process involves the distribution of familiarity that actors
have with certain ways of acting and seeing. Such a distribution contributes a variety of
effects to tactical choice, particularly the management of complexity through the reduction
of uncertainty and transaction costs.
In explaining choices in organizational practices, Polletta (2002, 19-20) argues that
identity and familiarity explanations are distinct (though she does not then argue that they
are strictly exclusive). Identity aligns what one chooses with what one believes about
oneself; actions are thus expressions of oneself. Familiarity refers to making choices based
on one’s sets of routine experiences. I approach familairity from two perspectives. First, I
argue that familiarity and identity are not as exclusive as this may suggest. Our shared
understandings and public representations of our social relationships, including the
everyday practices that reinforce them, are in fact what are most familiar to us. These help
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Figure 3.1. Two Socialization Effects: Identity and Familiarity
activists recognize and evaluate the opportunities and constraints offered by social
environments and situations, thus reducing uncertainties and shaping our choice set. As
Polletta (2002, 20) observes, “our very criteria for assessing what is instrumental, strategic,
efficient…are based on the social associations underpinning those conceptions.”
Second, however, this distinction between identity and familiarity, between our
sense of self and our daily routines, brings the discussion to a crucial point. The argument
here is that familiarity breeds relative certainty and predictability. How can we explain
choices that deviate from what is most familiar?15 Why would anyone move from a
decision of relative certainty into the area of uncertainty and risk? In order to answer
these questions and others, I turn to a third but crucial theoretical approach.
3.2. Collective Action Theory
3.2.1. Bourdieu, Tilly, and Rational Choice
Perhaps controversially, I enlist collective action theory to complete this account of
repertoire change and tactical choice. Both Bourdieu and Tilly were famously critical of the

These two concepts point to a possible strategic dilemma: while decreasing uncertainty may lead to
strategic moves in which one has a better ex ante estimate of the situation, in strategic interactions it may
provide one’s opponents with better information about one’s future strategic moves. The safety of relative
certainty may thus be illusory; opponents may strategically utilize your predictability by being themselves
unpredictable. McAdam (1983) famously argued that even innovative and effective tactics can be neutralized
by the tactical responses of opponents. Advantages may be thus always tentative. This possibility provides
one compelling reason for tactical deviations from that which is most familiar. In this dissertation, especially
this chapter and Chapter Twelve, I aim to provide a more generalized explanation inclusive of this argument.
15
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broader theoretical approach inclusive of collection action theory, rational choice theory.
For example, Bourdieu (1990, 49) regards rational choice as one of the more pernicious
manifestations of the scholastic fallacy, the tendency of academics to impute “the things of
logic to the logic of things.” Tilly (1991; 2002) is critical of the reductionism to the
individual. Most objections are leveled at the thin psychology of homo economicus.
Particularly scorned is the assumption that individuals exhaustively calculate the costs and
benefits of alternative courses of action in order to determine which option maximizes
their utility. In part this involves the expected utility hypothesis, in which individuals
assess the probability of securing future states of the world resulting from their actions. A
second criticism involves the assumption that actors take into account more than the
material incentives of income or physical well-being when they make decisions (Fireman
and Gamson 1979).
None of these assumptions are integral to a collective action theory account of
tactical choice (Opp 1989; 2009). First, wider versions of the theory incorporating
bounded rationality make more relaxed assumptions about the decision-making process.
In contrast to classical or unbounded rationality, bounded rationality begins with the basic
observation that humans lack the cognitive capacities to exhaustively evaluate complex
environments.16 Consequently, it employs a basic strategy of satisficing in which choice is
governed by the achievement of an acceptable or appropriate threshold of satisfaction.
Second, contra Olson (1965) non-economic incentives can be incorporated into rational
Tilly and Bourdieu have commented on the utility of bounded rationality. In one essay, Tilly (1996, 543)
endorses the view that humans are satisficers. In his discussions on repertoires, however, he regards
bounded rationality as a rationalist innovation that remains hamstrung by an inability to model history,
culture, and social relations (Tilly 2006a, 41). Bourdieu (2005, 211) likewise acknowledges the contribution
of the concept, but like Tilly stresses the lack of social constraints in the model (which for Bourdieu include
culture and history by definition).
16
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choice models. Such intangible costs and benefits can include psychological, solidarity, and
moral incentives like pleasure, love, a sense of justice, and social interactions (Clark and
Wilson (1961).
It is my contention that Tilly and Bourdieu’s unease with rational choice theory is
borne of a focus on classical or unbounded models.17 Opp’s (2009) structural-cognitive
model, partially reproduced in Chapter Two, serves as a starting point for this study in that
it integrates structural, cultural, and interactional variables into a rationalist account of the
constitution of collective action. Likewise, Tilly (2001; McAdam et al 2001) argues that a
full accounting of social life must integrate three varieties of causal mechanisms. These
include, first, environmental mechanisms, or structural factors that are external to actors
and action such as political structures, resource distributions, etc. Second, analysis must
turn to cognitive mechanisms, or alterations in the mental states and perceptions of
individuals. Finally, he identifies relational mechanisms as shifts in the relations among
individuals and groups.18 Tilly suggests that these classes of mechanisms basically exhaust
the range of causal factors available to analysts. My suggestion is that these mechanisms
are in essence no different from Opp’s range of causal variables.
Such synthetic efforts are not uncommon in the literature. New institutionalism
integrates decision theory into hybrid structural/rational analyses, while game theory
formalizes dynamic interactions and provides partial explanations for cultural phenomena
like norms of reciprocity, trust, and reputation.19 Though individuals are often the singular

Of course, both are often criticized for standing too close to the economist’s fire (Calhoun 1993a; Rule
1989).
18 However, he argues, in contrast to Opp (1989; 2009), that environmental and relational mechanisms can
have direct effects on collective action. This seems to be the real point of contention.
19 For an example of thicker game theoretic accounts of collective action, see Chong (1991) and Gould (2003).
17
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actors, there is no inherent assumption that they are asocial egoists. For the purposes of
analysis, organizations can be said to behave rationality as well. Additionally, models of
interaction can include solidarity incentives (Chong 1991) and constraints like norms (Opp
1989). The most heated animosity remains between rational choice and social
psychological approaches despite impressive synthetic work (Chong 1991; Klandermans
1997; Scott 1978). Finally, in contrast to Tilly’s (2006a) insistence that history cannot be
modeled with an individualist ontology (despite a not infrequent emphasis on
organizations), bounded rationality conceives of behavior as an adaptive process
(Gigerenzer and Selten 2002a). In this view, choice is weighted by the experiences of
actors. I thus argue that Tilly and Bourdieu are in fact compatible with models of individual
behavior so long as care is taken to incorporate the contextual dimensions of social life.
3.2.2. Rational Choice Theory
This collective action theory account of tactical choice includes the fundamental
architecture of rational choice models. At the core of this approach is the basic hypothesis
that actors are goal-directed. At the least, to be rational is to utilize efficient means in
pursuit of ends. Specifying this very general hypothesis, however, has led to a variety of
approaches. At least two conceptions of rationality are considered here: classic and
bounded. According to Opp (1999, 171; 1989; 2009), the minimal assumptions of the
theory common to both spring from three basic propositions:
1. PREFERENCE PROPOSITION: Individual preferences (or goals) are conditions of
behaviors which are instrumental in satisfying the respective preferences.
2. CONSTRAINTS PROPOSITION: Anything that increases or decreases the possibilities
of an individual to be able to satisfy his or her preferences by performing certain
actions (i.e., opportunities or constraints) is a condition for performing these actions.
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3. UTILITY MAXIMIZATION PROPOSITION: Individuals choose those actions that satisfy
their preferences to the greatest extent, taking into account the constraints.
Rational choice analysis (in this case decision theory: single actor decision-making) first
involves the identification of the preferences and constraints that determine the utilities
for each option among the set of behavioral alternatives. Preferences and constraints offer
incentives for or against certain courses of action. Incentives are the intervening
motivational variables between constraints and decision that make particular actions more
or less attractive. Increases in costs make an option less attractive and vice versa, while
increases or decreases in benefits make an option more or less attractive. In accordance
with the utility maximization proposition, actors choose the alternative with the most
benefits at the least cost from among the range of options.
Incentives vary also in their relation to the locus of action.20 Extrinsic or
prospective incentives refer to the costs and benefits associated with the consequences of
action. From this perspective, actions have anticipated repercussions on the environment
that make the action more or less attractive. Such actions may yield negative
consequences: decreased public support, repression, decreased membership, etc. They
may also yield corresponding positive consequences. Some of these effects may constitute
the goal of a SMO, as I will discuss below with respect to extrinsic goals. However, even
when an SMO seeks to change some aspect of the environment, such as public policy,
aspects of the environment may respond (SMOs, governments, media, etc.) in such a way
that they generate incentives distinct from the investment in changing public policy.
Intrinsic, participation, or transaction incentives refer to the costs and benefits derived
This distinction does not necessarily correspond with the well-known distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation in psychology. The latter distinction functions at the individual level, while the former
operates at the organizational level.
20
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from the act of protesting. The costs of such social exchanges are many: the effects of intraorganizational bargaining and negotiating in the selection and preparation of actions; the
information and search costs involved in conceiving and evaluating possible outcomes and
utilities; and the surveillance and enforcement costs relating to the various stages of
cooperation within the SMO. The benefits may include the various joys of social
interaction, edification, building reputation and character, and a sense of efficacy.
Choice is thus governed by the arrangement of costs and benefits associated with
the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of each course of action. In Figure 3.1 familiarity and
identity affect contentious performances through the reduction of costs and uncertainty
and the specification of expected outcomes and utilities. As I will show below, both involve
incentives: familiarity reduces both transaction costs and the costs associated with
uncertainty (ambiguity aversion), while identity specifies the expected consequences of
actions and their related costs and benefits.
Three considerations follow from this presentation. First, there are several
assumptions embedded in most versions of rational choice theory. Establishing a rational
preference ordering, for example, requires that the preference relations satisfy sets of
axioms including, but not limited to completeness, continuity, reflexivity, and transitivity.
However, the approach taken here is not axiomatic.
Second, the final proposition of utility maximization is controversial. Maximization
or optimization is often contrasted with satisficing. Gigerenzer and Selten (2002b) are
particularly critical of the tendency to assume that bounded rationality is in essence
‘optimization under constraints.‘ Other interpretations are available. Recall that the search
for more complete information is aborted when an option hits a threshold of utility
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provision, not necessarily when the search yields the highest utility of all possible options.
However, within the set of searched options, choice is guided by utility maximization.
From this perspective, the primary distinction between maximization and satisficing is the
fullness of the choice set as defined by the decision-maker.
Third, the nature of the question facing decision-makers in this dissertation strongly
suggests that bounded rationality offers a better set of underlying assumptions. The
question of mobilization generally involves the modeling of a dichotomous choice: to
engage in political action or not.21 If we are to study tactical choice with any level of
specificity, however, the potential range of strategies and tactics does not yield a
dichotomous choice. Tactical choice is a more cognitively demanding choice problem.
Thus, bounded rationality looks like a more useful conception of decision-making.
3.2.3. Bounded Rationality
There is no singular general theory of bounded rationality (Gigerenzer and Selten
2002a). However, some important points are available to guide the approach taken in this
dissertation. In his most celebrated presentation of the concept of bounded rationality,
Simon (1997) builds three key criticisms of classical economic rationality.22 This assault is
founded on the assumption (and empirical evidence) that finite cognitive capacities and
environmental complexities constrain decision-making. First, knowledge about the nature
and probability of outcomes regarding each action is incomplete. Instead, possible

Despite the fact that participation in protest often involves various levels of contribution (Klandermans
2004; for an exception in the collective action literature see Marwell and Oliver 1993).
22
“(1) Rationality requires complete knowledge and anticipation of the consequences that will follow on each
choice. In fact, knowledge of consequences is always fragmentary. (2) Since these questions lie in the future,
imagination must supply the lack of experienced feeling in attaching value to them. But values can be only
imperfectly anticipated. 3. Rationality requires a choice among all possible alternative behaviors. In actual
behavior, only a very few of all these possible alternatives come to mind” (Simon 1997, 93-94).
21
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outcomes are weighted heavily by previous outcomes. In other words, we tend to repeat
actions that ourselves and others define as previously successful and drop actions that
ourselves and others define as previously unsuccessful. Thus, action is adaptive; it
develops in a trial-and-error process of exploration and evaluation.
Second, knowledge about the utilities of these outcomes is incomplete. Put another
way, the evaluation of alternatives is an imperfect process, because individuals lack the
information and the capacity to accurately determine the relevant costs and benefits of
various courses of action. However, as Opp (2009) notes, subjective evaluations of costs
and benefits need not be objectively accurate in order to constrain action. They need only
conform to a pattern in which the choice set is represented as sets of relative values
arranged from best to worst.
Third - assuming a medium-to large-n choice set - knowledge about the range of
options is incomplete. Bounded rationality is characterized not by perfect information of
all possible courses of action, but by a limited search among options. While the previous
points leave open the assumption that the choice set is complete, this final criticism
suggests that at some point in the process of searching - depending on the possible breadth
of the choice set - a point is reached at which wide swaths of possibilities are left
unexplored or underexplored. Together with the second point, this insight has the
consequence that preferences may also be incomplete, precisely because unknown options
yield unknown utilities.
3.3. Theoretical Development
In order to reduce the friction between Bourdieu, Tilly, and collective action theory,
I focus on a specific area of agreement by extracting some of the crucial elements from each
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regarding the process of decision-making. Before doing so, I establish some basic
assumptions about the objects of inquiry.
3.3.1. Preliminaries
The theoretical approach taken here is organized around an ideal situation in
which, once a CJO has formed (solved the collective action problem), it is faced with a series
of questions about how best to achieve the goals of the collective. The first basic question,
addressed in Chapter Nine, concerns the establishment of an overarching strategic
orientation. The second question, and the orienting concern for this dissertation, is the
identification and elaboration of the conditions and mechanisms of tactical choice. The
primary dependent variable is thus the choice an organization makes among a set of tactics.
Likely, the soon-to-be-members of actual SMOs are engaged in the question of strategy
before the act of organization. This approach is thus a highly stylized effort to isolate a
central problematic.
The dependent variable, at least for the majority of the study, does not vary.
Nonetheless, this chapter treats it as an explicit variable in accordance with the general
theoretical concerns of this project. Further below I distinguish between different sets of
tactics. For now, I assume for the sake of simplicity that the range of tactics available to the
SMO is a finite set of all possible tactics, X. For now I assume that these tactics vary
continuously and not discretely.
3.3.2. Schemas and Information
One of the basic implications of Chapter Two is that, though they differ in specifics,
Tilly and Bourdieu utilize a similar and very general model of action. For both, actions or
performances are a function of the interaction of environments (or situations) and
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behavioral structures. I utilize the same model in order to lay the foundation for an
analysis of the relation of socialization to tactical choice.
When confronting a decision context (a situation that yields more than one possible
payoff) characterized by uncertainty, actors utilize both schemas and information to
produce a reasonable choice. As described in Chapter Two, schemas are durable, organized
structures of information that produce relatively efficient interpretations of situations or
interactions and thus appropriate action. These structures are at once cognitive-behavioral
(they endow individuals with means of perception and action) and communicative (they
are shared such that they cue our meanings and expectations to others).23 Information is
the data pertaining to the situation or interaction, whether ex ante (to cue a relevant
schema) or ex post (feedback). It varies in degrees of organization that range from
unstructured data (information bits as Downs called them) to highly organized and
structured frames.24 In order to provide guidance for actors, information (including
frames) must be integrated into the schemas of actors.
The decision context demands of the organization the evaluation of multiple
possible courses of action. These evaluations can be summarized as expectations. These
expectations involve three basic elements: outcomes, utilities, and probabilities. Outcomes

Notice my emphasis on cognition and behavior, while above I regarded Bourdieu and Tilly’s commensurate
emphases on ‘behavioral structures.’ Bourdieu’s anti-representationalism emphasizes bodily dispositions as
opposed to mental structures, while Tilly is prone to regard consciousness as a black box. I preserve a
cognition-behavior distinction primarily for analytic purposes.
24 It also varies in at least three other ways: 1) in terms of the salience of the information (trivial or crucial
depending on whether it contributes towards a more robust sense of the decision context); 2), in terms of the
accuracy of the information (accurate or inaccurate); and (3) in terms of its intent (whether it is strategic or
inert; an example of the former being an effort by a countermovement organization to frame an issue; an
example of the latter being datasets on employment produced by parties not implicated in the conflict). For
now, I assume that information is only problematic in terms of quantity, not quality, meaning information is
crucial, accurate, and inert. Of course, one of the more interesting aspects of real-world uncertainty is the
quality of information. For example, consider the implications of a distinction between knowledge,
misinformation, and disinformation.
23
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are those states of the world (including the organization, but also other actors, resources,
institutions, etc.) resulting directly or indirectly from organizational action. Utilities are the
net value of these outcomes for the organization, a consequence of the preferences for
certain actions, constraints imposed on each choice, and the incentives they offer.
Probabilities are the subjective degrees of uncertainty (or confidence) attached to each
outcome. Here, I focus on schemas as inferred knowledge of the actors, constraints,
incentives, outcomes, utilities, and probabilities pertaining to a decision context. It follows
that schemas are generative of future expectations based on previous decisions.
A point of objection arises at this juncture. Frames generally denote schemas of
interpretation.25 A common though contentious distinction in the framing literature
identifies frames and framing as either cognitive structures or as interactive processes.
Snow and Benford (2000b) are particularly keen on conceptualizing framing as a social
process, at least so far as explaining social movement participation is concerned. Perhaps
the most important concept in their approach is frame resonance. Frame resonance refers
to the degree to which an SMO’s frame resonates with an audience. Resonance here
signifies commensurate and congruent interpretations; the tighter the fit between an
SMO’s frame and an individual, the higher the likelihood of participation. However, as a
consequence, any theory of framing as a theory of mobilization must attend to two different
conceptualizations of frames: first, to the discursive and strategic processes that generate
and distribute frames (Snow and Benford 2000a), and second, to the cognitive structures
within audiences that translate frames into incentives for or against collective action. A
simultaneous distinction is implicitly made between SMOs and audiences: the former are
Frames are “schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label
occurrences within their life space and the world at large” (Snow et al 1986, 464).
25
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strategic actors that choose among sets of tactics in order to appeal to audiences, while
audiences are comparatively inert actors with the potential for mobilization once an appeal
to them has been made.26 The degree to which strategic actors are themselves cognitively
constrained is not plainly considered. While a similar distinction is sometimes made in the
voter turnout literature (Aldrich 1993), the basic question of this study is not a question of
mobilization, but a question of strategy.27 For my purposes, I regard frames as schemas in
contentious play, as strategic communicative processes. Thus, while schemas in general
are cognitive-behavioral and communicative, further usage of the term schema will refer
primarily to their cognitive-behavioral aspect, while the usage of frames will refer to the
strategic communicative aspect. Thus, SMOs produce and distribute frames that they hope
will be congruent and commensurate with the schemas of their audiences.
Figure 3.2 presents the relation between the shared schemas within an organization
and information.28 First, organizational actors develop perceptions of the decision context
that are shaped both by schemas and information derived from the actual situation. This
initial Information animates those schema(s) that are most congruent with this initial
stimulus. Second, with even low information, the activated schemas produce a generally
robust sense of the situation, thereby generating choice sets and expected outcomes
pertaining to each choice. Finally, once an action is chosen – necessitating action within

This is not to say that audiences are not strategic or that they do not weigh the costs and benefits of
different courses of action.
27 This distinction is important with respect to explaining mobilization. While voting is likely to be a marginal
activity with low cost, activism can range from marginal to significant costs.
28
The model adapted and modified in Figure 4.2 differs in some crucial ways from the original (North and
Denzau 1994, 17-18; Ostrom 2005, 105). First, the original model focuses on individual, not organizational
decision-making. Second, in the original, while expected outcomes are internal to the participant in the action
situation, chosen actions and actual outcomes are found in the external action situation, outside of the
participant’s mental processes. Figure 4.2 distinguishes extrinsic from intrinsic outcomes.
26
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Figure 3.2. Schemas, Information, and Decision-Making
and without the organization – it produces outcomes that generate feedback processes
from the environment and internal to the organization.
Through these basic insights, I suggest that socialization shapes the preferences for
certain forms of action over others, reduces the costs of some actions but not others, and
reduces the uncertainties associated with some actions but not others.
3.4. Identity and Preferences
Figure 3.3 represents the relation between identity and action. First, this model is a
partial reproduction of Figure 2.2. Both social networks and fields are mutually
constitutive and determinative. Second, it unpacks the concept of identity as a social
process of definition and classification of relations among actors and institutions, of
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Figure 3.3. Everyday Social Organization, Socialization, and Contentious Performances
ideologies, including the vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities of actors and
institutions and the normative evaluations of each, and thus of the salient properties of
available means of action, especially their perceived effectiveness.
3.4.1. Socialization and Identity
If we consider Figure 3.3 in the context of Figure 2.2, we can begin to elaborate on
the relation of everyday social organization to the contentious performances of interest in
this study. The conception of collective identity utilized in this dissertation concerns an
individual’s mutually constituted sense of his or her’s particular categorical membership
encompassing the shared understandings and public representations that define the
boundaries and the relations among social categories. The content of these identities is
organized by social classifications that are differentially distributed across various social
groups. These classifications identify the properties of actors, institutions, environments,
and objects and evaluate their utility in establishing valued social positions. Through this
process of selective categorization, employed and recognized classifications identify the
locations of actors in social space by betraying the strategies that they utilize to mark
others and themselves in a manner that furthers their interests. Thus, identification as an
experience and as a representation entails cognitive and evaluative processes – the
activation of schemas - that construct a social space of actors.
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These constructions of good/bad, friend/enemy, moral/immoral, etc. are not simply
constructions of actors, however. Identity is a social process of defining actions with
respect to audiences and targets. In other words, the field of actors and institutions is not
neutral in its implications for action; each construction of an actor closes off some options
and opens up others by defining their relative strengths and weaknesses. For our
purposes, these shared understandings that undergird and constitute identities help define
ideologies. Ideologies are relatively sophisticated and coherent organizations of shared
schemas that construct a group’s position in social space. In this sense they identify the
strategic significance of social relations. They thus refer to the array of “opportunities,
threats, available means of action, likely consequences of those actions, evaluations of
those consequences, capacities to act, memories of previous contention, and inventories of
likely parties to any action” recognized by SMOs and other parties to the conflict (Tilly
2005, 61). Such constructions define the vulnerabilities that different relations offer for
influence by the protagonist(s), as in the extraction or control of resources, in the
solicitation of cooperation, etc. They also denote the motivations of other relations,
including their perceived interests and constraints, in order that protagonists may exploit
the interests of actors. Moreover, they express the generalized capacities that actors and
institutions possess to influence the protagonist(s), whether in the degree and efficiency of
force and coercion, in their capacity for subterfuge, their legitimacy and means of
persuasion, their financial and material assets, etc. Thus, the field of actors that identities
construct is a field strewn with possibilities for action. These evaluations are not merely
cognitive, but affective and normative as well, thus providing a general capacity and
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motivation to evaluate and manipulate, acquiesce to, or venerate a given set of social
relations. I consider ideologies in more detail in Chapter Ten.
3.4.2. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goals
Defining these possibilities, however, requires prior assessments of the actions in
relation to their targets. Actions can have variable significance for different individuals and
groups because actions, like all social phenomena, come to sense as social constructions.
No potential action has content separate from perceived targets and audiences (though
these can be highly generalized); they possess no universal and strategic value, even
though to activists they are likely to feel this way. It is, in part, the orientations or attitudes
towards actions, the comparative properties of possibility, desirability, acceptability,
among others, which shape choices in regular social interactions as well as episodic
contentious collective actions. They confer a degree of strategic sense to possible courses
of action and their outcomes. In this sense, they involve the processes of identification and
evaluation of possible courses of action and outcomes, processes implicit in the ideologies
defined by shared understandings and constrained by the opportunity structures available
to activists. Such attitudes define the meaning structure of a repertoire (Ennis 1987).
In order to translate this insight into a useful consideration for tactical choice, I
focus on a particularly salient attitude towards actions: the perception of the effectiveness
of a tactic. I argue that the appropriate way to consider effectiveness is as a function of
goals and objectives. Of course, it is not logically necessary that defining how appropriate a
tactic is for a situation entails specifying a relation between actions and goals. For example,
tactics may have intrinsic value (Jasper 1997). In their study of protest potential (attitudes
towards participating in protest), Barnes and Kaase (1979, 67) find that, when asked to
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evaluate a variety of protest tactics in particular issue contexts, survey respondents
expressed attitudes more generalized than context-dependent. In other words, tactics
were judged in an apparently abstract sense devoid of a reference to issues or goals.
This does not necessarily contradict my charge of the relation of effectiveness to
goals, however. It seems plausible to assume that the generalized attitudes about protest
tactics are at least constrained by the general goals of (extrinsic) influence or (intrinsic)
development, especially considering the issue stimuli broadly framing the survey
questions. In addition, the ideal situation sketched in section 3.3 of this study stresses the
organizational level, not the individual level of Barnes and Kaase’s study. Presumably, the
act of organization itself involves a discussion of the interests and goods common to the
individuals involved and thus the goals of the organization.
Goals presuppose a basic type of relation between means and actions. I distinguish
between two goal types by clarifying their expected action-outcome linkage. Some points
of clarity to begin. First, I do not consider the literature on goals, logics, and orientations
until Chapter Nine. Second, I assume that all evaluations are prospective, meaning that
they function as prior estimates of future actions and outcomes. Above, Figure 3.2 situates
an organizational actor within a decision context. As noted already, expected outcomes are
produced through a comparative process informed by shared schemas and information.
Chosen actions, which unfold internal and external to the SMO, produce outcomes both
intrinsic and extrinsic to the SMO. Information about these outcomes is then produced
internal and external to the SMO as a result of intrinsic and extrinsic outcomes. This
information is then utilized to revise the shared schemas.
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Both of the goal types discussed here conform to the model presented in Figure 3.2:
schemas and information produce expectations about future actions. However, they differ
along two crucial dimensions: temporality and extrinsicality. Table 3.1 presents the
relations between action-outcome structure (time, the utility of the SMO, and the state of
affairs) and goal type. Three time periods are relevant: the point at which expectations are
developed, represented as t-1; the period during which the action unfolds, represented as t;
and the period following the action in which information about outcomes is provided,
which is represented as t+1.29 Extrinsicality is expressed as the relation between changes
in utilities and states of affairs. U represents the utility of an SMO at a given period of time.
U’ specifies a change in the utility of the SMO. The state of affairs at a given moment, or the
world external to the SMO, including the utility of opponents, resource availability, public
support, etc., is specified as Ω. Ω’ represents a change in the state of affairs.
To continue requires an analysis of temporality. Time, t-1, represents the baseline: Ut-1 and
Ωt-1 are stable. As I will show below, U’ and Ω’ are further defined only temporally.
Table 3.1 Goals: Expected Action-Outcome Structures
Time
Extrinsic Goal
t-1
t
t+1
Intrinsic Goal
t-1
t
t+1

Utility of SMO

State of Affairs

U
U
U’

Ω
Ω
Ω’

U
U’
U’

Ω
Ω
Ω

It is important to note that all of these time periods are subjective evaluations of future intrinsic and
extrinsic outcomes. In other words, {t-1, t, t+1) occurs at the point, t-1, in which expected outcomes are
generated in Figure 3.2. Thus, chosen actions and outcomes in Figure 3.2 are not included in this discussion;
only the temporal structure of expectations is involved in this analysis.
29
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Changes in utility are derived from the link that SMOs make between their actions and
outcomes. Outcomes include intrinsic outcomes, U’, and extrinsic changes in the state of
affairs, Ω’. While the nature of intrinsicality allows U’t, Ω’ only succeeds action: Ω’t+1.
An extrinsic goal refers to a goal that presupposes a conceptual link between SMO
actions and extrinsic outcomes. At first glance, this conforms to what several scholars
regard as the instrumental or strategic logic that conceptually relates actions to outcomes:
actions oriented towards the change or maintenance of political or economic institutions
and policies (Aberle 1966; Breines 1982; Gusfield 1963; Kriesi et al1995; Rucht 1990).
Effectiveness is often defined solely as the ability to achieve this type of goal. McAdam
(1983) argues, for example, that tactical interaction involves a process in which activists
utilize tactics in order to yield political advantages. However, consider an SMO whose
stated goal is to challenge social norms (for example, patterns of everyday waste disposal)
in order to increase awareness of the implications of individual behavior on the
environment. While such a goal is not directed at changing political or economic
institutions and policies, it still involves an outcome extrinsic to the action itself insofar as
the changing of behavior outside of the SMO is expected to lead to an increased probability
of behavioral change. To briefly clarify, Table 3.1 yields the conclusion that expected utility
derived from this action is wholly extrinsic.
An intrinsic goal refers to a goal that assumes a conceptual link between SMO
actions and intrinsic outcomes. Intrinsic outcomes refer to outcomes that are internal to
the group, such as the growth of moral character or the establishment of a space or
experience free from political, cultural, or economic interference. Referring again to
Figure 3.2, chosen actions occur both within and without the SMO, because intra-
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organizational processes are essential to engaging in extrinsically oriented actions, and
because actions oriented internally always affect the environment in some way, even
minimally by disrupting the available resources of members of the SMO. However, intrinsic
goals define extrinsic outcomes as constraints, while they rank some intrinsic outcomes as
preferences and others as constraints.30 With respect to intrinsic goals, Table 3.1 yields the
conclusion that the expected utility derived from this action is wholly intrinsic.
But an objection may arise when one considers the possibility that intrinsic goals
may necessitate sub-goals or objectives that are extrinsically oriented. While certainly
actions that are oriented towards extrinsic goals can yield intrinsic incentives, I sense no
reason to object to the argument that indeed some tactics oriented by intrinsic goals can
also exhibit non-zero estimates of extrinsic efficacy. In other words, the pursuit of intrinsic
goals is potentially constrained by the production of Ω’. To clarify, it is important to make
three assumptions. First, I assume that each SMO pursues one primary goal. Obviously,
SMOs pursue a variety of goals, but preliminary analysis is greatly aided by this simplifying
assumption. Second, despite the interesting implications of relaxing it, I assume that
organizational maintenance is subordinate to the primary goal.
An auxiliary assumption specifies the goal structure of an SMO – the sets of goals
and objectives that orient its choices – as perfectly hierarchical and subordinate to the
primary goal, as well as potentially heterogeneous. Hierarchy and subordinate are
relatively clear, but the latter needs some elaboration. I define heterogeneity in a goal
structure as a plurality of expected action-outcome structures. In other words, while an
SMO may pursue a goal with the object of intrinsic change, it may also possess a series of
Further below I consider the inverse: extrinsic goals define intrinsic outcomes as constraints (transaction
costs and benefits), while they rank extrinsic outcomes as preferences and constraints.
30
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objectives that include the acquisition of resources or a change in laws (Ω’) necessary to
achieve this goal. The only assumption here is that these objectives are entirely
subordinate to the goal. Figure 3.4 illustrates distinctions between homogenous and
heterogeneous hierarchical goal structures as well as a non-hierarchical structure. Here,
differences lie not only in the nature of objectives (secondary goals), but also in the relation
of objectives to goals. It is thus no contradiction to suggest that an SMO that pursues
intrinsic goals may nonetheless pursue extrinsic outcomes.
3.4.3. Effectiveness and Goals
With these concepts in tow, I begin with a set of assumptions that contribute to a
fuller specification of the relationship of effectiveness to goals. First, I assume that SMOs
want to maximize their chances of achieving their goals and objectives. Additionally, SMOs
derive utility from these achievements such that this process of pursuing goals can be
interpreted as a utility maximizing process. In order to maximize utility, they must engage
in a variety of actions, or tactics. In choosing tactics, SMOs select from a finite set of all
possible tactics. While they may use a variety of criteria to determine which tactics are
Included in Analysis
Homogeneous Hierarchy
Heterogeneous Hierarchy

 =Intrinsic Goal

 = Intrinsic Objective
Figure 3.4. Goal Structures
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Excluded from Analysis
Non-Hierarchical

Δ = Extrinsic Objective

most appropriate, the working assumption of this study is that SMOs seek to achieve their
goals by choosing the most effective tactics (Klandermans 1984).
I define effectiveness as the perceived ability of a tactic to further the goals and
objectives of an SMO.31 Conceptually, effectiveness can extend from highly effective to
counter-effective. It seems reasonable to conjecture that activists will avoid actions that
they believe will not contribute to the achievement of their goals, and that they will avoid
actions that they believe will make it harder for them to achieve their goals and objectives.
If I accordingly conceive of the effectiveness of a tactic as a continuous variable ranging
from negative to positive, I can additionally assume that SMOs will not choose tactics that
they believe have non-positive effectiveness. For now, I avoid the difficulties arising from a
set of tactics that yield only non-positive effectiveness by assuming that the set of possible
tactics always includes some tactics with positive effectiveness.
Additional points arise from this preliminary discussion of effectiveness. First, I do
not consider targets as actors; they do not enjoy strategic agency. Thus, this analysis is not
game theoretic. Second, while a given SMO seeks to achieve goals or objectives and thus
maximize utility by choosing tactics that increase their ability to achieve their goals (i.e.,
effectiveness), they nonetheless choose tactics under constraints. Some have been noted
already. With an extrinsic goal, an SMO incurs both extrinsic constraints and transaction
costs or benefits, whereas with an intrinsic goal, extrinsic outcomes can produce
constraints, including repression, facilitation, and variation in public support. Below, I
introduce sets of constraints on the preference for effectiveness among the set of tactics.

31

This translates to the perception of a tactic’s contribution to the production of a public or club good.
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3.5. Familiarity and Uncertainty
3.5.1. Uncertainty in Contentious Politics
A realistic assessment of the information endowments of actors involved in
contentious politics – indeed politics in general - would identify significant uncertainties.
Decision making under uncertainty is typically cast as the maximization of expected utility,
which involves the assignment of definite probabilities to future alternative states of
affairs. A more radical notion of uncertainty developed especially by economist Frank
Knight (1921) involves the inability of actors to estimate the probability that future states
of affairs will come to pass. Between definite and unquantifiable uncertainty lie a range of
conditions in which information is incomplete such that expectations are better
represented by imprecise probabilities, often denoted by intervals of probability instead of
singular probabilities (Walley 1991).32
What level of uncertainty - represented by the specificity of probabilities of future
states of affairs (from a singular probability [say, 0.4] to an interval 0 to 1 under Knightian
uncertainty) - characterizes contentious politics? A variety of responses are possible. First,
a natural response to such an inquiry is that because contentious politics can occur in a
range of environments, it is an empirical question as to which degree of uncertainty
plagues which specific type of contentious interactions. A second response is that
deductions from specific theories should provide testable hypotheses about degrees of
uncertainty. Variations in determinant conditions would be endogenous to whatever
theory is relevant. A third response is an educated ad hoc approach in which researchers
These can also be represented by ordinal probabilities such that one can determine rankings but not
degrees of probability (Keynes 2004 [1921]). Of course, the question of how to incorporate uncertainty into
models of choice remains a problematic area of decision theory. This is a generic attempt to consider the
relation between provisions of information and uncertainty.
32
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weigh the body of empirical evidence and theoretical work on a particular research
question. While the most preferable means of specification is the second approach, it
seems evident that the third approach is not only the most common and the least costly
operation, but also the most feasible considering the lack of specificity in social movement
theory. Considering existing research and frequent anecdotal empirical observations, the
most defensible option is to assume that SMOs in general operate under a condition of
uncertainty such that imprecise probabilities are the best that they can assign to the range
of options before them. The remaining analysis of familiarity will specify more clearly the
importance of information and the assignment of interval probabilities.
3.5.2. The Distribution of Familiarity
In order to relax the assumption of perfect information, it is important to consider
the concept of familiarity. Familiarity involves means that are “ready-at-hand” in the
Heideggerian sense, a contextual and immersive involvement with the tasks we are often
engaged in and the materials we employ in their achievement. From a more sociological
perspective, Bourdieu identifies this immersive but attentive practice as the “practical
sense” that we utilize in order to navigate the various constraints (opportunities, threats,
etc.) offered by our positioning within various social fields. Situations and their
accoutrements are most familiar when action is characterized by a practical mastery of its
utility in particular situations. Familiarity is always a feel for a situation, for a context such
that its constraints can be exploited and avoided. Like Bourdieu, I use the concept of
schemas and their relation to action as a basic unit of organized information.
I contend that a tentative but useful way of thinking of the notion of bounded
rationality with the theoretical developments thus far elucidated involves the relation of
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information to schemas. Familiarity can be described as the relationship between 1) the
information required to navigate a situation, and 2) an individual or group’s endowment of
schemas, or dispositions. If the information is a generally good fit for some of the schemas
in a disposition - if it cues a basically confident sketch of the situation (actors, constraints,
incentives, outcomes, and utilities) - then the actor is familiar with the situation. This fit
between schemas and initial information can be construed as a continuous variable ranging
from 0 (absolutely no fit and no familiarity) to 1 (a perfect fit and total familiarity).
Intuitively, the concept of familiarity appears synonymous with information. If we
think of a complete lack of information about some phenomenon, we define it as a state of
pure ignorance. It is an unknown unknown. There can be no familiarity with such an
object. Once the amount of information is increased, however, we can begin to make sense
of the object by linking it to other objects about which we possess more information. At the
height of information saturation, it is an understatement to say that one is familiar with the
object. Strictly speaking, however, familiarity is not a perfect function of information. Even
extensive amounts of information cannot by themselves provide a robust sense of a
situation, as anyone reading a novel in a foreign language that they do not understand will
attest. Such information requires schemas – themselves organized structures of
information - to simplify the process of interpretation, for example, by endowing an actor
with knowledge of the language.
The endowment of schemas or dispositions varies in at least two important ways.
First, most sets of skills and knowledge are specialized and thus unevenly distributed
across a population. Familiarity is not only potentially variable for a particular object or
situation (we may learn more about some phenomenon, for example, thus increasing

91

familiarity, or we may fail to reinforce our experience with an object, thus decaying our
familiarity with the object), it also varies across objects. To state the obvious, we are more
or less familiar with some objects than others. For example, the capacity to engage the
legal system competently, to understand it and to utilize it to one’s advantage, is
distributed primarily to people and groups that have extensive knowledge and experience
with the system, especially lawyers. Everyday life is thus a mosaic of individuals and
groups with variable competencies with respect to variable tasks. In other words, due to
the different tasks and routines they engage in on a relatively regular basis, some are
familiar with different sets of tasks and routines than others. They obtain, maintain, and
employ more information and thus, over time, schemas on certain actions than other
people. If schemas and information yield familiarity, a social life invariably yields
familiarity with certain ways of seeing and acting.33
Second, skills and knowledge range from highly specialized and scarce (media, legal,
military, etc.) to highly generalized and abundant. As Downs (1957) argued with respect to
the search costs of voting, everyday forms of activity like consuming mass media and
interpersonal contact produce a free and abundant stream of information. Some studies
characterize the act of voting as an instance of low information rationality, in which the
everyday lives of citizens provide them with bits of information that they use to determine
their vote (Popkin 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). In the long-term, this stream is a
source of socialization about politics, history, economics, psychology, and various other
Within rational choice theory, Downs (1957, 79) similarly describes contextual knowledge as a “grasp of
the relations among the fundamental variables in some area” of knowledge, the set of specializations that
characterize an advanced division of labor. He does not explicitly include practices, but the concept of
practice employed by Bourdieu abrogates the distinction between cognition and action, because both
ultimately require the deployment of schemas of classification in social activity. Again, for analytic purposes,
I distinguish the behavioral-cognitive aspect of schemas from their communicative or framing aspects.
33
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areas of concern. Unlike the heterogeneous distribution of schemas associated with
specialized sets of skills and knowledge, this free stream produces a comparatively flat
distribution of schemas, because they are forged from abundant information.
3.5.3. Familiarity and Tactics
In describing the relation between the performances of everyday life and
contentious performances, McAdam et al (2001, 140) state, “the social networks and
shared understandings at hand channel participants into available definitions of what is
happening, available means of communication and cooperation, available practices of
conflict resolution, and available cultural idioms.” I argue that an essential mechanism in
this channeling process is the role of familiarity in evaluating decision contexts, including
expected outcomes, utilities, and incentives, as well as the scope of choice sets.
The core of my concern lies in the relation between the degree of familiarity with
some subject, action, or situation in everyday life and the range of expectations regarding
tactical alternatives in contentious politics. In other words, it concerns the degree of
congruence between two apparently different decision contexts, one in everyday life and
another in contentious politics. Familiarity involves an interaction between environments
(or, alternatively, the information they give off and give up) and schemas. This channeling
mechanism concerns variation in the former while holding the latter constant. In this
sense, it is a process involving the transposition of schemas developed in one decision
context to another. This process occurs in everyday life, wherein we apply our experience
with some phenomenon to others, typically because 1) our experience with and knowledge
of the old experience exceeds our experience with and knowledge of the new experience,
and/or 2) the available information suggests the schema is appropriate for this experience.
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My argument is that this process likewise occurs in contentious politics; schemas
developed in everyday life are applied to contentious politics, because they reduce
uncertainties and transaction costs.
I clarify the concept of familiarity further by distinguishing among the everyday
correlates of contentious politics. Everyday correlates refer to those socializing sources
(decision contexts) and the schemas they generate that are potentially applicable to
contentious political activity. First, direct everyday correlates refer to imminent and
concrete experiences. For example, driving, talking, reading, walking, and hammering: all
of these represent experiences that over time impart deep senses of familiarity such that
they become second nature. Direct everyday correlates can range from extremely
abundant to extremely scarce: from talking and walking to organization and public
speaking and persuasion to military, scientific, and legal training. The concept also
encompasses experience with actual contentious politics. Like any form of social activity,
activism is potentially a habit-forming activity (Crossley 2003).
Indirect everyday correlates of contentious politics refer to those socializing sources
and the schemas they generate that are independent of actual or concrete experience.
These include those schemas generated by impersonal forms of information distribution,
especially the mass media. Downs’ stream of free information partially captures this flow
of distant experience. Importantly, indirect everyday correlates include schemas about the
history of contentious interaction, basic knowledge about the forms of protest and
resistance available to individuals and groups. Even without direct experience of strikes,
riots, bombings, or petitions, many people encounter some information in their daily lives
that provides them with basic sketches of what these concepts constitute and implicate. I
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assume that this stream of information is such that a given population of SMOs can produce
expectations for a set of tactics, Y (defined in Section 3.5.5). Additionally, I assume that
every SMO is likely to have an endowment of schemas such that they can produce
minimally confident expectations for a range of tactics, Yj (defined in Section 3.5.5). SMOs
may also simultaneously be endowed with scarce schemas such that they can produce
more confident expectations regarding a smaller range of tactics.34
An obvious implication of this analysis involves the relation between tactics and the
distribution of schemas. Familiarity with everyday correlates of contentious politics is
abundant for some tactics, while familiarity is scarce for others. In other words, tactics
vary in the degree of skill specialization that they require. Some notable examples of scarce
schemas with tactical implications include legal tactics, military training, and relationships
with the media. Somewhat less scarce but still not abundant schemas might involve basic
organizational and communication skills. Obvious examples of abundant schemas with
tactical implications may include shared understandings of pickets, petitions, rallies, and
strikes.
To further clarify, the (implicit) process of estimating expectations is not specific to
contentious politics. Familiarity is a product of the history of navigating similar sets of
situations and interactions involving generally similar people, equipment, language, and
practices. This process of socialization – an accumulation of choices and feedback -

One object of schemas requires further discussion. Consider a city with its defining terrain: roads, bridges,
signs, parks, buildings, etc., as well as its cultural features: specific places, history, etc. Local residents have
abundant schemas about this environment, all of which can contribute to more confident estimates of utilities
and outcomes. However, such schemas may also be regarded as scarce outside of the local population. The
simplest solution to this difficulty is to note that, again, the nature of the conflict determines the particular
parameters within a general model. Thus, the actual content of abundant and scarce schemas is determined
by the conflict structure, though they are still distinguished by their degree of dispersion across the
population.
34
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involves the implicit engraving of expectations within schemas such that Bourdieu (1990,
103-4) can describe the ‘practical sense’ as an “urgency of action” that “makes it possible to
appreciate the meaning of the situation…and to produce at once the opportune response”
without deduction or calculation. This opportune response is precisely the accumulation of
repeated experiences such that estimation becomes an implicit practical process.35 The
process of generating expectations is thus a sort of meta-schema transposed from the
everyday to the contentious.
3.5.4. Confidence and Transaction Costs
The familiar is attractive for a number of reasons. First, it reduces levels of
uncertainty about the consequences of action. If we take a classical rationalist perspective,
all possible courses of action produce finite numbers of different outcomes, all of which are
known by the actor (or they behave as if they know). A boundedly rational actor is likely to
have more information and a better understanding of the possible outcomes of some
actions as opposed to the outcomes of other possible actions. At the least, the former
should include those actions and their conditions that an actor is most familiar with, such
as actions that the actor engages in everyday with a generally predictable set of outcomes.
The latter should include actions which the actor is generally unfamiliar with, such as
actions that the actor has never experienced with little to no information regarding
possible outcomes. Of course, this act of transposition is generally not totally congruous
(everyday life is mostly not contentious politics), but it nonetheless provides some minimal
guidance. The hypothesis here is that familiarity reduces the uncertainty of (or increases
the confidence in) expectations about future outcomes.
Crossley (2001) describes a somewhat similar process in his effort to reconcile purposive habit-forming
choices with the habitus.
35
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Two, through the same process familiarity reduces levels of uncertainty with
respect to the estimation of expected costs and benefits. Again, because of an actor’s
familiarity with some courses of action as opposed to others, the relevant values of the
former are more firmly grasped than the latter. The less familiar courses of action (and
outcomes) are burdened with higher relative uncertainty.
A third effect of familiarity is to reduce learning and cooperation costs. All forms of
exchange and collective action involve transaction costs. With contentious collective
action, for example, there are intra-organizational bargaining and negotiating costs in
selecting and preparing actions, information costs involving assessments of outcomes,
incentives, and choice sets, and surveillance and enforcement costs relating to various
stages of cooperation. Shared understandings and social relations provide an existing
infrastructure that actors can utilize with less effort than if action was to involve strangers,
unknown technologies, or new actions. Thus, ceteris paribus, familiarity is inversely related
to transaction costs.
Fourth, familiarity provides pre-existing awareness of some behavioral options in
the choice set. Those courses of action already privileged with familiarity regarding
outcomes and incentives are more likely to ‘come to mind’ when faced with the task of
decision. Depending on the search, stopping, and decision rules (Gigerenzer and Selton
2002b), the extent to which individuals rely on this initial set of familiar options varies.
But what does higher or lower uncertainty mean in this context? Above I briefly
considered a continuum of levels of uncertainty. I can further flesh out my position of
imprecise probabilities by referring to Figure 3.5. Familiarity’s function thus far elucidated
is to contribute to a partial reduction in uncertainty by endowing actors with schemas that
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can serve as models or materials for contentious actions. In order to represent this
relation, Figure 3.5 presents an idealized schema of three tactics (x1, x2, x3) with variable
levels of familiarity. For each tactic, represented as a quadrilateral, probabilities for the
realization of future states of affairs run from left to right, 0 to 1, as clearly demonstrated
with x1. The most important aspect is the set of variable interval probabilities represented
as dotted lines; here, p and p represent the lower and upper probabilities. Clearly, as
familiarity increases the difference between p and p contracts. If we take the span of an
interval probability as a measure of uncertainty regarding Ω’ and U’, then we can develop a
set of relations from Figure 3.5: if |p - p = Δp, then Δp1 > Δp2 > Δp3. Thus, there is an
inverse relation between familiarity and uncertainty, or if we want to use a different
terminology, a positive relation between familiarity and confidence (Downs 1957, 77).36
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Figure 3.5. Familiarity and Uncertainty

Of course, as Downs (1957, 77) notes, some information can create more uncertainty by contradicting
already held information. This objection seems less pertinent to the use of schemas in this context, although
clearly feedback can challenge whether or not a schema was the appropriate one to apply in a situation.
36
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Four points are worth considering following this discussion. First, schemas are not
necessarily specific to one tactic. Familiarity is the degree of fit between initial information
and schemas such that an everyday decision context is implicitly grasped. In the
transposition of this process to contentious politics, schemas are potentially applicable to
wide ranges of tactics. Skills like holding signs, walking, or joining a boycott are widely
applicable. Organizational skills, for example, can be utilized in a significant variety of
contentious contexts. Even scarce legal skills can be used not only for crafting and
implementing legal strategies and tactics, but also for educating others about their rights,
avoiding provocative tactics by the opposition through knowledge of the law, creating
provocations that can legally support the SMO, endowing the SMO with various legal
paraphernalia, and providing legitimacy and authority in a media campaign, among others.
Art skills, to foreshadow, can be used in a wide array of activities: varieties of protest art
useful in fundraising, designing signs for marches and rallies, and designing websites.
Second, schemas are not the only means that SMOs utilize in order to generate
expectations. Current information about the situation is crucial in reducing uncertainties
and filling in the gaps between the schemas developed in previous everyday interactions
and unfolding contentious interactions
Finally, I incorporate the hypothesis that SMOs are ambiguity averse (Epstein 1999).
Ambiguity aversion refers to a basic preference for known risks over more ambiguous
risks. In other words, SMOs will tend to prefer definite probabilities to more imprecise
probabilities and smaller interval probabilities to wider interval probabilities. Figure 3.6
below can be interpreted as the effect of ambiguity aversion.
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Figures 3.6 and 3.7 graphically represent the relationships between familiarity,
transaction costs, and the probability that a particular tactic is adopted by an SMO. Figure
3.6 focuses on the importance of familiarity. Here, the probability of a tactic being adopted
within a population of SMOs is a function of the familiarity that actors have with the
everyday correlates of action and the percentage of the population that possesses these
schemas. These latter two variables together specify the scarcity of schemas in a
population, the range of which is captured in the grey zone. Moving diagonal from the
lower left to the upper right is thus an increase in the abundance of schemas across the
population. Tactics can be placed anywhere within the grey zone. Both familiarity and the
probability of adoption are continuous and range from 0 to 1, while the percentage of the
population ranges from 0 to 100. It is worth noting that this should not be interpreted as a
precise indicator of probability, but rather as an ordinal ranking in terms of the probability
of tactical adoption.
In general, this probability is here presented in a perfect positive correlation with
familiarity (though note again the preceding paragraph): an increase in a unit of familiarity
with the everyday correlates of tactics increases the probability that that tactic will be
adopted by a corresponding degree of probability. However, as noted, familiarity can be
distinguished by its degree of scarcity or abundance in a population. First, I consider
tactical adoption as a negatively decelerating function of scarce schemas (specialized skills
and knowledge). With very low levels of familiarity (whether scarce or abundant), actions
are highly unlikely to find favor with activists. In fact, activists are likely to never be aware
of them as even remote possibilities. In this way, they are excluded from the choice set.
However, scarce schemas are distributed unequally throughout a population; increases in
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Figure 3.6. The Distribution of Familiarity and Tactical Adoption

Decreasing Transaction Costs
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Familiarity
Figure 3.7. Familiarity, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Adoption
familiarity and adoption are marginal until the population possessing the skills and
knowledge pertaining to the everyday correlates of contentious politics is represented in
the lower percentiles. Second, I consider tactical adoption as a positively decelerating
function of abundant schemas. Again, low familiarity yields a low probability of adoption.
However, a marginal shift down the upper percentiles of the population (a shift crossing a
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space that represents that small part of the population that is generally ignorant of
common everyday routines and tasks with contentious correlates) yields extensive
increases in the probability of adoption. Here, the general abundance of familiarity
sustains a high probability across the remaining population.
Familiarity provides a second set of incentives for or against certain courses of
action: transaction costs. Figure 3.7 concerns the relation between familiarity, transaction
costs, and the probability of tactical adoption. Here, I focus on scarce schemas. For the rest
of the analysis I assume that abundant schemas are constant. Such a distribution has
uninteresting effects on transaction costs. Additionally, transaction costs are represented
as decreasing as opposed to a more standard presentation of increasing costs. Thus,
movement up the y-axis yields lower costs and thus a lower probability of tactical adoption.
As noted above, the degree of familiarity is inversely related to the costs of transacting with
others. Thus, more familiarity yields lower costs. However, the relation takes the form of
a positively decelerating curve. At very low levels, marginal increases in familiarity
engender significant decreases in transaction costs. As familiarity continues to increase,
however, it yields a decreasing rate of return as a more confident sketch of the possible
situation comes into view. Once the major details of the situation are in place, increases in
familiarity are of less and less value in altering probabilities of tactical adoption. The
relation between costs and probability of adoption is strictly negative according to rational
choice theory. Ceteris paribus, assuming variation in transaction costs across any set of
tactical alternatives, differences in such costs (indeed any costs) account for differences in
the probability of the adoption of the tactic.
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A broader way of looking at Figures 4.6 and 4.7 is as a static portrait of the relation
of everyday life to contentious politics. The closer a contentious performance relates to a
non-contentious performance, meaning the degree to which the conditions of actions in
everyday life inform the contentious performance, the more likely the tactic is to be chosen.
Thus, Figure 3.6 is a formal representation of channeling. It suggests that everyday life
constrains contentious politics through the reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs.
This is not to suggest that factors like social networks and resources are not part of the
channeling dynamic. What it means is that the familiarity with people and the means to act
can be expressed as variable provisions of schemas.
An additional point begs for discussion. In their revision of the renowned SES
model for explaining political participation, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995; Brady,
Verba, and Schlozman 1995) focus on the sets of organizational and communicative skills
that mediate between the effects of socioeconomic variables and political behavior. They
hypothesize a close relation between three organizational settings (school, work, and
religious organization) and the development of these skills. Descriptively, they find that
these skills are not purely abundant nor are they strictly scarce according to the model
developed above. Instead, they occupy the middle of the grey zone of Figure 3.6. The
approach taken in this chapter regarding familiarity can be seen as a generalization of this
SES-resource model. The skills developed in particular network settings (themselves
shaped by broader field forces in, for example, education, occupations, and religion)
generate particular competencies and knowledge that can be transposed into other
settings, such as activism. This relation between the SES-resource model and the approach
taken in this dissertation will be further considered in Chapter Eight.

103

3.5.5. Defining Sets of Tactics
Familiarity is operative on only a subset of all possible tactics, however. To clarify, it
is useful to first define possible, recognized, and probable tactics. A possible tactic is a
purely abstract construction denoting an action that can occur, even if it has not been or
ever will be. A complete set of possible tactics does not include impossible tactics nor does
it involve probabilities; possible tactics defined solely as possible have no more probability
of selection than any other possible tactic (unless the latter are included in the sets of
recognized or probable tactics). Generally speaking, this conception of possibility is
irreducible to specific situations and interactions. Recognized tactics are any tactics that
obtain a minimally confident set of expectations such that their probability of adoption
among a population of SMOs is less than an interval probability of 0 to 1. Probable tactics
are any tactics that possess a reasonable chance of being employed across the population at
a given time. Using the notation developed in the discussion of effectiveness and goals, the
set of possible tactics is represented as X. Y denotes the set of recognized tactics, while R
specifies the set of probable tactics. Considering these definitions, we can logically state
that, X ⊇ Y ⊇ R.
An important consideration is left unattended: the choice sets specific to a given
SMO. Recall the marker of membership for a tactic in Y: a minimally confident set of
expectations. I assume for convenience that the set of tactics in Y is constant across all
SMOs in a given society. I justify this assumption on the basis of two arguments. First,
recall Downs’ (1957) notion of a free stream of information. At a minimum, such a
distribution of information should allow for a given population to produce expectations for
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a range of tactics.37 Although the distribution is not perfectly flat (see Figure 3.6), for this
analysis I assume that variations in the distribution do not correlate with SMO estimates of
utility. Second, I assume - as a means to decrease the search costs for effective tactics – that
SMOs cluster sets of tactics into a smaller number of categories of tactics and produce
expectations for these clusters. For example, instead of listing all of the tactical variations
of the street demonstration and producing estimates for each one, SMOs instead lump them
together in a category like ‘street demonstration.’
However, though I assume a constancy of tactics, each SMO obtains its own set of
tactics, Yj, because SMOs assign different expectations to each tactic in the set, Y. I define a
fourth set, K, as the set of possible but unrecognized tactics. Because I am most concerned
with Y, I can define their relations formally. If Y ⊆ X, then X / Y = K such that K ⊆ X. Thus,
below a certain threshold of familiarity, the probability of tactical adoption is effectively
zero, because there is no information relating the accoutrements of everyday situations to
the outcomes or utilities of contentious action. Unlike Y, K is not defined heterogeneously
across SMOs, because by definition tactics in K do not obtain interval probabilities.
The third subset of X, denoted R, is the repertoire of contention. R is defined by the
population of SMOs at a given time. While a given SMO defines their set Yj as the set of
recognized tactics with their unique (to the SMO) set of expectations, set R constitutes the
array of tactics that all groups recognize as reasonably probable. Thus, like Y, R is a set of
37

Partial empirical support for this assumption is available:
Respondents…were asked to indicate whether there were any [protest] items they failed to
recognize…Only the boycott item drew more than a few ‘Don’t recognize” responses, and this mostly
in mainland Europe where they averaged about 7 percent of each national sample. This result,
simple enough in itself, is of more than methodological interest. It indicates support for our basic
idea that a substantial level of consciousness about protest behavior has indeed permeated the wider
political community. Everyone knows what protest behavior is, though not everyone will necessarily
recognize it by that name (original emphasis, Barnes and Kaase 1979, 70).
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tactics constant across a population of SMOs. Similarly, like Y, R is heterogeneous with
respect to expectations. Reasonable probability is thus a property of a tactic (and the set,
R) in relation to the entire population of SMOs, not a property with respect to a specific
SMO. This last qualifier is significant, because while the population of SMOs may regard a
tactic (say r1) as obtaining a reasonable probability of being adopted (it is part of the
repertoire of contention), within the set Rj the same tactic may obtain an extremely low
probability of adoption. Thus, reasonable probability is not an organizational-level
variable, though by definition a tactic in the repertoire must possess a relatively high
probability of adoption for at least some minimal number of SMOs.
To give this distinction some concreteness I consider two tactics: suicide car
bombing and picketing. Both tactics are recognizable in the United States in the sense that
some basic expectations can be generated by the general population. However, for a vast
majority of SMOs, suicide car bombing is given a fairly definite improbability of adoption
(some possible reasons: it likely rates as counter-effective and normatively unacceptable
and those SMOs that would use the tactic would find immediate and overwhelming
repression). Picketing, on the other hand, may find significant favor among some SMOs.
The latter, of course, is a well-known member of set R, the repertoire of contention,
whereas suicide car bombing, though well-known, does not obtain a reasonable probability
of adoption, and thus lacks membership in R, though it is a member of Y.
3.6. Familiarity, Effectiveness, and Incentives
I continue a sketch of an uncertain world by considering the relation between
familiarity and effectiveness. Familiarity produces at least three basic effects: a reduction
of uncertainty, lowered transaction costs, and a more manageable choice set. Effectiveness
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defines alternatives within a set of tactics in terms of their utility as preferences and
constraints. Thus, we can say that while the above analysis of effectiveness assumes
perfect information, uncertainty implies: 1) some tactics (K) possess no expectations, and
2) the expectations of recognized tactics vary in their degree of uncertainty.
Additionally, recall that recognition is defined as the attainment of minimally
confident expectations, or, in other words it achieves a minimal level of confidence without
falling into complete Knightian uncertainty. With respect to effectiveness, it is important to
consider the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic goals. It seems safe to assume that
the representation of uncertainty (or confidence) as interval probabilities is primarily a
property of the relation between an SMO and the world. If this is a safe assumption then
the assignment of interval probabilities falls primarily on the property of extrinsic efficacy.
However, intrinsic goals can concern the relation between an SMO and the world. For
example, Kriesi et al (1995) argues that some movements seek to craft identity through
highly disruptive contentious interactions. I thus assume for the purposes of analysis that
SMOs with either intrinsic or extrinsic goals face uncertainty.
3.6.1. Ambiguity Aversion and Effectiveness
Tactics vary for an SMO both in their perceived effectiveness and the confidence
with which this perception is held. If these vary independently, important consequences
follow. Familiar tactics may not be perceived as particularly effective, while tactics that are
not as familiar may be perceived as effective. Figure 3.8 presents a hypothetical scenario
involving three tactics: y1, y2, y3. Each tactic is assigned an effectiveness score and an
interval probability by the SMO. The latter, of course, represents the degree of confidence
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Figure 3.8. Uncertainty and Effectiveness: A Scenario
or certainty (and, conversely, the degree of uncertainty) attributed to the effectiveness
score by virtue of the familiarity that the SMO has with everyday correlates of these tactics.
A first crack at a preference relation for this set of tactics might look something like
this: y3 ≻ y2 ≻ y1. However, variation in confidence problematizes this initial structure.
Consider the relation, y3 ≻ y2. A significant overlap persists between the range of
probabilities assigned to both y2 and y3. Under this condition, the actual probability of y2
may yield a higher effectiveness score than y3. Aware of this possibility, an SMO may find
no decision rule to rationally distinguish between the two options.38 Sadly, despite
numerous efforts to solve this problem (Walley 1991), none has yet proven generally
acceptable. Even more complicating is the effect of ambiguity aversion (Epstein 1999).
Above, I assume that SMOs have a preference for tighter interval probabilities, meaning a
generalized aversion to more uncertain outcomes relative to more certain outcomes.
3.6.2. Searching and Information Costs
I consider one general means by which an SMO may cope with these difficulties: the
acquisition of information. The preceding analysis involves a sequential process in which

Obviously, a fuller consideration of the question of when a reasonable decision can be made requires a
deeper rendering of the question of incentives. This discussion assumes that all costs and benefits (excepting
the aversion to ambiguity and effectiveness [an investment cost or benefit]) are constant.
38
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initial information activates schemas that construct various tactical alternatives such that a
reasonable decision can be made. The following analysis extends this process by allowing
the search for information after an initial sketch does not provide the conditions for a
reasonable decision. A great deal has been written on information search, especially in
economics (Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright 2005). As far as I am aware, nothing comparable
has been published on the question of tactical choice in contentious politics. The effort will
be very cursory.
A basic assumption of rational choice theory is that costs reduce the attractiveness
or utility of options. Tactics vary for an SMO in how much they are expected to cost.
Above, I discussed variation in transaction costs. I assume that a notable component of the
search process is the incurring of specific types of transaction or intrinsic costs: search and
information costs. Of course, the decision to search is made only when the expected
benefits of searching exceed the expected costs.39 At the least, the benefits of searching
include the reduction of uncertainty (Downs 1957, 77). Thus, searching entails the
acquisition and processing of information in order to reduce the costs of uncertainty.
Search is concluded whenever the costs of search equal or exceed the marginal returns.
One aspect of searching deserves extensive comment here. Above I assumed that
the population of SMOs possesses minimally confident expectations for a set of tactics, Y.
Recall that set Y is the set of recognized tactics, and not the repertoire of contention, or R,

But how can an SMO know that search will yield crucial information (see footnote 9 and Downs 1957,77 )
such that confidence is increased? Can an SMO assign a probability to the expected benefits of search?
Should an SMO weigh this probability against the probability that the effectiveness of y 2 exceeds that of y3? If
the probability of reducing uncertainty through search is lower than the probability that the effectiveness of
y2 exceeds that of y3, does the SMO choose y3 because the highest probable effectiveness of y3 exceeds the
highest probable effectiveness of y2, while the lowest probable effectiveness of y2 is lower than the lowest
probable effectiveness of y3? Though these are important questions, for now I assume that the expected
benefits are minimally sufficient to generate a search decision.
39
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the set of tactics with a reasonable probability of being utilized. Recall as well that
familiarity with some everyday correlates of tactics can vary from an abundant distribution
across a population to a scarce distribution. Again, the latter implies that while some
tactics require a basic level of cognitive awareness that is widely distributed, others are
more specialized in the means by which they are practiced. Consequently, confidence
regarding the expected estimates of outcomes and utilities for the former should be high
relative to the latter.
Under these assumptions, how is it that tactics requiring some specialized
awareness can also be given minimally confident expectations by the entire population of
SMOs? In other words, if they require scarce schemas, how can those lacking these
schemas recognize them? One solution has already been described. In a classic study of
attitudes towards protest, almost all respondents in surveys administered over five
advanced industrial democracies were able to recognize sets of tactics ranging from
petitioning and writing a letter to newspapers to various legal, illegal, and violent tactics
like demonstrations, occupation of buildings, and damage to property (Barnes and Kaase
1979, 70). Such a list is not exhaustive, but it does suggest an interesting approach to
explaining the process of search. Most of the items in the survey were general terms that,
though perfectly valid as categories, nonetheless covered significant heterogeneity in
tactics. The blocking of traffic, for example, can come in numerous variations: terrain
(roads, footpaths, trains, ports, and now, the Internet), materials (barricades, human
chains, vehicles, disruption of existing traffic), modes (street theater, confrontations, etc.),
etc. In order to navigate this complexity, I assume that SMOs cluster sets of tactics into a
smaller number of categories and produce expectations for these clusters. Each cluster is
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thus characterized by a singular bundled estimate of expected outcomes, utilities, and
probabilities; all of the tactics included in a cluster possess these sets of values for the SMO.
Categories or tactical clusters with high familiarity are susceptible to
decomposition; in other words, the more familiar an SMO is with the everyday correlates of
a tactical cluster, the more likely an SMO is to make subtler distinctions within the cluster
and thus to introduce variation in expectations. An opposing proposition thus holds that
the less familiar an SMO is with a tactical cluster, the more extensive and potentially
heterogeneous is the set of tactics included in the cluster. An example may be the very
wide range of tactics available on the Internet. Those unfamiliar with the Internet may
cluster all of these tactics together and generate a set of expectations despite the variety of
this online repertoire. A similar process occurs with respect to clusters with high
effectiveness, though with an important caveat: ceteris paribus, perceived higher
effectiveness is more likely to lead to the expenditure of resources (costs) in order to
decompose the cluster into finer distinctions. Information is usually sought regarding the
set of tactics with the highest perceived effectiveness in order to make more careful
distinctions among more attractive options. Of course, this process occurs only under
conditions of search, itself a consequence of uncertainty.
There are at least two important exceptions to the transaction costs of searching
that posit basically non-negative incentives. First, recall my Downsian assumption that a
free stream of information affords the population of SMOs in a society (through
socialization) the ability to produce minimally confident expectations for a set of tactics, Y.
This free stream of information also provides current information on actual interactions or
situations. These streams (which may vary systematically across contexts in terms of the
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quantity and quality of information) are intervening variables between the opportunity
structures that activists face - sets of institutions and interactions that produce up-to-date
contextual information - and the perception and evaluation of these opportunities and
threats. The initial stimulus that activates schemas may or may not derive from this stream
of information, but subsequent search by the SMO draws on this diffuse stream in order to
provide more confidence in the estimates of expected outcomes and utilities. The search of
the stream includes incidental acquisitions of information (a generic property of social
interaction and media) and intentional acquisitions by the SMO. The latter involves both
the mining of the stream by the SMO and the efforts by actors outside of the SMO to provide
information to it, including family, friends, other SMOs, interest groups, and even
government and media sources.
Additionally, it seems reasonable to suggest that members of SMOs in general may
have larger streams of free information. Studies are consistent in showing that, like those
who engage in other forms of political participation, activists are relatively high in
motivational attitudes and behaviors like political interest and political discussion
(Jennings and Anderson 2003; Norris 2002; Schussman and Soule 2005). Interest in
politics involves an intrinsic motivation to acquire political information. Activists may thus
be more inclined to enjoy the process of acquiring and processing the information that they
encounter in their daily lives as well as the information that they actively pursue outside of
this stream, even if it is costly.
Taken to the extreme, these qualifications suggest that some activists are prone to
acquire information such that uncertainty is reduced to certainty. However, at least two
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objections are relevant.40 First, uncertainty is a generic property of contentious politics.
Considering even the intrinsic benefits of acquiring information, the search process
inevitably yields increasingly marginal returns in the reduction of uncertainty. Second,
uncertainty is reduced until a reasonable decision can be made. In the example provided
by Figure 3.8, a reasonable decision could be made once the overlap between y2 and y3
dissolves. Further search may yield continued intrinsic benefits, but this search is not
motivated by the desire to reduce uncertainty in the particular decision context. Thus, a
terminal decision to act is made even though information acquisition continues.
3.6.3. Other Intrinsic Incentives
Other intrinsic costs and benefits are potentially relevant in determining the
attractiveness of tactics.41 Expenses incurred in social exchanges include, as noted before,
1) bargaining and negotiation costs, and 2) surveillance and enforcement costs.
Individually and additively, these costs should negatively correlate with the probability of
tactical adoption. As demonstrated in Figure 3.7, a more complex relation emerges with
the consideration of familiarity.
Does the theoretical discussion above suggest a corresponding relation between
familiarity, intrinsic benefits, and the probability of tactical adoption? Rational choice
theory is unequivocal on one point: ceteris paribus, an increase in benefits should be
associated with an increase in the probability of tactical adoption. Some scholars
incorporate various intrinsic constraints and their corresponding incentives, including

Other important objections involve the relaxation of certain information assumptions, including the
assumptions of crucial, accurate, and inert information.
41
These incentives should primarily be consequential insofar as they discriminate among tactics. Any costs
or benefits that are generic to the act of choosing and engaging in tactics such that the costs are constant
across all options are inconsequential in this analysis.
40
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conforming to norms against violence, the thrill of action, and enjoying the company of
others (Jasper 1997; Opp 1989). My contribution is to suggest that whatever the
expectations, increases in familiarity should be associated with increases in confidence in
these expectations. I consider intrinsic incentives in Chapter Twelve.
3.6.4. Other Extrinsic Incentives
Above, the concept of an ideology established an interface between shared
understandings and the opportunity structures that will be considered more in depth in
Chapter Ten. This relationship is essentially a relation between schemas and information:
shared understandings are durable structures of information, while structures of
opportunity produce more contextual updates on the opportunities and threats facing
actors. The durability of many aspects of opportunity structures (institutional frameworks
like electoral systems and federalism as well as the persistence of specific organizational
relations like political parties, militaries, religious bodies, media organizations, and the
police) is thus supportive of the generation of shared understandings regarding the
vulnerabilities, motivation, and capacities offered by these structures.
Recall that familiarity reduces the uncertainties associated with the expectations of
action regarding both intrinsic and extrinsic processes. It follows that expected extrinsic
outcomes and incentives are derived in part from this prior sketch of the field of action: the
sets of vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities offered by the arrangement of actors,
institutions, and resources. Importantly, as suggested by Figure 3.2, an SMO with an
intrinsic goal must nevertheless engage in actions that can produce extrinsic outcomes like
repression or increased public support. This is so not only because of the possibility of a
heterogeneous hierarchical goal structure (intrinsic goals can nevertheless produce
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objectives that require extrinsically-oriented actions), but also because of the tendency for
oppositional practices, intrinsically oriented or otherwise, to generate dynamics of
opposition and support.
3.7. Conclusion
This principle goal of this chapter is to present a set of theoretical instruments for
explaining tactical choice. In this chapter I supplement the discussion from Chapter Two
with collective action theory and bounded rationality. I focus on two basic effects derived
from variation in socialization across a population of SMO members. First, I consider the
importance of collective identity in establishing basic constraints on the expectations
generated for a set of tactics, including the attribution of effectiveness. Second, I consider
how an SMO’s familiarity with the everyday correlates of tactics may affect the degree of
confidence in these expectations. In general, the two chapters together argue that the
effects of the socializing structures of everyday life – the networks and fields that organize
activities and the shared understandings that they generate – can be translated into a
consideration of the effects of a variety of costs and benefits on choice among a variety of
tactics.
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CHAPTER 4. DATA
In order to navigate the encounter between theoretical reflection and empirical
scrutiny, means of research must be devised that both maximize the risks to the
multiplicity of theories involved and minimize the uncertainties associated with faithfully
interpreting empirical results. Such conditions are seldom satisfactorily met in any
research project in the natural or social sciences. Consequently, a critical responsibility for
any researcher is to acknowledge, enumerate, and explore the limitations and constraints
of research as well as to identify the scope of, and opportunities for, knowledge claims.
The core task of this chapter is to present the foundations of the methodological
approach of this dissertation and its attendant responsibilities. First, I situate this
approach within the field of social movement studies, especially with respect to advanced
quantitative methods such as protest event analysis. Second, I detail the procedures
pertaining to the design of the sample utilized in this study and its constraints, especially
selection bias and the lack of representativeness. Third, I explore the means and methods
of data collection used in this study ranging from the use of primary and secondary textual
sources to semi-structured interviews. Fourth, I present brief descriptions of the twelve
cases that constitute the sample in this study.
4.1. Research Constraints
4.1.1. Methods and Data in Social Movements Studies
With the exception of experimental methods, the field of social movement and
protest studies is methodologically pluralist (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002). As
noted in Chapter One, the principal means of quantitative research is protest event
analysis, or the content coding of collective action events reported in newspapers, though
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police and organizational archives have also been used as supplemental or even primary
sources (Kriesi et al 1995; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1983; 1999; Olzak 1992;
Tilly 1995; 2008; Tilly et al 1975). This approach to quantifying the character and
frequency of protest has yielded significant progress by providing the field with a firm
empirical foundation for testing explanations of protest behavior. It has also garnered a
great deal of criticism (Davenport 2009; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996; Oliver and
Maney 2000). While this debate is extensive and informative, I focus on two critical points
of contention for this dissertation related to source constraints.
Event analysis systematically over-represents contentious phenomena like strikes
and demonstrations and under-represents less conspicuous tactics like small symbolic
actions (McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996; Mueller 1997; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004).
First, the criteria for coding events often include publicity. Publicity is operationalized as
reported and newsworthy events or actions deemed significant by the political and legal
authorities, hence the utility of newspapers and government documents as the sources of
event data. Such an operationalization (and conceptualization) excludes most instances of
culture jamming. Although some culture jamming events, especially Reclaim the Streets!
actions, create newsworthy spectacles, most culture jamming is public in a general sense
yet lacks newsworthiness.
Second, protest events are conceptualized as collective actions. This criterion is
generally operationalized as the reporting of some action involving at least ten or twenty
individuals. Though the definition of culture jamming utilized in this dissertation stresses
culture jamming as collective action, the number of individuals involved ranges from two to
thousands. As a consequence, unlike other protest phenomena like riots, petitions,
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demonstrations, or strikes, culture jams do not generally receive frequent or systematic
mass media coverage. Despite the fact that the definition of culture jamming used in this
study defines it as a form of action, I conclude that no sources of systematic event data are
currently available and that compiling such a dataset is unrealistic.
Another quantitative approach in the field, especially in organizational ecology
studies, focuses on a different unit of analysis: the SMO (Edwards and Foley 2002; Everett
1992; Gamson 1990; Lofland 1996; Minkoff 1995; Soule and King 2008). In order to
compile a sample frame of SMOs in a given territory at a given time, scholars typically
utilize directories of organizations, especially the Encyclopedia of Associations in studies of
American social movements (Minkoff 1995). After a sample is extracted, information on
each SMO is collected through various methods on topics ranging from organizational
structure and resources to tactics and alliances. Variables are then coded, thus enabling
the exercise of a range of statistical techniques.
4.1.2. Unit of Analysis
The protest event and the SMO do not exhaust the many possible units of analysis.
Others include the individual in survey research and ethnographic studies as well as frames
or discourses in qualitative textual and quantitative content analyses. The primary unit of
analysis in this study is the CJO. In part, this follows from the research definition (D.2) of
culture jamming utilized in this study, which distinguishes collective from individual
actions. Only collective actions constitute culture jams under this conception, and thus
those groups of individuals who come together to perform such collective actions are a
more suitable unit of analysis than individuals who engage in culture jamming. Thus, while
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this study tends to speak broadly of culture jamming, more constrained generalizations are
made based on the population of CJOs.
However, another approach to the individual as the unit of analysis is available.
CJOs are composed of individuals and, as the discussion below will suggest, variation
among individuals on key variables within such groups may arise in the collection and
analysis of data. Indeed, some criticisms of Bourdieusian concepts like habitus and field
insist on their intractable individualism (Bottero and Crossley 2011). In my judgment, the
generally small size of culture jamming groups affords this study the opportunity to
assume, in general, that an analysis at the level of the organization sacrifices little in the
way of empirical leverage over my research questions. Moreover, the data acquired in this
study allows me to identify intra-organizational variation at the individual level as an
organizational variable whenever such a procedure is necessary or productive.
4.1.2. Sampling Constraints
The ability or inability to compile an adequate sampling frame of SMOs has
significant consequences for research. First, without something approximating a
population list, the degree to which a sample is representative of the population of cases is
uncertain. Consequently, inferences and generalizations about populations are
substantially more problematic. Although the sampling frame is always a difficult issue in
social movement studies (Klandermans and Smith 2002, 14), obtaining a population list of
culture jamming organizations is still more laden with difficulties due to the lack of
directories or reliable substitutes. In studies with complete or adequate sampling frames
in which samples are drawn from the population (as opposed to an analysis of the entire
population in a census), the problem of obtaining a representative sample is generally
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tackled through the random selection of cases. Case selection in this study is thus by
necessity nonrandom.
Second, all of the cases included in the sample for this study are positive cases of
culture jamming. Sample designs that select on the dependent variable severely constrain
the range of possible knowledge claims that a study offers (King et al 1994). Still, a variety
of claims are available in such circumstances, such as descriptive inferences, identification
of necessary and/or sufficient conditions, and theory and hypothesis development (George
and Bennett 2005). In addition, whenever possible, variation will be introduced into the
dependent variable.
Third, the number of cases may affect the degree to which results are generalizable
or inferences are sound. Other research strategies, such as case studies, enable confident
inferences and generalizations based on smaller numbers of cases though under more
constraints (Gerring 2006). Previous research on culture jamming includes the two case
studies performed by Sandlin and Callahan (2009), three culture jamming groups studied
by Nomai (2008), and the seven organizations engaged by Wettergren (2005). While these
studies generate important insights into their specific cases as well as culture jamming in
general, it is my intention to expand the number of cases normally studied in works on
culture jamming in order to maximize the generality of my argument to culture jamming in
general as defined by the more restricted research definition (D.2).
4.2. Sample Design
4.2.1. Case Selection Criteria
Obtaining a sample of CJOs first requires that we translate the definition of culture
jamming utilized in this study into an operational definition capable of specifying a
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negative or positive case. For this study, a positive instance of culture jamming occurs
when a collection of individuals durably self-identify as a formal or informal actor whose set
of public actions include a significant subset of actions identified as (D.2) culture jamming.
This operationalization and other considerations yield a set of case selection
criteria: organization, contentious claims-making, ironic structure, location, and activity.42
Most lack the determinist assumptions common in many quantitative selection criteria.
Case selection is thus a messier process than desired. First, it emphasizes the actor as the
unit of analysis. Although included under the broad conception of culture jamming (D.1),
the research definition (D.2) excludes individuals. At a minimum, individuals identify
themselves as engaging in collective actions attributed to themselves and others as a
durable collective actor with formal or informal organizational properties including
especially decision-making procedures. Thus, individuals like Ron English or Banksy do
not qualify as cases in this analysis, because they lack this essential element of durable
collective organization.
Filling out some of the remaining criteria requires an operationalization of the
definition of culture jamming utilized in this study.43 While any SMO may engage in a range
of public actions, this definition focuses on culture jams. The second criterion involves the
claims-making process in culture jamming that implicates an identity or subject in a

An implicit criterion is publicity. The operationalization stresses those actions that are public. For
McAdam et al (2001, 5), this defines a scope of activity that excludes intra-organizational action. In Goffman’s
(1974) terminology, this excluded set of actions refers to the ‘back stage’ of organizational presentation.
Humorous office memos do not suffice. However, this criterion did not prove particularly discriminatory in
selecting cases.
43
(D.2) A contentious collective act involving the disruptive re-contextualization of a particular practice,
object, or discourse of a dominant ensemble of representation that is constrained by the elements of that
particular representation.
42
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contentious relation to another identity or object.44 Thus, the claims of one actor should be
identified as contentious, meaning if they were realized they would affect the interests of
the object, though the criterion of mutual recognition implicit in McAdam et al (2001) is
relaxed in favor of an intention of recognition (see Chapter Two). Thus, positive cases of
culture jamming involve the intentional aspiration to realize interests potentially
detrimental to some object. This criterion effectively excludes a great deal of culture
jamming from the analysis. For example, the Hypothetical Development Organization, a
New Orleans based group of culture jammers that creates practically impossible
architectural designs for derelict urban structures and presents them both on-site and in
institutional settings (art galleries), fails to register as a positive case of culture jamming,
because they do not regard their actions as contentious.45
Third, a significant component of the action is its symbolic nature. Culture jams are
relatively sophisticated symbolic statements. Thus, while all actions express some
meanings, and many contentious collective actions express relatively simple meanings such
as threat, culture jams involve an ironic structure and thus a subtly more complex
representation. As noted in Chapter One, this ironic structure is dominated by the form of
the dominant representation. This criterion is critical in that ideally it excludes culture
jammers from other acts of symbolic politics. For example, while a group like Negativland
re-assembles the sonic fragments of consumer culture into critical music tracks, groups like

A second implicit criterion is opposition. When this contentious relation is identified as involving the
perception of asymmetric power relations and the pressing of claims upon a dominant object, it is classified
as culture jamming. In other words, positive cases of culture jamming for this study are identified by their
opposition to perceived dominant representations. However, like publicity, this criterion failed to provide
additional leverage in identifying positive cases of culture jamming.
45 More accurately, they do not regard a political interpretation of their actions as especially illuminating
(Hypothetical Development Organization 2011).
44
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Public Enemy launch largely direct social and political criticism within sonic structures
assembled from elements themselves largely immune to these criticisms.
Fourth, I chose to restrict my analysis to CJOs that locate themselves within the
United States or Canada. While a more thorough study would certainly include the large
number of well-known groups in the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and France, and
many other countries, resource constraints necessitated a narrower and more practical
focus.
Finally, organizations that are currently active or that have engaged in collective
actions within the last five years are included. Older organizations are excluded.
4.2.2. Sampling Procedures
The sampling strategy adopted for this dissertation has two phases. During Phase I
an initial list of CJOs was gathered from various sources. The closest approximation to a
directory of culture jammers is the website Sniggle.net (Gross n.d.), an unofficial
‘encyclopedia’ of culture jamming events, texts, individuals, and groups. Sniggle.net is a
website created and maintained by Dave Gross and supplied with content on a wide array
of subversive or irreverent cultural activities by various contributors from across the
Internet. The content is typically arranged in the form of short descriptions with
hyperlinks to relevant sites.
However, Sniggle.net is not an ideal source. There are no means to verify whether
the website’s content is comprehensive or the degree to which its content represents
culture jamming as a whole. The procedures for identifying culture jamming content are
less than explicit or systematic. Voluntary contributions are the primary source of content;
however, Gross does not explain his criteria for acceptance or rejection, though it seems
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fairly relaxed. Perhaps more telling is the disclaimer: “The Culture Jammer’s Encyclopedia
isn’t meant to be an encyclopedia of culture jammers, so much as an encyclopedia for
culture jammers” (original emphasis, Gross n.d.) However, Sniggle.net offers the best
starting point for compiling a sample of culture jammers. Case selection thus began by
compiling a list of positive cases of culture jammers from Sniggle.net. This list was
supplemented by the inclusion of a small number of other sources, including the Wikipedia
article on culture jamming (Wikipedia contributors 2012), various culture jamming texts
(Klein 2000; Lasn 1999), and finally the cases analyzed by Wettergren (2005). There was a
high degree of overlap among these sources, though Wikipedia and especially Sniggle.net
were the most extensive. It is worth noting that in the case of the Wikipedia page, the
selection process is similar to Sniggle.net’s process in that it involves contributions. A
difference is noteworthy as well; contributions are not selected by a single individual, but
are the result of a cooperative equilibrium established by multiple contributors.
Phase II trimmed this initially messy list down to the twelve cases identified in
Table 4.1. Groups like newmindspace, ®™ark, Evolution Control Committee, and California
Department of Corrections were excluded from the sample principally as a consequence of
resource constraints, the paucity of data, and/or a lack of overt opposition. Analyzing
twelve cases does present numerous difficulties somewhat alien to case studies of one to
three cases or large N-studies. In particular, the depth of analysis is in part constrained by
the time and space available. Each chapter handles this difficulty in its own way.
4.3. Data Collection
Within the constraints described above, studies of culture jamming utilize two basic
methodological strategies. Some studies rely on existing data (Cammaerts 2007; Harold
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Table 4.1. Sample of Culture Jamming Organizations
Culture Jamming Organization
Adbusters Media Foundation
Anti-Advertising Agency
Billboard Liberation Front
The Billionaires
Center for Tactical Magic
Critical Art Ensemble
Institute for Applied Autonomy
Institute for Infinitely Small Things
Negativland
Reverend Billy and the Church of Earthalujah!
Surveillance Camera Players
The Yes Men

Acronym
AMF
AAA
BLF
BIL
CTM
CAE
IAA
IST
NVL
RBC
SCP
YM

2007; Jordan 2002; Meikle 2002; Sandlin and Callahan 2009; Strangelove 2005). This
includes primary sources such as the websites, organizational documents, and interviews
of CJOs and individuals as well as secondary materials such as Mark Dery’s (1993)
pamphlet or Naomi Klein’s (2000) No Logo. Others supplement these data with interviews
with culture jammers (Nomai 2008; Wettergren 2005; Woodside 2001). This dissertation
employs the latter strategy.
4.3.1. Primary and Secondary Sources
For this work I gathered data from a diverse array of primary and secondary
sources. Chapter’s Seven through Twelve focus on my sample of CJOs and rely primarily on
the former including group websites, published group texts, interviews, news and journal
articles, and a number of video and audio resources, all of which are cited in the Case
References section of this work. I also utilize an array of secondary sources including
commentaries and research on culture jamming groups and activities.
Selecting these sources was a relatively unsystematic process aside from a guiding
principle akin to a kitchen sink approach: grab anything of potential relevance. The
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sources were obtained in four ways: through repeated searches over the Internet from
roughly 2010-2013, various sites like Wikipedia and Sniggle.net, Lexis Nexis searches for
relevant newspaper and magazine articles, and citation tracing in both academic and
activist texts. More often than not problems stemmed from sparse data. Only Adbusters
Media Foundation, the Yes Men, Reverend Billy and the Church of Earthalujah!, and the
Billionaires generated enough sources to make this process unwieldy. For example, Lexis
Nexis searches from 1980 to 2013 yielded 422 results for Reverend Billy, a figure that does
not include the highly prolific blog posts of Reverend Billy. Haugerud (2013, 175)
observed the publication of 550 articles concerning the Billionaires between January 2000
and June 2007. Adbusters in particular presents problems of data saturation. First, a Lexis
Nexis search yields 995 results. Second, its primary organ of action is a bi-monthly (since
2001) magazine, Adbusters, which began publication in 1989. From the summer of 1989 to
the final issue of 2012, the organization has produced nearly a hundred issues. In order to
engage this latter mass of data, I generated a random sample of issues over a five year
period, 2008-2012. One issue was chosen out of every six issues in a year. Along with
Lasn’s (1999) Culture Jam and various interviews, these are the most essential sources for
the Adbusters Media Foundation.
In general, this type of data has a number of drawbacks. Some sources are limited in
scope, content, clarity, coherence, and analysis. The bulk of the material is subjective and
asystematic. Much of this data provides a singular perspective, the self-presentation of the
culture jammers themselves. Some sources, particularly mainstream news articles but also
community or activist journals, help to access a broader perspective within which the
actions and discourses of culture jammers can be brought to intelligibility. A notable
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problem lies in the source of much of the data on the cases. As a perusal through the Case
References section reveals, much of the data on CJOS in this project derives from Internet
sources. While this is not crippling, such sources are at risk of relocating to other URLs or
simply vanishing off-line. The most significant constraint is the temporality of the data. In
order to maximize the coherence of data presentation, I ignore the chronology of sources in
almost all cases. This handicaps my capacity to make substantive claims about the causal
relations between concepts like identities and tactics. The primary focus of this
dissertation is thus illustrative.
Several chapters go beyond these data sources in order to consider specific research
questions deviating from the direct focus on culture jamming organizations. Data
collection and construction in each instance is addressed in each chapter and any
corresponding appendices.
4.3.2. Interviews
Cognizant of the paucity of data for some groups, I supplement this initial set of
sources with richer data derived directly from the Institute for Infinitely Small Things and
the Surveillance Camera Players through a series of semi-structured in-depth interviews.
An initial test interview was conducted with the group newmindspace in Toronto, but the
group is excluded from the sample because of a lack of overt opposition. Although he is not
strictly a part of the sample (not a collective actor, but an individual identity that engages in
collective actions with a shifting group of people), a short e-mail correspondence yielded a
number of insights from Ron English, a notable culture jammer. Requests for interviews
with the AAA, members of three chapters of the Billionaires, CMT, the CAE, the IAA,
Negativland, Reverend Billy, and the Yes Men failed due to either a lack of response,
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overseas trips, my lack of funds, or a refusal to entertain academics with exclusive
attention. Nevertheless, both interviews provided invaluable data, especially the IST.
The interviews draw from a basic question template reproduced in Appendix One.
However, the construction of each interview took into account the information already
available via other sources in order to avoid excessive repetition and to maximize the
amount of new information. In New York City, I interviewed Bill Brown of the SCP. While
they espoused an anarchist politics, Brown is the first to admit that the group was really
centralized around his efforts. Thus, while at any one time the group consisted of a dozen
or so people, Brown was the consistent core of the group and thus provides a very useful
vantage point on the SCP as a whole. In Boston, I interviewed three members of the IST at
once: Catherine D’Ignazio, James Manning, and Savic Rasovic. D’Ignazio and Rasovic are
the co-founders of the IST, while Manning joined the group after its formation. Each
interview was audio recorded, transcribed, and returned to the individuals and groups for
final comments or corrections. No comments or corrections were provided.
4.4. Case Descriptions
Below I give brief descriptions of each of the twelve groups in my sample. When
available, I use those provided by the group itself.
The Adbusters Media Foundation is a non-profit organization founded in 1989 (and
still active today) by Kalle Lasn and Bill Schmalz and based in Vancouver, British Columbia,
Canada. They describe themselves as “a global network of artists, activists, writers,
pranksters, students, educators and entrepreneurs who want to advance the new social
activist movement of the information age" (AMF n.d.(a)) Generally, they espouse an anticonsumerist and pro-environmental politics. The group is the most well-known case in this

128

study and the most well-known example of culture jamming, particularly for their flagship
magazine, Adbusters. They are the only Canadian case in this sample.
The Anti-Advertising Agency was a collaboration between Steve Lambert and other
artists from 2004 to 2010 and primarily based in San Francisco, California. Sponsored by a
non-profit arts organization, the group was concerned with issues of public space and
advertising and typically engaged in acts of public artistry.
The Billboard Liberation Front is a loose and secretive organization founded in 1977
(and still active today despite several hiatuses) by members of the Suicide Club in San
Francisco, California. The group focuses on the ‘improvement’ of outdoor advertising.
They are one of the most prominent examples of culture jamming and directly inspired
other groups like the California Department of Corrections and Artfux.
The Billionaires is a loose network of performance activists founded in 1999 (and
still active today) by Andrew Boyd of the non-profit United for a Fair Economy in Boston,
Massachusetts. The moniker of the group is malleable and shifts according to the action or
campaign, i.e. the Billionaires for Forbes or the Billionaires for Wealthcare. The group(s)
focuses on two basic concerns: the role of money in politics and economic inequality. They
are one of the most prominent examples of culture jamming. Dozens of chapters are active
across the United States.
The Center for Tactical Magic is an arts collective founded around 2003 (and still
active today) by Aaron Gach and based in the San Francisco Bay Area. The group pursues
experimental means for generating discourses and practices critical of oppression and
authority.
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The Critical Art Ensemble (2000a, 136) is “five tactical media artists dedicated to
exploring the intersections between art, technology, critical theory, and political activism.”
Founded in 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida by Steve Kurtz, Steve Barnes, and others, the group
aims to develop pedagogical practices that open up spaces autonomous of authoritarian
culture. They are especially noted for their theoretical text, The Electronic Disturbance
(1994) and the trial of founder Steve Kurtz concerning charges of bioterrorism.
The Institute for Applied Autonomy is “a collective of engineers, artists, designers,
theorists” founded in 1998 and disbanded in the late 2000s (Brusadin, Mattes, and Mattes
n.d.). The group seeks to develop technologies that invert power relationships between
citizens and authorities.
The Institute for Infinitely Small Things is a loose organization of artists founded in
2004 in Boston, Massachusetts by Catherine D’Ignazio and Savic Rasovic. As an extension
of the non-profit arts organization Ikatun, the group “conducts creative, participatory
research that aims to temporarily transform public spaces and instigate dialogue about
democracy, spatial justice and everyday life” (IST 2012).
Negativland is an experimental music and now arts group founded in 1979 that
originated in the San Francisco Bay Area, though the members have since dispersed
geographically. Particularly critical of current U.S. copyright law and the ubiquity of
advertising, they are noteworthy for their legal battles with U2 record label, Island Records,
over copyright infringement. In addition, they are one of the more well-known culture
jamming outfits, in part because they basically coined the phrase in 1985
The Reverend Billy and the Church of Earthalujah (formerly the Church of Stop
Shopping) is a non-profit New York City-based performance collective and choir founded in
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1999. Originally a solo performance by Bill Talen as Reverend Billy, the group now pursues
direct action in challenging consumerism and defending both public space and the
environment. They are one of the more well-known culture jamming groups in the sample.
The Surveillance Camera Players was a performance group founded in 1996 and
disbanded in the late 2000s/early 2010s in New York City. For a brief time, numerous
other chapters sprang up in the U.S. and Europe. Led by Bill Brown, the group was
concerned with the proliferation of surveillance cameras in public spaces.
The Yes Men is a loose network of activists founded in 1997 (and still active today)
and fronted by members by Jacques Servin (a.k.a. Andy Bichlbaum) and Igor Vamos (a.k.a.
Mike Bonanno). They seek to “focus attention on the dangers of economic policies that
place the rights of capital before the needs of people and the environment” (TYM n.d.(b)).
The group is one of the more noteworthy culture jamming groups in the sample and are
noted especially for their documentaries.
4.5. Conclusion
This chapter concludes Part I of this study by specifying the basic methodological
constraints and capacities of the project. In particular, it considers issues of
representativeness, selection bias, case selection criteria, sampling procedures, and data
collection. Finally, it briefly describes each of the twelve cases in the sample of CJOs that
frames the bulk of this study.
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PART II:
EVERYDAY SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
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CHAPTER 5. THE FIELD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION
The goal of this chapter is to briefly describe the history and structure of the field of
cultural production in advanced Western industrial democracies. Though this field
includes a wide variety of activities, including news media, science, the arts, and literature,
the primary focus here artistic production. By necessity, this chapter is the least
comprehensive presentation in this entire project. In order to economize, description is
primarily informed by the work of sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Diana Crane. The
following chapter details sets of actors and networks that played pivotal roles in the
structuring of the field of cultural production in the twentieth century. Together, the two
chapters begin to develop the argument that repertoire change can be productively studied
as a consequence of changes in everyday social organization.
This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, utilizing the conceptual tools introduced
in Chapter Two’s review of Bourdieu’s sociology I explore the origin and structure of the
field of cultural production and the aesthetic disposition. Second, I consider some relevant
criticisms involving the application of Bourdieu’s model to contemporary postmodern
society and to cases outside of France. Third, I present some of the broad structural
changes in the American field of artistic production in an effort to lay the groundwork for
further chapters. Special emphasis is placed on the formal institutionalization of the field.
5.1. Bourdieu’s Sociology of Art
5.1.1. Structure of the Field
As noted in Chapter Two, Bourdieu begins with the assumption that in the history of
complex societies the agents of various types of activities (politics, economics, religion, art,
etc.) sought to carve their own spheres of values, norms, rewards and sanctions apart from
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political authorities and economic markets. These contexts, or social fields, are constituted
by sets of strategies, positions, and distributions of capital that organize the
institutionalization and habituation of the field’s struggle for autonomy. For Bourdieu, the
field of cultural production provides one of the more interesting instances of the
emergence of an autonomous field.46 Cultural production (and consumption) is a highly
inclusive sphere of activity encompassing journalism, literature, film and television, visual
and plastic arts, academia, and science among others, produced and consumed by a wide
variety of actors, including journalists, novelists, painters, actors, academics, critics, editors,
publishers, media conglomerates, museum curators, universities, and others. Below, I
detail the essential dualistic structure of this field.
Every field is internally differentiated into a dualistic structure by the struggle for
autonomy. To make sense of this process and structure, however, one must begin at a
further remove from the analysis of a single field. Figure 5.1 provides a basic model of the
relations of dominance between the field of cultural production and the fields it is
embedded within. The most comprehensive field is the field of social space (earlier
referred to as the field of class relations [Bourdieu 1993, 38]). This refers to the most
general structure of relations among people at the national level. As the diagram specifies,
Bourdieu regards this field as composed of a dominated and a dominant pole. In general,
those possessing the most capital valued in society reside in the upper half or dominant
section of social space. Within the dominant sector resides the field of power:

Bourdieu’s two extensive studies of this phenomenon, The Field of Cultural Production (1993) and The Rules
of Art (1996), as well as his focus on taste, Distinction (1984), engage in particular the French field of cultural
production. The former two deal primarily with the literary field of the second half of the nineteenth century.
46
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+ = Dominant
─ = Dominated
Figure 5.1. Bourdieu’s (1993, 38) Model of Relations of Dominance Between Fields
Source: Bourdieu (1993, 38).
the space of relations between agents or between institutions having in common the
possession of the capital necessary to occupy the dominant positions in different fields
(notably economic or cultural). It is the site of struggles between holders of different
powers (or kinds of capital) (Bourdieu 1996, 26).

To be more specific, the field of power is the “space of play in which holders of various
forms of capital struggle in particular for…statist capital that grants power over the
different species of capital” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 115). The field of power is thus
the struggle over the state, a struggle over the rules that govern all other fields.
The relation between the fields of cultural production and power is more closely
illustrated in Figure 5.2. As in Figure 5.1, the field of cultural production is situated at the
dominated end of the field of power. Here its bifurcated structure is clearly demonstrated.
Attention to some of the relevant variables should tease out this structure. First, the total
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Figure 5.2. Combined Model of the French Literary Field of the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century
Source: Bourdieu (1993, 49; 1996, 124).
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volume of capital agents or organizations possess and are capable of deploying is
represented vertically across all fields, thus distinguishing those with high levels of capital
from those with low levels. Second, horizontally represented and also structuring all fields
is the ratio of cultural capital to economic capital. This inverse relationship between
species of power extends from the left, in which actors possess high levels of cultural
capital but low levels of economic capital, to the right in which the reverse holds. The
relation between these variable constitutes in part the external structuring of the field of
cultural production.
The specific relation of the field of cultural production to the field of power is
expressed in the two opposing principles of hierarchization: autonomy and heteronomy.
Both are institutionalized features of the struggle over the power to define the principles
that legitimate artists and work of art by defining both what is (and is not) art and what is
good (and bad) art. The heteronomous principle governs the agents and organizations of
the field by rewarding strategies subordinate to the field of power. Lacking autonomy, art
and other forms of specific cultural production would be organized by market or political
imperatives, an activity in which success is measured in terms of revenue and popular
honors, among others. These producers tend to possess the least amount of cultural capital
and the greatest amount of economic capital. The autonomous principle, in contrast, guides
agents and organizations by rewarding strategies that seek distance from the economy or
politics by inverting the field of power’s strategies of reward and sanction. Autonomous
cultural production inhabits a particular “economy of practices…a systematic inversion of
the fundamental principles of all ordinary economies” in which success as defined by the
heteronomous principle is a sign of compromise, of ‘selling-out’ (Bourdieu 1993, 39). This
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world, the subfield of restricted production or high culture, “is so ordered that those who
enter it have an interest in disinterestedness,” in the disavowal of the economy of success
(Bourdieu 1993, 40).47 The subfield is thus structured in part by its valuation of forms of
capital distinct from the wider field of power. Consequently, cultural capital is generally in
great abundance for these producers, while they tend to lack economic capital. The guiding
logic of this alternative valuation in the art field is “art for art’s sake,” the production and
distribution of works not for their role in generating wealth or affecting political change,
but in their purity of aesthetic purpose and the artistic prestige they bestow. Figure 5.2
clearly expresses this antagonism between both principles of hierarchization.
Of course, this basic dualistic structure is far more complex than Figure 5.2 teases.
For example, each genre or area of cultural production from poetry to theatre to music to
journalism to science has its own structure that roughly mirrors the broader field. More
importantly, the degree to which the field(s) is bifurcated between two opposing principles
varies with the strength of the autonomous pole across time and space. Again, fields are
sites of struggle; only through struggles among actors and organizations do fields generate
their own laws and logics, but it is also through struggles that the field of power can
maintain or renew the force of its sanctions and the attraction of its rewards. For Bourdieu,
the French literary field of the second half of the nineteenth century is an exemplary
instance of an autonomous field. Other cultural fields such as journalism are almost
entirely dominated by the field of power. The degree of autonomy may be ascertained by

It is a subfield of restricted production, because the lack of extensive economic capital and the disregard for
popular audiences tend to constrain the scale of the production of works. In contrast, that space of the field of
cultural production oriented toward heteronomy and endowed with extensive economic capital is composed
in part of strategies of large-scale production such as Hollywood films.
47
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the degree “to which the field is capable of functioning as a field of competition for cultural
legitimacy” (Bourdieu 1996, 224).
Finally, in Figure 5.2 the field of cultural production is bisected by the degree of
consecration that actors and organizations obtain. Consecration is a specific form of
symbolic capital positively correlated with age and accruing to actors by virtue of their
acceptance and recognition by ‘legitimate’ authorities. Counterclockwise from the bottom
right corner (also indicating a decline in the size of audiences) the extremely broad space of
non-consecrated producers lacking in cultural capital and relatively lacking in economic
capital includes popular culture such as journalism. Here the guiding principle of
legitimacy, in contrast to ‘art for art’s sake, is popularity. In the heteronomous wing of the
field of cultural production, consecrated producers (lacking in cultural capital but wellendowed with economic capital) are those generally recognized as producers of academic
or bourgeois art, for whom legitimacy is bestowed in the form of recognition by the
dominant fraction of the dominant class. In the subfield of restricted production, recent
but not contemporary waves of the avant-garde lacking economic capital but well-endowed
with cultural capital are consecrated by the organizations and authorities that hold sway
over the subfield. Lacking in both economic and symbolic capital, the contemporary and
non-consecrated avant-garde generate strategies that produce their own cultural capital.
5.1.2. Permanent Revolution
The totality of these relations of dominance and the strategies they favor produce a
particular set of incentives for those entering the subfield of restricted production. As
noted, in order to compete, an effective strategy for new entrants (typically younger
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generations) with low resources is to generate their own cultural capital or artistic
prestige. Bourdieu (original emphasis, 1993, 106) describes this process:
It is the continuous creation of a battle between those who have made their names and are
struggling to stay in view and those who cannot make their own names without relegating
to the past the established figures. …On one side are the dominant figures, who want
continuity, identity, reproduction; on the other, the newcomers, who seek discontinuity,
rupture, difference, revolution. To ‘make one’s name’ means making one’s mark, achieving
recognition (in both senses) of one’s difference from other producers, especially the most
consecrated of them; at the same time, it means creating a new position beyond the
positions presently occupied, ahead of them, in the avant-garde.

These new positions are staked by virulent heterodoxy, by “imposing new modes of
thought and expression which break with current modes of thought and hence are destined
to disconcert by their ‘obscurity’ and their ‘gratuitousness’” (hence their excessively small
audience) (Bourdieu, 1996, 239-240). New and hungry entrants thus generally have an
interest in subversion, in equating the old guard, the custodians of the subfield, with the
hierarchy of the field of power. This challenge from below comes in the form of a
redefinition of the field and its artifacts. Because the incentive structure specific to the
structure of the relations of the fields of dominance is maintained by the struggles it is a
product of, and it produces, the process of innovation in the more autonomous fields of
cultural production, such as art and literature, is perpetual. Bourdieu christens this
tumultuous process permanent revolution. Each wave of innovation not only redefined art
and the artist, but the entire history of art and, in some cases, the world around them.
This model of artistic revolution only hints at the history of art, however.
Embedded in his discussion of the process of artistic revolution is the general notion that
cultural innovation is increasingly determined by the history of the field itself. The effect of
the isolation of an autonomous field of art, for example, from the burdens and imperatives
of politics and economics is that artistic practice was “accompanied by a sort of reflective
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and critical return by the producers upon their productions” (Bourdieu 1993, 265-6; 1996,
242). This reflection increasingly determined cultural innovation through a logic particular
to the field. Duchamp’s Fountain, for example, as an act of distinction and rebellion,
presupposes Duchamp as the artist with an acquired knowledge of the field of art and its
history such that his position-takings are calculated with masterful precision. Innovations
like Duchamp’s ready-mades and many others are negatives of negatives of negatives,
distinguishing classifications, a perpetual struggle of overturning prior modes of thought
and expression and thus a struggle constrained by this history. This deconstructive
process culminates in the closure of fields, meaning the exhaustion of artistic forms
(Bourdieu 1993, 119). Bourdieu uses the example of painting to note that this effect of
exhaustion leads to the questioning of the process of painting itself, a process mirrored in
other genres and arts. The notion of the closure of fields assumes agents in the field are
endowed with the reflexivity and dispositions necessary to exhaust forms, as with
Duchamp. He seems to suggest, for example, that closure tends to be preceded by the
fetishism of technicality (Bourdieu 1993, 119).
5.1.3. The Aesthetic Disposition
As noted in Chapter Two, social fields and the habitus are involved in a dance of
structuration in which the accumulation of struggles over certain goods strongly
determines the unfolding strategies of contemporary agents and organizations, while these
actors are nonetheless endowed with the capacity to play (and even in rare cases
transform) the game with variable virtuosity. The game itself favors certain strategies over
others. The sense of the game required to play is socialized in the form of the habitus of
those actors that successfully enter the field. Habitus is a matrix of dispositions, or sets of
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schemas of perception, appreciation, and action. The field of cultural production,
specifically the fields of art and literature, endows it’s agents with an aesthetic disposition,
the product, according to Bourdieu, of a nineteenth-century struggle.
The crucial moment for Bourdieu was, in literature, Gustave Flaubert, and in
painting, Édouard Manet. These two extraordinary individuals sought to impose a radical
creativity on their respective mediums. They developed what Bourdieu calls the “creative”
or “pure gaze,” the revolutionary thrust that ultimately yielded the autonomy of artistic
production, the institutionalization of the struggle over the irreducibility of art (Bourdieu
1993, 265). Buttressed by well-endowed agents and organizations, the contours of this
new game ultimately favored the institutionalization of an aesthetic disposition. Generally
speaking, the aesthetic disposition is the capacity to locate oneself in this game of art and to
assess the opportunities and constraints available for advancement in the field.
Importantly, this disposition is not simply a practical knowledge of particular techniques of
artistic production, such as painting murals, sculpting granite, or performing Shakespeare.
It is composed of sets of knowledge and competency regarding the classificatory schemes
and hierarchies that are both products of and constraining on the struggle. It is thus a
continuous variable ranging from a weak knowledge of the field to a virtuosic grip on the
game, typically a product of education and participation.
In addition, the aesthetic disposition, of which the pure gaze is an attribute,
connotes “the capacity to consider in and for themselves, as form rather than function, not
only the works designated for such apprehension, but everything in the world, including
cultural objects which are not yet consecrated… and natural objects” (Bourdieu 1984, 3).
There are consequently no limits to what cultural producers can appropriate and
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transform into an art object: a urinal, Brillo boxes, a cough in an auditorium, a stapler.
Performance artist Allan Kaprow (1993, 219-221) offers a superb and extreme illustration
of the creative gaze at work:
I decided to pay attention to brushing my teeth, to watch my elbow moving. I would be
alone in my bathroom, without art spectators. There would be no gallery, no critic to judge,
no publicity. This was the crucial shift that removed the performance of everyday life from
all but the memory of art. I could, of course, have said to myself, “Now I’m making art!!” But
in actual practice, I didn’t think much about it...
Brushing my teeth attentively for two weeks, I gradually became aware of the tension in my
elbow and fingers (was it there before?), the pressure of the brush on my gums, their slight
bleeding (should I visit the dentist?). I looked up once and saw, really saw, my face in the
mirror. I rarely looked at myself when I got up, perhaps because I wanted to avoid the puffy
face I’d see, at least until it could be washed and smoothed to match the public image I
prefer. (And how many times had I seen others do the same and believed I was different!)
This was an eye-opener to my privacy and to my humanity. An unremarkable picture of
myself was beginning to surface, an image I’d created but never examined. It colored the
images I made of the world and influenced how I dealt with my images of others. I saw this
little by little.
But if this wider domain of resonance, spreading from the mere process of brushing my
teeth, seems too far from its starting point, I should say immediately that it never left the
bathroom. The physicality of brushing, the aromatic taste of toothpaste, rinsing my mouth
and the brush, the many small nuances such as right-handedness causing me to enter my
mouth with the loaded rush from that side and then move to the left side — these
particularities always stayed in the present. The larger implications popped up from time
to time during the subsequent days. All this from toothbrushing.

Through Kaprow’s analysis of his hygienic performance, one witnesses the gaze as it
invests the movements and nuances of everyday life with not only their typical practical
meaning but also an aesthetic detail. Duchamp, Warhol, and Kaprow and many others are
for Bourdieu the logical extension of Flaubert and Manet’s achievement. This gaze, the
pure gaze of the aesthetic disposition, the capacity to appropriate aesthetically literally
anything, is now a legitimate schema of perception and appreciation in the field of art.
Bourdieu contrasts the pure gaze of the aesthetic disposition with the naïve gaze of
the popular aesthetic. The subordination of function to form, of life to art, is systematic; the
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pure gaze is essentially agnostic and amoral, irreligious and apolitical. If there is to be
purity to art, art for art’s sake, then it must bleach its vision of external influence in the
form especially of economics and politics. The field of cultural production thus generates a
peculiar way of seeing and doing in the world in which everything and anything can bear a
new witness, a testament to the purity of creation. Lacking the perceptual and appreciative
schemas specific to the field of art, the naïve gaze applies the schemas that inform practical
behavior in everyday life to artworks (Bourdieu 1984, 44). These ethical dispositions, as
Bourdieu is quick to call them, tend to subordinate form to function, art to life; through
these schemes the ethical, moral, or political impose on contemporary art.
5.2. Critical Analysis
While Bourdieu’s sociology of art and the research program it has spawned is
generally regarded as the most productive and compelling synthesis of theory and evidence
in the field, predictably it has its critics. I briefly focus on two of these criticisms, the first is
diachronic and the second, synchronic: postmodern critiques of aesthetic perception and
the generalization of his conclusions beyond the French case.
5.2.1. General Aestheticization and Cultural Omnivorism
Without inflicting too much violence to their diversity, strong postmodern critiques
of Bourdieu’s sociology of art perception can be succinctly captured with a quotation from
French philosopher Jean Baudrillard: “our society has given rise to a general aestheticization in the wake of the postmodern collapse of the domains of the economy, art, politics,
and sexuality into each other” (emphasis added, 1993b, 16; see 1975; 1993a; 1994;
Featherstone 1991; 1992). Prior to this development, production and consumption were
organized by the scarcity of material commodities. The domains of social life were
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governed by distinct hierarchies. In the society described by Baudrillard and his
contemporaries, commodification has crept into all spheres of activity; everyday life is
saturated not with material commodities, but with endless streams of spectacular imagery
and signs. In such a consumer society subtended by the capacities of a truly mass visual
media, everything is absorbed into the play of images. Under these conditions of
widespread spectacle, art de facto reigns. More importantly, this condition of spectacular
saturation entails an extreme shift in the modes of perception available to the inhabitants
of such social conditions. Culture is no longer a stable terrain but an accelerating stream of
indiscrete simulations, a gratuitous instantaneity of experiences that dissolve the
deliberative and classifying capacities so dear to Bourdieu’s social theory. No longer can
one speak coherently of an aesthetic disposition or a pure gaze; the aesthetic is diluted, the
eye distracted and mesmerized by a parade of images that collapse all oppositions and
hierarchies. General aestheticization is thus a leveling process, a demolition of hierarchies
of classification by indiscriminate flows. Class, gender, and other forms of social
stratification are no longer symbolically sustainable.
The aesthetic disposition is a resource, a supply of cultural capital for both
producers and consumers. As such, Bourdieu’s basic model predicts that social
stratification constrains the supply of cultural capital available to individuals, and thus the
distribution of the aesthetic disposition. This postmodern perspective predicts that there
is no longer a proper correspondence between perceptual schemas and field positions. In
other words, if the aesthetic is now general, then anyone can be familiar with the game of
art, precisely because, “[art] will…soon be gone, leaving behind an immense museum of
artificial art and abandoning the field completely to advertising” (Baudrillard 1993b, 17).
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Because his initial studies of consumption utilize data from the 1960s (1984), postmodern
criticisms often suggest that Bourdieu missed the pattern of general aestheticization that
followed.
Weaker postmodern arguments suggest a similar outcome, though they still attach
some strength to the relation between stratification and cultural capital. The general
pattern identified by these scholars is captured by the concept of the ‘cultural omnivore’
(Peterson 2002; 2005; Peterson and Kern 1996; Peterson and Simkus 1992; see also
DiMaggio 1996). Proponents of the omnivore thesis find evidence that previously
differentiated consumption patterns reflective of socio-economic background have
combined in postmodern society; the tastes of the cultural omnivore, typically of the higher
class, span across a variety of cultural forms, including high art and popular culture.
These arguments are not without their own critics. Criticisms of strong postmodern
social theory are so widespread it is hardly worth restating them here, except to note that
they consistently lack empirical verification. However, one important point of contention is
the rigidity with which Bourdieu separates high art from popular art (Fowler 1997; Prior
2005). Transformations in the field(s) over the last century have dramatically re-organized
the production and consumption of artistic practices and objects. Developments in media,
performance, and pop art, for example, have to some degree collapsed symbolic
hierarchies. Part of this argument will be addressed in the following chapter.
Weaker postmodern arguments are vulnerable to the fact that Bourdieu argues
quite clearly that the aesthetic disposition is not restricted to the consumption of fine arts;
it is a generalized disposition available to those most capable of consuming fine arts but
also including the “capacity to constitute aesthetically objects that are ordinary or even
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‘common’ or to apply the principles of a ‘pure’ aesthetic in the most everyday choices of
everyday life, in cooking, dress, or decoration, for example” (Bourdieu 1984, 40; Lizardo
and Skiles 2008). To be an omnivore is still to distinguish oneself.
5.2.2. Beyond the French Case
Finally, some scholars question the degree to which Bourdieu’s model is applicable
outside of its original context of France. For example, Lamont and Lareau (1988) suggest
that symbolic boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate cultures in the United States
may be weaker due to a number of factors, including the importance of ethnicity and
frequent cultural innovation. Another variant of this argument is Lopes’ (2000) study of
modern jazz in the United States in which he posits the need to integrate the concept of
‘popular restricted art’ into the subfield of restricted production. Additionally, the
omnivore thesis was developed in the context of American studies of consumption, though
whether it actually strikes a blow to Bourdieu’s model is debatable, as noted above.
However, numerous studies of the United States find general support for Bourdieu’s
model of cultural production and consumption (DiMaggio 1996; DiMaggio and Mukhtar
2004; Holt 1997; 1998). More generally, in their study of the reception of Bourdieu into
American sociology, Sallaz and Zavisca (2007, 37) find that not only is he frequently cited
in the major journals in the field, but that his “central theoretical concepts are increasingly
used to design empirical research and to advance debates in core sociological subﬁelds.”
5.3. The United States
5.3.1. Institutionalization
Bourdieu (1984; 1993; 1996) posits a powerful link between educational
achievement and cultural capital. Specifically, he argues that the aesthetic disposition in
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France is generated by a socially differentiated educational process. This process favors
those households possessing higher levels of capital (economic, cultural, etc.) by endowing
their progeny with the means (cultural capital) to reproduce their social status. Those with
lower levels of capital are constrained by this same process; obtaining higher levels of
capital than their households is more difficult. Consequently, they likewise tend to
reproduce their own social situation.
One aspect of this process is the reproduction of culture itself, which amounts to the
re-generation of sets of classificatory schemes that actors utilize in order to advance their
social position. The link between education and cultural capital that characterizes this
relationship is stronger the more institutionalized and regulated the social activity.
Bourdieu notes, for example, that the field of cultural production is uniquely characterized
by a high degree of boundary permeability. This means that the “conditions of entry that
are tacitly and practically required (such as a certain cultural capital [i.e., knowledge] or
explicitly codified and legally guaranteed [academic degrees, for example]” are insufficient
to uniquely determine the social characteristics (dispositions, resources) that yield
successful positions in the field (Bourdieu 1993, 43). In other words, the field of cultural
production, especially artistic production, is riven with conflict over basic principles
(autonomy and heteronomy) in part because formal institutionalization (educational
achievement) lacks a sufficient monopoly over the production of meaning (social
classifications). This means that embodied cultural capital like the aesthetic disposition
does not strictly correlate with institutionalized cultural capital like educational degrees
and awards (Bourdieu 1996). Still, the stronger the institutionalization process the
stronger the link between embodied and institutionalized capital.
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While education may be significant for the generation of certain sets of skills and
knowledge, I suggest that occupations are also important. While Bourdieu’s claims
regarding education are relatively clear, I argue that expansion in arts occupations should
be also indicative of a process of institutionalization, because it may reflect the general
recognition and appreciation of the institutionalized and embodied cultural capital
generated by arts education, namely degrees and skills. Demand for arts education should
ultimately reflect expectations of future income.48 Arts education is a capital investment
that more or less pays off with a corresponding occupation. In other words, the cultural
capital generated by education is recognized by a corresponding market.
In their revision of the renowned SES model, Verba et al (1995; Brady et al1995)
establish a set of relations between organizational contexts, skills, and political
participation. They hypothesize that extensive experience in each context (work, school,
church) generates sets of organizational and communication skills that actors can utilize in
political contexts like voting or campaigning. Following the theoretical developments in
Chapters Two and Three, I apply these arguments to artistic practice and political behavior
specifically; experience in certain contexts should generate certain sets of skills that should
in turn reduce the costs and uncertainties of political actions in which these skills are
applicable. In particular, educational and occupational contexts associated with artistic
production and consumption should generate sets of skills and knowledge particular to the
field of art.
As a preliminary step, the remainder of this chapter aims to provide a general but
cursory description of the American field of artistic production. This chapter thus
Clearly, the human capital literature is relevant here, but this theoretical treatment is sufficient for my
purposes.
48
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establishes some of the content of everyday social organization. While I focus on
institutionalization, it is worth noting that the data presented below also pertains to the
simple expansion of the field of art. The relation to activism is considered in Part III.
If I anticipate the development of a set of protest practices as a consequence in part
of a politicized aesthetic disposition (elaborated in the following chapter), and if this
disposition is an institutionalized feature of the field of artistic production, then I should
expect to find evidence of a process of institutionalization in the American field of artistic
production. In other words, I expect to find evidence of the development and growth of
formal institutions like academic degrees and occupations. Attention is thus focused here
on the narrower fields of artistic production and consumption, especially basic structural
trends in arts-related education and occupations in the United States over the twentieth
century. In her work on the avant-garde, Crane (1987) demonstrates the tremendous
growth of an art world in the United States. Increases in auction markets, galleries,
museums, private collections, and government funding of artists all point towards an
exceptional process of institutionalization. However, her consideration of education and
occupations is comparatively cursory (Crane 1987, 9-10).
Following Crane’s general hypothesis of the growth of the art world, Bourdieu’s
hypothesis of the relationship between education and capital, and the hypothesized
process of institutionalization and the aesthetic disposition, I anticipate two general
patterns in this analysis. First, I expect an increase in formal arts education that outstrips
population growth. Second, I expect an increase in arts-related occupations that outstrips
growth in the labor market. Demonstrating such patterns would help lay the groundwork
for the remainder of this project: an expanding institutionalizing art field is more likely to
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generate sets of skills and knowledge characteristic of the aesthetic disposition. In other
words, it potentially tightens the link between social context and skill sets.
5.3.2. Arts Education
Crane (1997, 9-10) notes that from 1950 to 1980 the number of Master of Fine Arts
degrees increased from 525 to 8,708. The difference amounts to a 1,659% increase, a
figure far exceeding the growth in population (67% from 1950 to 1980). Such a higher
growth rate of Master’s degrees relative to population likely indicates explosive growth in
the sets of educational organizations, institutions, and resources relevant to the production
and consumption of aesthetic objects.49
Figure 5.3 pursues this line of inquiry further.50 I employ two measures of the
growth in arts education (see Appendix Three for a full account of the construction of these
measures). The first, Fine Arts, is a conservative indicator expressing the annual
percentage change in the number of Master’s and Doctorate degrees in the Fine Arts minus
degrees in Music and the Dramatic Arts. In other words, it is primarily focused on the
visual arts. The second, All Arts, is a more inclusive measure incorporating the Fine Arts
(including Music and the Dramatic Arts), English, and Architecture. Finally, Population
refers to the annual percentage change in the population of the United States. While from
1950 to 1982 the latter marginally decreases from highs never in excess of 2% and lows
never below zero, the measures of arts education follow distinct trajectories. The early to

This method is more effective at indicating growth than the percentage change in the proportion of the
population obtaining arts-based degrees. Because of the general scarcity of these degrees (a point I consider
in depth in Chapter Seven), absolute population growth quickly outpaces absolute growth in degrees, thus
falsely suggesting a shrinking art world.
50 The relevant data is limited and incomplete. Detailed Census data on specific degrees dates back to only
1949. Relevant categories begin to vanish after 1970. Still, while ideal data would extend beyond the
Roosevelt administration and the federal government’s generous support of the arts, the data are helpful
especially considering that Crane focuses on the middle of the century as a pivotal period of growth.
49
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Figure 5.3. Arts Education and Population Growth
mid-1950s provide mixed results, but a clear pattern of sizable sustained growth emerges
from the late 1950s into at least the 1970s where the data cut off. The chunks of data into
the 1980s indicate a stalling of growth. While the gist of Crane’s argument is intact, it is
clear that the trajectory is slightly more nuanced. In addition, this period of increasing arts
degrees corresponds with the emergence of several groundbreaking art movements
including Conceptual, Performance, and Pop Art and representative figures such as Warhol
and Kaprow that heralded the institutionalization and popularization of the dissolution of
the distinction between art and everyday life, a mark of the aesthetic disposition.
5.3.3. Arts Occupations
Crane (1987, 4) observes that the number of artists dramatically increased in the
third quarter of the twentieth century. This is especially indicated by the 67% growth in
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the number of self-identified artists from 1970 to 1980. Like arts education, this figure
clearly outstrips population growth. However, unlike arts education, population growth is
a misleading comparison. The mid-to-late twentieth century saw a tremendous expansion
in labor force participation. Thus, as a function of this increase we should expect a
corresponding increase in arts occupations beyond population growth. This should not in
itself point towards greater institutionalization in the field.
In order to counter this difficulty, I compare the percentage change in the number
of arts occupations to the percentage change in the size of the labor force. If there is little
difference in the rates of growth, then change in the size of the workforce largely explains
change in the number of arts occupations. If arts occupations grow significantly faster
than the labor force, then this supports the argument that increasing arts occupations
indicates a significant expansion of the artistic labor market. Coupled with increases in arts
education, this would provide additional but marginal support for the charge that the field
of artistic production increasingly institutionalized over this period of time.
Before I begin, it is worth noting that the data on occupations is sparser and more
scattershot than the data on degrees. As a consequence, a plurality of measures is
employed in order to capture variance over time in the two principal objects of interest:
arts occupations and civilian labor force (see Appendix Three for a full account of the
construction of these variables). Table 5.1 presents three measures of arts occupations.
The first (Artists, Actors, Architects, Musicians, Writers) is a composite variable for the
years 1940 to 1960, while the second (Artists, Entertainers, and Writers) measuring artist
occupations from 1960 to 1970 is lifted directly from the Census. The third employs
National Endowment for the Arts data on all artist occupations from 1970 to 1990. The

153

Table 5.1. Arts Occupations and the Civilian Labor Force

1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990

Occupations (in thousands)
Artists, Actors,
Artists,
Architects,
NEA
Entertainers, and
Musicians,
All
Artistsb
Writersa
a
Writers
% Change
% Change
% Change
343
393
14.6
495
26.1
536
791
47.6
737
1086
47.3
1671
53.9

Civilian Labor Force
(in thousands)a

52,020
58,999
67,991
82,771
106940
124067

% Change
13.4
15.2
21.7
29.2
16.0

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 1944; 1953; 1965; 1973; 1974; 1976; 1977; 1979; 1980; 1981;
1982/83; 1984; 1985; 1986; 1987; 1988; 1989; 1991. Statistical Abstract of the United States. U. S.
Census Bureau. accessed May 4, 2013 <http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_
abstract.html>
b Source: Ellis, Diane C. and John D. Beresford. 1994. Trends in Artist Occupation: 1970-1990.
Washington, DC: National Endowment for the Arts. National Endowment for the Arts. Accessed May
8, 2013 <http://www.nea.gov/research/reports/NEA-Research-Report-29.pdf>
a

Civilian Labor Force measure is straightforward. Percentage change over each decade is
calculated for each variable, and attention should fall here. Comparing these changes yields
the insight that growth in arts occupations significantly outpaces growth in the labor force.
While the 1940s show a similar growth rate, over the 1960s arts occupations outstrip
growth in the labor force by over 10%, while the 1960s witness a more dramatic difference
of over 25%, a pattern that increases through 1990. Figure 5.4 continues the analysis by
joining the measures of percentage change in arts occupation together to generate a single
measure of arts occupations change from 1950 to 1990. The chart clearly presents a pace
of growth in the arts labor market far exceeding the growth in the general labor market.
5.4. Conclusion
This chapter briefly considers Bourdieu’s sociology of art. First, the basic structure
of the field of cultural production and it’s relation to the fields of power and of social space,
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Figure 5.4. Arts Occupations and the Civilian Labor Force II
which is shaped by the distributions of various forms of capital, is presented. Second, I
emphasize endogenous mechanisms of change in the form of aesthetic revolutions specific
to the subfield of restricted production. Third, I consider the the incorporation of the
aesthetic disposition, the perceptual and actionable schemas of classification that favor
certain strategies over others. Fourth, a series of criticisms of Bourdieu’s sociology of art
are discussed. Finally, I consider evidence regarding the degree of institutionalization in
the field of art. Specifically, I present data on arts education and occupations that suggests
a dramatic expansion of the field over the third quarter of the twentieth century. The
following chapter extends this broader set of analyses by considering, from the perspective
of networks of agents in the form of the avant-garde, the politicization of the aesthetic
disposition and the creation of novel forms of collective action.
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CHAPTER 6. CRITICAL COMMUNITIES: THE AVANT-GARDE
There are two general defining characteristics of the aesthetic disposition that
contribute towards the ability of players to play the game of art. The first is the capacity
and the tendency to view art as irreducible to moral, political, or economic valuations or
functions. The second is the capacity and the tendency to appropriate anything
aesthetically, even the common accoutrements of daily life. For Bourdieu, though the
aesthetic disposition varies in degree across agents, these two characteristics or
classificatory schemas are basically inseparable. This chapter explores the relaxation of
this first principle, the principle of autonomy, in the permanent process of artistic
revolution across the twentieth century. In so doing, analytic emphasis shifts from the
structures of cultural production, the subject of the preceding chapter, to the strategies of
the avant-garde.
First, I review the literature on the relation between intellectual labor and
contentious politics. Second, I review the literature on the avant-garde art movements of
the first half of the twentieth century. Third, I establish a theoretical relation between the
analysis of cultural production presented in Chapter Five and the politicization of the
aesthetic disposition in the avant-garde. With the assistance of Crane (1987), Teune
(2005) and Bürger (1984), I argue that these art movements developed a specific
oppositional practice and discourse on aesthetics and politics in reaction to the autonomy
of the field, a practice and discourse that in turn came to inform the tactical behavior of
protesters. Along with other movements, they performed the critical intellectual labor of
“critical communities,” discursive publics that generate oppositional ideas, values (Rochon
1998) and practices (Teune 2005). Finally, I analyze the Dada, Surrealist, and the
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Situationist movements as critical communities, as collective efforts to politicize the field of
cultural production.
6.1. Review
6.1.1. Intellectual Labor and Contention
Early work on forms of protest considered the relation of intellectual labor to
contention from two normative directions. Conservative approaches regarded the crafting
of ideas as an essential component of the explanation of various forms of ‘collective
behavior.’ An extreme version of this perspective is represented by Gustave LeBon’s
(1896) work on the dynamics of crowds. He argues that the critical ideas propagated by
philosophers, intellectuals, and others constitute remote structural factors that broadly
constrain crowd formation. The corrosion of the esteem and wonder of authority as a
consequence of these ideas lays the ground for civil disturbances. Once these ideas
propagate and gain a general sympathy, what remains is the instrumental work of leaders
and orators. These actors frame the ideas such that they excite people into mobilization.
Marxists regarded the generation and diffusion of critical ideas as either irrelevant
(only economic factors are of any relevance) or of key importance to the struggle for
socialism. The most prominent representative of the latter school of thought is Antonio
Gramsci (1971). Gramsci argued that the coercive apparatus of the state was not sufficient
to explain the persistence of capitalism. He thus turned to cultural production as a
necessary factor in capitalist hegemony. For him, revolutionary activity under the
capitalist mode of production must be preceded by consistent counter-hegemonic activities
that not only corrode bourgeois ideology, but also provide an alternative culture and
consciousness. This cultural work is produced by a fraction of the traditional intellectuals -
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those who perform the social function of thinking – and more importantly, organic
intellectuals, those who develop ideas and practices organically from within their class. For
Gramsci, revolutionary protest is preceded by revolutionary culture, including art.
Despite their vast disagreements, conservatives and Marxists sketch an account of
cultural change in which actors craft critical ideas that contribute to a shift in
consciousness and values among wider audiences. A contemporary version of this
argument is presented by Rochon (1998). He demonstrates that while structural
conditions shape the context within which opposition develops, the process of relatively
rapid cultural change begins with the creation of oppositional ideas. These are formed and
debated in discursive publics he calls “critical communities.” Critical communities are not
formally organized; rather, they are delimited by the networks of communication that
critical thinkers use to define and elaborate problems and propose remedies. Similar to
LeBon’s emphasis on oratory, promoting these ideas requires framing efforts that resonate
with audiences. These collective action frames are fashioned out of the cloth of the ideas of
critical communities. Together, critical communities and their ideas constitute an
important condition for the development of social movements.
Others have suggested similar concepts and processes. Eyerman and Jamison
(1991) argue that a necessary condition for the formation of major social movements is the
development of ‘movement intellectuals.’ Movement intellectuals are a variety of actors –
scientists and a host of other professionals, including engineers, lawyers, media specialists,
and government employees - that develop critical ideas and disseminate them in a variety
of contexts. Once the movement begins, the lines between activist and intellectual, or
between thinking and doing, blur. Together, they engage in a continual process of identity
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formation through the specification of the particular logic of the movement. Critical of
Rochon and Eyerman and Jamison, Tesh (2000) breaks down the critical communitymovement-audience distinction. She argues that critical ideas are not only circulated by
professionals and academics, but also by audiences that often directly interact with these
critical thinkers.
The work of Rolfe (2005) and Teune (2005) highlights the role of small skilled
groups in the formation of ideas and practices. Rolfe suggests that “innovative hothouses,”
small experimental groups, produce tactical innovations that social movements
appropriate. The groups he looks at are artist collectives heavily influenced – and selfconsciously so – by many other artist groups. Teune looks at the role of art in protest from
the 1960’s to the movements against global capitalism. He suggests that various art
movements performed the critical function of elaborating certain ideas and practices that
were later absorbed into the protest activities of these periods. In particular, he turns to
the bohemian subcultures of the 1950’s and the Situationists by modifying Rochon’s initial
understanding of a critical community. Instead of limiting the conception of critical
communities to the incubators of new ideas, Teune argues that we must also consider the
development and elaboration of new oppositional practices as critical cultural production.
Both Rolfe and Teune thus argue that certain artistic groups and movements generate
innovative symbols and practices that were assimilated into contentious politics.
6.1.2. The Avant-Garde
Originally a military term designating the front line of an advancing army, the avantgarde took on new connotations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
signifying a relatively homogeneous group of artists, writers, and thinkers that seek to

159

produce works beyond the margins of what is defined as legitimate art, theatre, and
literature. By the turn of the century, the avant-garde was associated with perpetual
innovation and experimentation in nearly every field of cultural production.
Early works on the avant-garde were generally couched within broader discussions
regarding the nature of modernity. Some of the more innovative work came from Marxists.
From György Lukács (2001), Bertolt Brecht (1964), Walter Benjamin (1970 [1936]) to
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (2002), the interwar years were witness to a
feverish attempt within the currents of historical materialism to found and articulate a
revolutionary project for aesthetics. Some of the fruit borne by these critical efforts was an
early specification of the position of the avant-garde relative to economics and politics. For
example, Greenberg (1939) offered one of the first systematic analyses of this relation. He
argued that the avant-garde took its marginal commercial position by opposing itself to
kitsch, what he described as both academic art and commercial art. Although initially
sympathetic to radical politics, the avant-garde eventually sought to create for art a
position of transcendence and absolute value.
In developing a specific theory of the avant-garde as opposed to a general theory of
modernity, Poggioli (1968) defined the avant-garde as sets of oppositional arguments
distinguishing some set of actors and groups from the wider society. Vanguardism is an
expression of the romantic reaction to the development of the mass audience, to the
introduction of industrial production to cultural objects. This manifests in opposition to
older generations of artists, but especially to the vulgarity of popular or mass culture. The
avant-garde thus responds to a set of norms and motivations arising from the bohemian
condition in which artistic production begins to separate itself from commerce. This
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complex of oppositions subtended by a vibrant cultural life is characterized by a set of
durable norms and psychological motivations regarding cultural production that vary in
their extremes. These constraints are exceptional for their anti-conventionality; for
Poggioli, the avant-garde is inherently nonconformist, anti-traditional, and experimental.
In contrast to Poggioli, Bürger’s (1984) theory of the avant-garde focuses on a
narrower set of movements, specifically Dada, Surrealism, and the post-revolutionary
Russian avant-garde.51 He argues that the key point of discontinuity in art history is not the
rise of Aestheticism, the most potent expression of the autonomy of the institution of art
(art for art’s sake). Aestheticism is merely the culmination of a gradual separation of art
from what he calls the ‘praxis of life,’ meaning everyday life and social and political
concerns; it is the inevitable outcome of the bourgeois conception of art. However, with the
historical avant-garde, “the apartness from the praxis of life that had always constituted the
institutional status of art in bourgeois society now becomes the content of works” (Bürger
1984, 27). Whereas previous art movements focused their critical energies against certain
aesthetic practices and various concerns outside of the institution of art, the avant-garde
that interests Bürger is a protest against the entire institution of art and it’s relation to the
wider world. Only when the purity of art reveals its inconsequentiality in the world does
the vicious criticism of the avant-garde seek rectification.
6.2. Theoretical Development
6.2.1. Bürger and Bourdieu
There thus appears a tension between Bürger’s emphasis on the discontinuity of the
historical avant-garde and Bourdieu’s emphasis on the development of an autonomous

51

This list also includes to some extent Futurism and German Expressionism.
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field of cultural production. The point of contention is the degree of (dis)continuity posited
at two historical points: autonomy and self-critique. This study is not concerned with
determining whether the creation of an autonomous field of cultural production was a
rupture or not, but rather with the critique that developed in reaction to the historical
reality of a field of strategies structured in part by the ambition of an irreducible or pure
aesthetic. I consider two possible (but not mutually exclusive) Bourdieusian responses to
Bürger’s argument: Dada as supreme art and Dada as heteronomy.
For Bourdieu (1996, 257), Dada’s “refusal to separate life from art” is “an artistic act,
even the supreme artistic act.” Perhaps it is no accident that Bourdieu’s favorite subject in
this context is Duchamp, the most enigmatic and likely apolitical individual involved in the
Dada movement. His deployment of a common manufactured urinal in the context of
artistic appreciation shocked the art world. Despite the shock value of the event, the Dada
maneuver as exemplified by Duchamp is not in this sense a historical rupture; it is rather
the most radical crystallization of an aesthetically pure appropriation of everyday life
conceived up to that point. Duchamp is thus the finest example of a virtuoso at the game of
art.
From another Bourdieusian perspective, Dada’s refusal is also another form of social
art. Bourdieu and Bürger define autonomy essentially the same: the freedom from
demands that art be useful. Bürger’s error, from this perspective, is in supposing that
Dada’s critique of art is qualitatively new, whereas for Bourdieu it would represent merely
the reassertion of demands for usefulness. In other words, the criticism of art as an
institution could be seen as a set of strategies appealing to the heteronomous principle, the
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subordination of art to imperatives derived from beyond the field. Dada’s radicalism can
thus be interpreted as part of the traditional affinity of the avant-garde with leftist politics.
Of course, Bürger has his own retort. Until the early twentieth century, art itself was
left unscathed by the vigorous attacks of the avant-garde. With the arrival of the avantgarde of the early twentieth century, the very idea of art as an institution came under
attack. Bourdieu’s model predicts that however actors and organizations behave, they do
so in response to the objective conditions of the field in the form of position-takings in
relation to contemporaries and previous generations and their resource endowments.
Bürger’s model specifies that the historical avant-garde turned their critique upon art as a
whole. This self-critique can be understood as a potential set of strategies within the field.
That Bourdieu does not emphasize self-critique as much as Bürger is likely in part a
consequence of his focus on the nineteenth century as well as the two points made above.
Thus, in principle, the basic arguments, despite their baggage, are compatible.
6.2.2. Strategies of Distinction
First, this argument – that the aesthetic disposition is politicized in a radical critique
of the field of art - requires a more elaborate consideration of strategies of distinction
within the subfield of restricted production. Bourdieu’s discussion of the strategies
available to the avant-garde is generally restricted to technical fetishism and his general
argument that the avant-garde redefines the field of cultural production by selectively
inverting or negating some of the core arguments of the consecrated avant-garde. His
emphasis is primarily focused on the development of an autonomous aesthetic. This
generally deters him from attributing significance to other innovations in the strategies of
art movements (though see Bourdieu and Haacke 1995).
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Crane (1987, 14-15) argues that avant-gardes differ not only in the extent to which
they challenge existing conventions and institutions but also in the focus of their criticism.
She argues that identifying an art movement as avant-garde requires attention to any one
of three factors: the aesthetic content of art, the social content of art, and/or the norms
surrounding the production and distribution of artworks. From her elaboration of each
point, one can devise a set of strategies that those staking positions in the field can utilize in
order to accumulate cultural capital and aim to redefine the artistic field in their image.
This list is presented in Table 6.1. Like Bourdieu, most discussions of artistic revolution or
the avant-garde involve changes in the aesthetic content of works. One of the virtues of
Crane’s effort is her identification of the range of issues beyond formal considerations that
artists can take positions on in order to establish their credentials as avant-garde or
innovators. Moreover, she tends to refuse to lock in the direction of redefinition.
This final consideration is a telling indicator of the importance of a contextual
understanding of the exigencies of the field and the opportunities they offer. For example,
Table 6.1. Strategies of Distinction Available to the Avant-Garde
Aesthetic Content of Art

Social Content of Art

Norms Surrounding the
Production and
Distribution of Artworks

Redefinition of artistic conventions
Utilization of new artistic tools and techniques
Redefinition of the nature of the art object
Expression of social or political values that is critical of or
different from the mainstream
Redefinition of the relationship between high art and
popular culture
Criticism of artistic institutions
Redefinition of the social context for the production of art
Redefinition of the organizational context for the production
of art
Redefinition of the nature of the artistic role

Source: Crane (1987, 14-15)
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Crane (1987, 14) argues that those movements that seek to resurrect prior
conventions are unlikely to be identified as avant-garde. However, a dramatic example of a
set of strategies of resurrection is available with Stuckism. The Stuckists are an art
movement forged at the dawn of the twenty-first century in opposition to the more
extreme variants of modern and especially postmodern art. One manner of summarizing
their position is a quotation from one manifesto: “Artists who don’t paint aren’t artists”
(Childish and Thomson 1999). Marxist literary critic Terry Eagleton (2011) argues that the
Stuckist’s bombast is indeed subversive; “Today, rejecting the easel is as conventional as
the iambic pentameter.” In other words, when the subversive becomes conventional, the
formerly conventional can be subversive. Below, I argue that looking at the avant-garde in
this chapter from this perspective helps us to see the politicization of art in the avant-garde
as subversive.
6.2.3. Politicizing the Aesthetic Disposition
According to Bourdieu, there are two general defining characteristics of the
aesthetic disposition. The first is the capacity and the tendency to view art as irreducible to
moral, political, or economic valuations or functions. The second is the capacity and the
tendency to appropriate anything aesthetically. Together, these institutionalize the
separation of a sphere of transcendent aesthetic experience. Though the aesthetic
disposition varies in degree across agents, these two characteristics or classificatory
schemas are basically inseparable.
What Bürger adds to this account is the politicization of artistic production at the
frontier of the avant-garde in the early twentieth century. In Bourdieu’s model, the avantgarde is the bearer of autonomy, though the degree of autonomy characterizing the field is
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variable across time. Bürger emphasizes the focusing of the critical efforts of artists on the
field itself as it relates to a broader social world. Another manner of putting this argument
is that the historical avant-garde acquired and crystallized the second characteristic of the
aesthetic disposition while relaxing the first. They employed the means to constitute the
world and all of its objects, discourses, and practices as aesthetic materials, while
simultaneously constituting them as political, as suffused and traversed with a dimension
of power, of social significance. Referring to Table 6.1, these avant-garde sought more or
less to challenge existing conventions and practices utilizing at one time or another all of
the available strategies. This includes a marked emphasis on dramatically expanding the
aesthetic frontiers of art, developing the most virulent opposition to existing social and
political arrangements, including the institution of art itself, and finally, a critical focus on
the context of artistic production and distribution, including the advancement of a
decidedly militant role for the artist in social life.
For Bourdieu, actors respond to the objective possibilities available in each field. In
the field of cultural production, this yields the particular dynamic of perpetual revolution.
This process involves an incentive structure that rewards various strategies of distinction
at various times. Bürger’s argument can be translated thus: as the process of autonomy
intensified, the objective possibilities open to an emerging avant-garde included a radical
critique of cultural producers and the conditions of production in relation to the broader
field of power. The rallying cry of the subfield of restricted production is the autonomy of
art against the fields of politics and economics. But, like Eagleton’s characterization of
Stuckism as subversive, the field ultimately incentivizes a turn against even this principle in
order to subvert the field in a revolution against art, against a vision of society that seeks to
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expunge the social responsibilities of artists. Perpetual revolution thus ultimately yields
institutional critique; there are precious few sacred cows in the butcher shop of revolution.
6.2.4. Avant-Garde as Critical Communities
I argue, like Teune (2005), that a modified version of Rochon’s (1998) model offers
a meaningful way of approaching these critical art movements. As noted in the review
above, Rochon posits a basic two-phase process in which critical communities develop
critical ideas that are then framed by movements in order to appeal to audiences. Critical
communities are informal networks of communication distinguished by their concern over
some social problem(s). Through discussion in published works, these networks develop
innovative diagnoses and prognoses that are critical of existing practices and values. For
Rochon, “scientists, academics, and a variety of social analysts and commentators” are the
primary producers of critical ideas (1998, 97). This is clearly illustrated by his ideal
example of a critical community: the philosophes that promoted the Enlightenment.
Eyerman and Jamison’s (1991) criticism expands the range of intellectual labor by
including professionals of all types. Still, the concept may be too exclusive. Rochon’s ideal
example provides a lead. The philosophes included a wide range of public intellectuals that
engaged in a variety of critical activities. Their medium was not always that of academic or
scientific analysis. Voltaire’s biting satire provides an illustration of the aesthetic
instruments utilized by some of the philosophes. Moreover, the philosophes sought not
just to cultivate and disseminate ideas, but also to disseminate practices, the most general
of which was rational discourse itself. Finally, the infrastructure of their ‘republic of letters’
was firmly embedded in more intimate forms of social intercourse. In France, for example,
the salons were especially significant in fostering climates of critical discourse (Kale 2004).
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While Rochon’s analysis suggests a strictly cognitive, discursive, and academic definition of
the activities of critical communities, a more appropriate conceptualization should include
the practices promoted by critical actors (for example, recycling in the environmental
movement), a wider range of actors, including but not limited to artists and others familiar
to bohemian or countercultural networks and lifestyles (Teune 2005), and more direct
forms of critical discourse (as in clubs, academic conferences, and think tanks).
Critical communities are defined primarily by the problems they address. Rochon
(1998, 22) identifies three key features of critical communities.
1. Sensitivity: actors are in a condition of heightened awareness with respect to the
conditions of a problem, whether as a result of some vulnerability or interest.
2. Diagnosis: actors develop an analysis of the sources and the nature of the problem.
3. Prognosis: actors develop prescriptions for solving the problem, including policies,
strategies, and in some cases practices or tactics.
The degree to which the discourse within a community coheres around a single diagnosis
and a single prognosis is variable. The early period of discussion is often confused and
exploratory. Over time, some communities narrow their sets of diagnoses and prognoses.
In accordance with the academic and rationalist bias his conception harbors,
Rochon cites the importance of higher educational institutions in the formation of critical
communities. It seems plausible that the development of such communities can be
analyzed as phenomena emerging from the incentive structures offered by social fields,
including the academic field. My argument is that the field of artistic production described
in Chapter Five offers sets of opportunities that are exploited by the strategic acumen of
various artists and organizations like art critics, galleries, museums, governments, etc. The
sensitivity of avant-garde artists to these opportunities is shaped by their endowments of
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capital and the incentive structure of the field or fields that they occupy, which in turn is
shaped in part by broader field dynamics and exogenous factors. Much of Chapter Six
focuses on the question of the sensitivity of actors to opportunities. The process of
perpetual revolution is particularly relevant in this context. Others are important as well,
however. Technological change is a significant exogenous variable. For example, during
the period of the networks under study, artists were increasingly occupied by the concept
and the reality of the machine and scientific advances in general. The onset of World War I
was a particularly potent force in the radicalism of Dada, including the acquiescence of the
socialist parties of Europe in the struggle. After the Second World War, the
acknowledgement of a failed socialist experiment in the Soviet Union was important for the
development of the Situationist International (SI).
Exploiting these opportunities involved developing critical strategies (Table 7.1)
that, first, diagnosed a social problem and, second, generated solutions to the problem,
including appropriate tactics. This entailed, as discussed above, the politicization of the
aesthetic disposition and the field of artistic and cultural production as a whole. In
Bürger’s language, they criticized art as an institution for its relation to structures of
domination outside of the world of art.
Teune (2005) turns to the Bohemian subcultures of the 1950’s and the Situationists
through his modification of Rochon’s initial understanding of a critical community.
Whereas Teune emphasizes and demonstrates the effects of the diffusion of these forms of
criticism into social movements in the 1960’s and 1990’s and beyond, I turn to the art
movements themselves to determine whether they perform the function of criticism.
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6.3. Data and Method
I employ three case studies of art movements: Dada, Surrealism, and the SI. The
primary objective in this chapter is to determine whether these movements can be
identified as critical communities. I explore the range of strategies that they utilized,
especially the diagnoses and prescriptions that they offered through their activities. These
studies thus provide only a hint at the question of sensitivity.
Primary and secondary sources are utilized in order to isolate each movement’s
diagnoses and prognoses. The object of primary significance is the public discourse the
movement presents to the outside world in the form of manifestoes, artworks, interviews,
periodicals, memoirs, etc. Attention is focused on the actual practitioners and participants
in the movements and whomever they directly respond to in their discourses. Attempts by
others to define the discourse of each movement and to situate it in a context the
movement’s participants themselves do not address or explicitly disagree with are ignored.
Bürger’s historical avant-garde includes Dada, Surrealism, the post-revolutionary
Russian avant-garde, Futurism, and German Expressionism. This chapter’s case selection
yields disagreement with Bürger on one movement: the Situationist International. The
three movements of this study were chosen principally as a response to the literature on
culture jamming. Numerous authors recognize a debt to the historical avant-garde in
contemporary culture jamming (Cammaerts 2007; Cox 2005; Klein 2000; Nomai 2008).
The Situationists are the most commonly cited of these movements. Other movements,
such as Fluxus, are considered less central to the development of culture jamming.
These three movements are not the only generators of critical practices and ideas of
import in the first half of the twentieth century. Their discourses are part of wider critical
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discussions on aesthetics, politics and economics flowing from the nineteenth century. In
particular, Marxist analyses of cultural production addressed similar concerns. However,
in defining themselves, each movement addresses their specific sets of questions. It is also
worth stressing again that critical communities vary in the degree of pluralism in their
diagnoses and prognoses. The case studies below will not represent all veins of discussion
particular to the movements. Instead, the most salient and the most general diagnostic and
prognostic discourses will be presented. The cases are presented in chronological order.
6.4. Dada! (1916 – 1923)52
Dada began more or less independently in Zurich, Switzerland and New York City
around 1916 in the milieu of various avant-garde and radical circles during World War I.
Through lively discussions and provocative actions and pieces in the Cabaret Voltaire in
Zurich and the apartment of the Arensbergs in New York, groups of artists and writers
forged an increasingly confrontational aesthetic. It spread quickly to Germany, the
Netherlands, and many other urban areas, in part thanks to the efforts of Tristan Tzara. His
indefatigable networking and promotion pulled together a heterogeneous and far-flung set
of individuals into the most radical movement of ‘art’ in the history of art. By 1920, most of
the major figures involved in Dada activities had immigrated to Paris. After a brief period
of external provocation and internal conflict, the movement gradually dissolved and by
1923 was no longer a coherent force.
6.4.1. Diagnosis
A central problematic can be ascertained in the discourses of Dadaists: the role of
cultural production in a world of false values and mass slaughter. Much of the impetus for
My resources for the Dada movement include anthologies of Dada writings (Ades 2006; Lippard 1971,
Motherwell 1981), memoirs (Richter 1997), and histories (Lewis 1988; Sanouillet 2009; Sheppard 1979).
52
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this concern was World War I. The Dadaists were resolutely anti-nationalist and anti-war.
The values of the nation, of martial valor and honor were, for them, tools of manifest
absurdity used to send millions to their deaths. Moreover, the spectacle of the war
furthered the perception that the pretenses of progress, rationality, science, religion,
morality, even socialism (except in Germany) were hollow, though dangerous. Ball (1916)
asserted, “It is necessary to define the activity of this cabaret; its aim is to remind the world
that there are independent men, men – beyond war and nationalism – who live for other
ideals.” In Germany, Grosz (2006, 308) expressed the alienation engendered by the war: “I
could see that the individual freedom that I had enjoyed until then was being threatened… I
viewed this war as a monstrous and denatured manifestation of the ugly struggle for
ownership.” Tzara (1981, 403) clarifies further: “Honor, Country, Morality, Family, Art,
Religion, Liberty, Fraternity, etc. – all these notions had once answered to humans needs,
now nothing remained of them but a skeleton of conventions.” Aragon fumes:
[N]o more religions, no more royalists, no more radicals, no more imperialists, no more
anarchists, no more socialists, no more communists, no more proletariat, no more
democrats, no more republicans, no more bourgeois, no more aristocrats, no more arms, no
more police, no more nations, an end at last to all this stupidity, nothing left, nothing at all,
nothing, nothing (Picabia et al 2006, 181).

His final repetitions represent a common slur used by the Dadaists against practically the
whole of Western civilization: nothing. The 1918 Manifesto launches into another
characteristic series of negations:
Every product of disgust capable of becoming a negation of the family is Dada; a protest
with the fists of its whole being engaged in destructive action: Dada; knowledge of all the
means rejected up until now by the shamefaced sex of comfortable compromise and good
manners: Dada; abolition of logic, which is the dance of those impotent to create: Dada; of
every social hierarchy and equation set up for the sake of values by our valets: Dada; every
object, all objects, sentiments, obscurities, apparitions and the precise clash of parallel lines
are weapons for the fight: Dada; abolition of memory… (original emphasis, Tzara 2006, 42).

Fighting and dying for such values could only be hideous meaninglessness.
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This savage and comprehensive destruction of values, especially ‘bourgeois’ values,
was particularly pronounced in the rejection of art and aesthetic values such as beauty and
genius as complicit in the façade. Picabia et al (2006, 188) exclaims, “Essentially what’s
behind the word BEAUTY is unthinking, visual convention. Life bears no relation to what
grammarians call beauty.” He further states, “We don’t believe in God any more than we do
in Art” (Picabia et al, 188). Tzara (cited in Richter 1997, 35) casts more aspersions: “Art is
a pretension, warmed by the diffidence of the urinary tract, hysteria born in a studio.” Art
in the classical sense is singled out for two interrelated reasons. First, it represents the
loftiest realm of absolutes and human achievements. Second, like patriotism and other
values, it was complicit in the maintenance of the entire artifice of a society that marched
so many of its young men to senseless death. In other words, it performed something of
the function of ideology in Marxist terminology: a mechanism of justification. Huelsenbeck
(1971, 50) is straightforward: “The Dadaist considers it necessary to come out against art
because he has seen through its fraud as a moral safety valve…[Art] (including culture,
spirit, athletic club), regarded from a serious point of view, is a large-scale swindle.”
Though destructive, the Dadaists did affirm a number of general values. At the least,
there was basic agreement on values like individual freedom and spontaneity, though these
were variously defined and never clarified. “Dada was born of a need for independence, of
a distrust toward unity.” Tzara (2006, 37) continues, “Those who are with us preserve
their freedom.” At length, he declares:
Dada; absolute and unquestionable faith in every god that is the immediate product of
spontaneity: …to respect all individuals in their folly of the moment: whether it be serious,
fearful, timid, ardent, vigorous, determined, enthusiastic; ...Freedom: Dada Dada Dada, a
roaring of tense colors, and interlacing of opposites and of all contradictions, grotesques,
inconsistencies: LIFE. (original emphasis, Tzara 2006, 42).
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As indicated above, a general and vague notion of life and/or nature was also frequently
affirmed. This is not to be confused with everyday life, which was anathema to Dada; the
common and the ordinary were part of the suffocating detritus of bourgeois civilization.
Picabia’s wife is clear: “Dada aspires to escape from everything that is common or ordinary
or sensible” (cited in Coutts-Smith 1970, 23). Spontaneous and irreducible to logic, life or
nature (often summed up in the word Dada) was a sphere beyond sense or even awareness
that captivated the Dadaists. It is the positive valuation of life and freedom, variously
defined, that seems to justify so much of the loathing expressed by the Dadaists. Indeed,
the problem with the war, with rationality and bourgeois values and institutions, was their
infringement on the freedom of the individual and the spontaneity of life. Arp (1971, 24)
reasoned, “The confusion of our epoch results from [the] overestimation of reason.”
6.4.2. Prognosis
To some extent, the answers that Dada provided for this problem of art are general
and vague. Tzara lays down the gauntlet: “There is a great task of destruction and negation
to accomplish. We must sweep and clean!” The corroded values and institutions so
inimical to freedom, spontaneity, and life had to come down. The goal was total
destruction. Yet, there was little systematic in this cleaning. Richter (1997, 49) goes far as
to argue that while everyone else had a program, Dada was defined by its rejection of any
and all programs.
In truth, part of the tension in the group was the degree to which certain individuals
were interested in developing a positive approach to the problem identified above. While
some, like Tzara, were more concerned with the destruction of language as a vehicle of
sensemaking and thus values, others, like Richter and Breton, felt that Dada should forge a

174

balance between destruction and creation. Janco (1971, 36) identified this distinction as
the two ‘speeds’ of Dada: one negative and nihilistic; the other positive and primal.
This tension was apparently subtended by a general agreement regarding their
principal means of protest: art. As Richter (1997, 48) states, “we were looking for a way to
make art a meaningful instrument of life.” While existing art was complicit in the
maintenance of false values, Dada was in the process of crafting a new art, not for art’s
sake, but for the task of criticism. Huelsenbeck (1971, 23) declares: “the highest art will be
that in which in its conscious content presents the thousandfold problems of the day.” Arp
(1971, 24) reminisced, “We searched for an elementary art that would, we thought, save
mankind from the furious folly of these times.” Ball (cited in Richter 1997, 48) describes
discussion in the nascent Zurich group thus:
We discussed the theories of art current in the last few decades, always with reference to
the mysterious nature of art itself, its relationship with the public….It is true that for us art
is not an end in itself we have lost too many of our illusions for that. Art is for us an
occasion for social criticism.

This was especially pronounced in the promotion of ‘anti-art.’
For Dada, anti-art was the willing and defiant rejection of the basic principle’s upon
which bourgeois art was erected. The concept was variably interpreted depending on the
‘speed’ of Dada. For some, it meant celebrating the end of art through the creation of
defiant or primitive works, as in Tzara’s constant refrain: nothing. For others, it signified
the end of an empty art and the dawn of a new art that tapped into life and nature.
However, most of the innovations of the movement were less ‘new’ than modifications and
elaborations of prior practices. Richter (1997, 217-8) argues that much of the movement’s
repertoire derived at least formally from its predecessors, especially Cubism and Futurism.
These include confrontational cabaret gatherings accompanied by shock effects and rioting,
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the manifesto, posters and wall tags, phonetic poetry, photomontage, collage, grotesque
costumes, and various techniques involving the use of color in painting. The most notable
innovation he does not mention, the ready-made, is in fact a Dadaist innovation.
Instead, what distinguishes Dada and anti-art strategically is the cultivation of the
virtues of chance, spontaneity, and the irrational in their performances, literature, and
visual works. Richter (1997, 51-52) relates how the concept of chance filled their
conversations and works; random pieces of pictures and texts thrown together, the use of
whatever materials were stumbled upon, the random application of materials like sand.
For some, the destruction of meaning and the values of a decaying belligerent society were
effected principally by the use of chance in the creation of works. Tzara in particular
preferred the deliberate effacement of meaning through the random association of words
as principally destructive. Others saw chance as a way to tap into the spontaneous order of
life and nature beyond the rationality of their contemporary society. Arp (1971, 28)
declared, “Dada aimed to destroy the reasonable deceptions of man and recover the natural
and unreasonable order.” Janco (1971, 36) defined Dada as “a synonym for pure, childlike,
direct, primal.” Chance also played a role in the important relation of everyday life to Dada
activities and works. Ball (cited in Richter 1997, 49) clarifies:
It was an adventure even to find a stone, a clock-movement a tram-ticket, a pretty leg, an
insect, the corner of one’s own room; all these things could inspire pure and direct feeling.
When art is brought into life with everyday life and individual experience, it is exposed to
the same risks, the same unforeseeable laws of chance, the same interplay of living forces.
Art is no longer a ‘serious and weighty’ emotional stimulus, nor a sentimental tragedy, but
the fruit of experience and joy in life.

Life itself was spontaneous; cultivating the creative potentiality of chance required
attention to its ubiquitous operation.

176

Though they seemed to tap an aesthetic impulse, techniques like collage also had
critical psychological effects. Richter (1997, 114) writes:
[T]hey cut up photographs, stuck them together in provocative ways, added drawings, cut
these up too, pasted in bits of newspapers, or old letters, or whatever happened to be lying
around – to confront a crazy world with its own image.

Torn from their familiar context, bits of meaning were suddenly brought under a new
critical light. Such techniques generated specific effects involving the juxtaposition of
previously incongruous elements. Ernst (1948, 13) describes it thus:
A ready-made reality (a canoe), finding itself in the presence of another and hardly less
absurd reality (a vacuum cleaner), in a place where both of them must feel displaced (a
forest), will, by this very fact, escape into anew absolute value, true and poetic: canoe and
vacuum cleaner will make love. The mechanism of collage, it seems to me, is revealed by
this very simple example.

Out of these formerly estranged materials, new meanings, new truths arrived, shaking up
any supposedly fixed set of references. A significant function of such practices was to
create controversy. Dada performances as well were typically chaotic juxtapositions of
various elements designed in part to shock unwitting audiences. Richter (1997, 66)
describes it thus: “The devising and raising of public hell was an essential function of any
Dada movement….And when the public, like insects or bacteria, had developed immunity to
one kind of poison, we had to think of another.”
As a critical community of artists and writers, Dada developed a set of diagnostic
and prognostic discourses regarding the problem of artistic production in the early
twentieth century. For them, art served an essential function in maintaining the bellicose
bourgeois façade of Western civilization and its pervasive rationalization. In order to
remedy this state of affairs, Dadaists developed and adapted various avant-garde
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techniques to a new emphasis on chance and everyday life. Such means of protest were
intended to provoke the development of a critical space.
6.5. Surrealism (1924 – 1938)53
In 1924, former Dadaists Breton, Aragon, Soupault, and others announced the
formation of the Surrealists. The center of this new movement was Paris, though groups
also organized in dozens of other countries and major events were held in London and New
York. Breton exerted a powerful leadership over the Parisian group and steered it through
difficult times; he established Surrealism as an independent force in the avant-garde,
responded to various events like the French war in Morocco and the rise of fascism, and
navigated a tumultuous and ultimately unsuccessful relationship with the French
Communist Party that was the primary impetus for internal conflict. In exile during World
War II, the movement came home to France somewhat discredited for its lack of
participation in the Resistance. In part from the sustained efforts of Breton, Surrealism
survived into at least the 1960s as a coherent intellectual force.
6.5.1. Diagnosis
The central problematic that occupied the Surrealists throughout almost the
entirety of their existence was the role of cultural production in the social revolution.54 The
consolidation of the Bolshevik regime in Russia following the Civil War was a principal
catalyst for this focus. The arrival of an alternative to capitalism precipitated the
development of a new orientation towards political action among artists and writers
(Maerhofer 2009). The Surrealists represented the most prominent avant-garde effort to

My resources for the Surrealist movement include a collection of manifestoes (Breton 1969), essays
(Lippard 1970), and histories (Lewis 1988; Nadeau 1965; Short 1996; Suleiman 1991).
54 The term most often used by the Surrealists was ‘expression in all its forms.’
53
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navigate this difficulty. Like Dada, the Surrealists regarded much of their contemporary
culture, especially art, as complicit in the maintenance of a general system of oppression.
This system manifested itself especially in wars and colonization, the repression of speech,
especially artistic expression, and the growing threat of fascism as the 1930s proceeded.
However, under Breton the Surrealists developed a more systematic diagnosis of the
problem than Dada.
This ‘rationalization’ of Dadaist revolt was especially inspired by Freudian
psychoanalysis. Like Freud, the Surrealists posited the existence of a mental realm or
sphere corresponding to the unconscious. Often described as the ‘marvelous,’
manifestations of this vast psychic domain included dreams, madness, childhood,
imagination, the play of chance, and other experiences and products that challenged
routinized ways of seeing and acting. These routinized patterns are best understood as the
logical antinomies or oppositions that organized human life: morality/immorality;
rationality/irrationality; love/hate; death/life. This psychic realm of the marvelous
evidenced the transcendence of these contradictions. Breton (1969, 123) is clear:
“Everything tends to make us believe that there exists a certain point of mind at which life
and death, the real and the imagined, past and future, the communicable and the
incommunicable, high and low, cease to be perceived as contradictions.” Further, he states:
“I believe in the future resolution of these two states, dream and reality, which are
seemingly so contradictory, into a kind of absolute reality, a surreality” (Breton 1969, 14).
This deep wealth was for the Surrealists the root of human freedom. The capacity to
imagine, to break down all barriers in thought, was the highest Surrealist value; conversely,
“to reduce the imagination to a state of slavery…is to betray all sense of absolute justice
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within oneself” (Breton 1969, 4). This freedom is organized and animated by desire, the
cacophony of mental movements initiated by the unconscious that burst into the waking
mind. From desire and freedom springs all true creativity, unhinged and unencumbered.
Only with true freedom do the contradictions that sustain everyday life dissolve. As Breton
(Breton 1969, 14) states, “the marvelous is always beautiful, anything marvelous is
beautiful, in fact only the marvelous is beautiful.”
This realm of the unconscious lay beyond the confines and strictures of the mental
structures, the values and norms that maintained the nationalist, capitalist, religious,
familial, and above all rational order. This dominant order of bourgeois rationality
appalled the Surrealists, because it represented the slavery of the imagination. Breton
(1969, 4) describes it thus:
Though he may later [following childhood] try to pull himself together upon occasion,
having felt that he is losing by slow degrees all reason for living, incapable as he has become
of being able to rise to some exceptional situation such as love, he will hardly succeed. This
is because he henceforth belongs body and soul to an imperative practical necessity which
demands his constant attention. None of his gestures will be expansive, none of his ideas
generous or far-reaching. In his mind’s eye, events real or imagined will be seen only as
they relate to a welter of similar events, events in which he has not participated, abortive
events.

Maintained by logical antinomies, this structure of mental oppression constrained the
desires that raged within each individual to unleash fundamental creative forces.
6.5.2. Prognosis
In response to this discovery, Surrealism proposed a project of expressive
liberation. Aragon (1970, 37) begins: “the relationship born of the negation of the real by
the marvelous is essentially of an ethical nature, and the marvelous is always the
materialization of a moral symbol in violent opposition to the morality of the world from
which it arises.” The duty of the Surrealists, then, is to “make the point of the marvelous,”
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to engage in symbolic conflict with the morality of their time, with the logical antinomies of
daily life. As Breton (1969, 128) states, “everything remains to be done, every means must
be worth trying, in order to lay waste to the ideas of family, country, religion.” This conflict
of ideas established the opening salvos of a social revolution, a revolution of the mind.
However, the means to this liberation required elucidation and experimentation.
Above all, the Surrealists saw their actions as experimental attempts to explore the
marvelous. Breton (1969, 136) again clarifies:
The idea of Surrealism aims quite simply at the total recovery of the psychic force by a
means which is nothing other than the dizzying descent into ourselves, the systematic
illumination of hidden places and the progressive darkening of other places, the perpetual
excursion into the mist of forbidden territory…

In their view, the excavation, or ‘materialization’ in Aragon’s terminology, of this rich
source of counter-logic was fundamentally corrosive of the established bourgeois order.
Various means of exploration were developed. Most notably, the Surrealists argued
that through the “fortuitous juxtaposition” of apparently unrelated objects, words, or
images - processes relatively unmediated by rational procedures - the organized recesses
of the unconscious broke through the confines of rationality (Breton 1969, 37). Ernst
(1970, 135) explains:
It became evident that the more arbitrarily elements were brought together, the greater
was the certainty that a totally or partially new interpretation had to occur through the
transcending spark. The joy accompanying every successful metamorphosis does not
correspond to a miserable aesthetic propensity to distraction, but to the intellect’s very
ancient, vital need for liberation from the deceptive and boring paradise of fixed memories,
and for explorations of a new, greater range of experience.

Thus, the Surrealists either created or formalized various techniques of cultural production
ranging from automatic writing to exquisite corpse to the further utilization of means like
photomontage and collage. Each of these tactics sought to replace the conscious and
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deliberative creator with the random unconscious act, known as automatism. As defined
by Breton (1969, 26), Surrealism was, “pure psychic automatism, by which one proposes to
express, either verbally, in writing, or by any other manner, the real functioning of thought.
Dictation of thought in the absence of all control exercised by reason, outside of all
aesthetic and moral preoccupations.”
The desired effect of these methods was liberation. Breton (1969, 123) argues,
“Surrealism attempted to provoke, from the intellectual and moral point of view, an attack
of conscience, of the most general and serious kind.” Tactics like automatic writing were
designed to provoke and shock by the suggestion of heterogeneous association. Breton
(cited in Nadeau 1965, 104) claims that “the immediate reality of the surrealist revolution
is not so much to change anything in the physical… order…as to create a movement in
men’s minds.” Elsewhere, he offers a more detailed explanation:
The hordes of words which…Dada and Surrealism set about to let loose…will slowly but
surely make their way into the silly little towns and cities of literature such as it is still
being taught in this day and age and, here confusing without any difficulty the poor and rich
sections, they will calmly consume a great number of towers. The population, taking the
tact that the only edifice which has, thanks to our efforts, been seriously shaken to date is
that of poetry, is not overly on its guard; it is setting up insignificant little defensive dikes
here and there. People pretend not to pay too much attention to the fact that the logical
mechanism of the sentence alone reveals itself to be increasingly powerless to provoke the
emotional shock in man which really makes his life meaningful. By comparison, the
products of this…activity, such as those which Surrealism offers him in ever-increasing
numbers in the form of books, paintings, and films, are products which he looked at
dumfounded at first, but which he now surrounds himself with, and begins, more or less
timidly, to rely on to shake up his settled ways of thinking (Breton 1969, 152).

Surrealist means of influence thus rely on the gradual corrosion of the reified
consciousness of everyday life though the corruption of language (and symbols). These
techniques rely on a series of psychological mechanisms that satisfy the basic human desire
for meaningful experience.
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At first glance the social revolution that the Surrealists anticipated was solely at the
level of consciousness. This apparently idealist emphasis seemed to close off the field of
practical political action. Still, Breton consistently sought a cooperative relationship with
the French Communist Party in an effort to align his movement with the most powerful
revolutionary organization in France. This entailed at one point the disavowal of the very
notion of a Surrealist revolution. Referring to the party, Breton (1969, 140) noted, “I really
fail to see…why we should refrain from supporting the Revolution, provided we view the
problems of love, dreams, madness, art, and religion from the same angle they do.” The
most heated debates, aside from charges of idealism and immaturity, often raged over the
preference of many communists, including important party organs, for proletarian
literature over the avant-garde. Outside of these efforts, the Surrealists were also involved
in various political campaigns against French nationalism and fascism. More generally,
they saw the liberation of the subconscious as a necessary condition for revolutionary
political action.
As a critical community of artists and writers, the Surrealists developed a series of
diagnostic and prognostic discourses regarding the problem of artistic production in the
early twentieth century. They defined the unconscious as the source of human freedom
and the existing social regime as detrimental to its exercise. In order to remedy this state
of affairs, the Surrealists developed and adapted various avant-garde techniques to a new
emphasis on the psychic realm and everyday life. Such means of protest were intended to
provoke the disintegration of existing values.
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6.6. The Situationist International (1957-1968)55
After World War II, a diversity of avant-garde groups sought to take the mantle of
innovation and opposition from the Surrealists. In 1957, several of these groups merged to
form the SI. The movement was centered primarily in Paris, though it had affiliated groups
and activities across Europe. Held together in large part by the efforts of Guy Debord, the
chief theoretician of the movement, the SI established an increasingly belligerent position
against not only Western capitalism and Soviet socialism, but also nearly all Leftist groups
and individuals that claimed to represent the vanguard of social revolution, including
especially the French Communist Party and the artistic avant-garde. Immediately prior to
the massive French general strike of 1968, the group published their two most important
works: Debord’s (1995) theoretically sophisticated The Society of the Spectacle and Raoul
Vaneigem’s (1983) playful and poetic The Revolution of Everyday Life. Soon after the end of
the protests the group gradually dissolved.
6.6.1. Diagnosis
The central problematic that animated the SI was the role of cultural production in
consumer capitalism. The SI sought, first, to explain how capitalism had survived the
tumultuous first half of the twentieth century and, second, to identify the effects of this
consumer-oriented society in the field of resistance and revolution. Addressing the
perceived failings of Surrealism, especially their reliance on Freudianism, the SI developed
a relatively novel variant of Marxism, which they applied not only to advanced Western
economies, but also to the Soviet Union.

My resources for the SI are the movement’s journals (Knabb 2006), an early series of correspondences
(Debord 2009), SI books (Debord 1995; Vaneigem 1983), and histories (Home 1988; Marcus 1990;
McDonough 2007; Plant 1992).
55
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The SI argued that in order to survive, capitalism (and state socialism) was forced to
create new markets by perpetually crafting new desires. The unprecedented economic
condition in which human nature and subjectivity – the terrain of desire - are brought
under the sway of the economy is that of the “spectacle.” This essential Situationist
concept, an elaboration of Marx’s notion of alienation, is an attempt to describe human life
under a consumption-oriented social system. It specifies the inverted image of social
relations, relationships that are characterized by a fundamental distance and separation
enforced by the mediation of spectacular imagery, by representations of desires. Debord
(1995, 12) described it thus: "The spectacle is not a collection of images; rather, it is a social
relationship between people that is mediated by images." Such a state of affairs attests to
the notion that, “All that once was directly lived has become mere representation” (Debord
1995, 12). The images that saturate everyday life include advertising billboards, television
programs, Hollywood cinema, Soviet propaganda, the entire edifice of mass media, all of
which decree the infinite scope of human desire. These ensembles erect gulfs between
individuals, who now relate to each other and themselves through the imagery of an
unsatiated desire. When everyone wants an impossibly beautiful Hollywood starlet, and
when ads implore one to live life to the fullest and celebrate endless spontaneity and
leisure, the reality of economic necessity is a perpetual disappointment. The spectacle,
which seeps into every crevice of everyday life and leaves no urge or desire unturned, thus
tends towards the “colonization of social life” by the commodity, by the economic
imperatives of efficiency, and thus, ultimately, of rationalization (Debord 195, 29). Debord
(1995, 28) explains: “the economy transforms the world, but transforms it into a world of
the economy.”
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The gulf between individuals is the source of inauthenticity. The SI argued that an
economy that dominates everyday life so thoroughly that it commodifies all forms of
mediation between individuals necessarily yields a degraded human experience. The
inferior existence occasioned by this economic condition is multiply flawed: it fails to
satisfy the desires it creates; it extinguishes community, the direct relations that survived
even under pre-spectacular capitalism; it dissolves the capacity for critical thought; and it
engenders a perpetual malaise of isolation, passivity, and inefficacy. At its cruelest, the
spectacular invasion of everyday life masquerades as authenticity in the moment of leisure;
the consumption of leisure time manages to only reproduce the spectacle in more refined
forms: “what has been passed off as authentic life turns out to be merely a life more
authentically spectacular” (Debord 1995, 112).
The SI believed that despite the abundance of capitalism the spectacle paradoxically
amplified the conquest of bare necessity. Once capitalism achieved the ability to produce
and distribute beyond the means necessary to reproduce its population, it continued to
reproduce the alienation specific to commodity relations. In other words, because
consumers must purchase commodities in the market system, they are still, despite the
productive capacity of the system, hitched to the imperative of survival; their lives are still
determined by consumption, by the possession of things. In direct opposition to the vulgar
economism of survival, the SI’s highest value was life. Life represented the fullest
expression of creative energies and impulses. It stood for the passionate exploration of
infinite possibility and spontaneity, the only condition of existence that could satisfy the
desires generated by the spectacle.
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It is this fundamental distinction that animates the SI. Vaneigem (1983, 159) argues
that, “Capitalism has demystified survival. It has made the poverty of daily life intolerable
in view of the increasing wealth of technical possibilities.” This very intolerance is the stuff
of passion, of life. Elsewhere he notes, “By force-feeding survival to satiation point,
consumer society awakens a new appetite for life” (Vaneigem 1983, 98). The system is
doomed to collapse precisely because it offers what it cannot fulfill, mainly the desire to
live an authentic life. In fact, for Vaneigem (1983, 6), “the desire to live is a political
decision.”
6.6.2. Prognosis
The very nature of the spectacle necessitated conflict on the terrain of culture, the
topography of images and desires. Art was clearly complicit in the maintenance of the
regime of survival. As Debord and Wilman (2007, 14) put it:
Every reasonably aware person of our time is aware of the obvious fact that art can no
longer be justified as a superior activity, or even as a compensatory activity to which one
might honorably devote oneself. The reason for this deterioration is clearly the emergence
of productive forces that necessitate other production relations and a new practice of life.

Art, understood as a specialized activity, was only valid when it renounced its specialized
position in the social structure and sank into the interventions practiced on the everyday.
The situationists consider cultural activity in its totality as an experimental method for
constructing everyday life, a method that can and should be continually developed with the
extension of leisure and the withering of the division of labor (beginning with the division of
artistic labour).
Art can stop being an interpretation of sensations and become an immediate creation of
more highly evolved sensations. The problem is how to produce ourselves, and not the
things which enslave us (Debord 2007c, 53).

The SI’s response was to formulate a strategy of propaganda and experimentation. This
entailed “the systematic provocative dissemination of a host of proposals aimed at turning
the whole of life into an exciting game, combined with constant depreciation of all current
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diversions” (Debord 2007a, 9). Experimentation involved activity which, “consists in
setting up, on the basis of more or less clearly recognized desires, a temporary field of
activity favorable to these desires” (SI 2007, 49). Such fields are new ambiences, areas in
which new behaviors and languages are forged and discarded; in other words, situations,
the construction of which is a central goal of the SI, involve the “immediate participation in
a passionate abundance of life by means of deliberately arranged variations of ephemeral
moments” (Debord 2007b, 53). The strategy of propaganda and experimentation
ultimately sought to create situations as the organizing principle of a new society.
The SI formalized two distinct tactical means. The first is the derive, a wandering or
drifting through an urban environment in order to explore the contour of the environment
and its emotional and behavioral effects on individuals.56 Derives and their attendant
mappings were part of a more systematic attempt at developing psychogeography, a
mapping of these effects. Psychogeography assumed that physical environments were
variably conducive to cultural expression. Constant (2007, 71), for example, argues that
the commercialization and increased automobile traffic of certain Parisian neighborhoods
stifled “the natural expression of collective creativity,” a possibility only when direct social
relations are possible. Psychogeography itself was part of the broader attempt to fashion a
radical architecture, a prospective ‘unitary urbanism’ in which the function of structures
was subordinate to their ludic or playful potentialities.
The second means of resistance, détournement. refers to the appropriation of
materials in the cultural environment in such a manner as to invert or lead astray its initial

The concept of derive owes its origins largely to the poet Baudelaire’s concept of the flâneur and the
Surrealists emphasis on spontaneous activity, especially as recounted in their novels.
56
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meaning in order to subvert the article and the spectacle as a whole. In a surrealist
description, Debord and Wolman (2007, 15) described it thus:
Any elements, no matter where they are taken from, can be used to make new
combinations. The discoveries of modern poetry regarding the analogical structure of
images demonstrate that when two objects are brought together, no matter how far apart
their original contexts may be, a relationship is always formed….The mutual interference of
two worlds of feeling, or the juxtaposition of two independent expressions, supersedes the
original elements and produces a synthetic organization of greater efficacy. Anything can be
used.

This process of détournement, of juxtaposing distinct elements in order to build new
meanings and relationships, was conceived as an almost universally applicable tactic. In
principle, everything and anything can be détourned, can be made to expose its role in the
spectacle as well as the spectacle itself: “all goods proposed by the spectacular system,
from cars to televisions, also serve as weapons for that system” (Debord 1995, 28).
Because the spectacle has colonized everyday life, it is precisely on this terrain where it
must be fought with its own weapons, from films to comics to radio to advertising.
Because détournement involves the appropriation of the spectacle, it is constantly in
danger of being recuperated back into the service of the spectacle. Recuperation is, “the
process whereby the spectacle ―take[s] up and use[s] [the vocabulary of revolutionary
discourse] to support the existing networks of power” (Plant 1992, 76).57 It is the depoliticization or re-commodification of revolutionary weapons. “Words forged by
revolutionary criticism are like partisan weapons; abandoned on the battlefield, they fall
into the hands of the counterrevolution” (Khayati 2007, 225). Situationist propaganda
thus required a perpetual vigilance against and cognizance of the spectacle’s ability to

This concept is part of the Situationist critique of the Soviet Union, labor unions, and the avant-garde, all of
whom they regarded as insufficiently aware of the degree to which their practices supported the spectacular
mode of production, whether it was run by capitalists or bureaucrats.
57

189

neutralize oppositional means. In such a situation, “the only historically justified tactic is
extremist innovation” (Debord and Wilson 2007, 14).
At a more general strategic level, the SI also sought to express their general disdain
for alienated relations, relations of separation and passivity. This entailed the fundamental
rejection of all relations of hierarchy, especially in the State but also, importantly, in the
organizations tasked with revolution. Debord (1995, 88) is clear:
In the struggle between the revolutionary organization and class society, the weapons are
nothing other than the essence of the combatants themselves: the revolutionary organization cannot reproduce within itself the dominant society's conditions of separation
and hierarchy.

True revolutionaries do not give orders; they together erect a total participatory
democracy that, through the momentum of its own novelty, crafts perpetual situations.
The SI developed a set of diagnostic and prognostic discourses that identified a
pattern of conflict on the terrain of culture and everyday life. This theoretical project was
strongly informed by its predecessors in the avant-garde. As the SI acknowledged,
détournement has a fairly esteemed genealogy running through Dada and Surrealism. By
juxtaposing different elements and decontextualizing cultural artifacts, creative acts and
works can disorient perception and cognition to such a degree as to open up new
possibilities for consciousness. For Dadaists, Surrealists, and the SI, these possibilities
included critique of the values and practices of bourgeois society and capitalism and,
especially for the latter two, new conceptions of values and practices that could organize a
future and better social order. As a critical community, the SI formalized these techniques
and the logic of cultural resistance on the terrain of the everyday at a new height of
conceptual and practical rigor.
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6.7. Conclusion
This chapter considers whether Dada, the Surrealists, and the SI can be described as
critical communities in the sense suggested by Rochon (1998) and Teune (2005).
Together, these movements developed not only a theoretical foundation for cultural
contestation but also various means by which to do so. This logic postulates that
contemporary culture and everyday life is the battlefield and everything found therein are
the weapons. Through a radical critique first aimed at art as a separate sphere of activity,
the tremendous experimental and innovative capabilities of modern artists are unleashed
on the world of objects, words, and practices. In doing so, they progressively formulated a
coherent method of criticism. This critique and the attendant wealth of means of
contestation evidence the development of a politicized aesthetic disposition, a weaponized
capacity to aesthetically appropriate virtually any object, practice, or discourse. It thus
appears that these avant-garde movements did behave as critical communities offering
several novel forms of collective action for future activists.
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CHAPTER 7. FIELD AND IDENTITY
Broadly construed, everyday social organization is composed of fields, networks,
and identities. This chapter aims, first, to present evidence of the content of collective
identity within the sample of CJOs. A secondary goal is to provide empirical support for
hypothesized relationships between CJOs and the field of cultural production.
This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I review the literature on collective
identity. Second, I situate this analysis within the theoretical developments presented
previous chapters. Specifically, I establish the relevant relations between identities,
biographies of cultural production, and fields. Hypotheses and propositions are developed
to flesh out these theoretical relations for empirical inquiry. Third, the developed
hypotheses and propositions provide guides for empirical inquiry.
7.1. Collective Identity
7.1.1. Political Participation and Social Movements
The literature on collective identity is enormous and spans a variety of disciplines
including social psychology, anthropology, political science, and sociology. As might be
expected, the dialogue between the fields is minimal. This is especially frustrating
considering the importance attributed to collective identity in social movement studies.
Because contentious politics is a form of political activity, I briefly consult both the social
movements and political participation literatures on the question of collective identity.
Efforts to explain conventional political behavior often utilize collective identity as
an explanatory variable. Two relatively distinct literatures are relevant: partisanship and
group consciousness. Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes’ (1960) argue that party
identification – the direction of identification with a particular political party and the
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strength of the resulting attachment - acts as a perceptual filter. Individuals process
information and make voting decisions in part by selecting facts that favor the object of
their attachment and rejecting information that disfavors it. Subsequent research wrestled
with the myriad implications of this conception of partisan identity, including the origin of
partisanship and the degree to which voting is rational (Fiorina 1981; Green, Palmquist,
and Schickler 2002; Key 1966; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976).
Work on voter turnout and other forms of political participation addressed a focus
on group consciousness beyond partisanship. In order to explain high levels of
involvement in politics among resource-poor minorities, Verba and Nie (1972; Verba, Nie,
and Kim 1978) argued that group membership was a potent factor in explaining groupbased mobilization that, unlike voting, require resources and organization. However, the
particular mechanisms linking identification to participation were left unspecified. Others
further developed the concept by distinguishing between group identification and group
consciousness (Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981; Chong and Rogers 2005). These
scholars argued that group consciousness - a politicized awareness of the status of one’s
group relative to others – mediates the relationship between identifying with a group and
participating in political action. Thus, while identification is a necessary condition in the
causal chain, more proximate factors include group efficacy, satisfaction or dissatisfaction
with the status of one’s group, support for collective action, ideology, and others.
In social movement studies, scholars also utilize the concept of collective identity as
an explanatory variable. Though typically marginalized in resource mobilization theory
(RMT) and the political opportunity approach (see Chapter Ten), the concept is
paradoxically central. The polity model offered by Gamson (1990) and Tilly (1978)
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stresses a key distinction between the members of the political system and those with
limited or no access to it. Tilly’s early concept of a ‘catnet’ emphasized the importance of
close relational ties and their categorical definition in the shaping of collective identity.
NSM theory is especially associated with the effort to link identification with activism
(Castells 1997; Habermas 1981; Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; 1985).
The most prominent conceptualization is offered by Melucci (1996, ch. 4), who defines
collective identity as a meso-level property of certain social interactions. For him, identity
is a negotiated and conflictual process defining the basic orientation of a group of
individuals and the field of actors, opportunities, and constraints they face in pursuing their
goals. At the macro-level, Melucci uses this concept to explain the mobilization and
orientation of the peace, women’s, and environmental movements among others.
Irreducible to social class, collective actors associated with these identities – lifestyles,
sexual orientations, environmentalism, etc. - forged new collective concerns and goals, and
thus new social and political issues. At the micro-level, Melucci and others endeavored to
explain the decision to participate in activism through an individual’s level of subjective
identification with a group (Pizzorno 1978; Melucci 1996). Early efforts to synthesize RMT
and social psychological approaches were motivated by the failure of the former to
adequately account for mobilization through a cost-benefit analysis. In order to fill out the
explanation, scholars turned to concepts like ideology, solidarity, and identity that focused
attention on subjective relations to groups (Klandermans 1984).
7.1.2. Collective Identity and Ideology
In studies of voting behavior, one of the more stubborn questions involves the
relative weight of partisanship and ideology in determining vote choice. At a more general
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remove, this question concerns the degree to which an individual’s identification with a
social or political group and that same individual’s ideology affects individual political
decisions. Verba and Nie (1972; Verba et al1978) demonstrate that the aggregate level of
objective and subjective group identification in a society strongly constrains the level of
participation in political activities that require non-trivial costs and risks, i.e., campaign
activity. They anticipate this finding because, in contrast to acts like voting, group conflict
requires the mobilization of group resources. While Verba and Nie explicitly exclude
protest from their analysis, Chong and Rogers (2005, 352) extend this argument in two
ways. First, in distinguishing group identification and group consciousness they argue that
the latter is the more proximate cause of political activity. Second, they suggest that the
political actions that require the most significant costs and risks are direct action tactics
like demonstrations. Recall that developments in the group consciousness literature
construed the concept as a bundle of mediating motivational variables between
identification and action. Chong and Rogers essentially reduce this bundle to group
ideology and solidarity. In other words, they argue that the effect of ideology is particularly
strong with respect to the decision to protest. Yet, ideology is rooted in identity, the latter
occupying a more distant causal position relative to action.
Beyond the question of mobilization, scholars explain variation in the strategies and
tactics of activists through collective identity (Dalton 1994; Eyerman and Jamison 1991;
Jasper 1997; Jasper and Polletta 2001; Taylor and Whittier 1992). In contrast to the
political participation literature, the approach taken in social movement studies generally
utilizes a qualitative emphasis in order to determine the relation between collective
identity and strategic and tactical choice. Thus, it has more or less assimilated studies that
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focus on ideology. Several scholars have utilized the beliefs and values held by activists as
a prominent independent variable for explaining tactical choice (Dalton 1994; Downey
1986; Gamson 1989; Nepstad 2008; Zald 2000). The literature on the environmental
movement is particularly well-developed in its work on the relationship between ideology
and strategy (Brulle 2000; Carmin and Balser 2002; Dryzek 1997). In his study of the
strategies of environmental movements, Dalton (1994) uses identity and ideology
interchangeably. Below, I consider the implications of this discussion.
7.2. Theory and Hypotheses
In order to establish a relationship between culture jammers and the field of
cultural production and determine the content of their collective identities, I elaborate on
the theoretical developments of Chapters Two and Three. First, I develop hypotheses
regarding the contexts of artistic socialization and the aesthetic disposition. Second, I
consider the most relevant aspects of collective identity: identification and evaluation, and
briefly establish a relation between identity and ideology.
7.2.1. Biography
The first task of this chapter is to generate a brief sketch of an objective basis for
collective identity by situating CJOs within the field of cultural production. This entails a
biographical analysis. First, I suggest that culture jammers possess extensive experience
with cultural production, especially artistic production, prior to activism. Complementing
Chapter Five, experience with artistic production includes an education in art, literature, or
art history, and/or a work environment that requires familiarity with forms of cultural
production. Both of these social fields represent significant opportunities for immersion in
the world of cultural production, especially the field of art. According to the theoretical
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approach taken here, such contexts encourage the development of sets of skills and
knowledge specific to the arts, what Bourdieu calls the aesthetic disposition.58 NSM theory
likewise anticipates a specific demographic profile for participants and sympathizers, one
that stresses the development of a new middle class of professionals and semiprofessionals. In particular, this new class includes those who participate in cultural
production, such as journalists, academics, artists, and others (Klandermans and Tarrow
1988; Kriesi 1989; Kriesi et al 1995; Melucci 1989; 1996). My focus is on the skill sets that
such biographies may express.
If culture jammers are endowed with sets of artistic skills and knowledge that shape
their tactical choices, and if these skills sets are derived from extensive experience with
social contexts of artistic production, we should expect culture jammers to possess such
experience. This expectation is borne out in Wettergren’s (2005, 48) finding that culture
jammers are highly educated. Thus, I hypothesize:
H7.1: those with an arts education or arts occupation prior to participation in culture
jamming are more likely to participate in cultural jamming.
My primary expectation with respect to this hypothesis includes evidence of a pattern of
experience with artistic production prior to politicization.
In order to move beyond inferring the possession of skill sets from social context, I
develop hypotheses concerning more direct expressions of the aesthetic disposition.
Ideally, these hypotheses would pertain to pre-political activity as well. However, I am
unable to empirically demonstrate the absence or presence of a pattern of aesthetic

In order to increase clarity, it may be crucial to reiterate here the relation between the aesthetic
disposition, artistic skills and knowledge, skill sets, and cultural capital. The aesthetic disposition is here
regarded as synonymous with artistic skills and knowledge. Skill sets in general are synonymous with bodily
dispositions, also known as embodied cultural capital.
58
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dispositions possessed by my sample of culture jammers either before or immediately after
any relevant educational or occupational experience. Thus, any demonstration of both prepolitical arts education and/or occupations and contemporary artistic skills and knowledge
draws on a theoretical relationship between social context and cultural capital in order to
establish the values on my independent variable of interest. In other words, I infer such a
relationship with less than ideal information.
I am also unable to demonstrate the presence or absence of the acquisition of an
aesthetic disposition prior to participation in culture jamming. This opens up a possible
charge of reverse causation: participation in culture jamming may foster an aesthetic
disposition. If participation in culture jamming precedes any possession of an aesthetic
disposition, then the strength of the relationship between culture jamming and artistic
skills and knowledge may lie solely in an endogenous loop (social reproduction), if a
relation actually exists at all. It is the tremendous burden of this chapter, and specifically
the analysis below, to increase confidence in the explanation I offer as opposed to the null
hypothesis or the reverse causation hypothesis. This effort will rely on both the strength of
theory and the teasing possibilities of data.
Additionally, Wettergren (2005, 48) finds that culture jammers possess extensive
symbolic and cultural capital. The aesthetic disposition is the general embodied culture
capital of the artistic field. Bourdieu (1986) refers to this form of cultural capital as the
durable dispositions of the mind and body, the particular ways of seeing and doing that
marks one’s position in the field. Beyond the distinction between embodied and
institutionalized cultural capital discussed in Chapter Five, Bourdieu also discusses
objectified cultural capital. The objectified state of capital is expressed “in the form of
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cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.),” as “the trace or
realization of theories or critiques of these theories, problematics, etc.” (Bourdieu 1986,
47). The following hypotheses straddle the distinction between embodied and objectified
cultural capital. First, recall that one of the distinguishing characteristics of the aesthetic
disposition is the capacity and the tendency to appropriate anything aesthetically, even the
common accoutrements of daily life. If culture jammers possess an aesthetic disposition,
then at the least they express this capacity. Thus, I hypothesize:
H7.2: the tendency to perceive and utilize everyday objects, discourses, and practices
as aesthetic is associated with participation in culture jamming.
This hypothesis suggests the expectation that culture jammers will tend to describe
everyday materials as art or aesthetic or situate such items within an artistic setting. I
consider the difficult questions of operationalization in my analysis below.
The aesthetic disposition is not merely the capacity for aestheticization. It is
generally the ability to situate oneself and others in a social space defined by the
production and consumption of artistic objects. A possible expression of the ability to play
this game of art is the utilization of particular organizational settings oriented towards the
presentation of artistic goods. Thus, I hypothesize:
H7.3: the tendency to deploy artistic productions in organizational settings oriented
towards the exhibition of artistic goods is associated with participation
in culture jamming
This hypothesis suggests that culture jammers engage organizations and spaces like art
museums, art galleries, or art centers in order to present the objectified cultural capital that
they produce. However, it is worth noting that artists may not engage such organizations
or spaces because they seem them as fundamentally illegitimate or counter-effective. This
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hypothesis just suggests that a positive finding would be additional evidence, while a
negative finding would, strictly speaking, not support a more general null hypothesis.
As discussed in Chapter Six, Bürger stresses the politicization of artistic production
at the frontier of the avant-garde in the early twentieth century. These movements,
especially Dada and Surrealism, developed a politicized aesthetic disposition; while
employing the means to constitute the world and all of its objects, discourses, and practices
as aesthetic materials, they simultaneously constituted them as political, as suffused and
traversed with a dimension of power. The principal expectation here is that culture
jammers regard art as a set of cultural activities imbued with political significance. Art is
not a neutral phenomenon, as the purely aesthetic disposition would suggest. Instead, I
suggest that culture jammers possess a politicized aesthetic disposition, an
institutionalized artifact of the revolt of the avant-garde against the institution of art. One
who possesses a politicized aesthetic disposition should tend to transmute their daily
surroundings into expressions of power relations. I thus develop a descriptive hypothesis:
H7.4: the tendency to perceive and utilize everyday objects, discourses, and practices
as political is associated with participation in culture jamming.
This suggests that culture jammers construct their environment such that the materials of
everyday life serve some function of domination or resistance.
However, the definition of culture jamming used in this study seems to guarantee an
affirmative answer to this expectation. As noted in Chapter One, some ensembles organize
meaning in such a way as to legitimate, rationalize, and perpetuate some set of social
relations that favor one group(s) in society over others. Culture jammers engage in
contentious collective actions that aim to disrupt these dominant ensembles of
representation. Such actions are defined here as political. However, I make a basic
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distinction between the perception of everyday objects, discourses, and practices as
political and the range of perceptions of the political that is characteristic of the average
person or even a fierce partisan or political ideologue. As with the second hypothesis, I
consider these questions of operationalization in my analysis below.
7.2.2. Categorization and Evaluation
As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the conception of collective identity
utilized in this dissertation concerns an individual’s mutually constituted sense of their
particular categorical membership encompassing the shared understandings and public
representations that define the boundaries and the relations between actors and institutions.
It unpacks the concept of identity as a social process of definition and classification of
relations among actors and institutions, but also a subjective identification with a group
situated within these relations. Thus, this definition attempts to reconcile individual and
interactional conceptions of collective identity.
This point is particularly salient with respect to the dimension of evaluation. All
social relations are saturated with judgment; social classifications are not merely cognitive,
but affective as well. In other words, relations and classifications are organized by
hierarchies of value and belonging that construct a ‘hot’ field of action. Individuals thus
possess positive or negative attitudes towards the relevant social category. This partially
contrasts with the approach taken by many social psychologists. In an effort to develop a
general conceptual framework for the analysis of collective identity, Ashmore, Deaux, and
McLaughlin-Volpe (2004) focus on the multidimensionality of identification with a
particular social category. As an example, they define evaluation as “the positive or
negative attitude that a person has toward the social category…that one claims or
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acknowledges as one’s collective identity” (2004, 86). My conception focuses instead on
the sets of relations that social groups have with other groups. Here, evaluation is
characterized by the classifications brought to bear on the field of actors, not just those
pertaining to a single social category.
While much of the research on voting behavior clearly distinguishes partisanship
from ideology, the question is more complex when consulting the literature on group
consciousness. In identifying specific mediating mechanisms between identity and action,
attention falls in part on ideological beliefs. Ashmore et al (2004) describe this elaboration
of collective identification as the content and meaning of identity. In particular, they
describe ideology as beliefs about the social position of one’s group. Such positioning
should require evaluations of other social groups. However, people vary in the degree to
which their evaluations are internally coherent or organized (Converse 1964). In other
words, some people possess more belief constraint or more developed ideological
conceptions of the world around them. In this sense, ideology is a relatively sophisticated
or coherent organization of the shared schemas that construct a group’s position in social
space, including the field of politics. Schemas are not merely cognitive; they are affective
and normative, such that the scope and coherence of this organization provides a general
capacity and motivation to evaluate and manipulate, acquiesce to, or venerate a given set of
social relations.59 In other words, one might say that the more coherent the organization of
the schemas, the more constraining the effects on choice.
This is not an outright attempt at a definition, but a general characterization of what ideology constitutes.
The literature on ideology is enormous and riddled with difficulty (Gerring 1997). Bourdieu regards ideology
(doxa, symbolic domination, etc.) as the dominant logic of a field, the set of structures or social classifications
that conceals knowledge of the essential nature of the game such that those who dominate the field can
perpetuate their rule (Bourdieu and Eagleton 2012). The approach taken here simply construes ideology as a
more general (potentially dominant or subordinate) sense of social relations.
59
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While I consider ideology in Chapter Ten, the descriptive analysis offered here
elaborates on both the particular social category and the field of social categories that CJOs
construct in their shared understandings and public representations. However,
particularly vexing is the difficulty of measurement. Work in political participation tends to
utilize variants of a Likert scale to measure the degree of identification with a social
category. In social movement studies, however, more qualitative analyses identify typically
discrete collective identities. I take the latter approach here emphasizing both the actors
and institutions pertinent to a CJO’s sense of positioning and the social classifications that
are attributed to them. In particular, I focus on the array of actors and social groups that
may be broadly designated as protagonists, antagonists, and others.
7.3. Analysis I
In this chapter, none of the hypotheses, propositions, or expectations developed
above is tested in the strictest sense. The closest approximation to a test burdens the first
hypothesis (H1), but even this effort is handicapped by the focus on one explanatory
variable and the indeterminate representativeness of the culture jamming sample. Instead,
they provide more precise guides for illustration. Hypotheses can systematically direct our
attention to specific patterns or observations that would otherwise escape scrutiny. The
means of inquiry are specific to each set of hypotheses and propositions. The data used in
this chapter includes, first, the sample of CJOs specified in Chapter Four, and second,
additional sources specified in the course of analysis.
7.3.1. Gender, Race and Ethnicity, and Age
First, I consider a general but brief analysis of some objective indicators of social
position: gender, race and ethnicity, and age. The rest of the project deals with other
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indicators, including occupation and class. The distribution of genders across the sample
generally skews male, an observation noted by Wettergren (2005, 36) regarding her
sample. However, some partial exceptions include the BIL, IST, RBC, and SCP. With regards
to race or ethnicity, white non-Hispanics constitute almost the entire sample; only RBC
exhibited notable variation. The data for these observations is far less than ideal, but data
on age is even less. Casual observation suggests that the sample is widely distributed from
the twenties to middle age.
7.3.2. Participation in Artistic Production
The first hypothesis (H7.1) assumes a positive correlation between the independent
variable: history of participation in artistic production prior to politicization, and the
dependent variable: participation in culture jamming. While the dependent variable is
dichotomous (you either participate or you don’t), the independent variable offers more
possibilities. Participation in artistic production can theoretically range from no
participation (one has had no contact with any form of artistic production, whether as a
spectator or as a participant), through a range of levels of engagement (some schooling but
no degree, for example) to full participation (one has obtained a college level degree in the
arts and is employed in a cultural industry). To simplify the analysis, I reduce this
complexity to a dichotomous variable in which one either has a certain minimum level of
participation in cultural production or one does not. However, in order to properly satisfy
a causal argument, participation in artistic production must be temporally prior to
participation in culture jamming.
One means of provisionally ‘testing’ this hypothesis is through the use of population
data. If we compare culture jammers to a representative sample or census of the
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population, then a simple pattern should support the hypothesis, however weakly: culture
jammers should ceteris paribus have a higher rate of prior participation in artistic
production than the general population. In order to detect such patterns, I develop a set of
operational criteria for identifying prior participation in artistic production.
Table 7.1 presents data on arts education and occupations in the United States. The
first operational criterion for participation in artistic production is the possession of a
bachelor’s degree in a field relevant to artistic production: visual arts, art history,
communications, theatre, graphic design, literature, etc. Clearly, this measure indicates the
distribution of institutionalized cultural capital in the population. Data from the 2009
American Community Survey provides the distribution of bachelor degrees by field in the
United States for everyone over 25 years of age. Under the general field of arts, humanities,
and other, three fields are particularly relevant: literature and languages (including English
literature), visual and performance arts (including fine arts, commercial art, music), and
communications (including communications, journalism, and mass media). 3.41% of the
American population over 25 years of age in 2009 (and 12.24% of all those with bachelor
degrees) held an undergraduate degree in one of these fields. One should expect this figure
to be somewhat inflated as a measure of history of participation in artistic production,
however; there is no reason to expect fields like foreign languages or communications to
have much if any relation to artistic production.
A second operational criterion is employment in a field of artistic production. I
argue in Chapter Six that occupations may indicate a process of institutionalization, thus
providing marginal evidence for the distribution of institutionalized cultural capital. Data
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics provide two measures of the number of people
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Table 7.1. Arts Education and Occupations in the Arts, United States
Education
2009
Over 25 Years of Age
Relevant Bachelor’s Degreesa
Literature and Languages
Visual And Performance Arts
Communications
All Bachelor’s Degrees
U.S. Populationb

In thousands
6,899
2,569
2,307
2,023
56,366
202,045

Relevant Bachelor’s
Percentage of…
12.24
3.41

Occupationc
2009
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media
Occupations
Establishment Datad
Household Datae
All Occupations
Establishment Data
Household Data
U.S. Population Over 16 Years of Age
Establishment Data
Household Data

In thousands

Relevant Occupations
Percentage of…

1,746
2,724

-

130,648
139,877
243,323
-

1.34
1.95
0.72
1.12

The Survey of Public Participation in the Arts includes measures of lifetime participation in arts
classes or lessons. However, I believe a more powerful measure of immersion in cultural
production consistent with theory is the attainment of a college degree. Source: Siebens, Julie and
Camille L. Ryan. 2012. “American Community Survey Reports: Field of Bachelor’s Degree in the
United States: 2009.” U. S. Census Bureau. accessed July 25, 2012
<http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/acs-18.pdf>
b Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 2011. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, 131st ed. U. S.
Census Bureau. accessed July 25, 2012
<http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/pop.pdf>
c The Bureau of Labor Statistics utilizes two sources of data: establishment and household. The
former surveys businesses, while the latter surveys households. The difference between each
approach’s procedures does produce differing results. For a summary of these procedures and
their effects on their respective samples, see Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2001. “Differences Between
Data Series.” Bureau of Labor Statistics. accessed July 26, 2012
<http://www.bls.gov/lau/lauhvse.htm#hvse>
d Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2010. “May 2009 National Occupational Employment and Wage
Estimates: United States.” Bureau of Labor Statistics. accessed July 25, 2012
<http://www.bls.gov/oes/
2009/may/oes_nat.htm>
e Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2011. Employment and Earnings 58 (1): 206. Bureau of Labor
Statistics. accessed July 25, 2012 <http://www.bls.gov/opub/ee/empearn201101.pdf>
a

206

employed in the arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media sectors in 2009. Those
employed in these sectors account for 1.34/1.95% of all occupations. Those employed in
these sectors account for .72/1.12% of the population of the United States over 16 years of
age. However, like the previous figures for education, this occupational measure may be
inflated; some media and likely all sports occupations need not have any relation to artistic
production. The measure only specifies, however, the respondent’s present occupation;
previous employment may be in one of the relevant fields.
While ideally I would generate a single index, a more practical alternative is to
utilize a variety of comparisons between the figures in Table 7.1 and the history of
participation in artistic production in the sample of CJOs. Turning to the sample of CJOs,
analysis shows that six of the twelve groups (AMF, AAA, IST, RBC, SCP, TYM) provide strong
evidence for an arts occupation or education credential prior to participation in the CJO.
The early founding members of the AMF were “all some sort of film maker, designer,
illustrator or cartoonist” (Lasn 2005). Both the AAA’s Steve Lambert (n.d.) and the IST’s
Catherine D’Ignazio (Kanarinka 2012) are practicing artists, arts teachers, and Masters of
Fine Arts. Other members of the IST have histories in theatre, arts administration, English,
film, and architecture; as co-founder Savic Rasovic states: “we have a lot of education”
(Catherine D’Ignazio, James Manning, and Savic Rasovic, personal interview, August 27,
2012). The SCP’s Bill Brown earned a doctorate degree in American Literature and taught
English (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 362). The RBC’s Bill Talen was a playwright, actor, and
artist before developing his Reverend Billy persona (Lane 2002, 63), while his partner
Savitri D was an artist and dancer (D. and Talen 2011, 208-9). Both of the most visible
members of the Yes Men possess advanced degrees in the arts and teach the arts in the
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university (Cusp Conference 2010; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. 2013), though their
culture jamming activities famously precede the creation of the Yes Men.
The remaining six groups (BLF, BIL, CAE, CTM, IAA, NGL) differ in some key
respects. First, the only group that clearly fails to conform to the hypothesis is Negativland.
The two founding members of the group were still in high school when the first recordings
were made in the late 1970s (NGL 1985). This does not mean that the early members had
no experience with cultural production. Domestic environments saturated with avantgarde music may perform a similar function as an arts education or occupation, but there is
no evidence either for or against this supplemental hypothesis. Second, the BLF and the
IAA are largely anonymous and use pseudonyms, though many of the BLF’s members work
for advertising companies (Berger 2000; BLF 1999; Hua 2006), while the IAA describes
itself as a collective of engineers, designers, and artists (Brusadin et al n.d.).
The remaining three groups exhibit a possible simultaneity of artistic experience
and culture jamming practice. While the CTM’s Gach is a practicing artist, teaches art, and
possesses a Master of Fine Arts (California College of the Arts, 2013), he states that he
engaged in Situationist and Dadaist activities while he was an undergraduate (Gach 2007).
A similar pattern appears in other cases. While Billionaires founder Andrew Boyd (2001-2)
did have some experience in arts education (“somewhere along the way, I completed…
various course series in new media production, computer programming, and creative
writing”), I found no evidence that places this experience prior to his immersion in the
fields of street theater and creative tactics. The CAE began while the first two members,
Steven Kurtz (a PhD in Interdisciplinary Humanities) and Steve Barnes, were in school.
When asked about his earliest art projects, Kurtz states that he didn’t have “an a-ha
moment; [he] slid into art slowly.’ He was on an academic, scholarly path but found himself
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surrounded by those whom he didn’t find very much fun. Instead he was “attracted” to a
circle of artist friends, and began to face “a crisis moment of too much thinking and not
enough doing” (Parisi 2008).

Kurtz “was teaching ﬁlm studies at the time and was interested in ﬁlm/video production”
(Hirsch 2005, 25). Additionally, all CAE members work in arts-related occupations like
education, editing, and photography (Hirsch 2005, 28).
Strictly speaking, these three cases do not run afoul of the hypothesis; it concerns
experience, while degrees are merely an operationalization. However, they fail to provide
evidence for or against strictly prior experience in an arts occupation or education. If I
consider only the six groups that show strict evidence in favor of the hypothesis, they
constitute 50% of the sample, a figure far exceeding the prevalence of arts degrees and
occupations in the population. Even excluding the Canadian Adbusters from the analysis
does not dampen the conclusion that the data generally support the hypothesis.
7.3.3. The Aesthetic Disposition
Like the first hypothesis, the following three hypotheses concern the same
dependent variable: participation in culture jamming. The second hypothesis (H7.2)
involves the relation of participation in culture jamming to an independent variable: the
tendency to perceive and utilize everyday objects, discourses, and practices as aesthetic.
While theoretically a range of values of aesthetic perception may be considered (complete
non-aesthetic perception to comprehensive aesthetic perception), I treat the independent
variable as dichotomous: absence or presence.
The evidence here is textual and at times phenomenological: how do members of
these groups perceive and engage their reality? An example of the aesthetic disposition is
provided by the Critical Art Ensemble. The CAE employ a rhetoric that blurs the line
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between art or aesthetics and everyday life. They refer to the production of culture, the
process through which the semiotic regime, the symbolic order, or authoritarian culture,
among other monikers, negotiates its domination, as their arena of contention. At the
micro-level, everyday life is the where this process is negotiated; their practice “is a
struggle over the micro-sociology of the performative matrix of everyday life (CAE 2001,
76). This matrix is “the aggregate interactions within social space – the dramaturgical
activities of everyday life” (McKenzie and Schneider 2000, 149). In order for art to achieve
its critical function, it must make itself intelligible to the viewer. Art discards its opacity by
insinuating itself into the familiar. This process seeks to penetrate everyday life, the
repetitious concerns, pleasures, anticipations, memories, and habits of the viewer, thereby
bringing to consciousness the relation of the particular to the general, of the concrete to the
abstract, of the real to the virtual. CAE’s high regard for the Living Theater is instructive:
“The Living Theater collapsed the life and art distinction…After all, only by examining
everyday life through the frame of a dramaturgical model can one witness the poverty of
this performative matrix” (CAE 1994, 62).
Similar expressions of an aesthetic sense of everyday life are available across the
sample of CJOs. The AMF aim to safeguard or reinvigorate the mental environment: the
images, ideas, and flows of information that we encounter in our daily lives. But “the ideas,
expressions, and concerns of individual citizens no longer matter very much. Culture isn’t
created from the bottom up by the people anymore – it’s fed to us top down by
corporations (Lasn 1999, 189). “Layer upon layer of mediated artifice come between us
and the world until we are mummified (Lasn 1999, 12). Like the Situationists, the AMF and
Lasn view culture and everyday life as overlaid by a media spectacle that is all–pervasive
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(Lasn 1999, 99-109). The CMT too have an extremely expansive sense of the terrain of art
or aesthetics. “One of the things that concerns us about contemporary art is that it
positions itself as the authority on culture, but culture explodes beyond the parameters of
art” (Gach 2007). Yet, culture is the artists’ playground; “artists produce culture,
participate in culture, and reflect culture” (CTM 2007). Art is the elaborate and pragmatic
integration of all things related into an associative life/practice…it is creative problemsolving“ (CTM n.d.(c)). NGL (1995, 23) appropriate an endless stream of sounds from the
media but also a vast array of everyday sounds; “artists have always approached the entire
world around them…as raw material to mold and remold.” Similar to the CAE, the RBC
senses a performative color to everyday life:
I was studying thousands of shoppers…Shopping is the cornerstone of modern American
life and this essence began to show itself, coming through the surface of regular dailiness. I
had to stand there for months to see under the patterns…I began to suspect that shopping
had a second underlying dance. The gestures of driving, parking, walking, taking escalators
and elevators…they make up a formal dance, one that sustains everything in the world
around it…The shopping became a kind of marching etc. (Reverend Billy 2003, 50, 56).

The SCP (2006, 174) appropriates the language of spectacle (a pervasive system of images
that mediates social relations) directly from the Situationists and links it surveillance:
[T]hese two tools of power (surveillance cameras and ritualized spectacle) have become
ever-more relied upon since the 1970s. As Orwell understood, [they] are closely
related…If they are not properly conditioned by the spectacle, people will not accept the
imposition of transparency; without the imposition of transparency, people will not derive
any satisfaction from spectacle.

The Billionaires founder authored and edited a volume cataloguing creative protest:
This blending of art and politics is nothing new. Tactical pranks go back at least as far as the
Trojan Horse. Jesus of Nazareth overturning the tables of the money changers mastered
the craft of political theater… art, culture, and creative protest tactics have for centuries
served as fuel and foundation for successful social movements (Boyd and Mitchell 2012, 1).

The most dramatic example of the tendency to perceive everyday life as aesthetic is the IST,
one of whose projects include a highly participatory “expedition…to collect research
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samples of infinitely small things” (IST 2005, 78). These include text on a mirror, telephone
poles, lottery tickets, falling leaves, and roughly 500 other examples of mundane items.
Additionally, some confidence may be drawn from another bit of evidence: inferring
the capacity (but less certainly the tendency) to perceive aesthetically from a particular
occupation: arts instruction. This particular position requires a sense of the aesthetic
disposition sufficient to impart it to students. As noted previously, the AAA, IST, CAE, CTM,
IST, SCP, and TYM all contain seminal members with histories of teaching in the arts.
Some groups appear to actively disparage an expansive sense of aesthetics or especially art.
The AAA (2013b; 2013c) strongly distinguishes advertising and art and raises concerns
that the former saps the creativity out of the population. The BLF’s Napier clearly states,
“We don’t consider what we do to be Art” (Napier 2009), and elsewhere, in response to a
question regarding whether the BLF produces art, member Kalman (2008) dryly replies,
“No more than anyone would consider advertising ‘art.’ If art is a reflection of life as the
artist sees it, and your life is marketing then I guess you could consider it art.” Napier notes
with regard to equating their actions with art, “It's funny that anybody would think that it
was” (BLF 1999). There is little information on the Yes Men, while the IAA (2005, 99) only
hint at the scope of aestheticization when they describe their projects as “tactical aesthetics
- we use the visual and rhetorical devices of sanctioned research organizations in an
elaborate performance aimed at inﬁltrating engineering culture.”
Overall, eight groups exhibited the capacity and the tendency to perceive and utilize
everyday objects, discourses, and practices as aesthetic. Two did not (though better data
my resolve otherwise), and two groups lacked sufficient data to identify a positive case.
Considering the latter two as negative cases, this finding still supports the hypothesis.
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The third hypothesis (H7.3) involves the relation of participation in culture jamming
to another independent variable: the tendency to deploy artistic productions in
organizational settings oriented towards the exhibition of artistic goods. This hypothesis
suggests that culture jammers engage organizations and spaces like art museums, art
galleries, or art centers in order to present and distribute the objectified cultural capital
that they produce. While theoretically an additive index of the degrees of involvement
should capture this phenomenon, I again reduce this complexity to a simple dichotomous
variable: absence or presence of the behavior. Importantly, this activity must suggest
something more than a twenty-year retrospective exhibition.
An example of the extensive use of art spaces is the Institute for Infinitely Small
Things and co-founder Catherine D’Ignazio. The Institute itself employs actions in a variety
of art settings, especially art galleries and art festivals (IST n.d.). As an established artist
before the founding of the IST, D’Ignazio presented works from 2001-2013 in such venues
as physical and online art galleries, art festivals, art museums, media centers and
conferences (Kanarinka 2012). Other groups perform similarly. The AAA and Steve
Lambert (n.d.) have extensive histories of art world exhibition, as do groups like the CAE,
CTM, IAA, and the SCP. As a musical group, Negativland performs many live shows and is
featured in music magazines and music web sites. The RBC regularly performs on stage at
various locales, such as theatres and art auditoriums. Even the Yes Men have enjoyed the
use of art spaces like galleries and museums as well as film festivals (Suparak n.d.). In
contrast, I have found only minor evidence of extensive use of artistic venues by the BLF or
its members and no evidence for the AMF or the Billionaires.
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Notable engagements with the art world occur with nine of the twelve groups. The
remaining three groups do not appear to exhibit this tendency. This suggests strong
support the hypothesis.
The final hypothesis (H7.4) of this chapter involves the relation of participation in
culture jamming to the tendency to perceive and utilize everyday objects, discourses, and
practices as political. Like the second hypothesis, a range of values of political perception
may be considered (complete apolitical perception to comprehensive political perception).
I treat the independent variable as dichotomous: absence or presence.
Again, the evidence here is textual and at times phenomenological. An example of
this pervasive sense of politics is provided by the Institute for Infinitely Small Things.
According to co-founder D’Ignazio, the IST asks the question, “how are you invited as a
citizen to participate in the public realm” (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal
interview, August 27, 2012)? From this perspective, the materials and rules of public and
quasi-public space – even infinitely small things - all possess some political potentiality. In
reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s argument that the French Revolution began with the
absence of a simple formality – a greeting – the IST (2005, 80-1) state, “[T]hese everyday
spaces – the absolute war of a missing signal – are micropolitical…They are beginnings of
whole other worlds that might also materialize to nothing.” The minutiae are especially
significant, because all objects and actions are embedded in wider social and political
contexts.
The myths of individuality, originality, an authenticity are all emphasized by corporations
as advertising constructions, to sell more products. It’s not just about artistic authority, but
the whole we are embedded in. It’s always political and always economic. What I see as the
Institute’s mission is a way of engaging people in conversation, producing these strange
situations and dealing with politics of everyday life (Kanarinka and Pirun 2006).
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Other examples of the pervasive politicization of everyday life can be found across the
sample. With a bit of tongue-in-cheek, the BLF stress the ubiquity of advertising. For them,
it “suffuses all corners of our waking lives; it so permeates our consciousness that even our
dreams are often indistinguishable from a rapid succession of TV commercials” (Napier
and Thomas 2006). Great fields of human pursuit and creativity are reduced to “marketing
strategies,” while the Ad itself not only defines the self but also the world. This condition is
a symptom of an asymmetric power relationship between corporations and the public;
“[P]ublic space should include areas in which the public can truly express itself,” rather
than just running around the hamster wheel of commerce at the mall” (Black n.d.). The
CAE seek to “develop tactics and tools of resistance against the authoritarian tendencies of
a given cultural situation” (Hirsch 2005). Such situations include “galleries and museums,
radio, TV, festivals, bars and clubs, the net, [and] the street” (McKenzie and Schneider2000,
136). The group insist that “no matter what variety of everyday life systems a person
participates in, an element of radical practice can always be initiated within it” (CAE 1996,
52). Thus, “politics [can] not be separated from…cultural practice” (Little 1999, 194). The
RBC, much like the AMF, mark out a wide sense of the political:
Consumerism is normalized in the mind of the average person, sometimes we even refer to
ourselves as consumers forgetting that we are also citizens, humans, men, women, animals.
We forget that we share many resources, public spaces, libraries, information, history,
sidewalks, streets, schools that we created laws and covenants and governments to protect
us, to support us, to help us…
Above all we try to complexify the moment of purchase, to snap people out their hypnosis
and back into the mystery of being human. We remind people that things come from
somewhere, that products have a resource past, a labor past (RBC 2012).

Reverend Billy (2006, 112) continually expands the scope of politics: “They are
trademarking the water and the air, the radio frequencies and the cyber portals, the forests
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and the horizon and the street corner to the left of or front door.” More dramatically, “our
opponent is everywhere and nowhere, does not have to retreat or advance. It melts into the
air” (Talen 2003, 127). In this sense, resistance entails taking control of one’s stories and
one’s life. Similar patterns of politicization are seen in the CTM (2006b): “Authority
commonly wields power through the manipulation of sign systems which individuals are
collectively programmed to accept as valid structures of discipline and control.” The scope
extends beyond the abstract sense of culture, however. The group began as a concrete
investigation into micro-politics at the individual and community level by peculiar
practitioners of power: a ninja, a private investigator, and a magician. Like others,
Negativland stress the all-pervasive presence of advertising and an environment saturated
with media. The SCP also exhibits a comprehensive politicization. Even the “transparent
surfaces, mirrored surfaces, and surveillance cameras” of contemporary urban architecture
are symptoms of the spectacle and it’s relation to surveillance (SCP 2006, 176). Television
shows, voyeurism, the Internet: these merely tap into the total rendering of everything as
image, as transparent and recorded, the mediating principle of the spectacle. Bound with
surveillance the spectacle organizes desire and discipline at the service of the State.
Other groups do not provide evidence of such pervasive politicization and instead
seem to focus on more specific areas of politicization. The IAA’s politics centers on the
cultures of engineering, surveillance, and militarization, while the AAA focuses on the
politics of outdoor advertising. The Billionaires and the Yes Men likewise provide little to
no evidence of a comprehensive politicized perception.60

Yet, TYM member Bonanno was involved in the Barbie Liberation Organization, an action that critiqued the
gender stereotypes of toy action figures and dolls.
60
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Overall, eight of the groups in the sample exhibited the capacity and the tendency to
perceive and utilize everyday objects, discourses, and practices as political. The remaining
four suggest a limited conception of politics. This finding supports the hypothesis.
Table 7.2 summarizes the data on the biographies of artistic production. While the
results are not overwhelming, they do suggest a general pattern: most of the groups
possess a politicized aesthetic disposition either developed or honed in an educational or
occupational setting (IST, RBC, SCP, with the AMF, CTM, CAE close as well). Still, some
groups appear to avoid the expression of an aesthetic disposition, the BLF especially,
although they clearly appreciate Art and distinguish it from advertising, a point made as
well by the AAA.61 While the BLF admire the creativity of advertisers, the AAA suggests
that it dulls creativity. Others appear to possess a narrower conception of the political.
This is especially the case with the Billionaires and the Yes Men. Importantly, the quality of
Table 7.2. The Arts and CJOs

AMF
AAA
BLF
BIL
CTM
CAE
IAA
IST
NGL
RBC
SCP
TYM
1

- mixed

Education or
Occupation
Yes
Yes

1

Aesthetic
Perception
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

2

2

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

2
1
1

2

2

Organizational
Settings
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Political
Perception
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

– insufficient data

It is worth stressing that the aesthetic disposition is not itself a set of value judgments. One possessing the
aesthetic disposition may utilize the world and its myriad objects aesthetically, but define other forms of
appropriation as non-aesthetic.
61
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the data pertinent to all four hypotheses is not ideal. As I note above, formal education in
the arts or an arts occupation are not the only social contexts that may generate or
maintain a sense of the aesthetic game. More data may reveal and earlier history of culture
jamming in my positive, mixed, or insufficient data cases. If so, the skills and knowledge
developed in these contexts may be a function of activism. More data may also reveal the
form of activism is a function of education. However, the results are broadly consistent
with the relation explored by my theoretical approach. The CJOs considered here have a
far higher rate of immersion in these contexts than the population. As noted, some culture
jamming groups precede the operational measures of education, while only one (NGL)
precedes any experience in college-level arts education or an arts occupation.
Still, it is worth reiterating that I am not offering the argument that formal education
and occupation are the only individual-level determinants of culture jamming. As I noted in
the introduction, culture jamming is an age-old practice, part of the wider history of
creative activism noted by Boyd above. Instead, and as I will show in later chapters, I am
arguing that the sets of skills and knowledge that constitute an aesthetic disposition offer
incentives for culture jamming as a tactical choice.
7.4. Analysis II
The rest of this chapter elaborates on both the particular social category and the
field of social categories that CJOs construct in their shared understandings and public
representations. I emphasize both the actors and institutions pertinent to a CJO’s sense of
positioning and the social classifications that are attributed to them. In particular, I focus
on the array of actors and social groups that may be broadly designated as protagonists,
antagonists, and others.
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7.4.1. Protagonists
Most of the groups in the sample (AMF, AAA, CAE, IAA, IST, NGL, RBC, and the SCP)
view themselves as part of a wider community of artists or, more generally, as cultural
producers or cultural activists. The AMF are especially keen on identifying themselves as
culture jammers, part of “a loose network of media activists who see ourselves as the
advance shock troops of the most significant social movement of the next twenty years”
(Lasn 1999, xi). At the launch of the AMF:
we were all some sort of film maker, designer, illustrator or cartoonist and right from the
start we decided that if we were going to launch this culture jamming movement then it
would have to be driven by TV, posters, postcards, art, statues, performance art and all
those tricks of the trade (Lasn 2005).

The CAE define themselves as “five tactical media artists dedicated to exploring the
intersections between art, technology, critical theory, and political activism” I(McKenzie
and Schneider 2000, 136). Elsewhere, they identify with a contemporary, though
unrecognizable, avant-garde consisting of artists-activists who eschew the traditional role
designations assigned to either group. Hence, CAE (1996, 48-9), “call for artists, once
outside the parameters of cultural production for other members of the culture industry, to
separate their work from the system of signs which shape the non-specialist’s perception of
art.” As they argue, both “the political activist and the cultural activist (anachronistically
known as the artist) can still produce disturbances” (CAE 1994, 12). By opening the
website with the statement, “The Anti-Advertising Agency was a collaboration between
myself and dozens of other artists,” founder Steve Lambert also emphasizes an artist selfpresentation (AAA 2013a). Negativland (1995, 23) “respond (as artists always have) to our
environment.” Like CAE, Gach emphasizes a ‘shape-shifting’ identity that respects the
exigencies of each situation by utilizing artistic or more generally cultural materials:
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We don’t think of ourselves as artists doing an art project unless we’re doing it in an arts
venue or applying for an arts grant. Instead, we recognize that, like all people, we are
essentially shape-shifters. Specialization is a temporal condition – different identities at
different times (CTM 2007).

But the work of the artist, including the magical and the martial, extends beyond the art
context: “art can be creative and poetic and spiritual, [but] it is also in many respects
utilitarian” (Gach 2008a). It can be used to solve problems, because art is, at its most
general, “a way of manifesting your intentions, as a way of creating change in the world”
(Gach 2007). The RBC (n.d.(a)) identify as “a radical performance community.”
Some groups are somewhat more idiosyncratic or general. Instead of artists, the
BLF present themselves as Jarry-esque pranksters, a point underscored by their frequent
use of humorous masks when engaging the media or other public audiences. Groups like
the Billionaires and the Yes Men (and to some extent the BLF) often eschew reliance on
such categories in order to either focus attention on their ironic identities as billionaire
protesters or to empower potential imitators.
Another notable category aside from, but inclusive of, artist-activist is a de-centered
conception of identity. The CTM’s shape-shifting has already been discussed, while the CAE
(2012b, 62) welcomes “any kind of hybrid – artist, scientist, technician, craftsperson,
theorist, activist.” Similarly, the IAA plays up a diversity of identities from which members
can draw on, especially engineer and artist. More generally, some groups develop a
universal sense of identity:
Consumerism is normalized in the mind of the average person, sometimes we even refer to
ourselves as consumers forgetting that we are also citizens, humans, men, women, animals.
We forget that we share many resources, public spaces, libraries, information, history,
sidewalks, streets, schools that we created laws and covenants and governments to protect
us,, to support us, to help us (RBC 2012).
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As activists, many groups locate themselves relative to other activists and social
movements. By far the most common movements that CJOs show strong identification
with, or sympathy for, are the anti-globalization or global justice, environmental, and civil
rights movements (AMF, BIL, RBS, SCP, TYM). The Occupy movement also gathers a great
deal of positive sympathies. While groups like the Yes Men and the RBC directly
participated in both the Occupy and anti-globalization movements, and the AMF famously
provided the spark for the former movement, some, like the IST and the SCP, keep their
distance from the Occupy movement. AIDS activists ACT-UP are particularly inspirational
for the CAE, while the AMF are highly critical of, though sympathetic to, activists like that
focus on identity politics.
As artists, many groups in the sample situate themselves relative to artists as well as
the field of art as a whole. By far the most common positive associations are with the
Dadaists, Surrealists, and the Situationists (AMF, BLF, BIL, CTM, CAE, NGL, RBC, SCP).
Others include Augusto Boal, Antonin Artaud, the Living Theatre, Abbie Hoffman, and
Alfred Jarry. Some are mildly critical of the Situationists (BLF and TYM) and typically fall
for less intellectualist pranksters like Hoffman and Jarry. Delicate distinctions are made by
groups like the CAE and the SCP. A unifying theme is the importance of many 1960s artists,
including many that flowered in the counterculture and developed various practices and
justifications for cultural resistance. The CTM’s Gach sizes it up nicely: “In terms of
contemporary art there is certainly a debt of gratitude that deserves to be paid to the
Situationists, Provo, the Yippies, the Diggers, and everyone else organizing happenings,
interventions, and provocations over 50 years” (CTM 2007).

221

The art world in general is often viewed with a degree of ambivalence. While The
CAE and the IST are particularly critical of the art world’s ideology of individual genius and
controlled environments, both regard art institutions as basically allied spaces and
networks that serve some functions but not others. This ambivalence is nicely captured by
a discussion between IST members Manning and Rasovic:
What’s interesting is that the few times that we’ve fallen flat is when we try to do those
projects in the context of the art world like in the museum. They strip it down to this point
where it is basically a window display…
If we are going to look for allies where else do you have them? Most of the people working
there understand what you are going through. Most of the people working there work for
little money and love of art (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27,
2012

The relationship between the art world and many of the groups is nicely captured by CTM’s
Gach (2007):
For me, personally, I went through a period when I was anti-institutional. Wanted nothing
to do with the artworld. Part of the difficulties is wanting something from the art world that
it could not offer. The shift came appreciating the art world for what it can offer, shouldn’t
try to squeeze blood from stone. We are definitely incorporating aesthetic strategies.

But what properties inhere in these sets of categories? A prevalent sense of self in
this sample is one of agency, awareness, and freedom. With regard to the AAA, Lambert
(2007) contends that, “It may not be completely obvious, but part of this project is about
freedom. Freedom from these commercial images and ideas that permeate and limit our
imagination of what is possible in the world – ideas about what life is for.” The BLF stress
the freedom and agency that comes with talking back to the media and corporations. While
ironically touting the virtues of heteronomy over freedom (Segal n.d.), they emphasize the
stakes more clearly: “It's either write, or be written. I can raise a pen or a brush in defense
of my own mental environment, or allow myself to be the passive, infinitely impressed
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palimpsest” (Black n.d.). Such values are especially prominent in the self-presentations of
the AMF. Lasn (1999: 146) consistently evokes images of freedom and autonomy:
the goal of this workshop is to spark a dramatic personal mindshift that will change the way
you relate to corporations. Once you’ve experienced this shift, you’ll feel ashamed for
having been so docile and subservient for so long. Your days will be charged with a new
sense of autonomy and mission.

And elsewhere, he sketches a strong sense of revelation, of an awareness of truth:
Once you experience even a few of these ‘moments of truth,’ things can never be the same again.
Your life veers off in strange new directions. It’s very exciting and a little scary. Ideas blossom into
obsessions. The imperative to live life differently keeps building until the day it breaks through the
surface (Lasn 1999, xiv)

The IAA are clear as well in their operators manual: “our goal is to provide you with a
comfortable venue in which you can function as an autonomous entity ascribed to the
simple ideologies of truth, love, and courage” (IAA Operative 2008, 8).
Freedom, awareness, and agency are conditions for a life of spontaneity, creativity,
and authenticity. The AAA’s (2013c) Lambert views freedom as in part the expression of
creativity. The RBC defines freedom as in part the creation of original, authentic stories,
stories forged in a rich spontaneous life, the “hot, complex human living” of public life
(Talen 2006, 108). Likewise, the CTM (n.d.(c)) view themselves as engaged in a
fundamentally creative enterprise, “creative problem-solving” in the service of a “complete
realization of a creative liberation of the ‘true will to live.’” The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 106)
lays it on thick: “Living in the moment, pursuing the authentic gesture, living close to the
edge-call it what you will-when it’s genuine, it’s the force that makes life worth living.”
Importantly, this understanding of life and authentic culture supersedes economic
motivations. Negativland (1995, 22) state it thus:
How and why should these laws apply when the infringement is not done for economic
gain?...For the law to claim that this alleged motive is the whole criterion for legal
deliberation is to admit that music, itself, is not to be taken seriously. Culture is more than

223

commerce. It may actually have something to say about commerce. It may even use
examples of commerce to comment upon it.

The AAA (2013b) expands this understanding to the mundane: “Look around and you’ll
notice all the important things in life don’t make money – like loving others, giving gifts,
sharing time with friends. It might not make financial sense, but this is a new kind of
company with new kinds of goals.” The BLF concur when they state, “the movement to
convert open or public space into display advertising is deforming the community and
pitting those who value art and community against those who respect only money” (Black
n.d.).
Culture jamming groups also tend to express a strong sense of social responsibility,
honesty, and egalitarianism. Politically, many construct a sense of self as citizen, democrat,
and participant. The AAA’s Lambert (2007) is clear: “Personally, what we call it isn’t
important to me. I think it’s about being a citizen. I am an artist and I am a citizen.” The
CTM (n.d.(b)) defines the purpose of tactical magic as, “activating the social imaginary with
notions of responsible citizenship through creative action.” The RBC (n.d.(a)) emphatically
declares that through action in public space, “we become citizens again” and become
responsible for the environment and others. The CAE dissents on this point as they regard
the concept of the citizen as “completely bankrupt” (Little 1999, 197). A constant theme is
support for real democracy. This is especially pronounced in the importance of dialogue in
the public sphere. The BLF construe their activities as “simply having a dialogue with the
advertisers” (Haller and Napier 2006, 93). The IAA contributes to the reinvigoration of
public space, including the free exchange of ideas and widening the scope of debate
(Scheinke and IAA 2002, 117). The AMF’s emphasizes a battle of ideas, the opening up of a
wider dialogue between corporations, consumers, and citizens. The CAE (1994, 27) declare
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that “artists-activists…have been left with the responsibility to help provide a critical
discourse” with respect to the frontiers of power, whether it is cyberspace or the body.
This discourse is one of honesty and truth. Both the RBC and the SCP speak of reclaiming a
suppressed history: “Celebratory history, or condemning & counteracting suppression &
failure of historical memory, is what the SCP attempts to do when it performs its
performances on important dates” (SCP 2006, 43). The Yes Men are unconcealers by trade:
“these things that are not really presenting themselves honestly, or that hide something
about their nature that is really scary, we want to bring that to, we want to show that, we
want to demonstrate that (Ollman, Prince, and Smith 2004).
The most radical understanding of democracy is provided by the SCP and the CAE.
Most of the SCP self-identify as anarchists (Bill Brown, personal communication, July 6,
2012), a point Brown clarifies when he advocates direct democracy on a community-level
as opposed to representative democracy (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 373). The CAE
describes themselves as practical anarchists devoted to principles of liberty and social
justice (Little 1999, 194). Like the SCP, this anarchism connotes a strong sense of
democracy, egalitarianism, and anti-authoritarianism, though the CAE are extremely
skeptical of almost all forms of social organization. In contrast to the SCP, the CAE refer to
‘community’ as a mythical concept and undesirable reality; “Solidarity based on similarity
through shared ethnicity, and interconnected familial networks supported by a shared
sense of place and history, work against the possibility of power through diversity”
(McKenzie and Schneider 2000, 146).
Importantly, some groups are prone to distance themselves from the Left. The
AMF’s Lasn (1999, 118-9) declares: “we are not Lefties.” He describes the traditional
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opposition as “tired, self-satisfied, and dogmatic,” lacking in passion, and “no longer
pin[ing] for real change.” Yet, they smother every effort at legitimate change, “muscl[ing] in
on every major struggle and social protest of the past half century…but[now] they are the
problem.” The CAE are clear:
Admittedly, CAE isn't fond of progressives primarily because they still believe the state will
save them. The Law/the Logos/the Patriarchy is not going to help anyone, and empowering
it further only serves to increase the gravity of power bearing down on us. But because of
faith in democracy (or at least its simulation), they are always ready to be the dupes of
various power vectors (CAE and Dery 1997).

However, others like the Billionaires and Yes Men are quite clear on their affinity for the
Left as an agency for positive social change.
Thus with some deviations, the CJOs studied here define themselves as authentic
and creative artist-activists fulfilling their roles as responsible and free democratic citizens
by engaging in a public dialogue with power and authority.
7.4.2. Antagonists
The primary antagonists of my sample are economic elites and the economic system
that favors them. Eight groups situate multi-national corporations (MNCs), economic
globalization, international organizations like the IMF, and the legal frameworks that
empower and sustain them as their primary antagonists (AMF, AAA, BLF, BIL, IST, NGL,
RBC, TYM). Media corporations are especially common antagonists. According to the
sample of culture jamming groups, these foes possess a number of distinguishing
characteristics. First, they are essentially non-democratic organizations and structures.
Corporations possess enormous resources that effectively subvert the egalitarian
principles of political democracy. Negativland (1995, 24) provides an example:
One failing of the U.S. legal system is that it treats the plaintiff and the defendant as though
they are equally powerful entities, regardless of the actual resources each may have…when
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a corporation goes after a small business or low-income individual, the conflict
automatically rolls outside of the court system because of the defendant’s inability to pay
the costs of mounting a proper defense.

The AMF’s Lasn summarizes the relationship between economic power and political
power: “Considering their vast financial resources, corporations thereafter actually had
more power than any private citizen. They could defend and exploit their rights and
freedom more vigorously than any individual and therefore they were more free” (Lasn
1999, 68). The Billionaire’s Monet Oliver DePlace (say it slow) is clear as well: “I actually
believe in a fair and balanced capitalist system — it’s just that’s not what we’re living in”
(Schartz 2010). The RBC is stark: “The ideal conditions for consumerism [free market
capitalism] are almost never the ideal conditions for civic democracy” (D. and Talen 2011,
136). The enormous resources they wield and the influence they possess stands in stark
contrast to their lack of accountability. For example, the Yes Men (2004, 9) are incensed at
the global power of the World Trade Organization, because like so many such institutions,
“they were not elected by anyone. They are not accountable to any constituency.”
Moreover, corporations are perceived as monologic structures. Whereas democracy
entails a dialogue, the marketing campaigns, advertisements, and media products of MNCs
are not conceived as part of a broader process of public dialogue, but of an imposition of
texts and images. The IST implicitly makes this point in a fascinating work in which they
publicly enact the commands of advertisements. Such monologues are dishonest and
conceal important truths about corporate behavior. The Yes Men describe corporations as
“things that are not really presenting themselves honestly, or that hide something about
their nature that is really scary” (Ollman et al 2004). The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 19) describes
the language of the corporation, adspeak, as “anti-language that, whenever it runs into
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truth and meaning, annihilates it.” Finally, MNCs and other economic actors are portrayed
as opposed to the freedoms of others. The Yes Men (2004, 16) explain:
‘free trade’ elevates the freedom of transnationals to do business however they see fit above
all other freedoms, including freedoms that are crucial to the vast majority of the world’s
people: the freedom to organize a trade union; the freedom to grow your own crops; the
freedom to maintain social services or protect the environment you live in; the freedom to
eat, the freedom to not eat certain things, the freedom to drink water.

One noteworthy press release from the BLF wryly claims:
The value of freedom has been rendered obsolete. There is no longer any need for
individual choice in this age when all decisions can be left to a skilled professional who
specializes in knowing our every desire and need: the Advertiser…The people know better.
Let heteronomy reign! (Segal n.d.).

Thus the majority of the sample identifies their antagonists as non-democratic, resource
rich, monologic, dishonest, and opposed to the freedoms of others. This conception of
economic elites is diametrically opposed to the free and responsible citizen. Negativland
clarify: “It means to build this society up into an amazing consumer society, where
everyone is consuming all the time” (Hossler and Joyce 1997). The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 54)
hits at the general concern: “the notions of citizenship and nationhood make little sense in
this world. We’re not fathers and mothers and brothers. We’re consumers.”
Second, many groups note that MNCs are non-persons or fictions. For many, the
Supreme Court decision Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad (1886) wrongly
granted corporations extensive rights equivalent to the rights of individual citizens (AMF,
BIL, NGL, RBC, TYM). The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 157) charges that, “corporations are in the
most literal and chilling sense, dispassionate.” They lack fundamental human qualities like
compassion and responsibility. This is by design, as they simply function as instruments of
profit maximization. For groups like the Yes Men and especially the RBC this singular
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purpose calls to mind highly charged language like evil and sinister, a callous disregard for
the concerns and freedoms of others.
More generally, many groups in the sample view a system as destructive when such
single-minded entities proliferate and gather a wide sphere of influence. While a number
express positive evaluations of capitalism, the same cannot be said for the unfettered
variety. Note again Monet Oliver DePlace’s confession: “I actually believe in a fair and
balanced capitalist system — it’s just that’s not what we’re living in” (Schwartz 2010). The
BLF’s Napier explains, “My beef is not with capitalism…the free market is wonderful”
(Burkes 2012). Yet, the unfettered variety consumes all value in its wake: “Old fashioned
notions about art, science and spirituality being the peak achievements and the noblest
goals of the spirit of man have been dashed on the crystalline shores of Acquisition; the
holy pursuit of consumer goods” (Napier and Thomas 2006). An ideal system lacks
oppressive MNCs and is tempered by concerns over “community need” (Napier 2009). The
RBC sums it up well: “a principal strategy of Consumerism [unfettered free market] is to
bring all public institutions – public spaces and, of course, the government – into the
market” (D. and Talen 2011, 54). This understanding of unfettered capitalism has grown
progressively apocalyptic as the political debate over climate change continues unabated.
The AMF, RBC, and TYM are especially prone to deploy catastrophic imagery and urgency
in depicting the economic and cultural system’s relationship to the environment.
Corporations and the economic system are viewed as fundamentally anti-environmental.
TYM (2010) weighs in: “capitalism is a machine that will destroy itself given enough time
and given enough rope and you’d just hope that it doesn’t destroy us all with it.” For the
RBC, capitalism destroys culture. Talen (2012, 39) notes the prevalence of mono-culture,
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the “Sea of Identical Details” that pervades a highly corporatized area like Times Square.
The AMF’s Lasn (1999, xii) describes contemporary American culture as a product of “topdown” corporate influence: “our stories are now told by distant corporations with
something to sell as well as to tell.”
The corporate elite are not the only foe of CJOs. For many, the political elite also fit
much of the description of the economic elite. A prominent Billionaires chant celebrates,
“This is What Plutocracy Looks Like.” Billionaire Hal. E. Burton describes the government
as captured (Roselund 2004). More specifically, political parties feature prominently as
antagonists. Republicans are almost uniformly condemned as legally corrupt lackeys of the
economic elites. The Yes Men (n.d.(b)) refer to the Bush administration as the Bush cartel.
Democrats take a beating as well. An early incarnation of the Billionaires was Billionaires
for Bush (or Gore). However, the Billionaires and the Yes Men see a Democratic
administration (in this case Obama) as sympathetic but constrained by regular politics:
In the '30s, things changed dramatically in a progressive direction, similar to after a crash.
And after everybody saw that there was a major problem with the way things had been
done--which was a very free-market way. It had led to a collapse, and there was a
progressive president who was ready to make those changes. But people took to the streets
and forced it to happen. And what we need to do is recognize that we have a progressive
president now, and we need to actually take to the streets and give him the pressure that he
needs (TYM 2009b).

Here, Obama and FDR are progressives basically in tune with the demands of the group.
Aside from this relatively concrete vision of economic and political elites, more
nebulous constructions are common. Whether described as culture, spectacle, signs, or
simply consumerism a common characterization of this sense of the enemy is its ubiquity.
Negativland summarize their work as, “self-defense against the incessant barrage of
corporate messages” (Baldwin 1995). For the AMF’s Lasn (1999, 140), consumer
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capitalism diffuses responsibility. The culture is the problem, not the agents. The RBC’s
Talen (2003, 147) is succinct: “our opponent is everywhere and nowhere, does not have to
retreat or advance. It melts into the air.” This sense of an all-pervasive corporate influence
is often given the description of colonizing. The BLF note, “advertising suffuses all corners
of our waking lives; it so permeates our consciousness that even our dreams are often
indistinguishable from a rapid succession of TV commercials” (Napier and Thomas 2006).
Elsewhere, BFL member Black (n.d.) claims, “our minds and attention-span are a resource
that will be colonized and exploited, unless we work to conserve them.” The RBC “connects
the enjoyment we can have in the theatre or in the streets with the need to free our
colonized imaginations” (D. and Talen 2011, 13).
The CAE and the CTM regard the state and corporate power as part of a general
system of power and domination operative at the micro-level. Both speak of authoritarian
power vectors originating in a variety of contexts and institutions. Although they refuse to
pin down a single term (Spectacle, Machine, etc.), the CTM (2006b) view these sources of
authority as “commonly [wielding] power through the manipulation of sign systems which
individuals are collectively programmed to accept as valid structures of discipline and
control.” Whether described as pancapitalism, authoritarian culture, or semiotic regime,
the CAE define their adversary broadly as the overarching structure of power in society
and the globe that serves to impose control over individuals. The group contrasts nomadic
liquid power with sedentary power. Sedentary power is located in “halls of power” dubbed
bunkers: “castles, palaces, malls, government bureaucracies, monuments, factories, the
media, etc.” (CAE 1996, 6). Power today is not so anchored. As a “nomadic electronic flow,”
it moves through “ambiguous zone[s] without borders,” and is composed of a “diffuse field

231

without location, and a fixed sight machine appearing as spectacle” (CAE 1994, 6, 11, 15).62
Bunkers still exist, but only as “colonize[rs] of the mind (CAE 1996, 37).” More generally,
CAE view all of these processes and structures as expressions of the rationalization and
instrumentalization of culture and social life. The incessant homogenizing reductivism of
efficiency and profit is at the core of the pancapitalist imperative. The IAA is somewhat
more restrictive in its focus on corporate and government modes of authority. Like the
CAE (2012b, 81-82), which views the pre-Bush United States mode of governance as
“friendly fascism” and the Bush mode of governance as “neofascism”, the IAA describe
corporate and state authority as “fascist” and authoritarian (IAA Operative 2008).
The SCP (2006, 43) is unique in the sample for focusing exclusively on the state - the “police
state” - as the locus of oppression. Like the CAE, the SCP describes the social system as
spectacle. However, the SCP’s focus on surveillance highlights state imperatives that
reinforce order, fear, and dependence: "We don't worry for ourselves anymore…There are
specialists that do the worrying for us. This is warping human beings" (Tavernise 2004).
Like the construction of economic elites, governance structures and practices like
surveillance weaken the critical faculties necessary for freedom. Elsewhere, the SCP (2006,
172) describe contemporary society as the “transparent society – the universal destruction
of the rights to privacy, anonymity, and free assembly.” The IAA comment as well on this
dynamic between surveillance and democracy:
Cameras take any kind of agency or responsibility that an individual citizen might have out
of the question. Then you place your trust in this mechanism that you have no connection
to. It has no accountability to you. It relies on fear as the overwhelming force, rather than
co-operation. Any of the traditional social values we like to associate democracy with in
America – all of those become really unnecessary (Scheinke and IAA 2002, 114)

62

The sight machine basically refers to the spectacle (CAE 1994, 15).
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Thus, most groups in the sample negatively evaluate economic elites and to a lesser extent
political elites. Many groups view their antagonist as a more generalized culture of
oppression or consumerism. The SCP and to some extent the IAA, CTM, and the CAE focus
on the State as a significant foe, but many of the same properties are attributed to political
institutions and actors as other groups attribute primarily to economic elites.
7.4.3. The Public
Along with sketches of protagonists and antagonists, CJOs construct a sense of the
public. Here I focus on three broad angles: contextual, dominated, and potential. First,
some CJOs differentiate among publics. One distinction separates direct and indirect
audiences (CAE, IST, TYM). Here, the IST’s D’Ignazio distinguishes a general from a specific
audience, the latter largely determined by the nature of each project:
There is always a kind of general audience…like the person who comes to the website...
There’s always that audience…People who would be interested from a general sense. Every
project, like the Renaming project, was for the audience in Cambridge…In a sense, they were
our first order of audience. It’s really small, really tight (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic,
personal interview, August 27, 2012).

The Yes Men’s direct audiences are typically conference attendees. In the case of their
WTO events, the direct audience consisted of “foot soldiers in WTO’s war on trade unions,
environmental protections, and indigenous rights “(TYM 2004). As they discovered:
our audience of lawyers in Salzburg had a theory—that the free market could bring
happiness to the world at large—and they had the deepest possible faith in it. We had
imagined that if we pushed our proposals into the outer limits of ugliness, we could horrify
our audience into objecting. But the nature of their faith was such that so long as our
proposals derived from the one true theory, there was no way they would ever see anything
wrong with them. (TYM n.d.(b))

The CAE are cautious about generalizing about anything like a general audience. For them,
the idea of a public (like a public sphere) is a myth, because public space is so thoroughly
managed and the homogenization of an audience is a move of power. Instead, they develop
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counter-publics “directly constituted by those who occupy” them (CAE 2012b, 15, 134).
The Billionaires, on the other hand, are concerned with ‘voters,’ whom they parcel into
categories like leftists, swing voters, Bush voters, and the middle.
A second distinction involves general versus specialized audiences (AMF, CAE, CMT,
IAA, IST, TYM). The AMF distinguish between their general audience and two particular
groups: economics students (Lasn 2012) and graphic designers (Lasn 2006). Both are
critical actors in the perpetuation of consumer society and suffer the same ambivalent
descriptions as the general public below, but they are both more directly complicit and
more crucial to resistance than the general public. The IAA distinguishes between the
public and engineers. Like the AMF’s specialized publics, engineers are both more
complicit and more crucial to resistance than the general public (IAA 2005). Much the
same can be said of the CAE’s focus on cultural producers and hackers (CAE 1994, 1996).
Finally, some groups distinguish between audiences constituted in an art context and those
encountered outside of this context. The CMT’s Gach (2007) notes that art audiences
receive the Center’s actions differently. The IST’s Rasovic notes the contextual differences:
It is a very different experience. And it is one where the audience is again that audience that
looks at art and looks at things, a sophisticated audience versus an audience that we kind of
composite based on the context, a specific place, an urban place. A museum or a gallery
feels like a temple. Everybody shows up for the service, and then everybody disperses
(D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012).

Second, many CJOs view the public as dominated by economic elites or the economic
system, an oppressive culture, and/or the state. Because this domination involves the
third dimension of power – the acquiescence to power either as resignation or preference –
the dominated are caught in a perilous zone encompassing victimization and complicity.
The victimized are variously portrayed as unaware, lacking agency, colonized, exploited,
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unwitting, predictable, etc. The Yes Men view the public as highly susceptible to free
market ideology:
Ready to goosestep. Fully in sync with the bottom line… And not just the corporate man: the
corporate woman, the academic man, the political woman, the alcoholic child. Many, many
people, regardless of education, are easy prey for the ideas of the corporate decisionmakers. Present them with a decision, they will accept it! (TYM n.d.(b))

The AAA (2013c) describes advertising as naturalized and normalized, as “understood by
the public that [it] has the right to own, occupy, and control any available space, ” a process
facilitated by feelings of powerlessness. The IST’s Rasovic states, “our point was you are
not immune to it. Don’t think you are smart enough to reject it. It’s seeping into us, this
constant fear, this constant bombardment with messaging” (D’Ignazio, Manning, and
Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). The RBC’s Talen (2006, 23) notes that, “the
consumers, upon seeing the imagery of the product or corporation, often immediately have
memories, fantasies, anticipations” that compel them to buy. The BLF’s Napier (2009)
suggests that advertising supersedes free will if it is effective. More generally:
I think we're in a transition period right now with popular culture kind of consuming
everything. The center of the universe in our world now seems to be Madison Ave and
Hollywood, and everything emanates out of there and ricochets all over the place. That's
what people are interested in, that's what motivates them, that's what they aspire to. If you
look at it one way, it can be very disturbing and frightening (BLF 1999).

Yet, elsewhere Napier (2009) cautions against making assumptions about the awareness of
the public: “I feel that presupposing ‘self-awareness’ in any demographic sector is as
dangerous as presupposing stupidity or close-mindedness.”
The AMF provides the most extreme and detailed constructions of a public
straddling complicity and victimization. For the AMF, consumers live mediated,
inauthentic, unaware lives that unwittingly sustain consumer capitalism. No longer do
people enjoy direct relations with other people, nature, or even themselves; instead, they
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live through the images of the spectacle of news, entertainment, and advertising. Such a
life, “erode[s] our ability to empathize, to take social issues seriously, to be moved by
atrocity” (Lasn 1999, 19). The process is sustained by a socialization process that Lasn
(Lasn 1999, 40-1) equates with programming and brainwashing:
The modern consumer is a Manchurian Candidate living in a trance. He has a vague notion
that at some point early in his life, experiments were carried out on him, but he can’t
remember much about them. While he was drugged, or too young to remember, ideas were
implanted into his subconscious with a view to changing his behavior.

Everyone is “recruited into role and behavior patterns we did not consciously choose”
(Lasn 1999, 53). Those who have not developed the agency and freedom that comes with
awareness of their programming are equated with pigs that roll over for MNCs, slaves, and
parts of a machine. Yet, this trance-like enslavement is strangely desirable. Lasn’s favorite
analogy is Huxleyan soma. The spectacle appeals to our basic human desires and exploits
our weaknesses. He notes, “the strange thing is, you don’t’ really mind. In fact, on some
level, you’re happy as a clam” (Lasn 1999, 143). While the AMF tend to create a distance
between themselves and the public or consumers by stressing awareness and agency
despite the shared experience of living in the same media environment, the Yes Men’s
Bichlbaum highlights a political complicity common to all: “No one can govern without the
consent of the governed. So making fun of power enables people to see in themselves
how they are the power, and how they are propping it up—how we are all propping it up”
(Bichlbaum 2012a). Likewise, the SCP’s Brown declares, “we are unwitting citizens of a
surveilled society” (Kirby 1999). The RBC’s Talen (2006, 112) speculates:
Perhaps because we are the subjects of consumerism, we cannot show to the public air our
original selves. We are in a hurry, exhausted, worn down. Or we are giving out signals that
are too predictable and fashionable, not surprising – we are simply sinking into a larger
culture.
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Third, many CJOs regard the public as ripe with potential for awareness, agency, and
freedom. In other words, while they are dominated, people are also capable of becoming
cognizant of their domination and even participate in resistance. Adopting a first-person
perspective, the AMF’s Lasn (1999, 143) speculates: “Once in a while, in a flash of light, you
understand that something is wrong.” He charges: “There is an anger, a rage-driven
defiance, that is healthy, ethical, and empowering. It contains the conviction that change is
possible…Learning how to jam our culture with this rage may be one of the few ways left to
feel truly among the quick” (Lasn 1999, 143). The AAA’s Lambert (2007) expresses
optimism at the potential for people to move into a state of awareness:
In the world I encounter, the trend is always upward. I get more emails and letters from
people all over the world thanking the AAA for what we do, asking for more information
and more ways to be involved. I also teach and I see students that more or less move from
passive consumers towards engaged citizens in the course of a semester. I meet more fellow
artists who are responding to the world around them, who want to make work that involves
itself in popular culture, work that addresses ideas of social control. People see the
relationship between the short-term desires reinforced by advertising and the long-term
problems like global warming and war. I admit, this may be the bubble that I walk around
in, but regardless, I know once people are educated, they can’t turn back.

The BLF (1999) promotes “the idea that people can do this kind of thing because it makes
them more alive.” The CAE (2001) promote amateurism as a basic principle of tactical
media. While this applies to practitioners, it also applies to the wider public. The group
argues that the discourses and practices of science and other spheres of knowledge are
perfectly accessible to wider audiences, and that their actions are designed as interfaces
not to simplify knowledge, but to demystify it and thus generate a sense of critical agency
and awareness. For the Billionaires, not all voters are alike. The group defines the middle
and swing voters as susceptible to the notion that voting for a Republican is voting against
their own interests (Boyd 2004; Haugerud 2013, 57).
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In general, the CJOs in the sample distinguish among different publics, sketch them
as dominated and thus straddling a distinction between victim and complicit, and endow
them with the capacity to resist this domination.
7.5. Conclusion
In this chapter I develop hypotheses about the relationship between CJOs and the
field of artistic production and describe their collective identities. The evidence presented
basically supports the hypothesized relationship and establishes that CJOs have a strong
connection to the art world and possess artistic skills and knowledge. The content of CJO’s
collective identities supports this relationship as well. Most of the groups self-identify as
artist-activists or cultural activists.
A clear observation of this chapter is that among the CJOs studied here none engage
in identity politics. Such an observation might be anticipated when considering Kriesi et
al’s (1995) study of new social movements in Europe, in which they show that some new
social movements are not identity-oriented. The following chapter fills out the concept of
everyday social organization by attending to the networks and resources utilized by culture
jammers.
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CHAPTER 8: NETWORKS AND RESOURCES
As the final element of Part II of this study, this chapter concludes the analysis of
fields, networks, and identities. Only in social interaction are social fields and collective
identities forged, yet together their independent effects reverberate upon the course of
future social interactions, including contentious interactions. This chapter aims to clarify
this portrait of everyday social organization by presenting data regarding the various
resources that culture jammers utilize. This includes especially the durable social relations
and organizational structures specific to my sample of CJOs. Chapter Seven considers the
role of particular social networks (school and work) in the production of specific resources
(the aesthetic disposition). This chapter thus attempts to establish a fuller accounting of
the resource constraints of CJOs.
This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I review the literature on social
networks and resources in social movement theory. Second, I situate this focus within the
broader theoretical developments of this dissertation. Specifically, I explore the structure
of organization in culture jamming as well as the relevant links between networks,
organizations, and resources. Hypotheses and propositions are developed to flesh out
these theoretical relations. Third, the developed hypotheses and propositions provide
guidance for an exploration of my sample of CJOs.
8.1. Review
8.1.1. Social Networks
Everyone knows someone. This is the core of the concept of a social network: the
sets of social relationships between actors, the structures of durable social interaction that
characterize social life (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Such relations possess a number of
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important variable properties. Granovetter (1973), for example, argues that interpersonal
relations vary in strength from strong to weak to absent depending on the degrees of
investment, intimacy, and commitment. Relations are also distinguished by positive,
negative, or neutral evaluations: people or organizations may be enemies, friends, or
simply aware of one another (Labianca and Brass 2006). Finally, social relations can be
formal or informal (Wilson 2000). In the former, social ties are determined by the formal
organizational setting, as in the relation between students and teachers. Informal social
ties are interpersonal relationships that transcend the routines and roles of formal
organizations; friendship and family relations are two common informal ties.
Two of the great debates in social movement theory over the decades revolved
around the structure of social relations. The first involves the question of mobilization and
outcomes: which network structure is most conducive to the generation of social
movements (and thus to political instability)? For breakdown theorists, a healthy society is
characterized by dense networks that channel political concerns into political institutions,
whether through identification with the community and its values (Kornhauser 1959; Lang
and Lang 1961; Smelser 1963) or through the mediation and moderation of discontent
(Gurr 1970). When these ties are eroded, when individuals are isolated from community
or when grievances find no moderating medium, patterns of mobilization emerge in which
the mass of isolated individuals in society take their grievances to the streets. In contrast,
solidarity theorists (McAdam 1999; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978) argue that isolated
individuals lack the social connections to organize collective action. Instead, dense
networks provide the infrastructure of resources and commitments, including
interpersonal trust and cultural frames that lower the transaction costs for mobilizing large
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numbers of people. While empirical studies support solidarity theory, more recent efforts
have considered the potential multivalent effects of social ties in which different sets of ties
or network structures have different effects (Kitts 2000; McAdam and Paulsen 1993).
8.1.2. Networks and Organization
In the early years of the twentieth century, revolutionaries in Europe and the United
States debated whether the social revolution would come under the guidance of vanguard
parties (Lenin) or spontaneous mass uprisings (Luxembourg). More recently, this debate,
now less urgent, centers on the question of what effects organizational form have on
mobilization, strategy, and outcomes. Especially for proponents of RMT, formal and
centralized organizations are more capable of responding to changes in the political
environment, maintaining and deploying significant resources, and mobilizing large
numbers of people, while the use of more conventional or institutional tactics promises
more significant outcomes (McAdam 1999; McCarthy and Zald 1987a; Oberschall 1973).
Others, notably Piven and Cloward (1979) in their work on poor people’s movements,
argue that such organizations actually inhibit mobilization and settle for small concessions,
because they develop an accommodation to the political environment that prioritizes
organizational maintenance. Moreover, more informal and de-centralized organizations
tend to utilize innovative and disruptive tactics that constrain the resistance of authorities
and thus offer better rewards for activism.
Today, the debate has begun to eschew the dichotomy between formal centralized
organizations and informal de-centralized organizations. In her study of feminist
organizations, Staggenborg (1989; Lofland 1996) argued that formalization (especially the
division of labor) and centralization should be understood as distinct continuous variables.
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For example, a particular SMO may be highly informal with a weak division of labor but
extremely centralized. Lofland (1996) considers a wider range of qualitatively different
means of organizing. More dramatically, Clemens (1993; 1997) developed the concept of
an organizational repertoire, the set of organizational forms, practices, and roles that
citizens can draw on when engaging in politics. Like the repertoire of contention, the
organizational repertoire draws from the apolitical means of organization characteristic of
everyday life. Organizing for social change can thus take a wide variety of forms.
Finally, Polletta (2002) explores the varieties of organizational practices associated
with participatory democracy. Of note is her consideration that many such practices are
often grounded in basic social relations, such as kinship and friendship. This proposition
points to an extreme case of the common argument among solidarity theorists that
movement organization often builds directly onto the existing organization of a population.
The “bloc recruitment” of “solidarity communities” (Oberschall 1973), the “catnets”, or
networks formed of categories of people (Tilly 1978), and the “indigenous organizational
strength” of a population (McAdam 1999), among others, all refer to the same notion:
existing social networks reduce the costs of organizing by providing the identities and
resources for nascent movements. Most notably, Southern black churches were one of the
organizational cores of the burgeoning civil rights movement (McAdam 1999; Morris
1984). They provided not only the infrastructure for the movement in its early years,
including facilities and members, but also a great deal of its collective action frames and the
sense of belonging and commitment. In this argument, formal organizations are formed
and grown primarily through informal relations and their attendant commitments and

242

cognitions. Such work points directly to the strong links between social networks and the
collective identities and resources they house.
8.1.3. Resources
Resources are the assets that actors use to achieve their goals. One of the most
important resources for any form of human activity is the sets of commitments that bind
people together. Through these sets of social networks, resources are gathered, accessed,
identified, and utilized. But while social relations are essential for collective action, a full
accounting of social movements and protest must attend to a wide variety of resources.
The basic importance of resources to social movements became a systematic topic
of concern primarily with the advance of RMT. One of the central theses of this approach is
that shifts in the availability of resources affect patterns of mobilization. Despite its
significance, often ruefully noted is the fact that little effort has been spared to theoretically
ground the concept of resources (Cress and Snow 1996). The strongest advances are
typological. Two basic methods are used to generate tentatively exhaustive lists of the
resources relevant for collective action: inductive and deductive. Through their study of
homeless mobilization, Cress and Snow (1996) inductively develop a typology of resources
incorporating moral (legitimacy, authority), material (basic goods, money, transportation,
facilities, etc.), informational (knowledge relevant to collective action and organization),
and human resources (audiences, leaders, and members).
In contrast, Edwards and McCarthy (2004) develop a deductive approach through a
reading of the social movement literature and the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. At least
two categories are familiar: moral resources refer to solidarity and legitimacy, while
material resources include physical and financial capital, including money, property,

243

equipment, etc. The three remaining categories include cultural resources (forms of
knowledge and cultural products, including tactical repertoires), social-organizational
resources (social networks, physical infrastructure, and organizations), and human
resources (labor, skills, leadership). The key distinction between human resources and
cultural and social-organizational resources is that the former are more proprietary and
less widely available, while the latter are accessible. Cultural and moral resources are
distinct principally with respect to the latter’s scarcity; while large numbers of people can
access cultural resources like a repertoire of contention, moral resources are harder to tap,
because they are accrued through performance and position.
8.2. Theory and Hypotheses
In order to describe the sets of resources that CJOs have at their disposal, I briefly
elaborate on the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of resources and political
action. First, I consider some basic efforts at distinguishing among types of resources
before I return to Bourdieu’s concept of capital. Second, I develop hypotheses regarding
the relation between the social networks that members of CJOs are embedded within and
the organizational structures that they erect for their collective cultural jamming efforts.
Third, I briefly consider other resources that may be of interest with respect to culture
jamming.
8.2.1. Resources
While Edwards and McCarthy (2004) develop their taxonomy in part through their
reading of Bourdieu, I argue that this effort is not quite satisfactory. First, they distinguish
cultural from human resources by arguing that the former are generally accessible while
the latter are under the exclusive control of individuals. This is particularly confused in
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their insistence on equating cultural resources with habitus and human resources with
skills and experiences. Strictly speaking, the habitus is the sets of skills and knowledge
possessed by an individual, group, or organization. Second, the emphasis on proprietarity
is unevenly employed. While cultural and human resources are distinguished solely on this
basis, social-organizational resources include proprietary and non-proprietary resources.
Moreover, while material resources are highly proprietary, another material resource,
infrastructure (a clear example of physical capital in the economic sense), is classified as
social-organizational because it is nonproprietary. In other words, while an analysis of
variation in proprietarity is essential for a full accounting of resources, Edwards and
McCarthy’s effort is taxonomically inconsistent.
It is perhaps valuable to return to one of their primary inspirations. Bourdieu
(1986) distinguishes four forms of capital. Economic capital refers to physical and financial
capital, to that which “is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be
institutionalized in the form of property rights” (Bourdieu 1986, 243). It includes money,
real estate, infrastructure, and various material assets like equipment, vehicles, and basic
supplies that can be readily converted into money. Cultural capital includes the skills and
knowledge embodied in ways of seeing and acting (bodily dispositions), the ownership of
cultural objects like works of art, and possession of various forms of institutional
recognition, as in academic degrees and honors. Social capital specifies those resources
that are, “linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized
relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu 1986, 248). It thus
includes not only the range of commitments available to a particular agent and which can
be called upon under various circumstances, but also the totality of capital (economic,
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cultural, symbolic) that can be mobilized by others through these commitments. Finally,
symbolic capital refers to the variable property of all forms of capital that confers
legitimacy, prestige, honor, and other forms of authority and competence. Together, these
four species of capital, or power, are both the objects and the materials of strategies.
This Bourdieusian scheme is inclusive of the categories of Edwards and McCarthy.
Economic capital incorporates material resources and nonproprietary socialorganizational resources. Cultural capital includes cultural and human resources.
Symbolic capital is a generalization of moral resources, while social capital incorporates
proprietary social-organizational resources. The primary focus of this dissertation is on
cultural capital, specifically the aesthetic disposition. However, to understand culture
jamming requires a broader understanding of the resource priorities and constraints of
CJOs. Emphasis will fall primarily on the various forms of social, cultural, and economic
capital. It is to nonproprietary social organization, or social capital, that I now turn in order
to begin a discussion of the resources of culture jammers.
8.2.2. Social Networks and Organization
For solidarity theorists, social networks and existing organizations reduce
organizing costs by providing the resources and commitments necessary for nascent
movement leaders to mobilize large numbers of people (McAdam 1999; Morris 1984;
Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). Thus, it is through the provision of incentives for action that
prior social organization constrains the structure of movement organization; community
organization yields social movement organization. As this dissertation aims to
demonstrate, Tilly’s concept of everyday social organization as a constraint on repertoires
of contention reflects this argument with relation to tactical choice.
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The relation of organizing to social networks is more complex, however. SMOs vary
in the degree to which they are organized formally. A high degree of formalization
describes an SMO in which decision-making and action are organized by established
procedures, “a developed division of labor by function, explicit membership criteria, and
formal rules governing any subunits such as chapters and committees. SMOs that lack
formalized structures have few established decision-making and operational procedures, a
minimal and changing division of labor, and loose membership requirements”
(Staggenborg 1989, 75). Formal rules and roles thus tend to distinguish individuals from
their functions by clarifying the structure of the organization, while informality is more
likely to personalize responsibilities.
All decision-making processes in organizations and collective actions, even those
characterized by extensive formalization, are governed by an informal etiquette of
deliberation (Polletta 2002, 16). This etiquette pertains to those concerns either
unaddressed or inadequately addressed by the formal rules and roles, as in appropriate
body language and emotional expression, the framing of issues, and principles of legitimate
argumentation, among others. Such practices often operate at the level of the habitus. As
Chapter Two argues, the habitus is the accumulation of the practical responses, in the form
of the employment of social classifications, to social situations. It is the nexus of the
relation between social fields and unfolding social interactions. In other words, it guides a
practical sense of relationships that governs, among other behaviors, proper and
acceptable discussion and other essential organizing practices. Decision-making in SMOs,
even in formal settings, require this foundation of ‘unspoken’ coordination.
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The more informal the process in SMOs, the more likely the etiquette specific to
basic social relations will govern the decision-making and organizing process. Organizing
in highly informal SMOs is more likely to draw on basic social ties like religious fellowship,
student-teacher relations, friendship, and kinship, relations that are deeply embedded in
the habitus.63 Part of reducing the costs of organization is found in the mobilization of
familiar practices.64 Creating new formal and informal procedures for intra-organizational
interaction is likely a costly and risky affair. Drawing on existing and familiar models of
interaction, often unconsciously, frees up precious resources for other tasks. As Chapter
Three also argues, familiar deliberative practices may also increase the benefits of
interaction by building viable expectations and commitments regarding future interactions.
In other words, familiarity breeds trust and solidarity and thus reduces uncertainty. As
solidarity theorists would argue, there is a tight relation between social movements and
existing social networks.
NSM theory amends the basic solidarity hypothesis by situating the arrival of new
organizational forms within developments in the political economy (Castells 1997;
Habermas 1981; Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; 1985). According to this
perspective, previous movements generated hierarchical, bureaucratic, and large political
organizations in order to represent the interests of some sector of society, such as the
working class. In contrast, for the peace, women’s, environmental, and other movements,
This is a generalization of Polletta’s (2002) argument that participatory democratic decision-making in
SMOs draws on the norms of interaction characteristic of certain basic associational ties. I justify this
procedure on the observation, recognized by Polletta that not all everyday social relations, and thus not all
etiquettes of deliberation, are transparent, egalitarian, and anti-authoritarian. Friendship, for example, is
exclusivist; pedagogical etiquette is fully capable of significant inequality (though Polletta [2002, 75] argues it
also capable of more equitable applications); and ties based on faith can draw on a model of authoritarian
charisma. Other examples abound, particularly relations resting on significant inequalities: race, gender, etc.
64 This is clearly an application of the argument regarding familiarity, information, and incentives found in
Chapter Three.
63
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contemporary “collective mobilization assumes forms…which do not fit into traditional
categories, and which make evident a distinct analytical discontinuity” in the transition
from old to new movements (Melucci 1996, 113). These organizational forms and the
broader organizational structure of specific movements are decentralized, autonomous,
diffuse, amorphous, disorganized, reticular, etc. Such forms are latent structures,
“relatively permanent forms of network” that “interweave closely with daily life” beneath
the vagaries of mobilization (Melucci 1996, 116).65 Such submerged networks (Melucci
1989) reflect and refract the existing social organization of everyday life upon which they
subsist and shape the forms of contentious collective action that emerge from them.
Existing data supports the relation between activism and social organization with
respect to culture jamming. Wettergren (2005, 48) finds that CJOs are composed of
individuals with strong friendship ties existent prior to the establishment of the
organization. NSM theory anticipates precisely this manner of organization. For example,
Melucci (1996, 330) argues that friendship circles “are rather common in the movement
networks and seem to perform the function of enabling simultaneous investment in two
fields (friendship and commitment), thereby restricting possible losses”66 Furthermore,
NSM theory suggests that such groups tend to eschew formal rules for informal task
allocation (Melucci 1996, 329-331). Thus, I develop two descriptive hypotheses:
H8.1: CJOs are informally organized.
H8.2: CJOs are primarily composed of pre-existing friendship networks.
This implicitly establishes a layered distinction between routine social life, contention-connected social
interaction, and collective mobilization, one later recognized by Tilly (2008, 8).
66 However, Melucci (1996, 330) qualifies this hypothesis by suggesting that this is the case “especially where
professional or cultural skills are weaker.” Considering the findings in the previous chapter, if I find evidence
of friendship-based organization, then the hypothesized pattern of low skills and friendship circles does not
seem to apply to culture jamming organizations.
65
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Both hypotheses consider the nature of the social relations within the organization.
However, it is worth noting that formalization is not merely a property of intraorganizational relations, but also the manner in which an organization relates to other
actors. For example, obtaining 501(c) or non-profit status in the United States is a formal
status recognized by the federal government that incentivizes the formalization of some
internal tasks, such as record-keeping. I develop no hypotheses relating CJOs to this sense
of formalization.
Other descriptive hypotheses are also developed inductively, though there is some
basis in the preceding discussion of NSM theory for valid expectations consonant with the
available data. First, SMOs vary in their degree of centralization. Centralization refers to
the extent to which an SMO’s primary decision-making prerogatives are concentrated in a
small group or individual relative to the rest of the membership (Staggenborg 1989). Some
groups are highly concentrated, as when an individual makes all important authoritative
decisions, while others are highly decentralized, thus diffusing important decision-making
functions across many units or individuals without significant veto power at a center.
Wettergren (2005, 48) argues that CJOs are highly individualistic. I argue that together
these insights suggest a general pattern of decentralized organization. I thus hypothesize:
H8.3: CJOs are organizationally decentralized.
I thus expect to find evidence of non-hierarchical, participatory procedures for decisionmaking in my sample of CJOs.
Second, SMOs vary in the degree of commitment that they require of their members
(Downey and Rohlinger 2008; Jasper 2006; Lofland 1996). Inclusive SMOs tend to vary
wildly in the amount of effort that members provide for the organization and the degree of

250

indoctrination required for their participation. Exclusive SMOs tend to require significant
contributions from all or most members and thus tend to exclude from the organization
those who may be less committed. Polletta (2002, 140) finds that friendship, though a
strong tie with powerful commitments, is exclusivist;
If friendship supplies the trust, mutual affection, and respect that facilitate fast and fair
decisions, it also makes it difficult to expand the deliberative group beyond the original
circle. Newcomers lack an understanding of the history of the issues at stake as well as the
idiosyncratic practices of this organization…Since newcomers by definition threaten
existing friendships, they may find it difficult to secure the trust, respect, and solicitude that
veterans enjoy.

Wettergren (2005, 48) observes that CJOs tend to be very exclusivist. In fact, they are
usually composed of only two to five friends. Thus, I offer a descriptive hypothesis:
H8.4: CJOs are exclusively organized.
This hypothesis leads to two expectations. First, membership and participation in CJOs
tend to require a relatively high degree of commitment. Second, contrary to Staggenborg’s
(1989, 75) description of informal SMOs, membership is not “loosely” defined; though they
are unwritten, there are nonetheless significant barriers to membership.
Finally, the size of an organization may be anticipated by considering at least three
key variables: financial resources, membership size, and geographic scope. As noted above,
Wettergren (2005, 48) observes that CJOs tend to be extremely small in terms of
membership. If this is so, then it suggests that the economic resources of the organization
are significantly constrained. Additionally, the capacity for geographic scope should be
constrained. Furthermore, small financial resources and small memberships suggest that
the capacity for geographic scope should be constrained in part by financial and labor
resources. I thus hypothesize:
H8.5: CJOs are organizationally small.
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8.2.3. Organizational Resources
This hypothesized image of CJO paints a portrait of a relatively small, highly
personalized, individualistic, decentralized, and exclusivist set of informal arrangements
for organizing collective actions. However, while organizations and social networks are
themselves crucial resources that activists can utilize in order to further their goals, they
often provide a variety of other resources that are crucial or beneficial to collective action.
First, CJOs may have significant social relations with other organizations and networks.
Such relations may include other CJOs and individuals, family, friends, websites,
educational institutions, and a variety of other potential social, political, and economic
arrangements. Through these relationships culture jammers may obtain access to
potential members, audiences, money, supplies, facilities, infrastructure, information, skills,
and credentials, among others. One task of this chapter is to decipher the most relevant
social capital to culture jammers and their attendant resources. However, while I do
consider relations between inter-organizational resources and CJOs in Chapter Twelve, I do
not develop any hypotheses or propositions here.
Second, CJOs may draw on different forms of economic or material capital.
Infrastructure is crucial to a variety of social activities, including activism. Of particular
importance is the Internet. Access to the Internet and the requisite skills for its navigation
performs at least two important functions. First, advanced communications technologies
reduce transaction costs for organizing, including political activism (Bonchek 1995; Van
Laer and Van Aelst 2010). A variety of costs are involved in collective action, including the
acquisition and processing of information, communication, and coordination of individuals.
The Internet especially provides efficient, fast, and convenient means for addressing these
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difficulties. Second, and more importantly, the Internet offers a distinct terrain of action
with unique capacities. As one of the major structural changes in nearly every aspect of life
in the last two decades, the Internet offers new spaces and issues of contestation. I
consider as well the myriad ways in which CJOs utilize this structural development.
Additionally, a variety of facilities and equipment may be crucial to collective action. At the
least they should provide space for planning and action as well as the essential materials
for particular actions. Finally, financial resources, especially money, should also be
important resources. Although I considered the size of financial resources above, I do not
develop specific hypotheses about the sources of these resources and culture jamming.
8.3. Analysis
As with the previous chapter, none of the hypotheses, propositions, or expectations
developed above is tested in the strictest sense. Instead, they provide more precise guides
for illustration. Hypotheses can systematically direct our attention to specific patterns or
observations that would otherwise escape scrutiny. The means of inquiry are specific to
each set of hypotheses and propositions. The data used in this chapter is derived from the
sample of CJOs specified in Chapter Four. As a preliminary point, the following five
hypotheses are descriptive and involve a singular variable: CJOs, and its relationships with
five variables. I consider the nature of these variables below.
8.3.1. Networks and Organizations
First, I hypothesize (H8.1) that CJOs are informally organized. The degree of
formalization is here constructed loosely, meaning that while it is basically treated as
dichotomous difficult cases may be coded as mixed. A high degree of formalization occurs
when organizational practices - division of labor, membership criteria, operational
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procedures, relations among subunits, etc. – are constrained by formal rules and role
assignments are highly impersonal. Conversely, a low degree of formalization involves
informal if not unstable organizational practices and personalized responsibilities. I
consider formalization from two perspectives. Internal formalization refers to intraorganizational relationships and responsibilities. External formalization refers to interorganizational relationships and responsibilities. While the two are likely to co-vary, I
analyze them as distinct phenomena. However, principal weight is given to internal
formalization for two reasons. First, the latter is not considered by NSM theory and, second,
while external formalization is of intrinsic descriptive interest, I am primarily concerned
with its possible effects on internal formalization. External formalization such as nonprofit status or contractual relations may incentivize the formalization of internal
procedures such as record keeping and task allocation in order to maintain the integrity of
the relationship.
Five groups exhibit extremely low formalization (CAE, IST, NGL, SCP, TYM). For
example, the CAE (2012b, 20) describe their model of organization as ‘organic,’ in the sense
that specialization and interdependence arise through practice and are in part ad hoc and
dependent on the nature of each project. The IST’s D’Ignazio also describes the
organizational process as ad hoc and “organic” in that projects develop out of spontaneous
initiative (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). Like the
CAE, specializations developed out of practice and are personalized. The SCP’s Brown
(personal interview, July 6, 2012) describes a looser form of organization in which he
develops the basic action and tasks are taken up as needed by whoever appears to
participate.
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Data on the question of internal formalization is less than ideal with some groups.
None is available for three groups (AAA, CTM, IAA). Five provide some indications of
formalization (BLF, BIL, RBC), but they vary in the capacity for conclusion. The data here
primarily concerns the division of labor and role personalization. The BLF (n.d.) assign
nom de guerre’s to colorfully named roles such as Rico T. Spoons, Director of Offence and
English Major, Editor-at-Large. However, the group’s strict secrecy undermines efforts at
determining whether tasks correspond to any real role assignments, Still, because the
group’s list of alumni allows some comparison across time I can conclude that role
descriptions vary in transmissibility. Some roles like field op, security, and copywriter are
common and thus suggest the possibility of the depersonalization of roles. However, all of
this is speculation. The more earnest RBC (n.d.(a)) has a Board of Directors as well as a
choir. Over the course of the 2004 presidential campaign, the Billionaires developed three
salaried positions at the national level (Haugerud 2013, 125, 153-5). A further division of
labor was established in an executive committee and relations with chapters were
marginally tightened, though it is not clear that anything like formal relations were
established. The AMF is the most internally formalized group with a clear division of labor
among nearly two dozen people and impersonal task differentiation (with the obvious
exception of Kalle Lasn’s position as Editor-in-Chief).
One prominent expression of external formalization is non-profit status. Four
groups in the sample possess(ed) 501(c) non-profit status (or its Canadian equivalent) or
are closely linked to such an organization. The RBC (n.d.(b)) is a federally-recognized nonprofit organization through their Immediate Life, Inc. The IST is a project of iKatun, a
501(c) non-profit organization (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview,
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August 27, 2012). The AAA (2013d) is officially supported by the Lab, a 501(c) non-profit
organization. Finally, for the first four years of its existence, the Billionaires was an adjunct
to the 501(c) non-profit organization, United for a Fair Economy (Haugerud 2013, 125). In
2003, the group splintered off and acquired tax-exempt status under Section 527 of the IRS
tax code (Haugerud 2013, 125; Billionaires for Bush 2004a). A later iteration, the
Billionaires for Wealthcare (n.d.(a)), are supported by the Institute for America’s Future, a
501(c) non-profit foundation. Other forms of external formalization are evident.
Negativland operates the record label, Seeland Records, which also produces recordings for
other artists. For a time, the group signed to SST Records, the contractual relation to which
constituted grounds for a lawsuit against the group (NGL 1995). The AMF have contractual
relations with printers (Quad/Graphics) and a variety of distributors.
Among the nine groups with sufficient data to make tentative conclusions, only one
appears to obtain a significant degree of formalization (AMF). Three groups exhibit a low
but noticeable degree of formalization (BLF, BIL, RBC), while five exhibit low formalization
(CAE, IST, NGL, SCP, TYM). External formalization is spread across these three
classifications, including two groups in the lowest category (IST, NGL). While any
conclusion is at best tentative considering the variety of data and methodological
constraints, it is clear that the majority of CJOs in the sample lack the kind of formalized
procedures and practices associated with bureaucratic organizations. This provides
minimal support for the NSM hypothesis.
Second, I hypothesize (H8.2) that CJOs are primarily composed of pre-existing
friendship networks. I treat the latter variable as dichotomous and focus on whether or not
friendships constitute the basic social organization of CJOs. Data on this hypothesis is even
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more scarce. Only seven groups provide evidence of such friendship networks (AMF, CTM,
CAE, IST, NGL, SCP, TYM). The AMF began as a collaboration between friends Kalle Lasn
and Bill Schmalz (Sommer 2012). Negativland originated in a friendship circle in high
school (Joyce 2007), while the IST drew friends toward collaboration (D’Ignazio, Manning,
and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). The SCP began as the meeting of two
friendship networks (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 359) and gathered fresh members from a
combination of customers and friends:
The thing that kept the group constantly with new members, who were quite varied
actually, which I will return to in a moment, was Black Out Books, anarchist bookstore, in
which I worked every single Sunday, so that I met people and became friendly with them,
and also that was a way of finding people that would be interested in performing in the
group (Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012).

The CMT as well began as a conversation among friends (Gach 2008b), while the CAE
(2012b) is composed of a friendship network originally established in the art and academic
worlds of Tallahassee, Florida. The Yes Men were introduced by mutual friends before
their fortuitous absence at the battle of Seattle. More recently, member Ostertag (2008)
describes the group as a, “network of friends. As you would imagine, to do this sort of
things, it takes a lot of friends.” However, much of these data are inconclusive. It is unclear
how many members of the AMF, CMT, or SCP are part of a basic friendship network
underlying the organization. While the data is somewhat suggestive, it is not sufficient to
draw even tentative conclusions.
Third, I hypothesize (H8.3) that CJOs are organizationally decentralized. Like
formalization, the degree of centralization is constructed loosely. Centralization refers to
the proportion of the membership of an organization that has effective decision-making
power. High centralization refers to a low proportion of effective decision-makers. In the
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extreme this means one person determines the actions of the organization, whereas low
centralization or decentralization diffuses this power to a wider portion of the
membership.
Three groups clearly exhibit highly decentralized organization (CAE, IST, NGL),
though there is some evidence that the IAA does as well. Importantly, no group in the
sample explicitly rejects, at least in practice, the principle of hierarchy. In the case of the
CAE (2001, 66), while they,
[do] not follow the democratic model, the collective does recognize its merits; however, CAE
follows Foucault’s principle that hierarchical power can be productive (it does not
necessarily lead to domination), and hence uses a floating hierarchy to produce projects.
After consensus is reached on how a project should be produced, the member with the
greatest expertise in the area has authority over the final product. While all members have a
voice in the production process, the project leader makes the final decisions.

This principle of a floating hierarchy is evident as well with the IST, though consensus is
not a necessity:
I feel like the projects end up taking on organically, like, who is leading the project. And
encouraging leaders. We don’t follow a process like consensus-decision-making like Occupy
Boston. The projects often have clear administrative leaders. Right now Jim is leading a
project to put on a failure support group at BU this fall. We have another member for us
who is leading project where three people are going to the Philippines to do some peacebuilding workshops with some youth there….I’m very in favor of leaders; having leaders
and organizers. They don’t have to be autocratic. Someone who takes responsibility for it.

Negativland (2005) describe their creative process as “one brain,” a stew of collaboration
and contributions: “I don’t have a strong sense of which idea was whose, and who did what,
and I don’t care. It just doesn’t matter. If the idea’s great, and it’s evolving and good, then
I’m excited.” Less can be derived from the information on the IAA, but what can does
suggest a collaborative process: “Brainstorming session. Three is the best. Can fit in a
booth at a bar. Everybody can take a stake in it, have a part they call their own. When you
aren’t making any money and it’s your money, that’s really important” (Brusadin et al n.d.).
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Data are insufficient to determine the degree of centralization in seven cases (AMF,
AAA, BLF, CTM, IAA, RBC, TYM). However, two groups do show signs of organizational
centralization (BIL, SCP). The Billionaires are exceptional in the sample because they
established a large network of chapters across the country many of which were nominally
under a national leadership. However, according to Haugerud (2013, 156) the national
leadership primarily provided models for action (songs, slogans, images, etc.), advice, and
hands-on aid especially in electoral battleground states. She also finds that the group’s
organizing principle approximated meritocracy, not radical egalitarianism or consensus
decision-making; while they sought to encourage participation, those who did the most
work tended to have the most power (Haugerud 2013, 154-5). The SCP’s Brown describes
the group’s organization as a loose form of personalized centralization, in which Brown
generally established the initiative by organizing actions and from there feedback and
suggestions would shape the unfolding project.
Within the NY-SCP it was hierarchical, as in I was the one, not so much in control, but I
wrote the plays, was the media spokesperson, chose the time and place for performances,
was the one who invited people, so that inside of the group, we were not really anarchist in
organization (Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012).

Elsewhere he describes in more detail how the group was organized:
It was collaborative in that…...I fancied myself leading something like a big band, like the
Mingus Big Band, led by Charles Mingus. He’s always gonna be playing bass there and it can
still sound like the Mingus Big Band even though the horn players change. So what I’d do is
I had an e-mail list of 10-15 people who were interested in performing. So I’d invite all of
them and say, “the proposal is to perform on July 4th of 2012, let’s say. I propose that we do
this, that, and the other thing. I propose that we do this play.” There would be a selfselection process, which was whose available. Then the people who were available would
say, “nah I’m getting tired of that play that you proposed, why don’t we do something else?”
Which would either be they would propose something else, write something else, which
would take place in another location, so they had advanced notice, the freedom, and the
opportunity to choose other things (Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012).
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However, because of the paucity of data on other groups, conclusions are at best tentative.
What is clear is that of the groups with available data, none exhibit strong centralized
organization. Even among the Billionaires and the SCP, feedback, collaboration, and
participation are cultivated among the less committed.
Fourth, I hypothesize (H8.4) that CJOs are exclusively organized. Similar to
formalization and centralization the degree of exclusivity is constructed loosely.
Exclusivity refers here to organizational membership requirements. Several groups in the
sample strongly support the development of like-minded groups and copycat actions (AAA,
BLF, BIL, SCP, TYM). However, such efforts do not in themselves constitute inclusive
organization. Inclusive membership is principally characterized by low-cost commitments
and a lack of exclusionary criteria like race, gender, age, income, ideology, religion,
occupation, education, family, or friendship.
Five groups in the sample exhibit exclusive organization (BLF, CAE, IAA, NGL, SCP).
McManic (2003) notes, “you can't sign up for the BLF. It has to tap you. ‘Not just anybody
gets invited into the BLF, because it's dangerous and essentially illegal," says Napier’.”
Addressing the scope of the group, the CAE (2012b, 20) argue that it, “had to stay small
enough that everyone felt their voice was heard, and could see themselves in the process
and the product.” Opening up the group to more members would dilute the balance of
contributions and sense of participation. The IAA make similar statements about optimal
group organization:
It changes, but we keep it 3-5. Small, like a cell. It’s small enough that whatever does
happen, everyone can take a part in it. Brainstorming session. Three is the best. Can fit in a
booth at a bar. Everybody can take a stake in it, have a part they call their own. When you
aren’t making any money and it’s your money, that’s really important (Brusadin et al n.d.).
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Like most musical groups, Negativland have restrictive criteria for joining. The SCP’s
Brown describes their brand of exclusivity:
If you want to give it a bad spin, we’re sectarian. If you want to give it a good spin, we prize
our autonomy. So, that means like the Situationists, that we don’t just admit anybody into
the group. We don’t want to have a big group in which lots of people join. The idea is just a
proliferation of independent groups who have the name in common (Scheinke and Brown
2003, 363).

Elsewhere, the SCP (n.d.(b)) lays out there criteria:
On occasion, we (the New York Surveillance Camera Players) are contacted by people who
want to "get involved" in what we are doing. Though we wish to encourage everyone to get
involved in the struggle to protect and defend our collective and individual rights to privacy,
anonymity and free assembly, we need to make clear the types of involvement that we
encourage, and those that we do not.
We encourage potential performers to contact us. To become a performer with the SCP, you
1) must be unreservedly in accord with the SCP's basic positions; 2) must be someone who
lives in or near New York City, or is passing through NYC when the SCP is scheduled to
perform; 3) must be comfortable with and (ideally) capable of deriving pleasure from
appearing in public and, of course, on the closed-circuit television monitors of who-knowshow-many surveillance systems; 4) need not be one of the SCP's media spokespeople, but
should be comfortable with the fact that the group is media-friendly and so is often
videotaped and interviewed; 5) need not have any professional training as an actor; 6)
cannot be a professional actor; 7) cannot expect financial compensation for your
involvement; 8) must be an anarchist, autonomist, libertarian, free-thinker or
"independent"; 9) cannot be a Communist, Socialist, Marxist, Leninist, Trotskyite or Maoist,
an adherent to the ideologies of the Republican, Democratic or Reform Parties in the
United States, or someone who is racist, sexist or homophobic; and 10) cannot be a police
officer, an informant of any kind, a private security guard or a member of any of the United
States' armed forces or intelligence agencies.

Data are insufficient to make a determination with respect to four groups (AAA,
AMF, CTM, TYM). For example, the Yes Men (n.d.(b)) explicitly address the question how a
“person turn[s] into a Yes Man?”:
A person (male or female) becomes a Yes Man by exposing, perhaps deviously, the nastiness
of powerful evildoers. If this describes what you do, or want to do (the exposing, not the
evildoing), please visit [link provided]…More precisely, there are all kinds of ways of doing
what we call "Identity Correction." Soon, we'll post a little list of some ways that we've
thought of. There are plenty of ways that we haven't thought of, too.
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The link provided leads readers to the Yes Lab’s “Get Involved” page. From there, it is clear
that by Yes Men (2013) they simply mean like-minded groups (‘progressive’ is their term)
and similar actions. It thus remains unclear what organizational membership entails
beyond a “network of friends” (Ostertag 2008). With the AAA (2013c), there is some
evidence that the group expresses a very loose sense of membership:
1. Start your own Anti-Advertising Agency campaign! Look around the site, see what we’re
about, and do your own Anti-Advertising campaign. Send us pictures and we’ll post
them here.
2. Sign up on Steve Lambert’s mailing list.
3. Look for free downloads with our projects, or go to our downloads page to download
recent AAA poster designs, stencils, stickers, and other projects to put up in your town!
4. Send us a self addressed, postage paid, business sized envelope and we’ll send you
these “you don’t need it” stickers.
5. Check back for news, project updates, new downloads and opportunities to work with
the AAA.

Yet, elsewhere Lambert describes the AAA (2013a) as a “collaboration between myself and
dozens of other artists.”
The remaining three groups suggest an inclusive sense of membership. The
Billionaires cultivated chapters and participation with varying levels of commitment. The
RBC (n.d.(c) address the question directly: “What is Membership in the Church of Stop
Shopping? When we tour in your part of the world, we'll let you know, maybe you can help
us visit. We'll send notice of "Spiritual Trespassings" in the lobbies of big banks that finance
climate change… things like that.” A loose and inclusive sense of membership is provided
by the IST:
First of all, if anyone wants to be a member, you’re just a member. You join the e-mail list,
and you’re in. So when we do talks, for example, we say, If you wanna join, you can just
come up and say, I wanna join, and then you are on the e-mail list. And then it’s up to you if
you want to participate (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27,
2012).
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Clearly, relatively little commitment is needed to join these groups and no apparently
exclusive criteria are publicized.
Although the data are better for his hypothesis than the preceding ones, the results
remain inconclusive. Five groups exhibit exclusion (BLF, CAE, IAA, NGL, SCP), while three
groups practice inclusion (BIL, IST, RBC) with four suffering from insufficient data. What
this does suggest is that inclusive membership may be more prevalent than the NSM
hypothesis suggests.
Finally, I hypothesize (H8.5) that CJOs are organizationally small. While I initially
analyze the sample with a conception of organizational size ranging from small to medium
to large, I ultimately treat it as dichotomous –the organization is small or it is not considering the hypothesis. Distinguishing small from medium and large is somewhat
arbitrary, but the presentation of data should allow for reasonable evaluations of my
classifications. I break the concept of organizational size down into two component
variables: membership size and financial resources. For example, a small organization will
have a membership of two to twenty-five people, a bare minimum of financial resources
usually derived from member’s day jobs or some meager source of income, and a local
organizational distribution across a city, county, or state. The balance of these variables in
determining organizational size is not clearly laid out here, but ideally the effort will be
transparent. Table 8.1 summarizes the data.
First, at least seven CJOs have memberships of less than twenty five people (BLF,
CTM, CAE, IAA, IST, NGL, SCP). These range from the three to five of the IAA to slightly
large groups like the BLF, IST, or the SCP. Two groups lack sufficient data to make a
determination as to the extent of their membership (AAA, TYM). The AAA (2013a) has a
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Table 8.1. Organizational Size

AMF
AAA
BLF
BIL
CTM
CAE
IAA
IST
NGL
RBC
SCP
TYM
1

= mixed

Membership
Size
100+
2

15+
1,000+
5-12
5
3-5
Small
4-6
50+
10-20
2
2

Financial
Resources
Medium
Small
Small
Medium
2

Small
Small
Small
Small
Medium
Small
2

= insufficient data

clear core membership of a dozen people; however, as noted above a looser sense of
membership may make their network notably larger. The Yes Men’s refusal to publicly
delimit organizational membership makes a determination impossible, although the group
at least includes three members: Bichlbaum, Bonanno, and Ostertag). The remaining three
groups are larger (AMF, BIL, RBC). The RBC (n.d.(a)) is a core of roughly fifty performers,
but they claim a congregation in the thousands. The AMF is a core of ten to eighteen
members with hundreds of contributors (AMF 2005; Lasn, Nurse, and Torbett 2012).
Again, the Billionaires are unique. While most chapters are primarily composed of a few
dozen people, at one point the Manhattan chapter included roughly 150 members
(Haugerud 2013, 131). Altogether, the franchise or hub-node structure of the organization
incorporated at its height in the fall of 2004 over a thousand people, though dispersed over
roughly 100 chapters.
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Second, seven groups in the sample tend to utilize few financial resources (AAA,
BLF, CAE, IAA, IST, NGL, SCP). The AAA began as a $35,000 grant that stretched over a six
year period (Creative Work Fund 2004; Vartanian 2010). The CAE (2000b) do not receive
grants. Instead, “we just hobble along from project to project, usually working with an
extremely limited budget. A lot of our imaginative power goes into figuring out how to
make things for minimal cost.” The IAA is slim on funding as well: “We sort of use the
access we get at our day jobs to sort of allow us to make projects that we couldn’t
otherwise. We don’t have any funding ever. Every now and then we get something. But for
the most part it’s basically out of pocket” (Brusadin et al n.d.). The SCP receives “no
funding. This requires just money for the mail, the post-office box, and the webhosting—
that’s it” (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 365). The meager financial position of Negativland
(2005) was transparent following lawsuits from Island and SST Records. The IST describes
its parent organization, iKatun, as “probably the 501(c)(3) with the smallest budget in the
country” (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012), while the
BLF describe the extremely minimal resources required for ‘billboard improvement’
(Thornhill and DeCoverly 2006).
Three groups exhibit notably larger financial requirements and resources (AMF,
BIL, RBC). The AMF produces and markets a magazine with high production quality,
markets a shoe product – Blackspot sneakers – and staffs ten full-time employees (Lasn et
al 2012). At their height, the Billionaires managed to employ three full-time salaried staff
and acquired from $150,000 to $200,000 in the first half of 2004 (Haugerud 2013, 126).
The RBC (n.d.(b)) claims a “low budget,” but they also have “office costs,” frequently tour
nationally and internationally (recall the size of the membership), and enjoy a “matching
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grant” in which, “every dollar you give means two dollars for The Church.” Finally, two
groups lack sufficient data to determine their financial resources (CTM, TYM). The Yes Men
claim a small budget: “There’s no budget, so you have to find sofas to sleep on, and frequent
flyer tickets, and somebody who is willing to print a business card, and, you know, just a
network of friends (Ostertag 2008).” Elsewhere, they note:
It just so happens that we can't afford to take a vacation, so we've had to rely on the
generosity of friends and acquaintances in various places…As for the money to build our
Survivaball and other props, and to print up the fake New York Times ($6000 for 80,000
copies), it came from our mailing list (TYM n.d.(b)).

Yet, they raised over $100,000 in less than two months for their current film (TYM 2012c).
Considering the distribution of membership size and financial resources across the
sample, eight out of twelve groups are classified as organizationally small (AAA, BLF, CTM,
CAE, IAA, IST, NGL, SCP). Three of the remaining are somewhat larger than small (AMF,
BIL, RBC), while the Yes Men provide insufficient data. Still, even considering the variation
between groups like the IAA and the AMF, the core of the AMF and the RBC is still relatively
small compared to larger SMOs and interest groups. It is the Billionaires that truly stands
out as a relatively sizable organization, a status principally a consequence of its large
numbers of chapters. Considered individually, most of these chapters would be as large as
the average group in the sample. In contrast to the four preceding hypotheses, these
findings provide some support for the notion that CJOs are organizationally small.
Table 8.2 summarizes the data on all five organizational hypotheses. While glancing
only at sufficient data points towards a confirmation of the NSM hypotheses, the paucity of
information muddies confidence in this conclusion. Moreover, evidence of degrees of
formality, inclusivity, centralization, as well as medium-size suggests that the structures of
CJOs vary more than simple dichotomous conceptions of organization would imply. In
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Table 8.2. The Organizational Structures of CJOs
AMF
AAA
BLF
BIL
CTM
CAE
IAA
IST
NGL
RBC
SCP
TYM
1

Informal
No2

Friendship
Yes2

Decentralization

Exclusive

2

2

2
12

2

2

2

2

2

12

2

1

Yes
No

2

2

2

Yes

Yes2
Yes

2

2

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes2
Yes
Yes

1

2

2

Yes
Yes

Yes2
Yes

1

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

Small
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

2

2

2

= mixed

2

= insufficient data

particular, the AMF, BIL, and RBC appear somewhat organizationally distinct from the rest
of the sample in being larger and possibly more formalized, if not inclusive. In addition,
there appears to be too little data to note any correlation between friendship networks and
exclusivity, as Polletta suggests.
8.3.2. Organizational Resources
In this and the previous chapter I consider particular skill sets and organizations as
resources that activists utilize in their contentious interactions. Here, I look further at the
social and economic capital available to CJOs. It is worth noting that while social capital
helps individuals and organizations gain access to economic and other forms of capital,
economic capital can also be converted into social capital through investments in
relationships.
The previous section considers two particular forms of social capital: friendship
networks and the organization itself. However, social capital encompasses a diversity of
resources including relations with other organizations: other SMOs, interest groups,
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foundations, businesses, universities, and others. I begin with other activists, SMOs, and
related organizations. CJOs develop and utilize extensive networks of activists for various
purposes. The most intimate forms of relationships are cross-memberships. For example,
the Yes Men and the IAA shared members (Brusadin et al n.d.). The Billionaires shared
members with groups like United for a Fair Economy, its parent organization until 2003,
Reclaim the Streets!, and many other groups (Haugerud 2013, 84, 192). The BFL are
nominally part of the Cacophany Society (Burkes 2012). The AAA and the San Francisco
Print Collective enjoyed overlapping memberships as well (AAA 2013d). Now a university
professor, Ricardo Dominguez held memberships in the CAE, ACT UP/Tallahassee, the
Electronic Disturbance Theater, and thing.net (Dominguez 2004). The RBC (n.d.(a)) shares
members with the Living Theatre (2009). Many groups in the sample also collaborate with
other activists. The AMF have an extensive network of relations with activists, including
sister publications in four countries. They also run the Powershift Advocacy Advertising
Agency, a campaign assistance organization (AMF 2005). The AAA (2013a) collaborated
with hosts of different activists and artists for each project, including the Graffiti Research
Lab, the Yes Men, Code Pink, and Improv Everywhere. Hagerud (2013, 192) finds that the
Billionaires collaborated with the Yes Men, US Uncut, and others. BIL founder Boyd
collaborated with dozens of activist individuals and organizations in compiling his 2012
book Beautiful Trouble. The BLF famously worked with culture jammer Ron English on
some projects. The CAE (2001, ch. 6) worked with the IAA on developing contestational
robots, while the CTM (n.d.(a)) frequently collaborates with activists in various campaigns.
Negativland run their radio program “Over the Edge” on a station owned by the
progressive non-profit corporation, Pacfica Radio (Joyce 1995). The group also connected
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with activist documentarian Craig Baldwin (1995) and contributed to Creative Commons
(Parkins 2008). The RBC participates in Buy Nothing Day, a campaign initiated by the AMF,
and collaborates with local activist groups across the world. The SCP (2006) worked with
the New York Civil Liberties Union, various independent anti-surveillance groups, and Not
Bored journal, while the Yes Men have collaborated with many groups in the sample and
more, especially with the establishment of the Yes Lab. Finally, some CJOs utilize their
websites to post long lists of links to like-minded organizations and individuals (BIL, BLF,
IAA, RBC, SCP).
As further evidence of the placement of CJOs within the field of art, many groups in
the sample possess notable relations with arts organizations (AAA, CAE, CTM, IST, RBC,
TYM). In the previous chapter I noted the extent of arts occupations in the sample,
especially arts teaching. Art departments, universities, and centers such as the San
Francisco Art Institute, the Lab, Eyebeam Art and Technology Center, MIT Media Lab, the
Museum of Modern Art, the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, Creative Work Fund,
Rhizome, Creative Capital, and others are prominent examples of arts-related organizations
with long-lasting or significant relationships with some of the groups in the sample.
Some CJOs engage in regular beneficial relations with business enterprises or,
similarly, relations with non-profit organizations that produce and distribute objectified
cultural capital like books or films. The AMF, BIL, CAE, NGL, RBC, SCP, and TYM all produce
books and magazines that require printers, distributors, and retailers. The RBC and the
TYM produced feature-length documentary films with the aid of filmmakers, studios,
donors, and retailers. The AMF (n.d.(b)) markets the Blackspot shoe that is produced by a
family-owned union shop in Portugal. Somewhat different relations are also evident. The
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SCP’s Brown (personal interview, July 6, 2012) worked at an anarchist bookstore that
provided numerous opportunities to meet and recruit people. The BLF and the IAA confess
to utilizing time and materials at their jobs at private companies (Kalman 2006; Brusadin
et al n.d.). The Yes Men (2012c) funded their latest documentary film through Kickstarter.
Social capital is important for many reasons, but here it is significant for the access it
provides to other resources. First and foremost, social relations provide much-needed
access to economic capital. I discuss financial resources above, many of which come in the
form of grants and non-profit status. Many of the groups in the sample set up donations
pages on their websites that streamline the act of individual monetary contributions (AMF,
BIL, CTM, IST, RBC, TYM). Such groups occasionally utilize mailing lists or other online
means to plead for donations for particular projects or other contribution. The Yes Men
(n.d.(b)) provide one example:
As for the money to build our Survivaball and other props, and to print up the fake New
York Times ($6000 for 80,000 copies), it came from our mailing list, to which we sent calls
asking for help. Today, a fundraising platform like Kickstarter could do pretty much the
same thing.

Other forms of relevant economic capital include physical infrastructure such as offices,
places to eat and sleep, and exhibition spaces. Other resources include office supplies and
equipment, clothing, and valuable information.
A final form of economic or physical capital is the Internet. Access to the Internet
provides a number of advantages for CJOs. As noted, it allows groups to establish regular
public links with like-minded groups through their websites as well as simplify the
donations process. It also decreases the costs of communicating both within the group (email) and with others. Every group in the sample operates a website that serves numerous
functions, including publicizing the goals, strategies, and tactics of the organization,
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disseminating collective action frames, and offering various ways to contribute beyond
donations, including purchasing media, joining the mailing list, and joining the organization
or engaging in similar actions.
8.4. Conclusion
Chapters Five and Six establishes the structures and incentives of the field of artistic
production, while Chapter Seven presents descriptions of the content of CJO’s collective
identities as well as evidence relating culture jammers to the artistic field. Through an
analysis of the social and economic capital available to CJOs, especially the structure of
their organizations, this chapter concludes the analysis of the fields, networks, and
identities constituting everyday social organization. Part III of this dissertation follows
with an analysis of the relationship between everyday social organization and tactical
repertoires.
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PART III:
STRATEGY AND TACTICS

272

CHAPTER 9. GOALS AND STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS
While Part II of this study details the set of independent variables (networks, fields,
and identities, and by extension their resource constraints) that constitute everyday social
organization, the primary dependent variable of this study is tactical choice. However,
although a great deal of existing research has focused exclusively on the relation of tactics
to variables like identity, incentives, politics, or organization, more recent work argues that
tactics must be studied within the context of other components of the strategic approach of
a social movement organization: issues, frames, targets, alliances, solutions, etc. Together,
these constellations of strategic elements constitute the logics or “strategic orientations” of
organizational actors. The primary task of this chapter is to present data regarding the
goals and the strategic orientations of my sample of CJOs.
This chapter is segmented into three parts. First, I review the literature on goals
and strategic orientations. While the latter concept is decomposed into issues, targets, and
tactics, this review will focus only on the general logic of strategy. Second, I develop
several descriptive hypotheses and propositions that aid in the description of culture
jamming goals and strategic orientations. Third, I present evidence of the goals and the
general strategic approaches of my sample of CJOs, including their issues, by utilizing the
hypotheses and propositions developed in the preceding section. This chapter is thus
primarily descriptive. Description of the targets and tactics of the CJOs in my sample is left
to the following two chapters.
A final preliminary point is in order. Strictly speaking, goals are not the dependent
variable in this study. While implications may be deduced from Chapters Two and Three
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that can contribute to an explanation of goal selection, for this study goals are an
exogenous variable.
9.1. Review
9.1.1. Goals
Strategy is oriented towards goals, also called demands or claims. Consequently, an
analysis of strategy requires a preliminary analysis of goals. Scholarly efforts to broadly
describe the goals of SMOs and social movements are numerous. I focus on three basic and
mutually inclusive approaches.67
Traditionally, the issues and goals of social movements were designated as either
instrumental or symbolic (Aberle 1966; Breines 1982; Gusfield 1963), while more recent
scholarship utilizes a similar strategy-oriented and identity-oriented distinction (Cohen
1985; Rucht 1988; Tourraine 1981).6869 Instrumental or strategic goals involve a desired
change in the external environment, especially in economic or political institutions, actors,
and policies. Such conceptions identify action-outcome linkages that specify movement
action as means towards tangible or material ends. The emphasis on this set of goals is
principally associated with RMT (Gamson 1990; Jenkins 1983; Oberschall 1973; McCarthy
and Zald 1973; 1987a) and political process or opportunity theory (Kitschelt 1986;
There are other approaches of course. For example, an early effort by Tilly (1978) distinguishes
competitive, reactive, and proactive claims based on which group(s) possesses the resources of interest. This
review focuses on the most common and influential approaches.
68 Tilly (2006a, 32) makes a further distinction between program, standing, and identity claims. Identity
claims “assert the presence of a substantial collective actor”; standing claims “say that we Xs not only exist,
but occupy a certain position within the regime”; and program claims “call for their objects to take an action,
adopt a policy, or otherwise commit themselves to a change.”
69 The distinction is somewhat similar to the debate over expressive or intrinsic incentives in rational choice
theory. Whiteley (1995) argues that empirical support for psychological incentives derived from the process
of voting (including the beliefs and values implicated in the act, such as the famous ‘D’ term) disconfirms the
rationalist approach. Opp (1989; 2011) argues that the rational actor model incorporates such incentives,
because they can be interpreted as costs and benefits. As clarified in Chapter Three, the approach taken here
is that “the rational actor model is premised on individuals’ evaluating the costs and benefits of participating
rather than the particular types of benefits associated with participating” (Leighley 1995, 195).
67
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McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978; 1986). These approaches criticized earlier
scholarship for assuming that while normal political activity is channeled into official
institutional channels, protest is a frustrated response to social change. In contrast, these
scholars developed an approach in which activism is a strategic means to influence policy
(Gamson 1990; Tilly 1978). In this polity model, the government is inclusive and
responsive to the pressures of insiders, but those lacking access to the polity, typically as a
result of low resources or institutional exclusion, must utilize more disruptive means in
order to gain entry. The primary concern of challengers, then, is the state, the set of
political institutions, actors, and resources that defines the scope of the polity.
In contrast, symbolic or identity-related goals are personal, expressive, or cultural;
they seek to challenge practices or ideas in the private sphere or in civil society and involve
the creation and maintenance of solidarity and collective identity. Such goals are in general
means as well as ends; the action is directed inwards or is diffuse in its intentions. In this
sense, action symbolizes or expresses some change instead of forging a causal link between
action and environmental effects. While early attempts to explain social movements and
other forms of collective behavior argued that protest was a symbolic or expressive
attempt to reduce psychological distress (Blumer 1951; Kornhauser 1959), the emphasis
on rationality and strategy by RMT and political process theory theory led to a rejection of
social psychological explanations of activism. In response, NSM theorists developed
accounts of movements focusing on the development of conflicts over the creation and
expression of new ways of living (Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; 1985).
As Melucci (1985, 801) describes it:
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The medium, the movement itself as a new medium, is the message. As Prophets without
enchantment, contemporary movements practice in the present the change they are struggling
for: they redefine the meaning of social action for the whole society.

Recent efforts utilize less holistic explanations of social conflict but nonetheless retain the
emphasis on goals of value or identity expression (Gamson 1989; Jasper 1997).
A similar distinction in the literature considers whether activism is guided by
materialist or postmaterialist values and goals. Inglehart (1977; 1990) famously argues
that variation in the economic security of a generation in its formative years determines
their long-term value structure. Under conditions of scarcity, the development of
materialist values prioritizes goals of economic and physical security such as national
security and wages. Under conditions of affluence, the development of postmaterialist
values prioritizes quality of life and personal development issues such as human rights, the
environment, and the quality of democracy. According to Inglehart, this generational shift
in values and goals has far-reaching effects on political participation, including the
development of new political issues, political parties, and social movements.
While the instrumental/symbolic distinction focuses on the internal or external
orientation of the movement or group, scholars also developed a basic distinction between
movements or groups that desire limited or moderate social or political change and those
that pursue complete or radical change, though it operates more or less like a spectrum
(Downey and Rohlinger 2008; Gamson 1990; Haines 1988; McAdam 1999). Moderates or
reformists tend to be in broad agreement with the existing social and political order such
that their most basic values are not in conflict with this system. This typically implies an
emphasis on reforming or modifying existing institutions. Conversely, radicals or
revolutionaries are characterized by a general disagreement with the existing political and
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social structure and significant dissonance between their values and the values of the
system. Their goals express the desire to abolish and replace or radically transform the
organization of power in society. A third and related set of goals regarding the SMO’s
orientation towards the social system involve not the degree of change desired in the
system, but the degree of autonomy from the system. Turner and Killian (1987, 292) refer
to this objective as ‘separation,’ the establishment and maintenance of a space free from
control or interference from political or social authorities.
Finally, within rational choice theory efforts to explain collective action principally
focus on the question of mobilization (Chong 1991; Harris 1982; Lichbach 1995; Marwell
and Oliver 1993; Olson 1965; Opp 1989). This question is particularly vexing from this
perspective, because it is presented as a paradox of participation: rational individuals will
not join collective actions, yet we observe collective action everywhere. This paradox
arises in part from what is called the collective action problem. This dilemma is
determined in large part by the nature of the desired object of a group: public goods.
Goods vary along at least two important dimension: 1) the degree to which people can be
excluded from their consumption, and 2) the degree to which the quantity of the good is
reduced through consumption (rivalrous).70 This produces a typology of four types of
economic goods (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9). Table 9.1 specifies the relevant
dimensions. Private goods, like gasoline or apples, are highly rivalrous and excludable.
Common goods, like fisheries or oil reserves, are rivalrous but non-excludable. The most

However, these dimensions do not exhaust variation in the nature of public goods. For example, many note
that some public goods, known as step goods, do not yield benefits until a certain threshold or discrete
amount of contributions is met, while continuous goods are more gradual in their production (Hardin 1982;
Marwell and Oliver 1993; Opp 2009). Accordingly, variable production functions affect a variety of social
movement activity, including strategy.
70
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Table 9.1. Types of Economic Goods
Rivalrous
Non-Rivalrous

Excludable
Private Good
Club Good

Non-Excludable
Common Good
Public Good

important goods for this analysis are club goods and public goods. Public goods are
generally non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Typical examples include clean air and
national defense. Club goods are non-rivalrous but excludable. Typical examples include
religious services and country clubs. Club goods are distinguished from public goods by
the capacity to exclude others from consumption, including non-contributors to the
production of the club good. Public goods, on the other hand, are characterized by the
inclusion of non-contributors from the consumption of the good. It is this quality of public
goods that makes their provision so theoretically problematic: why contribute to the
production of a good everyone will benefit from when someone else can incur the costs?
9.1.2. Strategy
But goals are only the telos of strategy. In order to integrate organizational
activities, employ organizational resources, and conceptually link their activities and
resources to outcomes internal and external to the organization, actors develop strategies
(Ganz 2000, 1010). Strategies are basic or general plans that organizations utilize in order
to achieve their goals. By constraining an SMO’s sense of what is appropriate and effective
strategy facilitates a variety of choices including the selection of issues, tactics, frames,
alliances, recruitment programs, targets, and others. Recent work considers the
interdependence of the various elements of strategy as essential to the explanation of any
one component. As Downey and Rohlinger (2008, 6) argue:
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the choice to utilize highly confrontational tactics has implications for choices about
organization models, who to appeal to, and who to secure resources from, among
others. As such, discrete strategic choices must be seen as components of broader
decision-making processes.

Together, these clusters of choices and the strategy that organizes them are referred to as
strategic logics or strategic orientations (Downey and Rohlinger 2008; Larson 2011; Rucht
1988; 1990). Scholars have focused on different configurations of these components.
Dalton (1994) suggests five factors are constitutive: efforts to mobilize participants and
their contributions, the selection of issues and their solutions, the alliances with other
SMOs, and the tactics they use to pursue their claims. In his study of effective leadership in
activist groups, Ganz (2000, 1010; 2009) conceptualizes strategy as the “conceptual link we
make between the places, the times and ways we mobilize and deploy our resources,
and the goals we hope to achieve." Strategy is thus composed of the types of tactics
utilized, the targets of these actions, and the timing of the action. Meyer (2007; Meyer and
Staggenborg 2012) decomposes strategy into the claims or demands of actors, their tactics,
and the particular sites or venues within which they choose to press their claims. The more
common approach, however, is to focus on the issues, targets, and tactics utilized by SMOs
(Earl and Kimport 2008; Larson 2009; 2011; Walker et al 2008).
9.1.3. Dimensions of Strategic Orientation
Scholars have identified a number of important dimensions that allow finer
distinctions among varieties of strategic approaches.71 I briefly consider three.72 First, as

Strategies may also be distinguished as discrete categories, such as bargaining, or subcultural retrenchment
(Rucht 1990) as opposed to dimensions. I focus here only on dimensions of strategic orientations.
72 Downey and Rohlinger (2008) include the depth of the challenge presented by an SMO or movement as an
additional dimension of strategic orientations. However, my distinction between goals and strategic
orientations emphasizes that whether a movement or SMO is moderate or radical is a reflection of its goals
and not of its general strategic approach to their goals. In fact, the two may vary for strategic reasons: radical
groups may utilize a relatively non-confrontational strategy in order to avoid heavy repression or engage
71
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with goals, a basic distinction between logics or orientations that are instrumental and
strategic from those that are expressive, symbolic, or identity-oriented has proven
relatively durable (Aberle 1966; Breines 1982; Gusfield 1963; Jasper and Polletta 2001;
Jenkins 1983; Rucht 1988; 1990). I elaborate more on this distinction in my theoretical
discussion below.
Second, scholars consider the degree of risk involved in engaging in actions and the
closely related dimension of the degree of disruption introduced into everyday life when
characterizing strategies (DeNardo 1985; Kriesi et al 1995; Piven and Cloward 1979).73
This set of dimensions is often described as a spectrum ranging from conventional to
unconventional (or disruptive) to violent (Tarrow 1998). From this perspective, strategies
range from a low to a high threshold for adoption. While some generate relatively low
risks or little anticipated financial or physical harm, others produce much higher
expectations for high risks for participants, including financial ruin, physical harm, or even
death. The corresponding social consequences of such variation in risks involve the degree
of disruptiveness of the strategic approach; the more the strategic approach involves the
disruption of social routines and expectations, including sources of support for opponents,
the more risks that are involved in engaging in contentious politics. Because disrupting
social life can increase the costs that opponents are willing to pay in order to repress
activism, activists can face increasingly extreme threats of harm. However, the basic
strategy of disruption involves increasing negative sanctions on opponents (blocking
traffic, mobilizing public support, etc.) such that the costs of non-compliance outweigh the
channels of influence they perceive to be more effective, while moderate SMOs may utilize more disruptive
strategies to gather media attention.
73 This distinction is synonymous with a similar distinction in tactics, principally because tactics are the
means of disruption.
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costs of compliance (Lipsky 1968). Movements and SMOs are thus faced with the difficult
strategic and tactical question of how much disruption to generate before the authorities
can respond with more extensive and effective repressive measures.
Third, scholars distinguish strategies along a continuum representing the variable
scope of the appeal of an SMO to the population, often couched in terms of the distribution
of commitments required by an SMO (DeNardo 1985; Downey and Rohlinger 2008; see also
Jasper 2006). Some SMOs focus their energies and resources on a small circle of heavy
contributors, a hard-core of activists. While the vast majority of SMOs must cultivate a core
of committed members, others are oriented toward developing a broad support base with a
low set of commitments. Downey and Rohlinger (2008) refer to the former as insular
orientations; they help SMOs maintain ‘abeyance structures:’ internal organization,
solidarity, and collective identification during periods of relative demobilization. Mass
orientations are conducive to mass mobilization, including the development of large social
networks, access to significant resources, and wider public appeal.
9.2. Theory and Hypotheses
In order to determine the content of the goals and strategic orientations of culture
jammers, I elaborate on each relevant concept. First, I consider a set of expectations
regarding the goals of CJOs, in part relying on some basic but disputed distinctions in NSM
theory. Second, I develop propositions and hypotheses regarding the strategic orientations
of these groups.
9.2.1. Goals
Collective action is defined in part by the pursuit of shared interests. Thus, action is
oriented towards the attainment of some array of goals or priorities in order to focus the
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organization of resources and actions. As noted in Chapter Three this variety can in part be
analyzed hierarchically (Jasper 2006, ch. 3). The broadest and most comprehensive goals
are the primary orienting principles of strategies. These may be generally referred to as
goals. Examples may include gender or racial equality, ending a war, establishing a
communist system, developing solidarity, criminalizing abortion, generatin a space
temporarily free of the market economy, or ending local corruption. Lower levels are
referred to as objectives; they guide more specific courses of action. If the broad goal of an
SMO is to end a war, then more specific objectives may include maintaining an SMO, fundraising, increasing public support for ending the war, pressuring political leaders to oppose
the war, mobilizing people for demonstrations against the war, training activists in styles of
protest and leadership, etc. Goals and objectives serve as the ends in this analysis, but
objectives are simultaneously means towards an end of goal attainment.
Of course, objectives can contradict or defer resources from goals. There is no
necessary complicity between organizational goals and objectives. This is so because goals,
as I define them here, are the public representation of an SMO’s central purpose, while
objectives, which need not be publicly disclosed, are more specific concrete directives.
Slippage between the two can result from a number of conditions, including intraorganizational conflict or the strategic advantages of misrepresenting the goal of an
organization.74 One of the most common forms of misdirection is captured by a
generalized paraphrasing of Ambrose Bierce (1999 [1906], 148): private interest
masquerading as public interest. In democratic contexts, however, large voluntary

In the context of a dictatorship, an NGO that claims to further the interests of some constituency may in fact
represent the interests of the state in surveilling communities, acquiring foreign aid, and projecting a
reformist and democratic political process.
74
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organizations may be constrained by the importance of aligning their actions with their
public statements of purpose. As established in Chapter Three, I assume that SMOs pursue
one primary goal and that all objectives, including organizational maintenance, are
subordinate to this goal.
Preliminary to the analysis of strategy is the description of organizational goals and
objectives. Thus, while individuals have their own interests relative to organizations
(Jasper 2006; Olson 1965), I consider only the sets of collective goals and objectives
specific to my sample of CJOs. This offers an opportunity to consider a set of hypotheses
regarding the characteristics of new and old social movements. As noted in Chapter Two,
NSM theorists (Melucci 1985; 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; 1985) argue that
movements like the women’s, environmental, DIY, and other movements are distinct from
old social movements due to their emphasis on culture and identity as opposed to politics
and strategy, civil society as opposed to the state or the economy, and post-materialist as
opposed to materialist values. However, criticisms of these NSM approaches point to the
political and instrumental goals of these movements and the cultural and identity-oriented
goals of old social movements (Calhoun 1993b; Pichardo 1997). Within the social
movement literature, culture jammers and culture jamming in general are often described
as akin to or adjuncts to new social movements (Binay 2005; Kozinets and Handelman
2004; Wettergren 2005). Their goals are pegged as symbolic, expressive, personal, postmaterialist, and cultural. The following sets of hypotheses draw from this set of
expectations.
Table 9.2 schematizes some of the disputed differences between old and new social
movements. First, instrumental goals are organized like extrinsic expected action-outcome
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Table 9.2. The Goals of Old and New Social Movements
Mode
Field
Value Orientation
Good

Old Social Movements
Instrumental
Political
Materialism
Public

New Social Movements
Symbolic
Cultural
Post-materialism
Club

structures.75 Such structures are characterized by the expectation that actions produce
outcomes or changes in the state of the world, which in turn produce changes in utility for
the SMO. Most importantly, this change in utility is determined by the perceptions of
effectiveness. In other words, this structure is defined not by the effects of any or all sets of
incentives on the SMO’s utility, but by the capacity for an action to achieve the goal.
Symbolic goals are organized as intrinsic action-outcome structures. Such structures are
characterized by the expectation that actions are outcomes within the set of direct relations
imminent to the action itself. Such intrinsic outcomes produce changes in the utility of the
SMO. Again, this change in utility is determined by the perceptions of effectiveness. With
respect to this type, effectiveness still involves the capacity of an action to achieve a goal,
but the goal is not change in the state of the world, but a change in the state of the SMO or
those who identify with it.76 Melucci (1996, 329) considers this distinction with respect to
the new social movements:

My use of the terms instrumental and strategic should, at some point, raise eyebrows considering my
theoretical emphases on goals and the weighting of expectations. It is clear from the discussion in Chapter
Three and this chapter that the theoretical approach taken in this dissertation does not recognize “nonstrategic” or “non-instrumental” goals. I assume that SMO activity is goal-directed. The goal may be intrinsic
or extrinsic, but to distinguish one type of goal as instrumental or strategic either presumes that the
remaining goals lack instrumentality or strategy or that they possess some attributes in addition to their
instrumentality or strategy. Neither of these seems appropriate. My argument is that the temporality of
incentives is essential for a rational actor model, not the type of incentive.
76
This does not exhaust the distinction, however. SMOs with instrumental goals may also pursue symbolic
objectives, such as the creation and maintenance of solidarity and collective identity. However, as discussed
in Chapter Three and above, what distinguishes this set of goals and objectives from an SMO with symbolic
75
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In the movements’ networks, a large quantity of resources are (sic) allocated to the creation
and maintenance of a specific identity rather than to the pursuit of external objectives. In
contrast to traditional collective actors, there has been a substantial shift from investment
for the purposes of political action to an allocation of resources for the maintenance of an
internal market for symbolic goods.

Insofar as existing scholarship suggests a pattern of variance of expected action-outcome
linkages across SMOs, and insofar as CJOs resemble the collective mobilizations of new
social movements, we can develop a descriptive hypothesis:
H9.1: CJOs are associated with the pursuit of intrinsic goals.
This leads to the expectation that CJOs are generally oriented towards achieving goals that
primarily focus on the processes of action as opposed to tangible effects on institutions or
actors.
Second, often associated with this classification is a distinction among the fields of
action that SMOs or movements operate within. At their most basic, the goals of SMOs can
involve politics or culture. Political goals entail, for example, challenging or protecting
laws, statutes, regulations, office holders, enforcement and bureaucratic practices, and
judicial decisions; in other words, they involve an orientation towards the state. In
contrast, culture goals focus on and through civil society or the private sphere or, more
generally, non-state structures. Such goals entail, for example, changing or protecting the
personnel or practices of various social organizations like churches, schools, corporations,
non-profits, the media, other SMOs, etc., or challenging or protecting norms and practices
relating to various social institutions like marriage, patriarchy, hetero-normativity, public
property, capitalism, or culture in general. These examples make it clear that the
instrumental/symbolic and politics/culture distinction, if they are viable, may easily vary
goals is that the symbolic objectives, even though heterogeneous in structure to the instrumental goal, are
nonetheless subordinate to it.
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independently. An SMO may pursue instrumental goals aimed at changing the policies of
the Catholic Church or Starbucks, or they may pursue symbolic goals aimed at challenging
the state’s capacity and/or right to organize public space or engage in war.
The most persistent characterization of culture jamming common among academics
(Kozinets and Handelman 2007; Sandlin and Callahan 2009) and activists (Klein 2000;
Peretti 2001) is that it involves a critique of consumer capitalism. Consequently, the
appropriate field of action is culture. As I stressed in Chapter One, however, I do not define
culture jamming by a particular emphasis on capitalism or excessive commercialized
consumption. I do define culture jamming as a technique at the level of representation,
however. While this would seem to suggest that the goals of CJOs are by definition oriented
towards the cultural field of action, the distinction I consider here is not whether the action
is intrinsic or extrinsic, nor whether the tactic is cultural in nature, but whether or not the
goal is political (the state) or cultural (civil society). I argue that such a distinction is
helpful in identifying an additional goal dimension. Still, the tendency to equate culture
jamming with a critique of consumer capitalism does suggest a plausible descriptive
hypothesis:
H9.2: CJOs are associated with the pursuit of cultural goals.
This leads to the expectation that CJOs are oriented towards changing or challenging actors
or institutions outside of the state.
Third is a distinction between materialist and post-materialist goals. Goals that are
inspired by materialist values tend to emphasize economic and physical security, while
postmaterialist goals tend to emphasize self-expression and quality of life. Several studies
purport to show a link between post-materialism and participation in new social
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movements (Inglehart 1990b; Kriesi 1989).77 The most extensive effort to link culture
jamming and post-materialism is found in the political consumerism literature (Stolle,
Hooghe, and Micheletti 2005). These observations suggest a third descriptive hypothesis:
H9.3: CJOs are associated with the pursuit of post-materialist goals.
This leads to the expectation that CJOs are generally oriented towards issues concerning
the environment, rights, and lifestyle, among others.
Fourth, a public/club good distinction is analytically distinct from the previous three
classifications. While strictly speaking, public goods are not by definition provided by the
state, the authoritative capacity of the state to develop and implement public policy on a
wide variety of issues is often an implicit focus of collective action analyses. In this sense,
public good goals would essentially mark the intersection of extrinsic and political goals.
However, public goods like knowledge are frequently produced and distributed by other
actors, while states also produce club goods such as libraries and food stamp programs.
Club good goals are distinguished by the presence of crowding or congestion (only so many
can consume the good at any time) and exclusion mechanisms so that those who consume
the good contribute to its provision. In this sense they can be extrinsic or intrinsic objects
operative in either field of action. For example, an SMO may seek to change the
membership criteria of an organization, such as the Catholic Church or the Boy Scouts.
More generally, intense social interactions, which are generative of collective identification
and solidarity, function as exclusionary mechanisms but are also susceptible to crowding
or congestion. Like religious services, SMOs and movements with intrinsic goals are
concerned primarily with the goods specific to the group, such as the experience of
Though there is considerable evidence supporting the more general descriptive null hypothesis that postmaterialism does not constitute a distinct cluster of values, I do not consider this literature here.
77
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opposition, autonomy, and community. Finally, a public/club goods distinction varies
independently of the material/post-material classification. While Opp 1990) considers
post-material values as public good preferences, Kriesi et al’s (1995) concept of subcultural
movements implies that most such movements, including the women’s movement and the
gay rights movement, are concerned with producing club goods. Materialist goals can
involve the production of either club goods or public goods.
Kriesi et al (1995, ch. 7) offer the best analysis of the nature of the good desired by
some of the new social movements. While their work does not strictly support the
overarching hypothesis represented in Table 9.2, along with the discussion above it does
suggest that only club goods are associated with the intrinsic goal structure expected of
CJOs. While both types of goods may be found on all other values, this consideration does
suggest that:
H9.4: CJOs are associated with the pursuit of club goods.
This leads to the expectation, though weak, that CJOs are prone to pursue the production of
goods that do not deteriorate through consumption but are nonetheless characterized by
the capacity to exclude people from their benefits.
Finally, there is no a priori reason (no deductive or inductive hypotheses) to expect
CJOs to pursue radical or moderate goals. However, because autonomy is a post-materialist
value, one weak hypothesis can be developed:
H9.5: CJOs are associated with the pursuit of autonomous goals.
This leads to the expectation, though weak, that CJOs are prone to pursue a space or
practice free of interference from forces that they deem objectionable.
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9.2.2. Dimensions of Strategic Orientation
One of the two primary tasks of this chapter is to offer empirical descriptions of the
strategic orientations of CJOs. I seek to guide this operation by suggesting descriptive
hypotheses and propositions that tease out some of the essential properties of oppositional
strategy. The general hypothesis of the dimensionality of strategic orientations is that
variation in strategic choices is structured along whichever dimension is hypothesized to
be of interest. First, like goals, strategic orientations can be distinguished based on their
emphasis on intrinsic or extrinsic challenges. In general, we might anticipate that groups
that pursue intrinsic goals will express intrinsic orientations. I thus hypothesize
H9.6: CJOs are associated with intrinsic orientations
This leads to the expectation that CJOs develop basic orientations that are isomorphic with
their goal structure.
Second, SMOs are distinguished by the breadth of appeal they aim to cultivate. At
one extreme, an SMO may appeal to a broad swath of people and seek to develop a mass
base by lowering the commitments required. At the other extreme, an SMO may seek to
maximize the commitments of a core membership at the expense of developing a broad
base. The hypothesized exclusivity of CJOs suggests that insularity may be the
preponderant strategic orientation. I thus hypothesize
H9.7: CJOs are associated with an insular orientation.
This leads to the expectation that CJOs focus their energies on developing tight and
committed support bases as opposed to a broader mass support base.
Finally, SMO strategies vary in the costs they incur for participants or the degree of
disruption they introduce into everyday life. While the two concepts are conceptually
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distinct, the general assumption is that they tend to co-vary, though we can posit a causal
hypothesis: the more disruptive a tactic, the higher the costs of participating. It is precisely
this relationship, however, that suggests that it is more fruitful to classify strategies by
their degree of expected social disruption. Recall that costs can be distinguished as either
intrinsic or extrinsic. Focusing on disruption allows us to disaggregate the transaction and
prospective costs (and benefits) of actions and to determine the nature of their relationship
with social disruption as a strategy. For example, in their classification of tactics Van Laer
and Van Aelst (2010) develop what amounts to an additive index that sums the two types
of costs. Tactics with high costs have high thresholds for adoption, while actions with low
costs have low thresholds. Culture jamming is classified as a high-threshold action,
because 1) it requires more knowledge of communications technology than e-mails or
online petitions, and 2) the potential costs of engaging in possibly illegal actions are not
insignificant. While culture jamming is intended as a disruptive process, it is positioned at
roughly the same point along the threshold dimension as Internet-supported tactics like
sit-ins and occupations. While the costs incurred by these actions may or may not be
roughly equivalent in this instance, it seems hard to imagine that in general the degree of
social disruption is equivalent, even roughly so. This suggests the obvious implication that,
at the least, the transaction costs of actions should be distinguished from the level of
expected disruption. Consider, for example, Tarrow’s (1998, 94) observation that,
“[V]iolence is the easiest kind of collective action for small groups to initiate without
encountering major costs of coordination and control.”
So what can I conclude about the degree of social disruption intended by CJOs?
Much of the work on social movement strategy focuses on the capacity of activists to
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initiate social disruption and its effects on other actors (Lipsky 1968; Piven and Cloward
1978; Tarrow 1998). Disruption involves a sudden change in social routines and
understandings, an obstruction in the daily activities of various social groups. It results
not only in an increase in uncertainty for various actors, but also costs that may be
regarded as negative inducements to comply with the demands of activists.
In order to measure the level of social disruption, it is useful to consider two
indicators: the size of mobilization and the level of violence. DeNardo (1985) argues, first,
that the number of people that an SMO or movement mobilizes in actual demonstrations is
not only an expression of the scope of their support in society, but is itself an indicator of
disruption. During political events like marches and rallies, people take up space,
especially public space. A consequence of this occupation of space is the cessation or
detouring, at extra expense, of the mundane activities that typically occupy this space, as
well as the costs incurred by authorities in policing or suppressing the collective action.
Consequently, an increase in numbers (or, perhaps more specifically, an increase in the
mobilized proportion of the population) is more or less an increase in disruption. Violence
as well is disruptive. The use of force, especially in the threatened or actual damaging of
property of the harming of people, increases the sense of insecurity and threat posed by
activists. Although there are direct costs to violence, the threat of violence or mild coercion
can, like the size of mobilization, deter normal social activity and increase policing costs.
Recall that I defined culture jamming as a form of intended disruption in Chapter One.
While this disruption occurs on the plane of representation, this does not exclude the
disruption of actual social routines. Recall as well that culture jamming is non-violent.
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These considerations weakly suggest that the strategies of CJOs are typically oriented
towards minor or low disruption. I develop a descriptive hypothesis:
H9.8: CJOs are associated with the tendency to mobilize relatively small numbers of
people.
This leads to the expectation that CJOs tend to develop basic plans for action that typically
involve as few as two or as many as ten or twenty people. This hypothesis would seem to
pass too close to Chapter Eight’s exclusivity hypothesis. However, it is important to note
that that hypothesis refers to organizational membership. This hypothesis refers to the
total number of mobilized at an action. However, because Chapter One essentially and
sensibly defines culture jamming as non-violent (though without actually defining it as
such), it seems fruitless to consider a further hypothesis regarding an orientation towards
violence.
9.2.3. Interdependence
Strategy refers to the broader organization of interdependent choices that aim to
further the interests of the organization. In decomposing this conception, the most
common perspective is to focus on the issues, targets, and tactics utilized by SMOs (Earl
and Kimport 2008; Larson 2009; 2011; Walker et al 2008). This is the approach taken in
this chapter. Larson (2011, 3) provides some elaboration.
Issues - the perceived problems and proposed solutions that animate social
movements – e.g., worker protections, civil rights, tax relief, protection of clean
water.
Targets - the objects of challengers’ campaigns that are expected to take action on
an issue – e.g., lawmakers, a private business, university administrators, the public,
the President.
Tactics - the practices that challengers perform when interacting with and
attempting to influence those outside of their ranks – e.g., lobbying, picketing,
meeting with elites, destroying property, speaking to the media, petitioning.
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While clearly this list does not exhaust the wide range of activities and concerns that
organizations engage in, it does capture the most important set of strategic elements.
Strategy need not be explicit or coherent. Actions and choices may stray from even the
formal expression of strategy through experimentation and improvisation. However, all
actors ultimately seek to link their actions to actual or potential outcomes. SMOs may be
constrained by demands both internal and external to justify their actions and relate them
to outcomes. Participants and members need to know more or less why their contributions
and why the action as a whole are crucial to the campaign. SMOs may also justify their
action to the media, bystanders, the state, and other important organizations, because they
possess important desired resources. SMOs may also define their actions in opposition to
counter-framing efforts by opponents or media frames that aim to discredit or trivialize the
SMOs strategies and solutions. These justifications of past, present, and future actions
come in the form of prognostic framing actions (Snow and Benford 1988). Such framing
efforts seek to explain and justify the actions of SMOs as expressions of broader strategic
orientations to the problems identified in diagnostic framing efforts.
Recall that the interdependence of strategic choices is a hypothesis. It suggests that
strategic elements (issues, targets, and tactics) tend to cluster together and mutually
constrain one another. For example, issues constrain targets, as when anti-sweatshop
campaigns focus on corporations and the institutions and organizations that support them.
9.2.4. Issues
In this chapter I describe the issues pursued by CJOs. Issues are the problems that
SMOs seek to solve and that other actors like political parties engage in order to pursue
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their interests. I distinguish between two approaches to issues.78 Multi-issue SMOs tend to
take broad approaches to politics, often as a result of the claim that they represent
significant sectors of society, such as labor unions. Single-issue SMOs take a narrower
approach by focusing on one issue or a small set of issues that are closely related. In
contrast to the general focus of the labor or socialist movements, new social movements
are associated with a plethora of single-issue organizations (Melucci 1996; Rucht 1990;
Klandermans and Tarrow 1988). I thus hypothesize:
H9.9: CJOs are associated with a focus on single issues.
This leads to the expectation that the sample of CJOs will tend to pursue a relatively small
or minimal set of social problems and specific issues, as opposed to a broad, general
approach that encompasses a variety of issues.
9.3. Analysis
9.3.1. Goals
Like the other concepts in this project, attempting to summarize the goals of twelve
CJOs offers numerous difficulties. The approach taken here will engage the relevant
hypotheses of this chapter as guides to disciplining efforts at goal description. As a
preliminary point, the following five hypotheses are descriptive and involve a singular
variable: CJOs, and its relationships with five variables. These five variables are
constructed loosely, meaning that while they are treated as dichotomous, i.e. extrinsic or
intrinsic, difficult cases may be coded as mixed.
First, I hypothesize (H9.1) that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of intrinsic
goals. An example of a group that pursues such goals is offered by the IST. They succinctly
This distinction may also be construed as another dimension of strategic orientation. I consider it here
separately, because in my analysis below I consider qualitative variation in issues as well.
78
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describe their goal as “creative, participatory research that aims to temporarily transform
public spaces and instigate dialogue about democracy, spatial justice and everyday life”
(IST, 2012). For member D’Ignazio (Karanika), “often what the Institute’s projects are
about is calling attention to [the] assumptions” surrounding public space (D’Ignazio,
Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). But calling attention, while it
can and perhaps does extend to the wider audience that accesses the group’s websites and
other related media, is primarily performed in the immediacy of interaction. Member
Manning states:
I don’t think we ever walk into a project thinking, we’ll have the delusion that we’ll change
the world or we are going to have this mass following. I think it is very much about the oneon-one or small group that maybe they will get something out or maybe they will think we
are annoying. At least we have that interaction or that moment where we changed an idea.
(D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012).

One particularly insightful consideration of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is offered by
the AAA’s Steve Lambert (2007):
Basically the idea is that everyone has to move through certain steps to change their
behaviors…For example, you can’t adopt a new behavior without first being aware that
there is an alternative to what you are currently doing. Once you are aware, you need
information on how to change that behavior. Once you have the information, you need
motivation to start…And on and on.
So part of the measure of success for me is not just how many people saw this, but did I
move them along on a step? Did this piece really make a difference in this person’s life? Did
it have a profound effect on their thinking? Did it change their perspective on the world?
Will it change their behavior in the future?

Lambert’s extrinsic goal is ideally to dramatically reduce the amount of outdoor advertising
in the urban landscape and replace it with works of art. This involves both supporting legal
efforts to remove illegal advertising (not a culture jamming tactic) as well as moving people
towards behavioral change, one that involves an increased awareness of the ubiquity of
outdoor advertising and the political and artistic preference to change it. It is the emphasis
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on a movement towards behavioral change – an emphasis on actions that potentially
change the state of affairs - that establishes the extrinsicity of the action.
One case that suggests the difficulties of measurement is the BLF, a group whose
primary goal appears to be an effort to weaken the power of advertising on the individual
consciousness. Members Napier and Thomas (2006) state, “Each time you change the
Advertising message in your own mind…you enter into the High Priesthood of Advertising.”
Elsewhere, Napier is paraphrased as arguing that, “When people realize advertising is NOT
a one-way street – that this is a liberated country and dialogue is expected – then the
market will truly be free, and on top of it, the world will be a more fun place to live (Burkes
2012). Member Black (n.d.) claims that, “the battleground, the theater of operations is
human consciousness.” Here, the emphasis is on realization, a shift in consciousness that
empowers the individual. Although the group positively evaluates the possible effects on
behavior, their focus is more modest:
[W]e’re all just telling people, ‘Advertising is a language. You’re being spoken to constantly
through these ads. But you can talk back to them! You can make it a dialogue. And you don’t
necessarily have to climb on up and alter a billboard’ (Haller and Napier 2006, 93)

Measurement is extremely fuzzy on this question. However, across the sample as a whole a
slight majority of CJOs appear to pursue extrinsic goals. While two groups pursue intrinsic
goals (BFL, IST), eight pursue extrinsic goals (AMF, AAA, BIL, CTM, RBC, SCP, TYM), with
the IAA and NGL straddling the distinction.79 What I can conclude, if anything, is that I have
found little support here for this hypothesis. I try to make sense of this finding further
below.
“I think our projects generally play a dual role. On the one hand, they are pedagogical devices that provoke
public discussion of critical issues. This conception of work fits neatly within the confines of "art practice." At
the same time, our projects are functional tools that dissidents can actually use. In this regard, our work has
more to do with engineering (or at least hacker) practice” (Schienke and IAA 2002, 104).
79
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Second, I hypothesize (H9.2) that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of cultural
goals. One clear example of a group pursuing such a goal is the CAE. The CAE seek to
develop practices of resistance against what they term the semiotic regime or the symbolic
order, the particular dominant structure of power that constitutes the pervasive
“instrumentalization/rationalization of culture” (Little 1999, 194). Power is expressed and
enacted in cultural practices irreducible to political institutions, although they perform a
function of reification, as do a variety of social, economic, religious, and cultural
institutions. In contrast to the CAE’s manifestly cultural goal, the SCP is a clear example of a
group with a political goal. The SCP aim to completely eradicate the public surveillance
camera. The focus here is principally on the perceived unconstitutionality of the state
surveillance of public areas, especially as found in New York City. As founder Bill Brown
states, “the people who operate the cameras that worry us are the FBI, the NYPD, and the
state, not the corporations” (Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012).
This distinction between cultural and political goals appears problematic, however,
when considering groups like AMF or Negativland. The AMF clearly pursues objectives
within the political field of action. For example, one of their most noteworthy efforts
involves the Media Carta, a charter aimed at challenging the corporate control of television
and other means of mass communication. The charter states:
As a start, we demand the right to buy radio and television airtime under the same rules and
conditions as advertising agencies. We ask our media regulators to set aside two minutes of
every broadcast hour for citizen-produced messages. We want the six largest media
corporations in the world broken up into smaller units (AMF 2009).

Yet, this apparent emphasis on the political field of action is subservient to a broader goal
of cultural revolution, of which the Media Carta is merely a means. Opening the airways is
part of a broader project of initiating ‘meme warfare,’ “a war of ideas against the keepers of
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the current system, and we go right to the very foundations of that system, then we can
begin a war of ideas where the good guys can eventually win” (Lasn n.d.). This war of ideas
is at the core of the AMF’s mission, for they see their ultimate goal as a fundamental shift in
lifestyle. As Lasn (2007) notes, “We are rather a philosophical than a political movement.
We want people to think, to rethink their way of life.”
For their part, Negativland, the CTM, and the IAA seem to straddle the cultural/
political distinction. On the one hand, Negativland seek to raise consciousness by breaking
the spell of corporate advertising. With respect to their Dispepsi album, for example,
member Mark Hosler states that “I hope that by the time you get to the end of the record
you’re starting to get sick of hearing about this one product,” but “it’s also at the same time
symbolic of any large corporation and the kind of advertising they do. And I hope people
take it both ways (Hosler and Joyce 1997). On the other hand, in the wake of their lawsuit
with Island Records over their U2 single, they’ve pursued modifications to copyright law
that expand protections for artists that utilize fragments of copyrighted works (NGL 1995).
The CTM and the IAA are less clear examples, and thus constitute more precarious
measurements. With the CTM, for example, this arises in part because the group does not
identify a specific or even general goal to which their actions may contribute; instead, they
focus on crafting and testing tactics that they or others may deploy in the service of cultural
or political goals. As member Gach (2007) states, “One thing we are doing and one of the
reasons we are called the Center for Tactical Magic is that we are creating templates for
tactics. You may not create your own tactical ice cream unit, but you might borrow your
mom’s minivan, and conduct nomadic activities on your street.” These templates are
intended to serve purposes beyond merely raising consciousness; instead, they function as
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investigations into the particular sets of power relations – typically involving governments,
militaries, and/or corporations - as well as augmentations of existing strategies (Paglen
and Gach n.d.).
Across the sample as a whole about half of the CJOs pursue cultural goals (AMF,
AAA, BLF, IST, CAE, RBC). Only three groups (BIL, SCP, TYM) pursue clearly political goals,
with Negativland, the CTM, and the IAA straddling the distinction. Like the first hypothesis,
this one finds cautious support.
Third, I hypothesize (H9.3) that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of postmaterialist goals. Nearly the entire sample unequivocally pursues post-materialist goals,
thus supporting the hypothesis. The goal of the SCP, for example, is to maximize freedom
and autonomy by completely eradicating the public surveillance camera and its pervasive
invasion of privacy. There are some notable partial exceptions. One of the two major goals
of the Billionaires (the other is campaign finance reform) is to increase awareness of
increasing inequality in the United States, especially among swing voters in battleground
states during presidential election years. Another prominent materialist value concerns
protection of the environment. While this has long been construed as a post-materialist
concern, especially in terms of the aesthetics of nature, it is also clear that questions of
pollution and climate change also directly impact concerns over health and physical wellbeing. Most prominently expressed by RBC and the AMF, a focus on the environment
straddles a materialist/post-materialist goal distinction by pursuing the reorientation of
lifestyle along a more environmentally sustainable path. The Yes Men also pursue
materialist/post-materialist goals, for example goals concerning social insurance and the
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allocation of natural resources like water. I do not include the CTM in this particular
analysis due to the ambiguity of their goal.
Fourth, I hypothesize (H9.4) that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of club goods.
The IST presents a clear example of the pursuit of a club good in which the immediate field
of interaction and those who participate is restricted by an exclusion mechanism. In their
case, usually the particular spatial confines of the scenario limit the number of people that
can participate. As Manning notes, “I think it is very much about the one-on-one or small
group that maybe they will get something out or maybe they will think we are annoying. At
least we have that interaction or that moment where we changed an idea” (D’Ignazio,
Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). This moment of interaction
for the IST is the production of a club good of spontaneity, participation, conversation, and
inquiry into the politics of the everyday. In contrast, groups like the Yes Men ultimately
pursue the production of public goods, principally the reduction of corporate power and
the democratization of globalization, although some club goods, such as social insurance
programs, are included as a consequence of this general focus.
Most of the cases in the sample pursue public goods (AMF, AAA, BLF, BIL, NGL, RBC,
SCP, and TYM). Only two groups pursue club goods (CAE and IST), while IAA straddle the
distinction. I excluded the CTM from the analysis. This finding provides little support for
the hypothesis. I attempt to explain this finding further below.
Fifth, I hypothesize (H9.5) that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of autonomous
goals. One example of a group pursuing an autonomous goal is the Billboard Liberation
Front. As Napier urges, “Advertising is a language. You’re being spoken to constantly
through these ads. But you can talk back to them! You can make it a dialogue” (Haller and
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Napier 2006, 93). This dialogue constitutes an assertion of freedom and autonomy from
the oppression of corporate advertising, which supersedes free will:
It's either write, or be written. I can raise a pen or a brush in defense of my own mental
environment, or allow myself to be the passive, infinitely impressed palimpsest which is the
consumer caught in the maw of a marketing campaign (Black n.d.).

The Billionaires pursue a moderate goal of restricting the influence of corporations in
elections and public policy. Member Hal E. Burton explains that “the purpose of
Billionaires is “to expose the capture of the government by corporations” (Roselund 2004),
a point upon which founder Andrew Boyd (2002, 370) elaborates: “to educate the public
about the twin evils of campaign finance corruption and economic inequality.” However,
this pedagogical focus not only involves drawing in media attention to their issues, goal,
and objectives but also affecting voter turnout and political preferences (Boyd 2004).
Groups that pursue both extrinsic and autonomous goals appear to straddle the
distinction between moderation or reform and autonomy. Like the RBC, the AMF provides
an example of a group pursing a goal of autonomy and reform in their emphasis on lifestyle
change. These groups express broad opposition to consumer and neoliberal values, while
emphasizing freedom and community. In the principle book-length treatment of the AMF’s
philosophy, Kalle Lasn (1999, especially 165-184) argues at length for a “downshifter”
lifestyle, one that is more attuned to the non-material, more aware of the social and
environmental repercussions of individual actions, and free of the slavery of the
consciousness by corporations. While such a cultural shift would have wide-reaching
political, social, cultural, and economic effects, they only constitute a reformist agenda. As
noted by Nomai (2008, 147), Lasn does not oppose corporations, the pursuit of profit, or
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consumerism. Instead, he calls for the reassertion of the ultimate power of individuals over
culture and corporations and an environmentally sustainable future.
Unlike the previous goal dimensions, this dimension (or more accurately, two
dimensions) offers three values: moderate, radical, and/or autonomy. Two groups pursue
goals of autonomy (BLF, CAE, IAA), but three other groups pursue a mixture of autonomy
and moderate goals (AMF, IAA, and RBC). While the RBC and AMF pursue the most
relatively radical goals, even these goals can best be described as moderate. Six groups
pursue moderate goals (AAA, BIL, IST, NGL, SCP, TYM), while the CTM is not included in the
analysis. While roughly half the sample dabbles in autonomy, it is not clear that this
constitutes strong support for the hypothesis.
Table 9.3 summarizes the data on each hypothesis. The only group that
unequivocally conforms to every expectation is the CAE, while the SCP and the Billionaires
are the furthest from the expected goal profiles of CJOs. Clearly, the evidence strongly
supports only one of the hypotheses: post- materialism, while the expectation of club goods
Table 9.3. The Goal Profiles of CJOs
AMF
AAA
BLF
BIL
CTM
CAE
IAA
IST
NGL
RBC
SCP
TYM
1

Intrinsic Cultural
Extrinsic Cultural
Extrinsic Cultural
Intrinsic Cultural
Extrinsic Political
1
Extrinsic
Extrinsic Cultural
1

1

Intrinsic

Cultural

1

1

Extrinsic
Extrinsic
Extrinsic

Cultural
Political
Political

= mixed

2

Post-Materialist
1

Post-Materialist
Post-Materialist
1

Club Good
Autonomy
Public
Moderate/Autonomy
Public
Moderate
Public
Autonomy
Public
Moderate

2

2

2

Post-Materialist
Post-Materialist
Post-Materialist
Post-Materialist

Club

Autonomy
Moderate/Autonomy
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate/Autonomy
Moderate
Moderate

1

Post-Materialist
1

= insufficient data
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1

Club
Public
Public
Public
Public

is almost completely frustrated. The rest of the hypotheses offer mixed results, though the
majority of cases appear to be cultural, as expected, and extrinsic and moderate, which is
not what was expected. Importantly, the number of mixed cases suggests the difficulty in
determining the specific qualities of the general or primary goal of an SMO. Below I seek to
explain some of these findings.
9.3.2. Dimensions of Strategic Orientations
One of the two primary tasks of this chapter is to offer empirical descriptions of the
strategic orientations of CJOs. First, I hypothesize (H9.6) that CJOs are associated with
intrinsic orientations. The data on this hypothesis proves difficult to summarize due to the
heterogeneity of the goal structures in the sample. This makes it imperative that I
reconsider the distinction between goals and objectives. Goals constitute the primary
concern of an SMO, whereas objectives constitute the set of secondary goals that contribute
to the achievement of the goal. I assume that objectives are subordinate to the goal and
hierarchical, though they may be heterogeneous. In Chapter Three I define heterogeneity
or homogeneity as the intrinsincity or extrinsicity of a goal and an objective. Here, I expand
that definition to include the array of values specific to each of the dimensions specified
above.
The gist of my argument is that while a particular group’s primary goal may be
extrinsic and/or focus on the production of a public good, a central objective may involve
an intrinsic action/outcome linkage or the production of club goods. In order to flesh this
argument out I consider the Yes Men. The Yes Men see themselves as contributing to the
anti-globalization or global justice movement(s), the series of collective actions and
organizations that basically defines itself as pursuing a more equitable and democratic
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globalization. As they state: “When people ask us whether what we're doing makes a
difference, or ask what we accomplish, we say that mainly, we see our work as contributing
to a cumulative movement that does effect change” (TYM n.d.(b)). This change involves the
development of a “new legal framework to govern the behavior of corporations” in order to
replace a focus on short-term profits with a more socially responsible agenda (TYM
2009b). Such a goal is extrinsic, political, moderate, and concerns the production of a
bundle of primarily public goods.
In order to achieve this goal, however, the Yes Men engage in strategies and tactics
that concern the pursuit of objectives that in some cases vary significantly in their formal
characteristics from their wider goal. Many Yes Men actions involve impersonating
members or representatives of some target (the WTO, Chamber of Commerce, Shell, etc.)
and presenting satirical but ‘honest’ content at conferences. These audience members
constitute what Nomai (2008, 73) calls the Yes Men’s direct audience. For the group, “the
direct audience is crucial because without them there would be no scene” (Bichlbaum
2008, 255). Such actions are organized by the pursuit of specific objectives – the staging of
actions - that are intrinsic, cultural, moderate, and concern the production of a club good.
Once the scene is generated, however, a more significant objective is concerned, namely the
diffusion of the action to a wider viewing public. This involves accessing the mass media,
especially the mainstream media. This wider indirect audience of media and public
opinion is their primary audience; “this is just a gimmick to get a certain amount of press
attention for a certain number of issues. It’s nothing more and in no way a movement”
(Bichlbaum 2008, 259). Some of their actions essentially bypass the initial objective of the
club good, such as their impersonation of a Dow Chemical spokesperson on a BBC news
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broadcast. They also produce documentaries and books about their actions, do press,
releases, and operate a website. In reaching this wider audience, however, their specific
objectives seem less clear. For example, member Mike Bonanno claims:
For the people who see the film, it just seems to work in a different way. It's a slowerburning thing, more people see it and talk about it. In terms of changing people's
consciousness in a slow and subtle way, it really has an effect. We see high school students,
for example, who see The Yes Men and show it to their friends and so on. It makes a
difference (TYM 2009a).

Yet, elsewhere member Andy Bichlbaum suggests: “what we do is galvanize people who are
already on our side. Changing the minds of people on the other side is something this work
can do, and does in extraordinary moments, but doing that is more of a fact-to-face kind of
thing” (TYM 2012b). Elsewhere, Bonanno makes “no large claims about trying to build a
social movement or even necessarily making much of a difference in the world. He simply
said he saw himself helping to build morale for those really are in the trenches doing the
hard work of organizing for change” (Haugerud 2013, 195). These modest claims suggest
that the Yes Men hope to increase the amount of scrutiny brought to bear on certain issues
relevant to their wider goal of social change. In particular, they seek to increase awareness
and solidarity among an ideologically sympathetic population, if not those on the fence.
Such an objective is apparently intrinsic, cultural, moderate, and concerns the production
of a public good, namely the diffusion of information through the media and possible
preference change among some of the audience.
These objectives are, again, subordinate to the wider goal. The Yes Men see the
production of these goods as contributing to part of the wider effort; one that is sustained
by both legal and electoral challenges as well as civil disobedience. What they do is “just
one piece of the activism puzzle. It’s not the whole thing at all” (TYM 2012b), because the
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actions of the Yes Men “only [go] so far. The real engine is street protest and other forms of
mass movement” (Bichlbaum 2008, 259).
This strategic orientation is roughly similar across the cases of groups with extrinsic
goals. The Billionaires’ Andrew Boyd (n.d.) expresses the same sentiment as TYM:
I just emphasize this again and again with people with whom I do workshops and talk to –
creative actions, creative interventions can draw attention to an issue; they can push a
corporate target which is stealing from the people or getting away with an ecological crime,
and you can put a spotlight on them and it can be extremely useful. But then there has to be
a larger movement that keeps holding their feet to the fire.

Elsewhere, Boyd (2004) states a further clarification:
There are a lot of forms of activism that are massively more effective…It's only really fair to
compare [Billionaires for Bush] to other things of the same order. It's very effective at
getting media attention. It's very effective at inviting people who don't have a strong history
of political activism, but share progressive values and views, and are skilled, creative
professionals…Whether it's actually effective at changing anybody's mind is a whole other
matter. Whether it's the most effective voice with which to engage individual swing voters
face to face…some ways no, and some way (sic) yes.

Much like TYM, this final modest point finds a more robust counterpart:
What we tell funders is that we're trying to reach voters in battleground states. One part of
it is suppressing Bush voters by confirming their nagging suspicions that he is serving
corporate interests at the expense of the average voter. We're also trying to persuade those
in the middle (Boyd 2004).

This sense that these groups seek to raise consciousness, awareness, change political
preferences, or change political behavior as part of a wider struggle distinguishes them
from groups that pursue intrinsic goals. While the IST and the BLF do situate itself within
particular artistic and political milieus populated by similar groups past and present, their
strategic orientation is less conceived as part of a broader movement, and instead focuses
on developing specific instances or events of freedom, community, or discourse; in other
words, they try to create spaces of difference and dissent. For the BLF, this space or event
is a public good, one accessible to all through a reading of the billboard in person or in the
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media and crafted through the production of a club good: the expression of autonomy and
freedom by the BLF itself in the creation of a culture jam on a billboard. For the groups
pursuing broader extrinsic goals, this process is ultimately subordinate to a wider goal –
democratizing globalization, reforming corporate behavior, reducing advertising or
surveillance, changing authoritarian culture, etc.
Next, I hypothesize (H9.7) that CJOs are associated with insular orientations. Six
groups in the sample conform to this expectation (BLF, CAE, IAA, IST, NGL, SCP). These
groups express little to no interest in utilizing the resources of a broad support base and
cultivating wide appeal. Instead, they are more interested in developing internal
relationships and engaging audiences. Two groups lack sufficient data to determine their
orientation (CTM, TYM), while the remaining four express some degree of mass orientation
(AMF, AAA, BIL, RBC). For example, the AMF boasts of a network of activists approaching
100,000 (Lasn et al 2012). The AAA (2013c) asks for others to engage in AAA actions on
their own and share the experience on the group’s website. The Billionaires is the closest
thing to a mass organization in the sample. While insularity is the predominant orientation
in the sample, the four cases of mass orientations do not provide strong support for the
hypothesis.
Finally, I hypothesize (H10.8) that CJOs are associated with the tendency to mobilize
relatively small numbers of people. This hypothesis aims to determine the extent of social
disruption specific to my sample of CJOs. As expected, almost the entire sample of CJOs is
oriented towards relatively small mobilizations (see Table 9.4). Some groups (BLF, NGL,
and TYM) are concerned not with attracting non-members, but with simply performing
their actions, though the TYM require the unwitting participation of large numbers of
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Table 9.4. Insularity, Social Disruption, and Issues

AMF
AAA
BLF
BIL
CTM
CAE
IAA
IST
NGL
RBC
SCP
TYM
1

= Mixed

Insular
Orientation
No
No
Yes
No
2

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
2
2

Size of
Mobilization
Large
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small

Scope of
Issue Agenda
Multi-Issue
Single Issue
Single issue
Single Issue
Multi/Single
Single Issue
Single Issue
Single Issue
Single Issue
Multi-Issue
Single Issue
Single Issue

= Insufficient Data

people in some of their actions. Still others pursue small engagements with a handful of
participants and audience members, some of them bystanders (AAA, CAE, CTM, IAA, IST,
and SCP). Three groups differ somewhat from this pattern: the AMF, BIL, and RBC. The
AMF in particular are occasionally oriented towards large mobilizations with events such
as Buy Nothing Day. The Billionaires are also keen on mobilizing more than a small handful
of participants, though even their largest actions involve less than a hundred participants.
The RBC are clearly the most civil disobedient of the entire sample. While their actions
range in size of participation from very small store interventions to larger protests, they
also visibly and dramatically occupy private space, such as a Starbucks or Disney store.
They claim that “the fastest way to reclaim public space is to go and get in it…The only real
authority in public space is public action. Bodies in space, talking and listening: the
freedom starts there” (D. and Talen 2011, 136). Contact with the police and security
guards are routine features of this approach.
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9.3.3. Issues
In order to further flesh out the strategic orientation of culture jamming
orientations as the interdependence of strategic choices, I consider in this chapter the
issues that CJOs select as relevant. Analysis of targets and tactics proceeds in the following
chapters.
I hypothesize (H10.7) that CJOs are associated with a focus on single issues. For
example, the AAA is strictly concerned with the issue of outdoor advertising, while the SCP
is exclusively concerned with the presence of public surveillance cameras. In contrast, the
AMF focuses on an extremely wide set of issues including the relation of mass food
production to various physical and psychological conditions, access to media outlets, the
environmental impact of automobiles, and the harmful effects of the cosmetics and
advertising industries, as well as more recent concerns with U.S. foreign policy.
As expected, most cases in the sample pursued a single-issue agenda (see Table 9.4).
Nine groups conformed to this expectation, while the AMF and the RBC pursued multi-issue
agendas. The CTM again proves difficult to pigeonhole.
I briefly move beyond a general characterization of the scope of a group’s issue
agenda by attending to some of the substantive concerns of the groups. Some issues do
appear common across some or much of the sample. These include especially the harmful
effects of advertising, the privatization of public space, and media concentration, all of
which are issues bound up with the freedoms of speech and expression. The AMF, AAA,
BLF, CAE, CTM, IAA, IST, NGL, RBC all exhibit strong concern over these issues and define
their actions as addressing them. The BLF’s Napier state:
But I have to admit I’m pretty irate at a handful of billboard corporations controlling all the
public spaces. I find that completely undemocratic and I didn’t vote for it – and yet these
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billboards are in a public space and I have to look at them…Those spaces belong to all of us”
(Berger 2000).

The AMF’s Media Carta charter directly targets the problem of the concentration of media
outlets in the hands of a small number of corporations, while their entire mission takes
issue with the harmful pervasiveness of advertising. Other issues of note include economic
inequality, the power of corporations in politics, and the environment. Opposition to
surveillance cameras is notable in four groups: the CAE, IAA, RBC, and SCP. More
idiosyncratic issues include biotechnology (CAE), the relation between defense research,
engineering departments, and protest policing (CAE and IAA), the resurgence of
nationalism (CAE and IST), and copyright law (NGL), among others.
9.4. Conclusion
In this chapter I develop hypotheses regarding the goals and strategic orientations
of CJOs. Results were mixed on the general NSM hypothesis. The majority of CJOs in this
sample tends to develop strategic orientations that are either extrinsically oriented but
involve the production of club good or intrinsic objectives or they primarily focus on
intrinsic goals. Groups like the BLF and the CAE conform to this latter understanding of
culture jamming, one that appears to confirm the generic hypothesis of NSM theory.
However, the majority of the sample does not strictly conform to this understanding. I
suggest two ways to consider this frustration. First, as suggested in the conclusion of
Chapter Seven, most CJOs are not engaged identity politics. Instead, they consider
themselves part of what Kriesi et al (1995) call instrumental movements. This is made
clear by many of the goals of the groups in the sample, goals broadly sympathetic to the
anti-globalization or global justice and environmental movements, a point casually made in
the introduction to this dissertation.
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Second, one of the reasons that CJOs may choose to utilize the strategies that they do
– low social disruption - is that they may perceive the political environment to be
inopportune for more extrinsically oriented objectives, what Yes Men member Bichlbaum
(2008, 259) described as the real engine of social change, “street protest and other forms
of mass movement.” Kriesi et al (1995) suggest a similar mechanism at play in the relation
of subcultural movements to political opportunities. They argue that movements like the
gay rights or women’s movements are prone to shift to a more instrumental approach
when they encounter sustained facilitation (a concept explored further in Chapter Twelve)
and a more counter-cultural (aggressive) approach when they encounter sustained (though
not too heavy) repression. More generally, scholars now acknowledge the importance of
‘abeyance structures,’ networks and organizations of dissent that maintain solidarity,
ideology, and identity as well as resources during periods of low mobilization (Taylor
1989). However, such structures and relations do not necessarily evaporate during periods
of high mobilization. Social movements are diverse and in many cases characterized by
extensive organizational specialization (Gerlach and Hine 1970; Haines 1988). Thus, I
suggest here that part of this process of responding to the perception of adverse
opportunities involves an emphasis on modest strategies that maintain solidarity, ideology,
and identity, generate media awareness, and change political preferences. With respect to
my sample of CJOs, this involves the structure of strategic orientations described above:
extrinsic and public good goals with an emphasis on intrinsic and club or public good
objectives and low social disruption. In the following chapter I consider the question of
political opportunities, while this more general hypothesis I consider in the remaining
chapters.
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CHAPTER 10. IDENTITY AND STRATEGY
Chapter Nine describes the goals and strategic orientations of CJOs. This chapter’s
primary task is to relate these strategic considerations to the collective identities of these
organizations using data collected from my sample of CJOs. The primary argument of this
chapter is that identities are the shared understandings that shape the ideologies of these
organizations. Ideologies refer here to the cognitive, affective, and normative evaluation of
relevant social relations and the capacity and motivation to modify or venerate these
relations. These social relations are the stable and volatile aspects of the available
structure of opportunities and threats. In turn, these evaluations form the foundation for
strategic orientations. This chapter thus begins the analysis of a relation of culture
jamming to everyday social organization.
This chapter is organized into three parts. First, I review the concept of an
opportunity structure and consider the literature on targeting strategies. Second, I develop
theoretical relations between strategic orientations and collective identities. In order to
relate identities and strategies, I focus on the ideologies of CJOs and opportunity structures.
Third, I present data on the variety of targets that CJOs engage in their strategic choices.
An important caveat concerns the scope of this chapter. Chapter Nine develops the
relation between goals and strategic orientations. This chapter elaborates the relation
between collective identities and strategic orientations. My additional emphasis on targets
in this chapter implicitly suggests that sets of hypotheses may be developed relating goals
to targets through strategic orientations. However, while Chapter Nine explicitly avoids
addressing the determinants of goal selection, the model utilized in this dissertation does
suggest that collective identities and goals constitute two independent explanatory
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variables. However, because the focus of this dissertation remains an explanation of
tactical choice and due to space and time constraints, target selection is only considered as
part of the constraining context on the choice in tactics.
10.1. Opportunity Structures
10.1.1. Political Opportunities
Along with RMT, political process theory helped revive the study of social
movements in the 1970s (Eisinger 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi
et al 1995; McAdam 1999; Meyer 2004; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). Earlier social movement
theory largely neglected political motivations and the political context in favor of an
emphasis on social structure and psychology (Blumer 1951; Lang and Lang 1961; Smelser
1963).80 As political scientists sounded the call to “bring the state back in,” opportunity
theorists situated protest activity adjacent to the political environment. This explicitly
political perspective calls attention to a variety of factors exogenous to a social movement:
regime type; laws, regulations, and judicial decisions; relationships between political
actors, especially the party in government; public opinion and the mass media. These
contextual features offer opportunities and constraints that inhibit, channel, or instigate
collective challenges to elites and activists.
However, identifying the salient factors that constitute political opportunity
structures (POS) as well as their relative stability over time has proven somewhat
contentious. Early efforts typically conflated durable structural characteristics with more
unstable situational or conjunctural factors. For example, Kitschelt’s (1986) classification

Even Olson’s (1965) groundbreaking theory of collective action disregards both political institutions and
political motivation; political activity is only rational insofar as economic inducements are offered in the form
of material selective incentives.
80
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of West Germany as a closed opportunity structure was at odds with most scholars of West
German politics. Instead, closed opportunities were the result of contingent strategies by
various political actors, especially the SPD, in spite of the open federal structure of the West
German constitutional system (Rootes 1999). This reduction of agency to structure
sparked one of the longest-running critiques of the approach (Goodwin and Jasper 2003;
2011). Later practitioners would acknowledge this problem by distinguishing stable from
volatile aspects of the environment (Kriesi et al 1995; Meyer 1990; Rucht 1990; Tarrow
1998). For example, Tarrow (1998) identifies five sources of opportunities and constraints
on contentious politics: the degree of access to the political system, the stability of political
alignments, divided elites, influential allies, and repression and facilitation. However,
drawing on Kriesi et al’s (1995) conceptualization of stable opportunities, he stresses that
these situational opportunities function within a broader context of stable opportunities,
including variation in the strength of the state and the prevailing strategies that authorities
utilize against challengers. Still, Tarrow is quick to stress that even concepts like state
strength are too general and abstract to capture the nuances of politics.
The chief import of political variables is their perceived facility in explaining
variance in protest mobilization, strategies, and outcomes across time and across
institutional contexts. However, the form of the relationship between opportunities and
mobilization is often ill-specified or ignored (Opp 2009). Eisinger (1973) distinguishes a
negative linear relation – closed opportunities yield more protest through a frustrationaggression mechanism – from a curvilinear relation in which expanding opportunities
signal decreasing costs for activism and thus initially yield increasing protest. As the
structure continues to open, however, rising expectations are met by increases in
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satisfaction. Many scholars utilize an implicit hypothesis of a positive linear relationship in
which increasing opportunities produce increasing protest (McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998).
Goldstone (2004) argues that the primary predictive utility of POS is minimal, consisting
primarily in the argument that once access is opened – once effective democracy is
instituted – social movements become a regular feature of the political landscape.
With respect to the question of strategy, Marks and McAdam (original emphasis,
1999: 102) provide the most succinct theoretical proposition:
Organizers are also very likely to tailor their efforts to the specific kinds of changes they see
taking place in the political systems they seek to challenge. In particular, where and how
they seek to press their claims will reflect their view of where the system is newly
vulnerable or receptive to their efforts

Yet this reasonable conjecture has led to relatively anemic theorizing on the relationship.
For most POS scholars, institutional contexts are specified at the national level with little
effort to specify mechanisms. For example, one hypothesis suggests that the more open the
political system, the less disruptive the protests (Kitschelt 1986). Kitschelt suggests that
the structure of opportunities in each context translates directly into the calculus of protest
mobilization. While this may be helpful for explaining variation in strategies and tactics
across entire populations and across time, opportunities and constraints are not uniform
across movements or SMOs. The distribution of these factors across a population of
activists can yield variable strategies and tactics. For example, the perception of the level
of threat posed by an SMO may yield repression by authorities, thus making some actions
more or less attractive to other SMOs (Kriesi et al 1995; McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998).
10.1.2. Discursive Opportunities and Irony
Over the last decade, scholars have identified several other possible opportunity
structures of relevance to the study of contentious politics ranging from the economic
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(King 2008; Soule 2009) to the discursive (Koopmans and Olzak 2004; McCammon,
Newman, Muse, and Terrell 2007). In an effort to amend the framing literature’s relative
lack of emphasis on exogenous framing constraints, several scholars suggest that
discursive processes in a given society are constrained by the overall discursive
opportunity structure. As Lipsky argued (1968), protest is a process oriented not only
towards the target (government), but also the reference publics that have influence over
the political process. In order to maximize their bargaining capacity, activists develop
strategies and tactics that appeal to the mass media, which in turn publicizes the protests
to these reference publics. Like the POS, this sphere of publicity is not neutral. The
discursive environment is a field strewn with opportunities and constraints that can
channel, inhibit, or facilitate collective action. The most important discursive players are
the various mass media, but other major political actors, as well as various SMOs, utilize
their own discursive repertoires in an effort to increase support for their goals while
criticizing their opponents (Steinberg 1995; 1998; 1999a; 1999b). In addition, this
discursive struggle – frames, counter-frames, and the framing contests within a social
movement – mediates between objective POS and social movement mobilization, strategy,
and outcomes. Defining a political context as open or closed is itself a discursive conflict.
For example, a government that is opposed to an SMO may characterize the activists
demands as illegitimate and marginal, while simultaneously arguing either that the
government is unable to concede or that it refuses to do so. If the mass media refuse to
cover the group’s non-violent demonstrations, parrot the government narrative, or utilize
their own set of frames depicting the activists unfavorably, the SMO’s prospects for success
are indeed bleak, and mobilization may suffer accordingly.

316

The concept of discursive opportunities travels to non-democratic regimes as well.
State monopolies on mass media as well as the frequent use of surveillance and informants
to identify dissenters can severely constrict the opportunities available even for political
discussion. This repressive environment makes the articulation of overt contentious
frames very risky (Johnston 2006; Johnston and Mueller 2001; Thornton 2002; Wedeen
1999). As a consequence, “opposition movements have become skilled at mounting
unobtrusive, symbolic, and peaceful forms of disruption that avoid repression, while
symbolizing contention” (Tarrow 1998, 103). In particular, ‘unobtrusive’ (Johnston and
Mueller 2001) or ‘small’ (Johnston 2006) contention involves secure spaces of discourse:
cafes, official cultural organizations, literary or scientific circles, etc., wherein grievances,
ideologies, and identities can be articulated free from the overwhelming repression of the
state. Johnston and Mueller are explicit that the contentious nature of oppositional talk is a
function of the overwhelming risks that critical public speech holds for ordinary citizens,
let alone activists. Following this logic, Tarrow (1998, 103) hypothesizes that “the more
closed citizens’ access to legitimate participation, the more sensitive citizens are to the
meanings of symbolic forms of protest.” Presumably, this sensitivity translates into a
widely distributed capacity to decipher more sophisticated, subtle, or covert forms of
expression. Many note, for example, the use of irony and ambiguity in contentious
expressions under authoritarian regimes (Johnston 2006; Thornton 2002; Wedeen 1999).
Some works have explored the use of irony in more democratic contexts. Without
referring to framing, Stewart et al (2007, 195) identify rhetorical strategies in social
movements that contribute to the construction of ridicule, including the use of irony. Some
works consider the role of irony in culture jamming. Day (2008; 2011) and Wettergren
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(2005, ch. 8) argue that irony helps to create stronger feelings of collective identity by
appealing to sympathizers’ sense of humor. In Chapter One, I identify culture jamming as a
form of ironic framing. One interpretation of rational choice theory would suggest that,
assuming that activists regard their audience as endowed with variable degrees of
interpretive sophistication (varying resource constraints), framing strategies would be
constructed as maximally simplistic and straightforward (low cognitive costs) in order to
appeal to the most adherents. From this perspective, frames are created and distributed in
order to be effective. However, if a frame increases the cognitive demands on audiences – if
it requires more effort and more skill to successfully interpret – how can it be said to be a
rational choice? Under repressive conditions, sophisticated frames are not anomalous,
because the (repression) costs of overt simple contentious frames are presumably higher
than the (cognitive) costs of the more subtle frames. Under less repressive political
contexts like democracy, however, the use of ironic framing, or culture jamming, would
appear to be an occasion in which movement actors choose a deliberately more difficult
discursive device over the overt straightforward alternative that risks little to no costs.
This dissertation is an effort to explain this subtle anomaly in rational choice theory.
10.1.3. Targets
Within the literature on targets there are two basic but related ways to conceptually
distinguish among targets. The first concerns differences in the basic orientation towards
the target (Gamson 1990; Lipsky 1968; McCarthy, Smith, and Zald 1996). According to
Tilly (2008; McAdam et al 2001), by definition all contentious political action is directed
towards some object of claims. These objects are those collective actors or identities to
which activists press their claims. These actors, however, are only one form of target.
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Scholars have identified a number of other important targets that social movement actors
engage. Gamson (1990) distinguishes between antagonist, beneficiary, and constituency
targets. Antagonists are Tilly’s objects of claims: those actors or institutions whose actions
the protagonists believe can address their grievances. They are in this sense the targets of
influence, the group that an SMO seeks in order to provide benefits to beneficiary targets.
Beneficiaries are those actors or institutions that the protagonists believe will benefit from
these desired changes. Finally, constituency targets are those actors or institutions whose
commitment the protagonists seek – in the form of participation and contributions - in
order to pursue the desired changes of the SMO. Importantly, while Gamson introduced
some methodological qualifications, these categories are not logically exclusive.
Beneficiaries can also be constituents, for example.
In his study of local, ad hoc, and relatively powerless SMOs, Lipsky (1968) identified
four audiences that the group seeks to influence. Some are essentially the same as Gamson.
Both distinguish between constituents and antagonists or target groups. However, Lipsky
assumes that beneficiaries and constituents are the same: the SMO initially draws support
from those they seek to benefit. However, because the support base of the SMO is low in
resources, it lacks the capacity to bargain with the target group. In order to generate an
effective bargaining capacity, it must interact with two other basic types of actors: the
communications media and the reference publics of the target group. Through the media,
the SMO can ramify its actions and message and generate a favorable reaction among these
reference publics. In turn, the target group will respond to the reference publics.
McCarthy, Smith, and Zald (1996) makes an effort to distinguish SMO targets by identifying
four arenas in which movement actors seek to further their goals. These actors target the
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agenda within each arena, the hierarchy of issues most salient to that arena. The public
agenda refers to the general population’s aggregated concerns. Those issues that are given
the most attention across the mass media are the media agenda. The electoral agenda
denotes the set of issues that drive campaigns for political office. Finally, the governmental
agenda specifies the salient concerns of officials within political institutions.
The second means by which scholars distinguish targets is inductive or ad hoc,
though it relies on a basic distinction between state and non-state targets. While the state
is the most common single focus of protest, a variety of other actors are also prominent
targets, including schools and school boards, corporations, labor unions, religious and
medical organizations, and the public (Van Dyke et al 2004; Walker et al2008). Often this
approach is premised on the assumption that protest events are primarily oriented
towards objects of claims or Gamson’s antagonists. In attempting to capture variation in
targets across my sample of CJOs, I utilize both approaches below.
10.2. Theory and Hypotheses
In order to relate the identities of my sample of CJOs to their strategic orientations, I
develop the theoretical insights initially presented in Chapters Two and Rhree. First, I
consider the relation of opportunity structures to everyday social organization, especially
the shared understandings constitutive of collective identities. Second, I relate these
considerations to the ideologies I discuss in Chapter Three and to the strategic orientations
I describe in Chapter Nine. Finally, I consider differing targeting strategies.
While I draw extensively from Tilly in this chapter, my efforts to elaborate on
concepts like strategic situations and their relations to opportunity structures are largely
my own. This is primarily, though not exclusively, a consequence of the static decision
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theoretic analysis pursued so far in this dissertation. I offer only a rudimentary analysis of
objective structures here. Most of the focus here is on the subjective or attitudinal
correlates, the perceptions of these actors and institutions by SMOs. Instead, this singleactor model of tactical choice primarily focuses on the perception of the general structures
of opportunity and threat. Clearly, any consideration of interactions with political
authorities and media outlets, to name a few, would require a more robust and dynamic
analysis. I tentatively venture such an analysis in Chapter Twelve. Consequently, the focus
here is on establishing the generalized sense of the strategic situation recognized by SMOs
and represented in their ideologies. This leads to the related point that the initial utility of
analyses of opportunities and threats lay in the quantification of objective environmental
characteristics in order to facilitate rigorous cross-case comparison. However, the
distinction between perceived and objective opportunities is now recognized as a fruitful
one (Tarrow 1998). These considerations lead me to briefly note that, “the evaluation of
one’s capacities [and those of other actors] is itself shaped by former experiences with
authorities – [which] may explain why, contrary to what would be expected on the basis of
a simple [objective] POS model, people sometimes do not use the opportunities available to
them” (Kriesi et al 1995, 246). The following section considers this relation between
structures of opportunity, patterns of attribution and evaluation, and collective action.
10.2.1. Collective Identities and Opportunity Structures
Downey and Rohlinger (2008, 31n1) rightly point out that the concept of strategic
orientation is broader than Tilly’s repertoires of contention. They argue that in contrast to
the focus on tactics, strategic orientation “emphasizes collective identity as an organizing
principle.” However, in his work on repertoires of contention Tilly developed hypotheses
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relating claims or issues and identities to the sets of tactics that actors would utilize.81
McAdam et al (2001, 138) define repertoires of contention as “ensembles of claim-making
routines available to particular pairs of identities.” This definition clearly clusters claims,
performances, and identities. For Tilly, one of the defining features of a repertoire of
contention is that it can contribute to an explanation of tactical choice through the
specification of, networks, identities, and claims. Preferences for certain tactics tend to
cluster around these variables.
The model presented in Figure 10.1 introduces a set of relationships in order to
better explain the relation of identities to strategic orientations. Linking the shared
understandings of actors with the opportunity structures available to them is the set of
durable social relations and social fields that these actors are embedded within. In order to
elaborate, I consider the concept of an opportunity structure. As noted above, the POS
refers to the arrangement of threats and opportunities offered by both durable political
structures and the more volatile alignments among political actors. Opportunities refer to
the features of this environment affecting “the probability that social protest actions will
lead to success in achieving a desired outcome,” while threats connote those constraints
shaping “the costs that a social group will incur from protest or that it expects to suffer if it
does not act” (Goldstone and Tilly 2001, 181, 183). Such factors include the degree of
access, facilitation, prior success, and repression meted out to challengers by political
actors. For example, high capacity democratic regimes are generally tolerant of a wide
variety of political activity, but generally effective at suppressing highly disruptive activism,
including violence.
He hypothesizes: “For a given set of actors and issues, those performances change relatively little from one
round of action to the next” (Tilly 2008, 27).
81

322

Social Relations and Social Fields
Shared Understandings

Opportunity Structures

Collective Identities

Configuration of Power

Ideologies

Chosen Actions

Strategic Orientations

Figure 10.1 Understandings, Opportunities, and Strategy
As stressed in Chapter Three, my conception of structures of opportunity and threat
emphasizes the production of information through interactions with protagonists,
antagonists, and neutrals. While it is clear that direct interactions with actors can produce
updated estimates of the probability of success or the costs of inaction or protest, in some
ways the indirect effects of interaction are more crucial (Koopmans 2005). Figure 10.2 is a
simple formalization of the mediated relation of opportunity structures to action. Here,
opportunity structures, including the more volatile configurations of power within a
political regime, constitute constraints played out in the strategic interactions (direct and
indirect) among the major political actors in a given political regime: police, courts,
militaries, other SMOs, countermovement SMOs, interest groups, the public, media
organizations, political parties, and other groups. Importantly, these interactions are not
exclusively antagonistic. In the broader political participation literature, for example, a
prominent explanation of variation in political activity is the degree to which individuals
are actively mobilized by organizations like parties, interest groups, and candidate
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Opportunity Structures
Configuration of Power

Strategic Interactions
Information
Opportunities and Threats
Incentives
Chosen Actions
Figure 10.2. Opportunities, Information, and Action
campaigns (Hansen and Rosenstone 1993; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978), an argument echoed
in solidarity theorist’s emphasis on the mobilizing effects of political entrepreneur’s use of
pre-existing networks (McAdam 1999; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978).
These strategic interactions produce information externalities that provide updated
perceptions of the prevailing opportunities and threats available to actors. In turn, these
constraints provide updated expectations regarding the costs and benefits of various
contentious collective actions. A notable illustration of this process is found in Tarrow’s
(1998) claim that social movements are generated partly through the effects of ‘early
risers’. In his model, early successes by activists produce flows of information about the
political environment. This information signals new prospects for collective action that
diffuse to the wider public, including other activists. Conversely, perceived collective
action failures may generate information flows that dampen the prospects for success.
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10.2.2. Ideologies
Recall the basic relation between schemas and information established in Chapter
Three, especially Figure 3.2. While current information initiates the decision process by
offering the relevant cues for a sketch of the situation, the shared schemas activated by this
information constrain the effects of additional information on the decision process. In
other words, we tend to experience and analyze events through the lens of our prior
experiences. Figure 10.1 employs a parallel consideration. The distinction between
understandings and opportunities mirrors the relation between schemas and information;
shared understandings are composed of schemas, while the opportunities and threats
offered by an opportunity structure through strategic interactions are carried along by an
updated stream of information.82 One consequence of this distinction is that the sets of
actors and institutions that comprise the stable and volatile aspects of opportunity
structures are also embedded in sets of social relationships and social fields. As noted in
Chapter Two and as hinted in Figure 10.1, these durable social relations and the fields in
which they are embedded are maintained in part by collective identities, the shared
understandings and public representations that define the boundaries of these relations.
Thus, socialization into a set of social relations and social fields produces shared
understandings about sets of actors and institutions, while direct or indirect interactions
with these same institutions and actors produce the information flows that update actors

As I noted in Chapter Three, these (free and costly) streams (which may vary systematically across contexts
in terms of the quantity and quality of information) are intervening variables between the opportunity
structures that activists face - contexts inclusive of sets of institutions and interactions that produce up-todate contextual information - and the perception and evaluation of these opportunities and threats.
82
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on the opportunities and threats available to them and others.83 This point is crucial.
Within the constraints offered by these information-generating contexts, SMOs and
authorities respond to each other with tactics that vary across the system (chosen actions).
The POS – a significant constraint on the responses of political actors to activists and other
actors - thus generates current information about the various constraints the political
context offers, as well as updated information on the effectiveness of actions.
However, corresponding to the constraint imposed on choice by schemas (see
Figure 3.2), choices in tactics are constrained by the definition of the strategic situation
facing an SMO and the motivations to engage in collective action. These assessments
constitute a shared sense of the strategic significance of social relations; they identify the
range of appropriate (and thus inappropriate) means for action. As shared schemas, these
ideologies refer here to the relatively sophisticated or coherent organization of the
cognitive, affective, and normative evaluations of relevant social relations and the
motivation to modify, acquiesce to, or venerate these relations. Thus, ideologies are not
merely “the verbal image of a good society,” (Downs 1957, 96) but, as implied by Downs’
analysis, the preference structure relating different configurations of social relations – the
good society being the upmost desired.
In this understanding of ideology, each actor assesses their position relative to
others, especially the vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities of actors. Vulnerabilities
are an SMO’s sense of the degrees or points of access available to them within a structure
and the basic means of governing or restricting these points. Motivations refer to an SMO’s

Recall, for example, the notion that the practical sense that animates the habitus – the sets of dispositions
generated by social fields and social interaction - is a variably efficient capacity for exploiting the
opportunities available in a social field.
83
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sense of the preferences of actors and the incentive structures they are embedded within.
Capacities are an SMO’s sense of the resources and the autonomy that actors and
institutions constituting a structure possess that may be utilized to influence the
protagonist(s). From the perspective of an SMO, each structure of opportunities and threats
possesses some configuration of these basic factors. For example, imagine an SMO that
perceives the political environment to be extremely open, but believes that the major
actors, say Congress or Parliament, are greedy survivalists unwilling to act against the
interests of corporate campaign donors. Such a sense of the strategic situation does not
necessarily close off all strategic options, but rather makes some or many options far less
attractive than a neutral sense of the situation.
A preliminary point must be considered. As noted in Chapter Seven, people vary in
the degree to which their evaluations are internally coherent or organized (Converse
1964). In other words, some people possess more belief constraint or more developed
ideological conceptions of the world around them than others. Consequently, one might
say that the more coherent the organization of the schemas –the stronger or the more rigid
the ideology - the more constraining the effects on choice. I note as well in Chapter Seven
that the rejection of grand narratives – an observation by Wettergren (2005, 48) regarding
her sample of CJO’s - may suggest the possibility that these organizations do not exhibit the
coherence of a constraining ideology. Yet, Mueller and Judd (1981) found that political
activists, like political elites, possess high belief constraint and belief consensus, likely as a
consequence of higher levels of commitment and participation than the general population.
These possibly contradictory expectations may be reconciled with the observation that the
rejection of grand narratives itself constitutes an ideological position, insofar as we

327

recognize that ideologies need not be totalistic. How coherent such an ideology may be
relative to others remains an open question. Nevertheless, insofar as an “incredulity
towards metanarratives” anticipates the reliance on local or micro-narratives – from the
rejection of totalizing universal schemas like Marxism, religion, etc. to the embrace of
heterogeneous and particular ‘languages games’ (Lyotard 1984, xxiv) - this discussion does
suggest a particular hypothesis:
H10.1: CJOs are associated with the preference for micro-narratives over
metanarratives.
I thus expect to find evidence of a tendency to restrict or qualify claims of knowledge while
embracing or emphasizing local conditions or situations as particular or singular events.84
Additionally, one characteristic of the embrace of micro-narratives is the celebration
or toleration of pluralism and difference, of heterogeneous interests, capacities, and
behaviors. A wealth of research in political science and psychology supports the charge
that self-identified liberals tend to be more tolerant of other groups than conservatives
(McAdams et al 2008; McClosky and Brill 1983; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982;
Tetlock 1983). If we construe ideology generally and quantitatively, much like the
standard Likert scale of liberalism, then a preference for micro-narratives should be
broadly associated with liberalism. This tentative conclusion and the tendency in the
literature to associate culture jamming with opposition to capitalism suggests a hypothesis:
H10.2: CJOs are associated with the expression of liberal ideology
Empirically, this chapter focuses on that aspect of the structure of opportunities and
threats that is captured by a more robust conception of ideology, meaning a more
qualitative and expansive conception. Thus, the first task is to build on the previous
84

The degree to which this distinction holds empirically will be addressed as well.
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description of collective identities by stressing the preferences for various configurations
of social relations and the strategic significance of actual social relationships. Two
preliminary considerations are relevant. First, a focus on targets would seem paramount in
determining which social relations are strategically significant. Strictly speaking, such a
consideration would violate the incredibly simplified order of relations established in
Figure 10.1; strategic orientations, shaped both by collective identities and goals (in this
model), are the interdependencies of strategic choices, including choices in targets.
Instead, ideologies sketch the vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities of those actors
most important for determining the occurrence and trajectory of conflict and cooperation.
As a simplifying procedure I focus on three basic structures of opportunity and
threat that constitute the most salient social relations for contentious collective action: the
state, the media, and the market. Political process or opportunity theorists argue that the
political regime is the most important factor explaining social movement activity (Eisinger
1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al 1995; McAdam 1999; Meyer
2004; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). Much attention has already fallen on this argument here.
Also noted above, others argue that the discursive environment offers sets of opportunities
and threats for contentious collective action (Koopmans and Olzak 2004; McCammon et al
2007). Finally, because of the common targeting of corporations in contemporary
contentious politics, many scholars emphasize the importance of economic or market
opportunity structures in determining whether the characteristics of economic institutions
and actors and their relations to other actors and institutions affect the mobilization,
strategy, and outcomes of protest (King 2008; Soule 2009).
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Second, an exclusive focus on an actor’s perception of the structure of opportunities
and threats available to them risks subjectivizing all objective correlates in the
environment. However, the learning process presented in Figure 3.2 emphasizes a role for
information obtained from the environment, especially direct and indirect interactions
with other actors. As a consequence, at least two implications follow from the conception
of ideology. First, because relations with relevant institutions and actors are generally
durable (repeated interactions) over time they accumulate sets of schemas expressing the
vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities of these relations. Second, these schemas,
which constitute an SMO’s sense of the strategic situation, provide the crucial capacity for
an SMO to more or less effectively interpret the opportunities and threats available to them
indirectly through the stream of information or directly through interaction with political
actors. They also establish the relation of actual social relations to ideal social relations, as
in the good society or dystopian societies.
10.2.3. Ideologies and Strategic Orientations
The positioning of an actor relative to other actors and institutions and the strategic
situation that this positioning offers is deeply informed by their collective identities. These
identities are part of the shared understandings generated by social relations and the
exigencies of social fields and, as such, are constitutive of everyday social organization.
These shared understandings of our social world define not only who others are, but also
who we are. In this sense, they contribute to the definition not only of the capacities and
motivations for strategic interaction (ideologies) but also of our basic preferences for
strategy (strategic orientations). Downey and Rohlinger (2008, 31n1) are straightforward: strategic orientation “emphasizes collective identity as an organizing principle.”
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In Figure 10.1, strategic orientations are distinguished from shared understandings
in general and ideologies in particular. Ideologies highlight the basic strategic significance
of social relations and the motivation to modify, acquiesce to, or venerate them; strategic
orientations are the basic plans that organize action around these relations and
motivations. Strategic orientations are thus the basic organization of interdependent
choices informed by descriptions and intuitions of vulnerabilities, motivations, and
capacities; they inform basic strategic choices, including the issues, tactics, and targets that
are most appropriate. Because of this close relationship, however, a strict causal
relationship is not considered for the purposes of this dissertation. Instead, the empirical
analysis here will focus on identifying patterns of association between ideologies and
strategic orientations. Crucially, as argued in Chapter Nine, strategic orientations are
oriented in part by goals. Because this dissertation does not consider the determinants of
goal selection, ideologies are here considered independent of goals.
10.2.4. Targets
In Chapter Nine I provide empirical analyses of the issues of CJOs, but I delayed my
analysis of their targets and tactics. In order to further my account of the strategic
orientations within my sample, it is imperative that I describe their targets. As a
preliminary point, I note that a target is some object towards which an SMO directs its
actions.
According to Tilly (2008; McAdam et al 2001), by definition all contentious political
action is directed towards some object of claims. These objects are those collective actors
or identities to which activists press their claims. As noted in Chapter Eight, collective
identities involve public representations of relations between actors and institutions.
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Strictly speaking, only actors are capable of interaction, either as individuals or
organizations in the guise of collective or personal identities. Tilly (2008, 6) describes
contentious claims making as “always involving at least one subject reaching visibly
towards at least one object.” However, when this reaching extends towards a disembodied,
abstract system, such as art, nature, or communism, how can this be said to be an object
capable of interaction? The answer, Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) argue, is that all
action, no matter how abstract the description of its object, must target some concrete
objects that represent this object. In this sense there are potentially two targeted objects: a
concrete object and the object represented in the concrete object, as when a banker or an
insurance company represents capitalism or a stop sign or the police station represents the
state.85 The question remains as to whether or not the concrete object’s interests are
involved. McAdam et al (2001, 5) define contention as an interaction in which claims made
by some subject on an object, such as an SMO, “would, if realized, affect the interests of at
least one of the claimants.” One may speculate that if the rules, norms, and practices
governing situations and relations are altered (institutions), then the interests of actors
organized by these rules, norms, and practices are affected.
In this chapter, I focus only on Gamson’s (1990) antagonist targets. Antagonist
targets are those actors or institutions whose actions the protagonists believe can address
their grievances. I do not consider here an analysis of represented targets. Such an
analysis unfolds in Chapter Seven. However, I utilize an inductive or ad hoc approach to
identifying the actual range of targets through an analysis of my sample. In Chapter Nine I

This is conceptually distinct from the concept of proxy targeting: “the strategy of protesting or disrupting
one institution in order to effect change in a secondary, removed target” (Walker et al 2008, 25). Of course,
the two may overlap.
85
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draw on NSM theory in hypothesizing that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of cultural
goals. Moreover, in Chapter One I noted how many understandings of culture jamming
assume that it opposes corporate policies. Together, these suggest that CJOs target
corporations. I thus hypothesize:
H10.3. CJOs are associated with the targeting of corporations.
I thus anticipate that the preponderance of targeting strategies in the sample focus on
corporations, specifically MNCs.
10.3. Analysis
As with the previous chapter, none of the hypotheses, propositions, or expectations
developed above is tested in the strictest sense. The data derives from the sample of CJOs
specified in Chapter Four. Below, I describe the ideologies of the groups in the sample,
their relation to goals and strategic orientations, and their targeting strategies. Due to the
space constraints of this dissertation, the process of presenting this data necessarily does
violence to variation within the sample. However, when possible I note this variation.
10.3.1. Ideals and Ideology
I begin with a general sketch of the ideal set of social relations for the groups in the
sample. To be brief, many appear to have a preference for a more egalitarian and
sustainable economic system coupled with a more responsive and accountable democratic
political system. The Billionaire’s Monet Oliver DePlace is clear: “I actually believe in a fair
and balanced capitalist system — it’s just that’s not what we’re living in” (Schwartz 2010).
The BLF’s Napier explains, “My beef is not with capitalism…the free market is wonderful.”
But like the Billionaires, Napier’s vision is not one of an untempered free market. His ideal
is a system in which “individuals and small businesses [interact] with each one another out
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of choice as well as necessity driven by self-interest tempered with community need”
(Napier 2009). Channeling Churchill, he throws a bone to democracy, the “worst form of
government, except for all the others” (Napier 2009). The Yes Men (2009b) describe an
ideal state of affairs as one in which the:
Corporate bottom line…is defined as being a benefit to people and the environment, and
that necessarily is going to eliminate the imperative for endless growth and the imperative
for endless profit…Because short-term profitability is not what's going to make the world a
better place. So we need to create a new legal framework to govern the behavior of
corporations…The basic idea is really simple...It should just be straight up taxes and
incentives. Regulations and incentives, regulations sometimes in the form of taxes and
regulations in the form of simple outright laws against practices that we know are going to
kill us in the long run.

Similarly, despite their rhetoric the AMF appear to view an ideal world as one in which
democratic institutions are responsive to individual and community needs and markets
reflect the true (ecological) costs of goods and services, what Lasn (2007; 2001) calls
“radical democracy” and a “more grassroots kind of capitalism.” This vision does not
annihilate corporations per se, but simply grounds them in the public interest and revokes
the charters of those who transgress against that interest. An example of such an interest is
the ensured access of citizens to participate in the public discourse on public airwaves.
There are cultural correlates as well to this political economy of freedom and
community. Such a system allows for a more spontaneous authentic culture and thus the
crafting of a genuine participatory public sphere. For the AMF, only a culture created from
the bottom-up by free autonomous citizens is lived and authentic. This world of meaning
draws from actual experiences with nature, community, creativity, and our emotional
unmediated selves and provides us with a proper sense of our social responsibilities.
Similarly, the RBC describe an ideal world in which the Commons is a public space in which
authentic stories are created and shared, in which “hot, complex human living” is
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unencumbered by power (Talen 2006, 108). For the BLF, such a world involves a dialogue
among citizens as they note with tongue-in-cheek: “Our ultimate goal is nothing short of a
personal and singular Billboard for each citizen” (Napier and Thomas 2006).
This general ideal of soft-core capitalism is not the only vision offered within the
sample. The SCP in particular presents a distinct anarchist vision:
A gradual collapsing back to the human scale. Replace both [surveillance cameras and
police departments] by communities who watch themselves. So this very much rhymes with
whether or not you believe in direct democracy or representative democracy, which in
many ways the police are the representative democracy, the governance. You can still have
governance, it would be self-governance politically, as well as in communities the police
come right from the community instead of being an artificial prosthesis (Scheinke and
Brown 2003, 372).

Other groups either provide insufficient data (CTM, IAA, IST), or they refuse to express one.
Instead of a clear prescription, the CAE (2000b) stresses a preference for abstract ideals
such as tolerance and autonomy: “Our practice is about process only--the process of
resistance. We have no final cause in mind, no utopias, and no solid social categories. CAE
interacts with the becomings of lived time in an effort to expand difference.”
10.3.3. Narratives and Liberalism
In light of these ideals, I consider this chapter’s two hypotheses. Such an analysis
provides additional leverage in understanding the ideological approach of CJOs. First, I
hypothesize (H10.1) that CJOs are associated with the preference for micro-narratives over
metanarratives. Metanarratives are totalizing philosophies, myths, or ideologies of history
and knowledge that aim to legitimize a particular version of the ‘truth.’ Traditional
examples include Christianity, Marxism, and Enlightenment rationalism and progress. In
contrast, local or micro-narratives are comparatively modest stories that pertain to
particular contexts in a manner similar to Wittgenstein’s language games.
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Nearly without exception, the sample of CJOs rejects traditional grand narratives.
The IST is an example of a group with a relatively clear focus on micro-narratives. Rasovic
states, “Our political agenda is completely transparent. And it feels true to the audience,
and it feels like the audience knows that it’s true. Meaning, it’s right now, right here
between us. Not like some abstraction that I have to then interpret” (D’Ignazio, Manning,
and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). Explicit in this statement is a focus on
the imminence that characterizes the politics of the IST. From project to project, the group
stimulates the spontaneity and potential of a situation by providing extremely minimal but
provocative narratives. Another prominent example is the IAA:
We sort of shy away from promoting a particular ideology. If we had an answer, we might
promote it. We ask questions. We try to get other people to ask questions. Too many
voices promoting their particular ideology, and I really don’t think any of them are right.
The important part is to get people who aren’t talking to one another, talking to each other
(Brusadin et al n.d.).

In contrast, the CAE is the group in the sample that suggests a metanarrative. The group’s
comparatively theoretical output is a voluminous effort to identify and promote effective
resistant practices. This task entails assessing historical and existing approaches to dissent
and, most notably, sketching the political, economic, and cultural context of resistance. In
fulfilling the latter objective, the group argues that over the course of the last century the
nature of power shifted from a sedentary model based in an analogic cosmology to a more
pervasive liquid or nomadic power rooted in a digital cosmology.
Capitalism is primarily a digital political-economy, much as the medieval economy was
primarily analogic. Pancapitalism’s use of the digital thus far has been horrifying, whether
one considers the pathological separation and alienation of Taylorist production, the false
democracy of consumption, the repressive apparatus of surveillance, or the biotechnologies
of eugenics. Digital culture is on this same trajectory, with its primary manifestation being
an invasive mass media that functions as a reproduction and distribution network for the
ideology of capital (CAE 2001, 76).
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Such changes are rooted in material conditions, including technological change.
Importantly, “We believe that resistance to authoritarian structures and trends is
permanent and forever” (Little 1999, 194). The CAE thus appear to suggest a
metanarrative of permanent resistance.
At first glance, with the exception of the CAE, Wettergren’s (2005, 48) finding that
culture jammers privilege micro-narratives is reproduced here. Yet, her conception of a
metanarrative is never elucidated. Instead, she appears to rely on a strict Lyotardian sense
of a metanarrative. A looser conception does suggest that some CJOs adhere to an
environmental or ecological grand narrative. This is especially the case with the AMF,
which describes capitalism as a “Doomsday Machine” enabled by consumerism (Lasn n.d.),
and the RBC, for whom consumerism, militarism, and catastrophic climate change are
intimately linked in Talen’s (2012) The End of the World.86 While there is evidence that
other groups link the economic system to climate change (AAA, NGL, TYM), only the AMF
and the RBC make environmentalism a key aspect of their projects. Still, three out of
twelve does not bode well for a counter-hypothesis.
Second, I hypothesize (H10.2) that CJOs are associated with the expression of liberal
ideology. The Likert seven-point scale of liberalism arguably measures a respondent’s
answer to the question,” how much government intervention in the economy should there
be?” (Downs 1957, 115). It may also refer to one’s position on other dimensions, such as
attitudes toward social change and equality: “By left we shall mean advocating social
change in the direction of greater equality—political, economic or social; by right we shall

Both the AMF and the RBC are included in Wettergren’s (2005) sample. However, the RBC is clear that it
was only in 2006 that the group clearly linked consumerism to environmental degradation and climate
change (D. and Talen 2011, 91).
86
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mean supporting a traditional more or less hierarchical social order, and opposing change
toward equality” (Lipset, Lazarsfield, Barton, and Linz 1962, 1135). These famous
understandings of ideology point towards the means (government) and/or the ends
(equality) that constitute the liberal or left end of the scale. I do not consider the enormous
literature on ideology, but instead take this general sketch of liberalism and determine how
closely the groups in the sample approach it.
The brief analysis of ideal social relations does offer a sense of the degree to which
the sample of CJOs adheres to the ‘ends’ of liberal ideology. In addition, in Chapter Seven I
note how CJOs construct their understanding of the political Left. It is perhaps safe to say
that on a uni-dimensional scale of ideology the entire sample registers liberal, but the
evidence for four groups is not quite sufficient (BLF, CTM, IAA, IST). The remaining eight
groups provide some evidence that a multi-dimensional scale may prove more helpful in
simplifying ideology (AMF, AAA, BIL, CAE, NGL, RBC, SCP, TYM). Groups like the AMF and
the Yes Men are relatively straight-forward liberals. The AMF feels that part of the solution
to the problem of consumer culture is to develop laws, regulations, and court decisions that
effectively curtail the translation of economic power into disproportional political power.
Above, the Yes Men (2009b) describe their ideal as one in which corporations are heavily
constrained by taxes and incentives in order to produce a more egalitarian and sustainable
system. However, the CAE and the SCP – the two avowed anarchists of the sample – are
strictly anti-state and focus heavily on autonomy, freedom, and privacy. As usual,
anarchism does not neatly fall into the usual “means” sense of ideology. While they clearly
answer Downs’ query with a resounding ‘no government at all,’ anarchists are also
radically egalitarian. The CAE tackle this conceptual problem:
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To reduce CAE's position to a distorted simplicity, we are, admittedly, antistate and
committed to liberationist practices. The radical Right would probably say the same thing
about itself. However, CAE is not dedicated to racism, sexism, militarism, Christian (or any
other) fundamentalism, patriotic revolution, laissez-faire capitalism, or blind obedience to
authority. These are, however, characteristics representative of the radical Right. Given
these characteristics, one has to question how committed this movement is to principles of
anti-state or liberationist practice (CAE and Dery 1997).

The SCP (2006, 57; Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012) is concerned with sexual,
religious, racial, and political profiling, and perhaps puts the matter to rest when Brown
describes himself as “ultraleft” (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 361).
Table 10.1 summarizes the data for both hypotheses. It appears that in general the
sample of CJOs rejects meta-narratives and adheres to a generally liberal ideology, though
an environmental narrative has taken hold for a few groups. The adherence to anarchism
does suggest that a multidimensional view of ideology may be more helpful. In the analysis
that follows I briefly describe the predominant ideological currents in the sample of groups
by focusing on the motivations, capacities, and vulnerabilities of the actors in the relevant
opportunity structures.
Table 10.1. Narratives and Liberalism

AMF
AAA
BLF
BIL
CTM
CAE
IAA
IST
NGL
RBC
SCP
TYM
1

= mixed

MicroNarratives
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
2

Liberal
Ideology
Yes
Yes
2

Yes
2

Yes
2
2

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

= insufficient data
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10.3.2. Motivations and Capacities
In contrast to the ideal set of social relations, CJOs sketch a present and in some
cases a past that spells out the problematic nature of contemporary society. In so doing
they assess the strategic situations that surround them.
A central concern for most in the sample is the conversion of economic power into
political power. For these groups, democracy is based on the principle of political equality.
Underlying this institution of formal equality, however, is an economic system that
generates enormous inequalities in wealth. Such a system reflects its social and economic
disparities in its political outcomes despite the principles of its political institutions. The
wealthy enjoy a disproportionate amount of influence in politics, while the interests of the
middle class and especially marginalized groups like the poor will either be infrequently
accommodated or rationalized out of the political system. The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 68)
summarizes the relationship between economics and politics: “Considering their vast
financial resources, corporations thereafter actually had more power than any private
citizen. They could defend and exploit their rights and freedom more vigorously than any
individual and therefore they were more free.” This unequal freedom enjoyed by economic
elites is associated with free market capitalism. Capitalism aims to absorb (commodify) all
possible goods and services in order to maximize profits. To do so, it must encroach on
those areas of life essential to a healthy society, strong democracy, and sustainable
environment. As the RBC sums it up: “a principal strategy of Consumerism [unfettered free
market] is to bring all public institutions – public spaces and, of course, the government –
into the market” (D. and Talen 2011, 54). Because markets generate and aggravate
economic inequalities and underinvest in public goods, the effort to roll back the
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mechanisms (like government and community) that can alleviate some of these perceived
ills can generate significant backlash and potentially threaten the entire project of
expanding the market system. Consequently, economic elites pursue profits and social
control measures that ensure the continued existence and growth of the system, even to
the detriment of true democracy. As the RBC states, “The ideal conditions for consumerism
[free market capitalism] are almost never the ideal conditions for civic democracy” (D. and
Talen 2011, 136).
The conversion of economic resources into political power is accomplished in
multiple interrelated ways. First, economic elites utilize direct means such as lobbying,
advising, writing legislation, lawsuits, and the funding of campaigns and super PACs. These
means of influence are particularly addressed by the Billionaires, who point to the variety
of actors that contribute to the structure of plutocracy, including the Chamber of
Commerce, the American Legislative Exchange Council, and both major political parties
(Opprecht 2012). Negativland (1995, 24) provides an example of the clash of formal
equality and economic inequality in an institutional context:
One failing of the U.S. legal system is that it treats the plaintiff and the defendant as though
they are equally powerful entities, regardless of the actual resources each may have…when
a corporation goes after a small business or low-income individual, the conflict
automatically rolls outside of the court system because of the defendant’s inability to pay
the costs of mounting a proper defense.

Some of these techniques are perceived as legal corruption and represent a particularly
odious expression of the degree to which the government is captured by corporate
interests.
A more insidious means of converting economic into political power involves the
control of mass media, public space, and copyright law. Many groups see the concentration
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of media outlets in the hands of an increasingly small number of major multinational
corporations and the deregulation of the industry as a serious threat to democracy.
Because ownership amounts to effective control over the content of media outlets,
corporations narrow the range of issues and media frames that citizens encounter in their
news consumption. As the Billionaires for Bush (2004b, 15) wryly note, “we bought up and
merged the media to ensure that our economic policies were the standard by which all
policy must be judged.” The AMF chime in: “in North America there’s a lack of media space
in which to challenge consumptive, commercial and corporate agendas” (Lasn 1999, 33).
This has the unfortunate consequence of providing viewers and readers with insufficient
information to properly perform their roles as critical citizens. The AMF bear witness to
the “loss of diversity” in the mass media (Lasn 1999, 25) Another means for constricting
public discourse is the use of copyright and trademark law to repress dissent: “we’re
taking on the powers that be, which is really the world of corporate business. They’re the
powers that be…they have made themselves, through a whole set of copyright and
trademark laws, practically immune from criticism” (Hosler and Joyce 1997).
The notion of the paucity of media space keys in to a wider sense in which economic
power narrows the range of public debate. Many groups in the sample see physical public
space as increasingly colonized by private interests (AMF, AAA, BLF, IAA, and RBC). They
view billboards and other forms of outdoor advertising as ubiquitous and effective in
squeezing out citizen and dissident messages. The BLF’s Jack Napier fumes, “I’m pretty
irate at a handful of billboard corporations controlling all the public spaces. I find that
completely undemocratic and I didn’t vote for it – and yet these billboards are in a public
space and I have to look at them” (Berger 2000). Similarly, AAA founder Steve Lambert
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was driven to challenge outdoor advertising when he witnessed muralists driven from the
walls by owners selling their space to advertisers (Newman 2008). Groups like the IAA and
the RBC view the enclosure of the modern commons as a general phenomenon involving
the proliferation of quasi-public spaces like malls. The IAA notes:
One of the key functions of a public space within a healthy society is to be a place where
people tend to congregate, where you have a free exchange of ideas, and encounter those
that may not be like you…As public spaces disappear, they are replaced by privatized ones
that not play these roles (Scheinke and IAA 2002, 117),

These crucial roles evaporate because:
The privatization of public space has had a chilling effect on activist communications. As
malls replace marketplaces and parking lots replace parks, distributing unsanctioned
information is becoming an increasingly high-risk endeavor. Once protected by free-speech
laws, activists now face fines, imprisonment, and bodily harm for distributing literature on
what had previously been considered public property (IAA n.d.(b)).

Thus, corporations indirectly translate economic power into political power through the
control of space and public dialogue.
Many groups also bear witness to the utilization of a third dimension of power in the
translation of economic resources into political power. For example, the Billionaires note
the importance of the creation and maintenance of ideology, or the sets of justifications
that legitimate the capitalist free market system by equating the interests of economic
elites with the common good (Opprecht 2012). The Yes Men’s Bichlbaum argues:
Somehow over the last thirty-forty years with Thatcher in the UK and Reagan in the US and
all for Milton Friendman…We’ve gotten this ideology that you just let companies do what
they want, don’t bother them, don’t incentivize them or regulate them or anything. Things’ll
be great. It’s completely preposterous (Yes Lab Media 2009).

For other groups, these justifications are engrained in habits of consumption and
perception deliberately crafted and exploited by corporations and advertisers in order to
maximize profits. Negativland member Don Joyce describes advertising as “desire
mongering. To put a desire in you, to make you feel insufficient, inadequate, unhappy,
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dissatisfied” (Hossler and Joyce 1997). The BLF likewise link advertising to the definition
of self and the world: “He who controls the Ad speaks with the voice of our Age” (Napier
and Thomas 2006). This voice bypasses our free will and submerges in our subconscious
(Napier 2009). The IST’s Rasovic urges awareness: “You assume immunity to a lot of these
[advertising] messages and you are not immune, you’re a sponge” (Kanarinka and Pirun
2006). The AAA’s Lambert sketches a cycle of what he calls normalization:
Outdoor advertising has become unavoidable. Traditional billboards and transit shelters
have cleared the way for more pervasive methods...In urban areas commercial content is
placed in our sight and into our consciousness every moment we are in public space…
Through long-term commercial saturation, it has become implicitly understood by the
public that advertising has the right to own, occupy and control every inch of available
space. The steady normalization of invasive advertising dulls the public’s perception of their
surroundings, re-enforcing a general attitude of powerlessness toward creativity and
change, thus a cycle develops enabling advertisers to slowly and consistently increase the
saturation of advertising with little or no public outcry (AAA 2013c).

The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 54) hits at the general concern: “the notions of citizenship and
nationhood make little sense in this world. We’re not fathers and mothers and brothers:
We’re consumers.” Some groups view this third dimension of power at a somewhat deeper
level than the other groups. For them, concepts like community and public are
problematic, because they homogenize populations and practices that are inherently
characterized by difference. Technologies like the Internet and biotechnology are largely
colonized by corporate interests in perpetual efforts to increase the efficiency of productive
forces like the body and to render capital and thus power free of the moorings of the real.
To put it bleakly, “We are currently witnessing an ongoing process of aggressive body
invasion, guided by authoritarian demands for thoroughly rationalized flesh and
instrumental human behavior” (CAE 2012b, 55). The CAE (1996, 37) stresses the
alienation of the spectacle as an important factor in the operation of power:
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While mass media brings its viewer the world, the world is also held at bay while the viewer
commits her gaze to the screen, forever separated from others and from communal space.
In this case, the bunker is both material and ideational. On one hand, it serves as a concrete
garrison where images (troops) reside. On the other hand, it confirms state-sponsored
reality, by forever solidifying the reified notions of class, race, and gender.

Similarly, the AMF describes the mediation of the spectacle as a distance from nature and
other people. The RBC’s Talen (2012, 17-18) emphasizes the catastrophe of alienation:
There is a direct relationship between each additional minute that we are separated and
every pound of greenhouse gas that is added into the air. The greater the distance that
individual human beings are from one another, the more CO2 we put in the air…Our global
economy, fundamentalist religion, and national security are each based on increasing the
distance between us.

CJOs thus sense a variety of increasingly penetrating means to ensure control and profits.
The state performs a supportive role in the myriad ways that economic elites pursue
their interests. Many groups view the relationship between the government and
corporations as asymmetric and dependent. Negativland states they are, “taking on the
powers that be, which is really the world of corporate business. They’re the powers that
be! More powerful than government, more worldwide influential than any government”
(Hosler and Joyce 1997). In this vision, government is subservient. Billionaire Hal E.
Burton “explained that the purpose of the Billionaires is to expose the capture of the
government by corporations’” (Roselund 2004). In concrete terms, this means that
political actors produce political outcomes – judicial decisions, laws, regulations, etc. – that
advance the interests of economic and political elites. Activists encounter the state in
numerous ways, but a prominent one is on the streets. Many argue that the police are less
concerned with protecting citizen’s freedoms of speech and assembly than with protecting
property and profit. Reverend Billy describes an RBC mall action:
We ended up in Abercrombie and fitch underneath a big stuffed moosehead hanging his
head over the cash register, while hundreds of us are on our knees to this great dead moose-
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face, with the snoopy ferris wheel spinning in the background and a dozen police persons
clucking PRIVATE POPERTY PIVATE PROPERTY (Talen 2006, 133).

Elsewhere, he links the Patriot Act and surveillance to corporate marketing:
The police can ask their large friends the skyscraper to get the master shots. The buildings
of New York City are now bristling with surveillance cameras cocked down like that know
something about us pedestrians….The buildings are soaking up our images, the patterns of
our wanderings, who we kiss and why and who we shout at and who we pay….It’s for
security, we’re told, but we know that ultimately the Patriot Act has it’s evil twin
information sucker: corporate marketing. Someday it will all be fed into Christmas (Talen
2006, 190).

The CAE are clear: “Our position is that government is not a public apparatus. Public and
private vectors really don’t exist as discrete entities” (Little 1999, 194). Furthermore:
[The] function [of the political sector] is to mediate the contradictions [between economic
and moral ideology]. As an arm of the economy, the legitimized political sector has the
unenviable task of keeping the economy as free of regulation as possible, while seeming to
meet contradictory cultural demands. For example, the master narrative of the welfare state
has been a key site of inertia in the United States. The idea that the destitute must be given a
second chance, the sick be cared for, and the ignorant be educated, is antithetical to the
construction and maintenance of bourgeois economy. The government’s role in this conflict
is to maintain a symbolic order conducive to the perception that the welfare state is
functioning on behalf of its citizens, while allowing the business sector to follow its antiwelfare agenda (CAE 1994, 113).

A notable consequence of this perceived relationship between the political and economic
elites is that CJOs are extremely distrustful and cynical of government. The BLF’s Napier
(n.d.) expresses this skepticism as directly as he knows how: “If you think that the (any)
government works in YOUR best interest, I've got a great bridge in Manhattan you might be
interested in buying.” In this hostile political environment, the groups in the sample tend
to possess a tempered sense of the prospects for basic social change. The BLF’s Napier
claims that, “it’s getting to the point where you can’t do any real serious political work
without being threatened by the Powers That Be” (Haller and Napier 2006, 90). This is
especially the case during a Republican White House: “When the Bush cartel was in office,
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there was not a whole lot of hope of creating actual change. It was more a matter of keeping
spirits up and hope alive” (TYM (n.d.(b)).
While most CJOs recognize little autonomy for government, some exceptions are
noted. The Yes Men (original emphasis, n.d.(b)) explain, “There's nothing mysterious about
it: when Obama finds himself cornered by industrial lobbyists, he needs to be able to point
out the window (or at CNN) and say "Sorry, I can't do what you're asking me to – those
people won't let me." Still, the pattern is clear: in a plutocracy, government is only
responsive under exceptional circumstances. However, other groups in the sample afford
political actors significant independence from corporate interests. Political elites and the
state are driven by the desire for private gain, but more importantly, they are also driven
by distinct imperatives for social control and the establishment of an ever-penetrating
order. Most notably, the SCP focuses on the state as the locus of hierarchy and oppression
in the social system as opposed to the economic system. While he is largely sympathetic to,
and indeed utilizes the concept of the spectacle as a means to decipher an image-saturated
social system, member Brown is very clear: “I think that the Commodity is in service of the
State, and the State is not in service of the Commodity” (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 366).
For example:
When we hear the word “privatization” we almost always think of it in terms of private
companies taking on the functions that used to be public, as if it’s purely a corporate
phenomena. So, I would agree provided that we register that privatization could also be a
strategy of governing. It isn’t simply a way to give goodies over to the private sector and
bankrupting the government. The government has something to gain from the destruction
of public spaces that may not be financial, but that it makes the public easier to control. So,
it is a strategy of both the corporate entities as well as the government. To enrich upon it
more privatization as a term in that way catches both of those senses—privatization is
privatizing government functions and having them run by corporations. But, it is also
teaching people to stay in their own private lives, to no longer have a political awareness, in
a sense, that your private life is always a public life. So, privatization is a turn away from
public life towards the private as well. It’s mimicked by governmental functions, but the
functions continue to exist, even though police have become privatized, the plaza has
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become privatized, the government still very much exists (Scheinke and Brown 2003,
370).

Brown stresses as well the function of surveillance in a transparent society: social control.
By transgressing the fundamental right to privacy, surveillance weakens an individual’s
and a community’s capacity for responsibility and freedom.
10.3.3. Vulnerabilities
According to CJOs the deck is stacked against activists hoping to effect meaningful
social change. Actors with enormous resources utilize a variety of means to establish their
control over political and economic outcomes. Yet, all of the groups in the sample identify
vulnerabilities in their antagonists and the public that allow some measure of success in
pursuing their goals.
First, as noted in Chapter Seven, the sample of groups constructs a sense of the
public as to some degree capable of acknowledging domination and engaging in resistance.
For example, the Billionaires recognize that not all voters are alike. Some hold less
tenaciously to conservative ideology, while some that do may have a personal distaste for
corporate influence. As Boyd (2004) notes:
What we tell funders is that we're trying to reach voters in battleground states. One part of
it is suppressing Bush voters by confirming their nagging suspicions that he is serving
corporate interests at the expense of the average voter. We're also trying to persuade those
in the middle.

Another straightforward vulnerability recognized by some groups lies in the nature
of the political system. Because politicians are ultimately concerned with political survival,
citizens can signal that they are sufficiently upset with some set of laws and practices to
outweigh the enormous influence of capital. This is most clearly expressed by the Yes Men:
“The people’s only real control, or the only power, is through government unfortunately”
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(Yes Lab Media 2009). As noted above, “When Obama finds himself cornered by industrial
lobbyists, he needs to be able to point out the window (or at CNN) and say "Sorry, I can't do
what you're asking me to – those people won't let me" (TYM n.d.(b)).
Beyond this conventional sense of possibility, CJOs identify various points of
exploitation. The most basic vulnerability is the observation that efforts to control meaning
and perception are never complete or total. Communication, language, signs, images, and
symbols are too fluid and polyvalent to impose a singular reading. The CTM (2006b, Gach
2007) regard magic, defined broadly as one’s will manifesting one’s creative energy, as “an
open-source technology that doesn’t exclusively belong to advertising execs and policymakers.” Elsewhere, they acknowledge that “technologies can be used to control and
oppress just as they can be used to liberate and make life more enjoyable” (CTM 2006a).
The AMF explicitly reject the notion that recuperation by corporations and marketers
makes culture jamming irrelevant: “Instead of saying, ‘Oh no, our images are being sucked
up by the system – our images are being neutralized by their images.’ I don’t believe in that
kind of cynicism! I’ve seen enough images, jams, and détournements work to not be afraid
of that” (Lasn 2002). Such instability of meaning offers challengers countless paths to
corrupt the originally intended message.
Next, CJOs recognize the perceived successes of their antagonists’ strategies and
tactics in engaging audiences (AMF, AAA, BLF, BIL, IAA, NGL, TYM). Recall that
corporations (and governments) develop and deploy extremely persuasive forms of
rhetoric and imagery, forms that, according to the BLF’s Napier (2006), bypass our faculty
of reason and capacity for free will. In other words, they utilize emotional and
physiological mechanisms as opposed to rational persuasion. Argumentation is
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comparatively ineffective: “I don’t think any amount of whining, especially using the 26
letters of the alphabet—writing stories that whine about our culture and complaining
about corporations—will do much. It has been proven to be totally ineffective” (Lasn
2005). The AAA (2013b) explains:
We’re borrowing tools that have been researched and tested by marketers for decades and
using them to our own ends. Many of those marketing methods are very effective, that’s
why businesses are so invested in them. So why reinvent the wheel when we can just insert
one gear to make the whole thing run in another direction?

Negativland describe their record Dispepsi as a mimicking of advertising: “I hope that by
the time you get to the end of the record you’re starting to get sick of hearing about this one
product….I think the whole record simulates Pepsi’s multinational corporate form of
advertising, which is basically saturation (Hosler and Joyce 1997). The AMF’s Lasn
(original emphasis, 1999, 131-2) also discusses the vulnerability of the advertisement:
A well-produced “subvertisement” mimics the look and feel of the target ad, prompting the
classic double take as viewers realize what they’re seeing is in fact the very opposite of what
they expected…Suppose you don’t have the money to launch a real print ad campaign. What
you can do is mimic the million-dollar look and feel of your opponent’s campaign, thereby
détourning their own carefully worked out, button-pushing memes in your favor. They
spend millions building their corporate cool, and you keep stealing their electricity.

Antagonists are also vulnerable to other forms of mimicry. In a culture that privileges the
wealthy, the Yes Men simply pretend to be the privileged. ”Well, the culture that we’re in
respects money, and so if you pretend to be very very fabulously wealthy and powerful,
then people listen to you. It’s miraculous. Whereas if you’re a regular individual like us,
they’re never gonna listen to us” (Yes Lab Media 2009). Similarly, the Billionaires adopt
the garb and mannerisms of the wealthy to invert the stereotype of the leftist activist
(Haugerud 2013).
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CJOs also note the importance of humor in engaging audiences by bypassing initial
misconceptions or reducing tensions. The BLF’s Kalman (2008) uses humor because it is a
common marketing tool, while Napier notes, “We try to use humorous messages so people
aren’t overtly offended by them. You don’t go up and spray paint “Fuck Exxon” on a
billboard, because the average working guy or cop looks at that and they go, Commies!”
(Haller and Napier 2006). The Yes Men’s Bichlbaum (2012a) agrees: “If you’re angry about
something, you rant. But pushing facts down people’s throats doesn’t work. Humor can
really sideswipe this problem. It’s like there’s a wall between you and a person, and if you
make a joke, it’s a crack in the wall.” The Billionaire’s Boyd (2004) suggests that humor is,
“very disarming. It's very pleasurable, so people choose to engage with it, or if they find
themselves engaging with it, they choose to stick around or pay more attention to it.”
The mass media are vulnerable as well. The SCP’s Brown (2009) sums it up well:
the media “are not a monolith and you can exploit cracks, inconsistencies, and
contradictions within them.” Beyond the essential contested nature of language and
images, the media as a set of actors and practices also lacks the capacity and the motivation
to impose totalized control:
The media is not nearly as conniving, sophisticated and in control as we think it is. From
what I’ve seen behind the scenes, it comes out looking so well just because it is technically
flash. But these people are not in full control of what they are doing…they do lose control
on occasion (Brown 2009).

How and why do they lose control? Brown (2009) asserts that “the great weakness of the
news media is that they need to fill their content 24/7. In the moments when they are
stretched thin they might put something on the air that in their better judgement would
probably keep off the air.” The Yes Men describe some of these cracks:
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I think of journalists as collaborators. There are a lot of really bad journalistic
organizations-there’s nothing good about CNN or MSNBC—but there are a lot of individual
journalists, including at CNN and MSNBC, that are really friendly and love Occupy. When
you do creative actions, it’s like you’re giving journalists an extra token that allows them to
say something important. (Bichlbaum 2012a)

The BLF note as well that being creative and humorous catches the eye of the media
(Thornhill and DeCoverly 2006). Haugerud (2013, 168) notes that the Billionaires exploit
the cracks in the ‘unwitting’ media and thus maintain a position neither of resistance nor of
complicity.
Some groups express more suspicious positions than the majority of the sample.
This is especially the case with the CAE. In their many published works, the group
deciphers the political, social, and cultural environment in order to find points of
vulnerability. In essence, indirect means of influence are considered completely
unproductive if not counter-effective aside from the exigencies of some local conflicts.
Indirect means include media manipulation: “using [a] spectacle of disobedience designed
to muster public sympathy and support is a losing proposition” because “mass media
allegiance is skewed toward the status quo” (CAE 2001, 15). “Since the airwaves and
pressure owned by corporate entities, and since capitalist structures have huge budgets
allotted for public relations, there is no way that activist groups can outdo them.” Likewise,
political and corporate authorities are unresponsive to mass movements, because the
structure of power has shifted from concrete ‘bunkers’ like monuments, bureaucracies,
banks, and barracks to a virtual stream characterized by velocity without place.
Consequently, disrupting the streets and confronting tangible authoritarian entities are
practices similar to attacking a shadow. Ultimately, vulnerabilities lie in two positions: the
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interfaces between everyday life, the body, and liquid power, and the blocking of
information. The SCP is more direct with respect to political authorities:
People would invariably ask why are we not petitioning the various local politicians to do
something about surveillance, or to have politicians actually involved in regulating them, so
that there’d be like a city-wide list and be regulated that way. And in all cases the response
was, “These are the people who didn’t do anything and created the problem. Either did
nothing or created the problem themselves. So it seems pointless in either case to ask them
to produce the solution, to go to somebody else” (Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012)

For the anarchists in the sample, systemic, especially political, vulnerabilities are
somewhat less apparent. Notably, the IST gives little to no indication of a relationship to
wider political or economic structures. For the majority of groups, the system is somewhat
closed, but mass progressive movements and careful engagement with audiences can
exploit some cracks in the system.
10.3.4. Ideologies and Strategic Orientations
Above, I suggested that the structures of motivation, capacity, and vulnerability that
CJOs perceive and the ideal systems they construct - what I am calling ideology - constrain
the strategic orientations of these groups. In Chapter Nine I find that the strategic
orientations of the sample are primarily intrinsic and concern low social disruption, though
there are notable exceptions, while their degree of insularity varies. My effort to explain
these findings rested on an argument relating structures of opportunity to organizational
specialization. In the same chapter I argue that some CJOs pursue extrinsic goals with
intrinsic strategic orientations because they view their organization as a part of wider
activist efforts. They thus define themselves as occupying a position in the division of labor
that characterizes progressive movements or wider networks of cultural and political
activism. This position involves the maintenance of solidarity, ideology, and identity,
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generating media awareness, and changing political preferences. They occupy this niche in
part because of the perception of adverse opportunities.
This general expectation of the perception of a relatively closed opportunity
structure is supported by the findings in this chapter. CJOs bear witness to a closed
structure with a few points of access. There is some variation in this perception. Relative
to the rest of the sample, the Billionaires sense a mildly closed system. They also pursue
extrinsic goals with some mix of an intrinsic and extrinsic mass strategic orientation and
utilize a medium-sized organizational model. In contrast, the CAE, which views the
structure of opportunity as inhospitable, is highly insular, small, and pursues an extremely
vague and ill-expressed extrinsic goal. An adverse climate should also be associated with
the low social disruption characteristic of almost the entire sample (the RBC being the
notable partial exception).
10.3.5. Targets
Above, I hypothesize (H10.3) that CJOs are associated with the targeting of
corporations. Unlike previous hypotheses in this study, the targets of CJOs constitute a
variable with values constructed post hoc. However, the categories employed are basically
standard. I focus on five: corporations, governments, political parties, interest groups, and
militaries. In this analysis, government refers to not only local, regional, and national
government, but intergovernmental organizations like the WTO or the World Bank.
Although somewhat unconventional in the social movement literature, a focus on political
parties and interest groups is appropriate from a political science perspective. Moreover,
while there may be considerable overlap between government and political parties,
relevant CJOs do perceive some important distinctions. Finally, the military refers here to a
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subset of the government: the agency or department that constitutes and directs a
government’s military forces. In the case of the United States, the particular agency would
be the Department of Defense and any subunits therein. Some excluded targets are
religious and educational institutions. Negativland does take swipes at Christianity and the
IAA does concern itself with engineering departments, but these are exceptional cases.87 I
focus here on the most prominent concrete target pursued by the CJOs in the sample.
Table 10.2 presents the data for this hypothesis. With the sole exception of the SCP,
CJOs target corporations. Prominent examples include Exxon, Monsanto, Dow Chemical,
Time Warner, Disney, Bank of America, etc. The targeted corporations tend to be multinational in scope and industrial, media, or financial in nature. There are other examples,
however. The Billionaires often target corporations involved in the health care and
insurance industries. At a prominent second place is government. Only one group (BLF)
does not target government. In many cases, governments are conceived as the agents that
Table 10.2. CJO Targets

AMF
AAA
BLF
BIL
CTM
CAE
IAA
IST
NGL
RBS
SCP
TYM
87

Corporations

Government

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Political
Parties
X

Interest
Groups
X

X

X

Military
X

X
X
X

X

X

Other examples abound. For example, outside of the sample the Guerrilla Girls target the art world.
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can help manipulate corporate behavior. All levels of government, including the
international, are targeted, as are foreign governments. The remaining three categories
denote less frequent targets. The AMF, BIL, and TYM prominently target political parties
and interest groups. By far the most notable interest group is the Chamber of Commerce,
but lobbyists in general are targets. Finally, four groups target the military (AMF, CTM,
CAE, IAA). This data provide substantial support for the hypothesis, but it also emphasizes
the importance of government for CJOs, a target often ignored in analyses of culture
jamming.
10.4. Conclusion
The primary argument of this chapter is that identities are the shared
understandings that shape the ideologies of these organizations. In turn, ideologies
constrain the strategic orientations of SMOs. I present descriptions of these ideologies, or
the structures of motivation, capacity, and vulnerability that CJOs perceive - the durable
social relations that generate opportunities and threats - and the ideal systems they
construct. Next, I relate these ideologies to the strategic orientations described in the
previous chapter by focusing on the degree to which CJOs perceive these structures to be
open or closed. Finally, I describe the targets of CJOs. By focusing on identities and
ideologies, this chapter thus begins the analysis of a relation of culture jamming to
everyday social organization. The following chapters directly concern the question of
tactical choice.
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CHAPTER 11. EFFECTIVENESS, FAMILIARITY
AND TACTICAL CHOICE
Chapter Ten develops theoretical relationships between collective identities,
opportunity structures, strategic orientations, and the variety of strategic choices governed
by strategic orientations. The primary task of this chapter is to expand upon these
advances by further developing the theoretical insights of Chapters Two and Three as well
as illustrating and, when possible, providing some semblance of a test of hypotheses using
the data described in Chapter Four. Whereas Chapters Nine and Ten put special emphasis
on issues and targeting respectively, the focus here shifts to explaining tactical choice. In
other words, this chapter begins to account for why CJOs choose to culture jam as opposed
to petition, demonstrate, strike, or riot.
This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I review the various approaches to
explaining tactical choice. Second, I develop a set of theoretical relationships between the
goals and ideologies of SMOs. These involve the attribution of effectiveness and the
distribution of familiarity. Out of this discussion I develop a number of hypotheses. Third,
I employ these hypotheses in an effort to guide an empirical analysis of the tactical choices
of my sample of CJOs.
11.1. Tactical Choice
Explaining variation in tactics has received less attention than the question of
mobilization. Still, efforts at theory construction do provide some direction. Below, I
present the most noteworthy independent variables offered by the field. The review is
organized by three basic approaches found in the literature: RMT and its prominent
relation political opportunity or process theory, collective action theory, and cultural
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perspectives. Importantly, this review highlights those variables distinctly associated with
each approach.
11.1.1. Resource Mobilization Theory
RMT identifies organizational, resource, and interactional variables as the principle
explanations of variation in strategic and tactical choices among SMOs (Gamson 1990;
Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1977; 1987a; Oberschall 1973). These include the
effects of the organizational structure of the SMO (Piven and Cloward 1979; Polletta 2002;
Staggenborg 1988; 1989), the variable resource endowments of the constituency of the
SMO (Gamson 1990; Lipsky 1968; McAdam 1999; Piven and Cloward 1979; Tarrow 1998),
and the SMO’s dependence on different sources of resource contributions (Lipsky 1968;
McAdam 1999; McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1977; Piven and Cloward 1979). The theory’s
primary insight is that variation n the capacity for protest is decisive in accounting for
mobilization. It is not a function of grievances or social breakdown, as decades of research
had argued. The motivations for protest are assumed to be basically constant. While more
transient forms of activism do not require strong organization, social movements
necessitate the development of formal divisions of labor and rules of decision-making in
order to manage the resource requirements of sustained conflict. Professional activists
must develop formal organizations that can mobilize resources (money, membership,
legitimacy, etc.) in the pursuit of goals on behalf of a movement constituency.
The conditions that shape an SMO’s ability to mobilize are of particular interest.
While other actors like corporations, political parties, and interest groups compete and
cooperate for resources in a given population, SMOs are at a distinct disadvantage due to
the nature of their goals and the generally low resource endowments of their constituency.
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Each SMO seeks the acquisition of scarce resources from a variety of sources such as
donations, volunteers, foundations, or the media in order to further their organizational
interests. Competition and cooperation among SMOs, authorities, counter-movements, the
media, and the general public for these scarce resources is affected by variation in the
general resource endowments of a population. However, organizational strategies are also
essential in adapting to whatever resource environment an SMO faces. These strategies
typically involve the marketing of a product: the set of goals and tactics that each SMO
offers in the pursuit of shared interests. Thus, according to RMT, organization, resources,
and interaction shape variation in tactical choices.
11.1.2. Political Opportunities
Political process theory or opportunity models joined the chorus in political science
to ‘bring the state back in’ by turning to political variables to explain contentious
phenomena (Eisinger 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al 1995;
McAdam 1999; Meyer 2004; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). While closely akin to RMT in its
emphasis on resources and strategic interaction, these approaches argue that the political
context decisively shapes the nature of political action. The state especially performs this
unique structuring role primarily for two reasons. First, it crafts authoritative public policy
for a territory and population. Actions of the state are public goods or public bads that
often affect the entire incentive structure of a population. Second, the state possesses
capacities far in excess of the other organizations in society, including the use of organized
violence. Thus, the structure of a population’s political institutions and actors at a given
moment - the POS - may provide varieties of opportunities for and constraints on
contentious collective action. These characteristics range from the basic features of the
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political regime such as federal or unitary structures and the capacity of the state to
enforce policy to more flexible configurations of power among political elites such as
changes in governing parties. In order to take advantage of the opportunities offered by a
vulnerable political space and further their agenda activists develop strategies and deploy
tactics tailored to these conditions
A general proposition ventured by this approach is that the relative openness of the
political system to challenge shapes tactical choices. While this is may be helpful for
explaining variation in strategies and tactics across populations and across time,
opportunities and constraints are not necessarily uniform across movements or SMOs; the
distribution of these factors across a population of activists can yield variable strategies
and tactics. For example, the perception of the level of threat posed by an SMO may yield
different forms and levels of repression by political authorities, thus making some forms of
action more or less attractive to other SMOs (McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998). Thus, political
opportunity theory extends the RMT emphasis on interaction by focusing on the political
context.
11.1.3. Collective Action Theory
Collective action theory also provides notable contributions to an explanation of
tactical choice (Chong 1991; Harris 1982; Lichbach 1995; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Olson
1965; Opp 1989). The principal goals of such analyses lie in determining under what
conditions a collective action problem is operative and identifying the range of solutions to
the result: the underproduction of public goods. The problem can be stated thus: if one
assumes that individuals are self-interested rational utility-maximizers, then they will tend
to underinvest in the production of public goods. As noted in Chapter Nine, public goods
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are goods with at least two basic properties: non-rivalry and non-exclusion. Rational
actors have little to no incentive to participate in the production of a good that they will
consume regardless of whether they contribute to its production. In other words, the good
generated is an externality; benefits can be received with no costs. Rational individuals
thus have incentives to ‘free-ride.’ If everyone free rides, then there is no public good.
Collective action theory’s emphasis on the free rider problem has generated a
tremendous literature oriented toward explaining mobilization. Efforts to explain strategic
and tactical choices are not as common (DeNardo 1985; Freeman 1983; Marwell and Oliver
1992; Opp 2009). They start with the basic assumption, in line with the general model,
that each strategic and tactical option has a set of associated costs and benefits shaped by
the constraints unique to the decision context.88 Choice is constrained by any number of
factors, including resources, values, and political repression. Whichever action yields the
highest utility under constraints, or the highest benefits minus costs relative to the
alternatives, is the chosen action.
11.1.4. Cultural Approaches
Cultural approaches in the field of social movements also offer a number of
explanations for tactical choice. In general, they consider the various processes and
products of sense-making that activists utilize in order to interpret their environment and
achieve their goals. They assume above all that actions are sensible only as a virtue of the
meanings that actors provide them. Before actors can be rational or strategic, they must
Both RMT and political process theory appropriate this concern over the costs and benefits of collective
action in order to provide some semblance of micro-foundational theory (Eisinger 1973; McCarthy and Zald
1973; 1977; 1987a; Oberschall 1973). For example, Tarrow (1998, 76-77) defines political opportunities as
features of the political environment that create incentives for action. However, the position of collective
action theory within these approaches is ambiguous and incomplete. Opp (2009) is critical of both their
failure to explicitly assimilate the collective action approach into their analyses despite their implicit and
often explicit reliance on it and their misinterpretations of the theory.
88
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make sense of their world and the actions of other actors. These meanings are shaped by a
variety of social determinants, including social interaction and/or social structures. These
determinants configure and reproduce the sets of meanings that constrain social life by
inducing cooperation and animating social conflict. Because each action can express
variable meanings and thus have variable effects on political behavior, understanding the
range of interpretations and their determinants is a decisive procedure in explaining social
movement activity. Although the literature is replete with a diversity of cultural variables
that are often ill-defined, three in particular constitute the bulk of the literature: framing,
collective identity, and ideology.
Utilized in numerous fields from psychology to economics to sociology, though
lacking in any common theoretical framework, frame theory explains variation in strategy
and tactics through a variety of framing processes (Gamson 1992; Johnston and Noakes
2005; Snow and Benford 1988; 2000a; Snow et al 1986). In the context of social movement
studies, framing is a social process of crafting and employing meaning in a strategic effort
to further one’s interests. These meanings are constellations of representations that
simplify reality by highlighting certain elements and excluding others. Whether in
discussion or contention, the definitions of social reality represented in contentious frames
can define a social situation in myriad ways that are conducive to or inhibitive of social
movement activity. Framing is thus a significant part of the ‘meaning work’ involved in
generating, sustaining, and inhibiting collective action. This labor includes the diagnostic,
prognostic, and motivational functions essential to collective action as well as the
countering of such frames propagated by opponents. For framing scholars, the diagnostic
framing efforts of activists, specifically the identification and elaboration of problems,

362

grievances, and responsibility for injustices, restricts the range of solutions available,
including choices in tactics.
NSM theories (Castells 1997; Habermas 1981; Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985;
Touraine 1981; 1985) and recent cultural and cognitive approaches (Eyerman and Jamison
1991; Jasper 1997; Jasper and Polletta 2001; Taylor and Whittier 1992) turn to collective
identity in order to explain social movement activity. As noted in Chapter One, NSM
theories identify new forms of collective action as products of broad structural changes in
the nature of the political economy. These changes, many of which focus on the
development of new class configurations amidst the rise of information and service
industries, tend to shift the focus of contention from issues of material well-being to postmaterialist life politics. However, beyond the effects of the structural position of actors,
these theorists are not explicit about the factors that shape differences in tactical choice
among activists (Opp 2009). More recent approaches are more explicit. Activists choose
tactics that best conform to who they believe they are. Choices are expressions and
confirmations of their values, beliefs, and their construction of themselves and others. In
other words, variation in the content of collective identity shapes the tactical choices of
activists.
Early studies of social movements attended to ideology as an explanatory variable
(Turner and Killian 1987; Wilson 1973), but emerging RMT and political opportunity
theory dismissed social psychological explanations of mobilization. Recent emphases on
resources, politics, and frames prompted several scholars to propose a reintegration of
ideology into studies of social movement activity (Dalton 1994; Zald 2000). This
“ideologically structured action” approach develops the argument that basic sets of value
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and beliefs constrain social movement activity ranging from organizational choices to
tactical approaches. Several studies utilize the beliefs and values held by activists as a
prominent independent variable for explaining variation in tactics (Downey 1986; Gamson
1989; Nepstad 2008). The literature on European environmental movements is
particularly well-developed in its work on the relationship between ideology and strategy
(Brulle 2000; Carmin and Balser 2002; Dalton 1994; Dryzek 1997).
11.2. Theory and Hypotheses
11.2.1. The Structure of Repertoires
DeNardo (1985, 262) observes that “to explain why one strategy [or tactic] is
adopted is to explain why other strategies [or tactics] are not.” This entails first the
identification of the range of tactics available to protesters. As Ennis (1987, 522) argues, “A
theory of tactics must start with the range of options available to a given actor at a moment
in time.” There are at least two possible avenues: deduction and induction.
In the most complex formal analysis of strategic choice in the literature, DeNardo
(1985) classifies radical strategies and tactics along two continuous variables in order to
capture their degree of disruption: the number of people mobilized and the degree of
violence. Evaluations of the utility of strategic choices are functions of various constraints,
including the level of support in the population, the degree of responsiveness of the regime
to radical demands, state repression, and a number of dichotomous psychological variables
including the intensity of preferences among radicals and their patience with respect to the
desired outcomes of action. While the virtues of his theory are numerous, it does not
attempt to capture variation in choices among tactics that introduce roughly the same level
of disruption when the action is peaceful. In other words, when both mobilization and
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violence are held constant, qualitative variation in strategic and tactical choices is not
explained. Finer theoretical instruments are required.
In this chapter, I begin a cursory effort to identify what Ennis (1987) refers to as the
structure and meaning of culture jamming repertoires. Beginning from a list of tactics
utilized in the Boston area over a five year period, Ennis measures the similarity and
differences in attitudes towards tactics regarding their support, use, and effectiveness.
Structures of association are then identified across the data that cluster and distinguish
sets of tactics. Ennis’s approach is thus to develop a list of tactics from recent local practice
and allow respondents to evaluate them. An alternative approach is to allow respondents
to develop their own sets of classifications and evaluate them appropriately. While the
former assumes that the list derived prior to the survey is sufficiently exhaustive and
complete to offer a compelling source of comparable data, the latter approach makes no
such assumption but instead seeks to identify what such a list might look like. Additionally,
the latter approach allows for more rigorous testing of a theory of tactics that involves
variation in intersubjective recognition and evaluation in the categories of tactics.
This question requires some engagement here in order to answer the question: how
do I conceive the range of tactics available to activists for hypotheses development? This
concern will be addressed in two ways. First, through my sample of the culture jamming
repertoire of contention I develop a description of their tactical repertoires, while also
incorporating a wider set of data to fill out what constitutes the culture jamming repertoire
of contention. The effort is thus entirely inductive. Second, I rely on conventional
distinctions between tactics in the development of hypotheses. For example, in the first
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hypotheses I distinguish conventional or institutional tactics from all other tactics and
violent tactics from all other tactics.
11.2.2. The Attribution of Effectiveness
In Figure 3.3, I present a schematic set of relationships in which the attribution of
effectiveness across a set of tactics is in part a result of an SMO’s ideology. As Polletta
(2002, 20) observes, “our very criteria for assessing what is instrumental, strategic,
efficient…are based on the social associations underpinning those conceptions.” In Chapter
Three, I defined effectiveness as the perceived ability of a tactic to further the goals and
objectives of an SMO. It constitutes a continuous variable ranging from counter-effective to
ineffective to effective. Accordingly, an SMO defines its preference structure over tactics by
attributing varying degrees of effectiveness to the tactics of the repertoire of contention.
Figure 11.1 presents the general relationships that attribute effectiveness. Effectiveness is
defined and constrained in this analysis principally by the goals of an SMO and its ideology.
Strategic orientations are developed in response to these considerations, clarifying an
SMO’s sense of what constitutes effective action for them.
In the previous chapter I link ideologies and strategic orientations, while in Chapter
Nine I develop descriptions of goals and strategic orientations. The task here necessitates a
return to all three. Table 11.1 recaps the relevant descriptive hypotheses. In Chapter Nine
Ideology
Strategic Orientation
Goals
Figure 11.1. Relations of Effectiveness
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Action

Table 11.1. Hypothesized Goals and Strategic Orientations
Goals
Intrinsic
Cultural
Post-materialism
Club Good
Autonomous

Strategic Orientations
Intrinsic
Insular
Low Disruption
• Small Mobilization
• No Violence

I identify CJOs as associated with the pursuit of intrinsic, cultural, post-material, club good,
and autonomous goals. As the basic organization of strategic choices, strategic orientations
– intrinsic, insular, and low social disruption - are general guides to an SMO’s sense of what
is effective in the pursuit of their goals and objectives. The pursuit of intrinsic, postmaterial, club good, and autonomous goals does not provide any a priori reason to
distinguish across strategic relations. However, consider the pursuit of cultural goals, goals
that focus on and through non-state structures. From this starting point it seems plausible
to suggest that what I referred to as the vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities of the
discursive and economic opportunity structures are the most determinant in shaping the
group’s sense of effectiveness. The relation between cultural goals and political actors and
institutions offer one of two conditions for such an SMO: 1) politics is an irrelevant sphere
of activity, or 2) an indirect route into politics (through non-state structures) is made more
attractive than a direct route by some feature(s) of the political environment. This is
supported by Wettergren’s (2005, ch. 8) finding and the findings of Chapter Ten that for
CJOs the political opportunity structure is not considered favorable to larger-scale actions
and that political institutions are perceived as basically untrustworthy if not irrelevant. A
hypothesis may be developed:
H11.1: CJOs do not attribute high effectiveness to conventional or institutional tactics.
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This hypothesis does not specify whether such tactics are generally ranked as low in
effectiveness or if they are defined as counter-effective. It does lead us to anticipate that
conventional or institutional tactics like voting, petitions, or lawsuits are not perceived as
particularly useful for achieving the specific goals of the organization.
Second, SMOs develop strategic orientations that most efficiently exploit their
environment in order to most effectively pursue their goals. Consider the low level of
social disruption expected of culture jamming activities. In part this entails a generally
non-violent posture. In and of itself this should bear no necessary hypotheses about the
relation between effectiveness and violence for CJOs. For example, violence may be
regarded as effective but morally repugnant. Still, it does suggest a plausible hypothesis:
H11.2: CJOs do not attribute high effectiveness to violent tactics.
This leads to the expectation that actions involving personal violence and property damage
are not construed as especially efficacious.
The paucity of hypotheses does not mean that we lack guidance for the theoretical
approach taken here, but rather that the process remaining is messier. The empirical
descriptions of ideologies and strategic orientations offered by chapters nine and eleven
should divulge richer implications for further clarifying what kind of preference structure
might be expected.
11.2.3. Familiarity and Tactical Choice
This dissertation involves the explanation of tactical choice in part through a
translation of the concept of familiarity common to both Tilly and Bourdieu into a
behavioral approach to collective action theory. Figures 11.2 and 11.3 reproduce the
formal depiction of this relation offered in Chapter Three. In Figure 11.2, the probability of
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Familiarity

Scarcity

Probability of Tactical Adoption
Among SMO Population

Abundance

Percentage of Population

Figure 11.2. The Distribution of Familiarity and Tactical Adoption
a tactic being adopted within a population of SMOs is a function of the familiarity that
actors have with the everyday correlates of the action and the percentage of the population
that possesses these schemas. The latter may be broadly distinguished as scarcely or
abundantly distributed. In the case of abundance, skills that are widely distributed provide
certain tactics with a substantial probability of adoption across a population of SMOs.
Conversely, skills that are scarcely distributed provide certain tactics with an increased
probability of adoption among a small number of SMOs in the population, precisely because
these schemas are possessed by a small part of the population. According to the analysis
provided in Chapter Three, schemas reduce the uncertainty in a decision context by
providing more confidence in the estimation of expectations for some tactical alternative
but not others. This variation in confidence produces incentives for SMOs to discriminate
among their tactical options on the assumption that the SMO is ambiguity averse.
Figure 11.3 identifies a further relation between familiarity and the probability of
tactical adoption: transaction costs. Here, the relation takes the form of a positively
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Decreasing Transaction Costs

Probability of Tactical Adoption
Among SMO Population

Familiarity

Figure 11.3. Familiarity, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Adoption.
decelerating curve. At very low levels, marginal increases in familiarity engender
significant decreases in transaction costs. As familiarity continues to increase, however, it
yields a decreasing rate of return as a more confident sketch of the possible situation
comes into view. Once the major details of the situation are in place, increases in
familiarity are of less and less value in altering probabilities of tactical adoption. Ceteris
paribus, assuming variation in transaction costs across any set of tactical alternatives,
differences in such costs (indeed any costs) account for differences in the probability of the
adoption of the tactic.
If the foregoing relation between familiarity and tactical adoption is true, then
similar to Jasper’s (1997) argument and Carmin and Balser’s (2002) finding that personal
experience tends to shape an SMO’s tactical repertoire, I expect those with biographies of
artistic production to develop tactics that utilize their experiences. In Chapter Seven I
establish the scarcity of schemas associated with the aesthetic disposition. The skills and
competencies of cultural producers, especially artists, are more likely to dispose them to
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act in ways consistent with these skills and competencies, because, in part, they reduce
both the uncertainty and the transaction costs associated with some action and not others.
But does an aesthetic disposition shape tactical choices? In a synthesis of Tilly and
Bourdieu, Crossley (2002a, 62) offers a hypothesis: “Given the skills and competencies
which specific fields presuppose, [actors] from different backgrounds will tend to have
different dispositions for action in those various fields.” Given the skills and knowledge
which the field of artistic production presupposes, I hypothesize:
H11.3: CJOs are associated with the adoption of tactics that utilize the skills and
knowledge associated with the aesthetic disposition.
This hypothesis suggests that the tactics used by CJOs will involve the various skills and
knowledge associated with artistic production.
11.3. Analysis
As with previous chapters none of the hypotheses, propositions, or expectations
developed above is tested in the strictest sense. The data derives from the sample of CJOs
specified in Chapter Four. Below, I describe the tactical repertoires of CJOs and illustrate
hypotheses related to the attribution of effectiveness across the set of available tactics and
the distribution of familiarity and it’s relation to culture jamming.
11.3.1. Tactical Repertoires
The tactical repertoires of CJOs (and the collective culture jamming repertoire of
contention) are the primary dependent variable of this study, though the research design of
this study provides almost no variation in repertoires. This effort at description is largely
inductive. First, CJOs are prolific producers of media. Every group, defunct or active,
maintains a website. Many utilize Facebook and Twitter accounts. Ten of the twelve
groups published books, magazines, and/or articles (AMF, BIL, CAE, CTM, IAA, IST, NGL,
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RBC, SCP, TYM). Like many of the groups, the BLF provides theoretical and practical texts
on their website as well as press releases for the media. Only the AAA lacks equivalent
textual media production. Notably, some produce texts that are themselves culture jams
including websites (AMF, AAA, BLF, BIL, TYM), books (BIL, IST), magazines (AMF), and
audio (NGL). While almost every group produces and distributes some form of video
content on sites like Youtube, some produce commercials, music videos, and films for
offline distribution (AMF, BIL, NGL, RBC, TYM). In addition, all of the groups have some
members that participate in interviews for various media outlets. Typically these media are
local or alternative outlets, but some groups do engage mainstream media (AMF, BIL, NGL,
RBC, TYM).
Second, I develop a basic distinction between experimental and non-experimental
tactical repertoires. In the case of the former, CJOs utilize a wide variety of tactics that are
experimental, highly creative, and typically change over time. Such CJOs are “innovative
hothouses,” organizations that possess a “high level of critical awareness, technical
expertise in various fields, small organizational structures, an innovative and cooperative
mindset, and a flexible agenda” (Rolfe 2005, 70). Non-experimental repertoires are
characterized by a narrower range of tactics and consistency in tactical choice with only
minor variations. In other words, the experimental CJO repertoire tends to be unstable and
diverse, while the non-experimental variant tends to be stable and comparatively uniform.
I define experimentation in-depth in the following chapter, but for now a general common
sense understanding is sufficient.
Four groups in the sample exhibit experimental repertoires (AAA, CTM, CAE, IST),
while the IAA is a mixed case. I consider the CAE here in detail. The CAE aim to “develop
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tactics and tools of resistance” (Hirsch 2005, 28). Many CAE tactics are variations on street
theater, which they define as “those performances that invent ephemeral, autonomous
situations from which temporary public relationships emerge that can make possible
critical dialogue on a given issue” (2001, 87). Key references here are the invisible theater
and happenings, performances that blur the distinction between theater and everyday life.
Blending pedagogy, participation, and experimentation, CAE’s signature approach is what
they describe as recombinant theater. I provide two examples:
1) Critical Art Ensemble designed this work to be performed at tourist sites and locations of
extreme consumption. Note that such locations are heavily garrisoned and fortified, so only
the slightest act of deviance is needed to provoke a coercive response.
The performer selected a spot near an entrance/exit area at a public site, taking a position
at the side of the entrance way so as to minimize blockage. In place, he began to set up a toy
car track and then proceeded to push toy cars around the track. Other cars were displayed
for anyone else who wanted to participate. Other collective members insinuated themselves
into the crowd that developed, and spoke with the onlookers.
The results: The crowd generally began by speculating on the mental health of the
performer. Common themes were that the performer was “loony,” “on drugs,” or a “Viet
Nam vet.” Some people would join the performer in pushing cars around the track,
sometimes as a taunt, but mostly as gesture of sympathy. Within two to five minutes
security guards or police would arrive on the scene. They would approach cautiously,
fearing it was a disturbed person who might be prone to violence….The sight of security
forces would attract more people to the scene. F
2) CAE chose a harmless [Sheffield, UK] action that took place in a location where the
typical activities of the local population would not be disturbed. The activity chosen was to
give away beer and cigarettes. The location selected for the action was a pedestrian mall
and transportation artery. Here CAE attempted to inject the expressive possibilities of open
exchange found in a public bar into a space that was reserved exclusively for consumption.
Although the area was allegedly a public space, no conversation, conviviality, or coming
together of diverse groups (or any other characteristic of bourgeois utopian public space)
occurred there. Once this managed space was broken by the alien gesture of offering free
beer and cigarettes, these very same elements of utopian public space immediately
emerged…The most interesting reaction from the male participants was complete
astonishment at the action. The whole context —a moment of meeting new people, having
conversations, getting drunk while waiting for the tram, getting free commodities, and so
on—seemed so unbelievable that as one man put it, “It’s a dream come true.” Years of
socialization had made it seem impossible that members of the public could appropriate the
space of the commodity. In this case, prior to the event, reterritorialization of the space of
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the commodity through public process could only be imagined in the confines of a personal,
interior dreamspace (CAE 2001, 90-91).

The group engages in a number of other actions. They deploy a variety of installations
within art contexts like museums and galleries. Some of the more interesting involve
forays into bioart and the politics of biotechnology. An example is the Cult of the New Eve, a
live performance akin to a spectacular teach-in in which the group re-contextualize the
rhetoric of biotechnology by masquerading as a cult (CAE, Vanouse, and Wilding 2000).
One of Adbusters’ favorite tactics and a typical one for the CAE is the un-commercial.89
Along with the culture jamming group the Institute for Applied Autonomy, CAE employ
what they refer to as contestational robots (2001, ch. 6). These robots are designed to take
the place of the physically vulnerable human while performing certain functions that elicit
the attention of authority, such as graffiti writing and pamphleteering. Another tactic is the
shopdropping of informative works, such as those that comment on the medical regime in
the United States and the superfluity of technology. Other notable actions include bicycle
radios that blare détournements, plagiarized texts, small digital devices placed in various
environments that display humorous and critical messages, “sorry” bricks and flags at
tourist sites or monuments, and the renaming of streets.
Other groups exhibit a similar pattern. The AAA (2013a) developed an app for the
Mozilla Firefox browser that replaces advertisements with art, printed and distributed a
fake New York Times, replaced public bench and video advertisements with
subvertisements and art, shopdropped a variety of products, recorded interviews on
outdoor advertising and played them through small covertly placed sound systems in
As Wettergren (2005, 8n2) notes, the term un-commercial actually refers to two distinct tactics. One
involves the spoofing of a corporate commercials in order to critique the message the corporation is sending,
while the other resembles a short film that ‘advertises’ the concerns of the group.
89
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various high traffic locations, and a variety of others. The CTM identify their efforts as
“experiments” and “training exercises” (Gach and Sholette 2006), as “templates for tactics”
(Gach 2007). They developed dozens of actions: during a protest against the 2000 Bush
inauguration they handed out doughnuts to activists and offered them to cops; they set up
a fortune-reading space on the sidewalk and offered to curse malignant institutions and
provide means to resist them; developed a black-painted ice cream truck (think SWAT
truck) with multiple functions: surveillance, dispensing ice cream, and offering
propaganda; and many more (CTM n.d.(a)). The IST (2012) also developed a variety of
approaches: they offered to sell their patriotism while intoxicated, publicly perform the
commands explicit in advertising, shopdropped their dictionary of fear and security related
terms, and re-staged the U.S.-Mexican border fence at a Native American reservation.
Seven groups possess largely non-experimental tactical repertoires (AMF, BLF, BIL,
NGL, RBC, SCP, TYM). An extreme example of this phenomenon is the BLF. The group
engages exclusively in the culture jamming of billboards. While there are some variations
in this tactic – for example, the subversion of a neon sign, the addition of mechanical
elements, or the explicit use of Kantian philosophy – the basic idea remains intact. As a
variant of street theater, the SCP performs silent plays in front of surveillance cameras
using poster boards to display text. They also offer walking tours of the surveillance
environment and produce maps identifying the cameras. The Billionaires ‘protest’ leftist
protesters and ‘support’ right wing protester by engaging in street theater and crashing
events. They adorn the garb and mannerisms of the ‘wealthy, sing satirical songs, and wave
satirical posters with phrases like these from the Billionaires for Wealthcare (n.d.(b)):
• Leave No Billionaire Behind
• Let Them Eat Advil
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• Because Nothing Says Freedom Like Denying Claims
• Our Death Panels Turn a Profit
Negativland’s musical production is their primary tactic, although they also have a radio
show. The AMF produce un-commercials, a culture jamming magazine, and famous
subvertisements, as well as develop campaigns such as Buy Nothing Day and TV Turnoff
Week (now Digital Detox Week) and pursue lawsuits.
Two remaining groups have somewhat wider repertoires, though they do not have
the character of experimental repertoires. The Yes Men acquire and maintain fake
websites for the WTO, the Bush Campaign, Dow Chemical, and other antagonists. These
allow the group to receive messages and requests for appearances in the media and at
industry conferences. Accepting the invitations in the name of their antagonists and
carrying the pretense throughout their speaking engagements, the group present
outlandish presentations critical of those they impersonate. Their media hoaxes – for
example, portraying Dow Chemical as accepting responsibility for the Bhopal, India
industrial accident after they purchased Union Carbide –likewise seek to “correct” the
identity of the offending party. Other actions include fake petitions, subvertisements,
masquerading as part of the Bush campaign, and producing and disseminating fake New
York Times and New York Post editions.
The two remaining groups are slightly more difficult to place. The IAA (n.d.(a))
developed an app that identifies the location of surveillance cameras, a text messaging
service that allows quick broadcasts of messages (useful for activists in the streets), an
“airline” that helps users track private airplanes contracted by the CIA for the rendition
program, and worked with the CAE in developing contestational robots. The RBC engages
in a variety of performance actions, what they call “Art Attacks” (Talen 2006, 26). A typical
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action involves the Reverend Billy, a crusading, wild-eyed, thundering, Elvis-style preacher
of a gospel of shop shopping, and members of the choir either infiltrating private property
(Starbucks, Wal-Mart, Bank of America, etc.) or occupying public space with singing,
praying, and preaching. Exorcisms are performed on cash registers and credit cards.
Variations within this basic model are legion: a Thanksgiving dinner at Bank of America,
spilling oil in the Tate Museum, congregants adorned in toad costumes symbolizing an
extinct species. Other performances are somewhat more idiosyncratic. The group
frequently participates in Whirlmarts:
In a Whirl you go up and down the aisles pushing an empty shopping cart, in a long line that
turns and turns and goes straight and turns again, through the Big Box, for an hour. You
never put anything into the cart and keep pushing, looking straight ahead. If anyone stops
you and demands an exclamation, just say “I’m not shopping” (Reverend Billy 2006, 141).

Another example includes the cell phone opera (Talen 2003, 71. In this action, participants
dress inconspicuously and pretend to shop at some corporate establishment. Each
member engages in a cell phone call about shopping that evolves into a rousing
condemnation of the entire shopping experience. Soon, the shop is filled with a cacophony
of indignation. Products are lifted into the air and accused of a variety of social and
psychological ills. Suddenly, the anger turns into singing and the reverend bursts into a
sermon as congregants place audio players in covert positions throughout the store. Once
the event is concluded, recordings of testimonials from sweatshop workers blare
throughout the store. Beyond these actions, the RBC is also involved in more conventional
civil disobedience actions like the blockage of construction equipment and police.
Along with the production of media, the most common tactical forms in this
discussion are performance-based actions (BIL, CTM, CAE, IST, RBC, SCP, TYM) and
subvertisements (AMF, AAA, BLF, CAE, NGL, TYM). Variations on shopdropping are also
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prominent (AAA, CAE, IST, RBC), as are subversive objects situated in non-retail contexts
(AAA, CAE, IAA, IST, RBC). Impersonation and role-playing are prominent features of the
performance-based actions (BIL, CAE, RBC, TYM). Non-culture jamming actions include
lawsuits (AMF, RBC), demonstrations (AMF), and more conventional forms of civil
disobedience (RBC, TYM). However, what is clear is that the examples provided and the
many that were not included due to space constraints strongly suggest a performance and
media-based repertoire of contention with dramatic variations and experimentation.
11.3.2. Attribution of Effectiveness
Above I define effectiveness as the perceived ability of a tactic to further the goals
and objectives of an SMO. This emphasis on goals and objectives emphasizes that while
some tactics may be oriented directly towards the ultimate goal, others may focus on an
objective supporting the goal. In fact, I argue that the bulk of an SMO’s actions are oriented
towards objectives. This makes an analysis of effectiveness potentially extremely complex.
To simplify the analysis, I begin with descriptions of how CJOs perceive their actions
producing outcomes. I follow with an analysis guided by the two hypotheses (H11.1,
H11.2) pertinent to the question of effectiveness.
First, I consider a point of concern. In the account pursued by this chapter, behaving
strategically appears to imply that tactical choice is governed simply by effectiveness.
However, choices are governed by constraints as well. This means that tactics perceived to
be less effective than others may still be chosen if some constraint makes them too costly
or another option is more beneficial. Importantly, this implies that sets of discrete causes
(incentives) exact independent effects on tactical choice. The design of this study is unable
to systematically distinguish these effects. Moreover, a more insidious problem looms:
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rationalization. A group may rationalize an action as effective if it is chosen primarily for
some other set of incentives, such as intrinsic enjoyment. In this scenario, conclusions
based on the evidence risk a type I error in which the effectiveness of a tactical approach is
falsely identified as a factor in tactical choice. An opposing hypothesis is offered by Polletta
(2002). She demonstrates that many so-called cultural or personal benefits do perform
important strategic functions. An incentive like intrinsic enjoyment may perform
important functions such as building commitment and solidarity or developing skills
pertinent to protest or some activity crucial to the SMO’s goal (Staggenborg 1991, 100).
The research design of this study does not allow me to reject the rationalization hypothesis,
and thus leads to me emphasize illustration over testing.
Effectiveness may be defined intrinsically. For example, a tactic must be capable of
changing an audience member’s individual consciousness, however temporary, in the
general direction of the CJO’s ideology in order to be regarded as effective. Another
example is the generation of solidarity, or the reinforcement of an audience member’s
individual consciousness in the event that it already aligns with the CJO’s ideology.
Effective tactics may also involve the generation of a dialogue or engaging a wide audience.
Such notions of effectiveness constitute the common denominator among the sample of
CJOs. For example, the BLF describes their actions as “fauxvertising, [in which] an existing
message is creatively falsified to reach a higher truth or deeper meaning. It takes an
unacceptable sales pitch and turns it into a provocative statement” (Black n.d.).
Fauxvertising, their term for subvertising, thus expresses the ‘truth’ in advertising.
However, provocation is not the result of simple pedantry. For the bitter pill of truth to
“[stick] in our minds” (Berger 2000) and [encourage] thinking (Napier n.d.), it demands a
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more covert and pleasing coating. Riddles serve this function: “My favorite billboards are
ones that are enigmatic – the ones that people have a hard time figuring out right away.”
Humor as well lubricates the processing of the message: “You don’t go up and spray paint
“Fuck Exxon” on a billboard, because the average working guy or cop looks at that and they
go, Commies!” (Haller and Napier 2006). Thus, truth slides in with a Trojan Horse.
But truth does not simply lie fallow or inert; it paradoxically inspires frustration and
hope. Member Kalman (2008) suggests that “what resonates most with our audience is
expressing a collective frustration” with the ubiquity of advertising. Once it settles into the
mind, however, the frustration gives way to a playful anger without impotence, to hope.
Napier (2009) describes his own experience of a sense of hope arising from the “chance
juxtaposition of disparate images or essences that I might come across in my daily
excursions.” This hope arises in the realization that one need not be subject to the
monologue of advertising; rather, one can “change the Advertising message in your own
mind,” and “enter into the High Priesthood of Advertising” (Napier and Thomas 2006).
The AMF posit a similar process in which a subvertisement introduces a ‘moment of truth’
into an otherwise dishonest means of communication. However, crucial differences betray
the extrinsic focus of the group. First, the AMF strongly emphasizes behavioral change
following the spark of authentic life. Lasn (1999, xiv) is clear:
Once you experience even a few of these ‘moments of truth,’ things can never be the same
again. Your life veers off in strange new directions. It’s very exciting and a little scary.
Ideas blossom into obsessions. The imperative to live life differently keeps building until
the day it breaks through the surface.

Here, Lasn (2001) emphasizes not dialogue, but an arrest of the spectacle: “It's a way of
stopping the flow of the consumer spectacle long enough to adjust your set.” Second, the
AMF stress the diffusion of ideas. Lasn (1999, 123) calls the germ of the subvertisement a
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meme, “a unit of information that leaps from brain to brain. Memes compete with one
another for replication, and are passed down through a population much the way genes are
passed through a species.” Here, he emphasizes the capacity of ideas to travel through an
entire culture and defeat the ideas in power. Elsewhere, Lasn (2001) notes: “The point is to
break out of a trance. But culture jamming works on a social scale - a whole culture's satori
is at stake.” Thus he identifies culture jamming as a crude means of cultural change: “When
all this cognitive dissonance reaches critical mass in our collective unconscious, our minds
will open, the old consumer culture will heave its last” (Lasn 2001). Finally, as with many
other groups pursuing extrinsic goals means othe than culture jamming are required to
open up the channels of communication to allow the memes to proliferate. Because a
meme war requires a level-playing field, the AMF advocates an “Industrial Pincer,” a
movement on the level of the media (the meme war) and a grassroots level of action
involving lawsuits, citizens groups, and protests to open the airwaves (Lasn 1999, 134).
The Billionaires (like the Yes Men) offer more consideration of a relation between
intrinsic objectives and extrinsic goals. The group uses a process similar to the previous
examples: a masquerading ‘truth’ sticks in the mind and inspires both anger and a sense of
agency and freedom. This performs a number of intrinsic functions: “It's very effective at
inviting people who don't have a strong history of political activism, but share progressive
values and views, and are skilled, creative professionals. It's good at inviting young people
with ironic tendencies. It's good at replicating itself” (Boyd 2004). Yet, organizing is the
stuff of social change. “There are a lot of forms of activism that are massively more
effective. Like MoveOn…or Greenpeace” (Boyd 2004). These groups and others know:
You have to make email lists and stay in touch with the community. You have to figure out
what is your relationship with elections and maybe have an outside strategy where you are
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doing some of the boring, painful compromising work of running an election. You also have
to think about how to build power over the long term and build organizations and NGO
infrastructures. You have to do all this stuff. You have to have powerful charismatic leaders
who are maybe not “creative”, fancy, artsy or humorous (Boyd 2004).

The crucial contribution of the Billionaires is to generate “media attention” (Boyd 2004).
“Media attention is not the goal; the goal is to reach people. But media attention is a subgoal, in that it's probably the most important way we have of reaching people. It's not an
ultimate goal of the campaign, but it is an operational goal” (Boyd 2004). The media diffuse
the message of the Billionaires to audiences far larger than the direct audiences they
encounter on the ground. Yet, media attention is not in itself sufficient. It merely carries
the message, a message that ideally shifts the salience of an issue:
I just emphasize this again and again with people with whom I do workshops and talk to –
creative actions, creative interventions can draw attention to an issue; they can push a
corporate target which is stealing from the people or getting away with an ecological crime,
and you can put a spotlight on them and it can be extremely useful (Boyd n.d.)

Spotlighting an issue ideally performs a number of functions, including elevating the profile
of like-minded groups working on that issue: “But then there has to be a larger movement
that keeps holding their feet to the fire” (Boyd n.d.). The Billionaires thus see their action
as buttressing long-term organized efforts to generate social change.
Unlike the Yes Men, however, the group suggests a possible behavioral effect
resulting from media coverage. For example, the group speculates on the role of the
message in voting behavior:
What we tell funders is that we're trying to reach voters in battleground states. One part of
it is suppressing Bush voters by confirming their nagging suspicions that he is serving
corporate interests at the expense of the average voter. We're also trying to persuade those
in the middle (Boyd n.d.).

First, the message – economic inequality and corrupt campaign finance – may exploit the
general distaste for the translation of economic power into political power felt even by
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conservative voters. If these suspicions are sufficiently confirmed, the suggestion is that
the voters may simply refuse to vote, thus reducing the overall turnout of Bush supporters.
Second, a similar mechanism is at play on those voters in the middle, typically centrists,
independents, or undecideds. However, because these voters are not loyal to a
conservative candidate, persuasion may generate votes for the liberal candidate.
Another means of effecting change is expressed by the CAE. As one of their primary
tactics, the CAE fashion social interactions - what they call recombinant theater - that aim
to temporarily undermine authoritarian culture. The process of such performances begins
with the oppressive codes and practices that “normalize” and “homogenize” an audience
through extreme expression management, such as a pedestrian walkway at a mall. In such
managed contexts, the group deploys performance pieces and interactive installments that
aim to provide an interface between the abstraction and the immediacy of contemporary
power: “Experiencing the material effects of the real hyperreal as a means to understand its
politics in a lived way is at the heart of our performances. It is in this realm that the
transparent codes become opaque” (CAE 1996, 142).
Under these conditions, a loose-knit ephemeral public can emerge. An actual construction of
a public (temporary though it may be) through an open field of performative practice makes
possible a productive pedagogy…In this way, a participatory process can emerge out of both
rational social interactions and nonrational libidinal trafficking that creates skepticism in an
individual about the taken-for-grantedness of the social codes of a given situation (CAE
2001, 90).

Like the previous culture jams, such scenarios generate ‘moments of truth,’ but with the
CAE there is less of an emphasis on behavioral change. The focus is strongly directed at
creating moments of autonomy. However, the group does posit a connection to action,
however vague. First, they make a key distinction:
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Some activities, though they are performed, are not performative. These are activities that
directly intervene in the distribution of power on a macro level. A strategic form is policy
construction and reform; a tactical form is electronic civil disobedience. These types of
activities CAE considers political. The other form of intervention is in changing perceptions
through representational exchange. Tactical media practitioners initiate social processes
that aid people in perceiving a social system and their roles within in it in a manner that is
different from the normalized perception of these phenomena. This type of action is
pedagogical (emphasis added, CAE 1996, 142).

Political action is thus explicitly oriented towards reshaping the environment. It is what I
call extrinsic. The CAE identify their actions as pedagogical. Such actions “allow
[participants and viewers] to…gain a greater measure of autonomy (the affirmation of their
own desires and control over their surroundings)” (CAE 1996, 40). Such autonomy is
crucial in developing new ideas and conceptions - “alternative possibilities in relation to
the specific or general issue addressed” - apart from those imposed by the authoritarianism
of the managed situation (CAE 2001, 25). Pedagogy thus “prepares the consciousness of
individuals for new possibilities, and in the best cases, moves them to political action” (CAE
2001, 25). This work of preparation is crucial considering that much of the CAE’s texts are
ruminations on the possibility of political action in contemporary capitalism. Elsewhere,
the group engages directly the question of cultural change when they emphasize, “a single
project can at best only restructure a limited situation, while it is the aggregate of
politicized cultural actions that can create a break or shift in culture as a whole” (CAE
2012b, 104). The CAE thus adhere to a basic critical mass model similar to the AMF,
although the former refuse the efficacy of a war of ideas in an open mass media.
The IST fashions performative contexts intended to produce a similar function to
the CAE, although they do not emphasize the imminence of autonomy. As they note, “We
want people to use what we’re given in everyday life to start new conversations or think
about a new way of inhabiting a public space...We want to invent new ways of life and new
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ways of being social – if only temporarily” (Kanarinka and Pirun 2006). However, the
group are ambiguous in relating the construction of these events and broader social
change. While at one point, Rasovic declares “a million small influences make a change,”
(McQuaid 2005), in a personal interview the group refused to express such a relationship
(D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012).
Other models of action-outcome linkages are available. While some of the IAA’s
actions adhere to the common denominator of generating moments of truth, the same
actions are also intended to perform functions such as increasing the distribution of activist
pamphlets and removing the danger of physical harm by police from graffiti-writing. The
AMF developed the Blackspot sneaker as a means to showcase alternatives to
megacorporations and develop local economies. “Our hope is that people with similar
philosophies will be inspired by our experiment in grassroots capitalism and start their
own business ventures, spreading indie culture and providing ever more alternatives to
buying from megacorporations” (AMF n.d.(c)).
This construction of the relationship between actions and intended, if not hoped for,
outcomes thus constitutes a basic sense of how a group construes their own actions as
effective. Some comparative analysis of tactical effectiveness is already demonstrated.
Such an analysis is difficult, because tactics can perform different functions in the
achievement of an extrinsic goal. Nevertheless, the two hypotheses provide a guide to
discuss the relationships between culture jamming and other forms of action.
11.3.3. Comparative Effectiveness
The first hypothesis (H11.1) states that CJOs do not attribute high effectiveness to
conventional or institutional tactics. Recall that effectiveness varies from highly effective to
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no effect to countereffective. Ideally, I would utilize some measure of effectiveness similar
to Ennis (1987). However, the data restrict me to far more modest efforts. Here,
conventional or institutional tactics refer to those means of influence that engage legal and
regular political channels such as voting, campaigning, contacts with public officials (Verba
et al 1978), public discourse (newspaper opinion pieces, blogs, etc.), and judicial activity
such as lawsuits. The argument raised above claims that a hypothesized cultural goal may
suggest an irrelevant or inhospitable political environment. Consequently, it seems
plausible to suggest that such tactics are likely perceived to yield little in the way of goal
achievement. Nevertheless, other possibilities are plausible; cultural goals may involve
political objectives. Under this condition of heterogeneity, such tactics may in fact rate as
highly effective.
Some groups in the sample find noteworthy utility in conventional or institutional
tactics. Among their many activities, the AMF pursue numerous lawsuits against media
corporations (Lasn 2005). As noted above, the Billionaires view voting as a crucial part of
the linkage between intrinsic actions and extrinsic outcomes. The IAA speculates that
lawsuits, not legislative activity, will ultimately turn the tide against the privatization of
public space (Scheinke and IAA 2002, 118). The RBC engaged in a lawsuit following an
arrest and used it to champion the First Amendment. They also “often partner with large
NGO’s and advocacy groups, while they negotiate and lobby for policy change we raise the
profile of the effort and involve citizens more directly - creating classic inside/outside
campaigns” (RBC 2012). The Yes Men (n.d.(b)) regard “politics, lawsuits, letter-writing,” as
“needed for change to happen.” While this evidence lacks a sufficient distinction between
the use of a tactic and the perception of effectiveness, it does suggest that some CJOs
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evaluate conventional or institutional tactics positively. Such endorsements are not
uniform across all such tactics, however. For example, the AMF’s Lasn (2005) argues, “I
don’t think any amount of whining, especially using the 26 letters of the alphabet—writing
stories that whine about our culture and complaining about corporations—will do much. It
has been proven to be totally ineffective.”
Other groups express either no evaluation of such tactics (AAA, BLF, CTM, IST, NGL)
or a general disregard for them (CAE, SCP). The SCP’s Brown (personal interview, July 6,
2012) argues that appealing to the actors that created the problem of surveillance cameras,
and in so doing utilizing those means that the same actors designed for citizens to influence
them, is ineffective.
People would invariably ask why are we not petitioning the various local politicians to do
something about surveillance, or to have politicians actually involved in regulating them, so
that there’d be like a city-wide list and be regulated that way. And in all cases the response
was, “These are the people who didn’t do anything and created the problem. Either did
nothing or created the problem themselves. So it seems pointless in either case to ask them
to produce the solution, to go to somebody else.

Although the data is extremely limited, the analysis does suggest that CJOs do not offer a
blanket evaluation of conventional or institutional tactics as ineffective or countereffective.
The second hypothesis (H11.2) states that CJOs do not attribute high effectiveness to
violent tactics. Violence here refers to actual or threatened physical harm to people or
property. The close approximation of vandalism to many acts of culture jamming, at least
according to some antagonist, leads me to exclude such acts as property damage here.
Little is offered by the sample of groups regarding the question of the efficacy of violence.
All clearly endorse nonviolence, but only a small number comment in general on violence.
The Yes Men (n.d.(a)) ruminate on the relatively low start-up costs of violence relative to
their ‘interest’ in non-violence:
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For a non-violent mass movement to succeed it has to have an incredible amount of
support. Unfortunately, it’s pretty easy to do these things the violent way, you just need a
relatively small force that’s really well trained. But that’s not what we’re interested in; we’re
interested in doing this nonviolently, like they did in India to achieve independence, and like
the Civil Rights movement did to change the system at the time.

This does not comment on effectiveness, however. The SCP’s Brown (2009) is clear on the
efficacy of property damage: “in the American environment if you were destroying cameras
people would see you as a reason for putting more cameras up: you’re just another violent
activist.” The AMF are the only group that appears to explicitly condone the damaging of
property. For example, Lasn (1999, xiv-xv) describes the efficacy of his physical jamming
of a shopping cart dispenser with a bent coin:
Once you experience even a few of these ‘moments of truth,’ things can never be the same
again. Your life veers off in strange new directions. It’s very exciting and a little scary.
Ideas blossom into obsessions. The imperative to live life differently keeps building until
the day it breaks through the surface.

Elsewhere, the group appears to endorse anarchist elements like the Black Bloc (AMF
2012). While they do not mention violence in their endorsement, the Black Bloc is known
to occasionally engage in property destruction. Far too little information is available to
make any conclusions, however tentative, regarding this hypothesis.
Violent and institutional means of influence do not exhaust the wide array of
activities available to activists. Here I consider forms such as boycotts, demonstrations,
and civil disobedience. As should be evident from the discussion above, mass mobilization
and demonstrations are often regarded as effective or essential ingredients of social
change. However, the CAE (1996, 11) views such actions as ultimately ineffective because
they focus on an increasingly antiquated understanding of power: “As far as power is
concerned, the streets are dead capital! Nothing of value to the power elite can be found on
the streets, nor does this class need control of the streets to efficiently run and maintain
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state institutions.” Others stress the efficacy of civil disobedience. The Yes Men (2011)
compare the power of demonstrations and civil disobedience:
Millions of people in the streets couldn’t prevent the Iraq War. If a tenth of that many people
committed civil disobedience and had actually gotten arrested, what would have happened?
Maybe it would have stopped the war. If it was a real threat to the system, maybe the war
wouldn’t have happened. It’s definitely something to try. You make it impossible for the
system to continue, and it stops.

In contrast, the CAE (1996, 9) argue that although civil disobedience “is still effective as
originally conceived (particularly at local levels), its efficacy fades with each passing
decade.” This is the case because power has evacuated the streets and gone hypermobile.
Only in local conflicts does it retain its potency. Finally, boycotts receive mixed support as
well. While the IST declare that actions like boycotts work (D’Ignazio, Manning, and
Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012), the Yes Men’s Bichlbaum argues otherwise:
“Actually buying products that we like and not buying products that we don’t like really
achieves extremely little“ (Yes Lab Media 2009).
This analysis of the attribution of effectiveness suggests that for most groups in the
sample culture jamming is constructed as effective for certain limited objectives and goals.
More ambitious goals require other means of influence. Which tactics are useful in regards
to the latter is not terribly restrictive, although violence may not be conceived as terribly
effective.
11.3.4. The Aesthetic Disposition and Tactical Adoption
In Chapter Seven I provide evidence supporting the argument that participation in
culture jamming is associated with an aesthetic disposition. I build on this effort with the
third hypothesis (H11.3) of this chapter, which states that CJOs are associated with the
adoption of tactics that utilize the skills and knowledge associated with the aesthetic
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disposition. Here, tactics vary in the skills and knowledge associated with their
deployment, a specific expression of the more general Tillyian hypothesis that repertoires
are constrained by cognitive constraints. I focus here on those skills associated with the
field of art. Although most of the practices associated with CJOs are not so difficult or costly
that they effectively exclude all those without the requisite skills and knowledge (the skills
are not strictly necessary to most of the actions), skills function as resources constraints in
that their possession increases the likelihood that such actions will be taken, while the lack
of skills decreases the likelihood that such actions will be taken. While I spend nearly half
of Chapter Seven providing evidence of the aesthetic disposition, here I engage two
strategies: providing 1) a description of the skills utilized in the tactical repertoires of CJOs,
and 2) evidence that CJOs link the skills of art with their tactics.
First, I describe the culture jamming repertoire of contention above as constituted
by a basic set of tactical approaches (media production, subvertisements, performances,
and subversive objects, including shopdropping) supplemented by experimental tactical
repertoires. I focus on the first four categories. It is sufficient to suggest that more
experimental tactics vary widely in the degree to which artistic skills are required to
produce them. Importantly, I focus on the techniques required to produce these actions.
However, technicality is not the only means of establishing the degree to which artistic
skills are relevant to actions. The conceived relation of performances to outcomes may also
be informed by theoretical awareness of the reception of performances and media, an
awareness that is itself constructed by an aesthetic disposition. I assume that this question
has been more or less addressed in previous chapters.
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By definition, media production, including film production, writing, costume and
website design, musical production, and others, utilizes skills associated with the field of
art. While in some cases these tasks are handled by non-CJO agents, a great deal is
produced DIY-style. For example, the Yes Men’s Bichlbaum and Bonanno (2010) directed
their second documentary, The Yes Men Fix the World.
Subvertisements vary in their technical sophistication. Some involve the simple
covering or blacking out of letters in an advertisement text to change or delete a word,
while others involve elaborate modifications integrated into the design of a billboard. A
reasonable conjecture suggests an interactive relationship between technical
sophistication and the resource constraints imposed by skills. Under low technical
sophistication, technical artistic skills are not a determinate asset. However, with
increasing sophistication the value of such skills increases. Figure 11.4 provides an
example of a technically sophisticated Adbusters subvertisement. Here, practical
knowledge of painting and graphic design is required.
Performance-based actions also vary in the degree to which they require technical
knowledge and skills. At their most sophisticated, they involve elaborate props, costumes,
songs, and characterizations, while at their least sophisticated they require performers
engaging in improvised public dialogue and actions. The CAE perform actions that span the
spectrum of technical difficulty. For example, their Sheffield action involved nothing more
than a location, simple improvised performances, and beer (CAE 2001, 90-91). Yet, actions
like the Cult of the New Eve required elaborate art direction (CAE et al 2000). Because of
this variation in technical sophistication, the same argument that applies to
subvertisements should apply here. However, Haugerud (2013, 139) notes that even the
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Figure 11.4. Adbusters’ Joe Chemo Subvertisement.
Source: https://www.adbusters.org/content/joe-chemo-bed
simple act of public performance often requires some degree of skill in order to develop
confidence and translate performances into outcomes:
Billionaires had to transform what they knew about great wealth into embodied knowledge
conveyed through bodily expression – in order to perform their political dissent
convincingly. Improvisation and performance workshops, therefore, were part of the
Billionaires’ Manhattan chapter meetings. Participants learned how to make desirable
impressions on audiences or deal with hecklers (don’t take the bait and step out of
character) or with overly enthusiastic spectators who joined in shouting slogans with them
– and thereby disrupting the Billionaires’ carefully crafted media image.

These workshops were led by thespians, veteran performers imparting formal and tacit
knowledge of how to achieve effective public expression.
Subversive objects, including shopdropping, also vary in their degree of
sophistication. Many such objects are actually media like pamphlets and books. Others
include food items (see Figure 11.5), unmarked packages, bricks, flags, and a host of others.
More sophisticated forms involve elaborate graphic designs and product packaging.
Many CJOs recognize a linkage between the skills of art and their tactical
repertoires. The AMF’s Lasn (2005) is clear: “I think artists, designers and visual
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Figure 11.5. AAA Shopdropping. A Coca-Cola product that informs consumers about the
life of the laborers involved in the production of the product.
Source: http://antiadvertisingagency.com/project/peopleproducts123com/
communicators are extremely important. They use their skills to give people epiphanies
and wake them up from this media consumer nightmare that most of us are caught
in. When discussing why his group focuses more on consciousness and less on government
regulation, the AAA’s Lambert (2007) reasons, “I think the reason we land on the side of
awareness and critical thinking is because we are artists and that’s our area.” The CTM’s
Gach (2008a) describes his realization that art can be utilitarian (creative problem-solving)
and thus political:
I’ve always been interested in art. I drew and painted in high school and college, and I was
also interested in politics from a pretty young age. I didn’t see a connection between those
two for a very long time. Then I realized that art was more than just objects or things
hanging on walls. This opened me up to thinking about what the effect of art is on people,
what people bring to the art, what the art brings to them, and the relationship between the
art and the audience. At that point what became interesting to me was interactivity within
art, getting rid of objects altogether and getting into early performance art. I was also
coming to terms with the idea that the art is actually happening between the viewer and the
object, and it’s that space which is essential. Then when the object is less important, then all
of a sudden you start figuring out that the art object in many ways is, while it can be creative
and poetic and spiritual, it is also in many respects utilitarian.
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Art as creative-problem-solving is thus a set of understandings and skills that shape the
world according to the will of the artist. More to the point, art is a meta-skill set that allows
the integration of whatever skills are necessary to a task. The CAE emphasizes eclectic skill
sets as well:
Each artist in the group has his or her own specialized talents. The pool of skills includes
performance, book arts, graphic design, computer art, film/ video, text art, photography,
and critical writing. CAE generally uses these skills in a tactical manner. We choose a subject
matter, place it in a particular context (and hence address a particular audience), and then
attempt to construct a meaningful work in relation to the selected context (McKenzie and
Schneider 2000, 136).

The IST’s Rasovic comments as well on skills and practice:
There is this art technology, new media thing that could influence, politically, strategically,
artistically, but we have the skills and we could do this. I didn’t have to go to some kind of a
painting school to do this shit. I mean literally, for me anyway. It was a desire to
experiment, and a desire to really really use our skills, for something other than paying rent
and working for the man (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27,
2012).

The RBC’s director, Savitri D., describes her transition from a dancer to RBC activist:
When I was in my teens I was very political. I organized lots of things at my school – hunger
protests and peace concerts, and I was very active. It was when I became an artist that I
stopped being politically active. They were very distinct pieces of my life; I didn’t know that
I could put them together, though that seems so obvious now.
Then a lot of things coincided – meeting Billy and September 11th – and over about a year’s
time, I had the sudden understanding that I really had to dedicate myself to justice in a
different and new way…Yeah, I could continue being a dancer and performer and making
plays, but there were a lot of people doing that and a lot of people doing it really well and
that world wasn’t necessarily going to miss me. But I had a sense that I had a set of skills
and experiences that could feed a different kind of movement in a much more powerful way
(D. and Talen 2011, 209).

In contrast to the importance of skills demonstrated here, the SCP’s Brown offers the sole
example of a contrary position when he notes that the SCP avoided specialists in
performance by relying on volunteers without formal training (Brown, personal interview,
July 6, 2012; SCP 2006, 185).
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Despite suffering from data deficiencies, this analysis does suggest that many of the
CJOs in the sample are associated with the adoption of tactics that utilize the skills and
knowledge associated with the aesthetic disposition.
11.3.4. Uncertainty in Culture Jamming
Throughout this dissertation I argue that sets of skills and knowledge reduce the
uncertainty associated with using some tactics but not others. In Chapter Three, I made the
assumption that SMOs, including CJOs, are ambiguity averse, meaning they have a basic
preference for actions with more certain outcomes. Ceteris paribus, this suggests that
tactics associated with certain skills possessed by an SMO are more likely to be chosen than
tactics lacking such qualities. In this section, I provide a cursory description of CJOs
construction of uncertainty. I focus here on uncertainty relating to CJO actions, not
uncertainty about the future state of the world absent CJO action.
Many CJOs in the sample express a strong sense of uncertainty regarding their
actions and outcomes. The CAE (2001, 89-90) are straightforward when they note:
This model remains permanently experimental. The method itself may not be experimental,
but its application is. This type of performance is risky because the outcome is always
unknown. Like all experiments, this one can fail, and fail in the worst sense. While failure
from audience indifference to one’s gestures is always possible, experimental performance
can decline into a worst case scenario: a raving reinforcement of authoritarian culture.

Here, the group expresses a notable sentiment: performances like the group specializes in
are uncertain in that they can generate outcomes ranging from desirable to ineffective to
counter-effective. When describing their refusal to engage in illegal activity, the CAE
comment on the uncertainty involving the discretion of law enforcement:
No, we will walk up to the line, but we don’t cross it. There isn’t a work of art anywhere that
is worth going to jail for. However, as we all know you don’t have to break the law to go to
jail. Just exercising one’s rights is all it takes. There are plenty of laws on the books that are
there so that arrest remains discretionary—creating a false public emergency for example -
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and it’s often a way to disguise that the people being arrested are in fact political prisoners
(Hirsch 2005).

Despite their confident rhetoric, the AMF’s Lasn (n.d.) strikes a modest tone when he
states, “I think that Adbusters is an experiment in activism that is still unfolding. We’ve
learnt a hell of a lot over the last twenty five years.” The BLF’s Napier wonders whether
corporate power is so ubiquitous that only the necessity of trying justifies it:
I have thought about this question of whether it’s even possible anymore to question or
ridicule advertising, given that it has become so accepted as the language of the culture,” he
says. “All I can say is, you have to at least try. If there isn’t some kind of insurgent spirit
popping up between the cracks, you might as well give it up as a society. We’re not at that
point yet – not even close” (Berger 2000).

The IST’s Manning describes the group’s flirtation with spontaneity: “part of our thing is
that we don’t really know what’s gonna happen” (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic,
personal interview, August 27, 2012). In their action involving the placement of unmarked
packages in public spaces, Manning again refers to the uncertainty of such actions:
We thought a few times, “Should we actually do this? This might actually cause trouble?”
We did it of course, and nothing actually happened. I guess there is always a little bit of that
feeling of are we gonna be accosted the cops. Especially in the beginning when we were
doing the corporate Commands. We were basically trespassing in a way, sneaking into
malls or stores or wherever we are doing these commands. How are they gonna react? Are
they gonna come after us, throw us in jail? Is there gonna be big incident(D’Ignazio,
Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012)?

The IAA describes the first deployment of a contestational robot in Washington, D.C.: “We
didn’t know what was going to happen. We were fairly certain it was going to get taken
from us. We were gonna get caught. We expected that to happen” (Brusadin et al n.d.).
The same compulsion to act regardless of uncertainty is evidenced by the Yes Men
(n.d.(b)):
Before setting off from the States, we had tried to anticipate what might happen to us in
the city of Mozart. Never having addressed an audience of international lawyers before,
we had no idea how they would react. They had invited us thinking that we were ordinary
trade functionaries. They expected a garden-variety trade-conference lecture—not WTO
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dogma carried through to conclusions that are better left unstated in polite company. We
were sure to be confronted with outrage. But would we face physical danger?

These emphases on uncertainty stress what every SMO likely knows: activism is a
relatively uncertain form of political behavior. Uncertainties about effectiveness and
repression are particularly salient concerns. Yet, these CJOs describe the uncertainties they
encounter prior to actions they nonetheless employ. I consider why this might be the case
in the following chapter.
11.4. Conclusion
The primary concern of this chapter is to develop theoretical relationships between
everyday social organization, including the social relations that constitute opportunity
structures, and tactical choice. In so doing, I provide descriptions of the culture jamming
repertoire of contention; consider their sense of effectiveness; the aesthetic skills crucial to
the production of their tactics; and their construction of uncertainty. In other words, this
chapter begins to account for why CJOs choose to culture jam as opposed to petition,
demonstrate, strike, or riot.
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CHAPTER 12. TACTICAL INTERACTION AND INCENTIVES
Previous chapters rely on a static model of tactical choice in which an SMO, once
formed, must choose certain tactics over others in order to effectively pursue the group’s
goals. In this chapter, I refrain from developing a complete dynamic model. In its place, I
provide some theoretical direction for an empirical analysis of some of the incentives that
CJOs face in choosing tactics. My strategy focuses on three efforts. First, I develop
theoretical analyses of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives and generate hypotheses and
propositions regarding the relationship between particular incentives, resource
constraints, and tactical choice. Second, I elaborate on theoretical developments in
previous chapters by considering the dynamics of tactical interaction. In so doing, I draw
on the concepts of détournement and recuperation presented in Chapter Six. Third, I
present data drawn from the sample of CJOs to illustrate these dynamics.
12.1. Constraints and Incentives
12.1.1. Intrinsic Incentives
Although the central arguments of this dissertation concern effectiveness and
familiarity, choices in tactics are made under constraints. It is imperative to consider the
variety of constraints and incentives faced by CJOs in their tactical choices. I begin with
intrinsic incentives, which have partially been considered with the relation of schemas to
transaction costs. Recall first that in the case of intrinsic goals, effectiveness is determined
by the degree to which SMO’s perceive that actions are expected to achieve desirable
intrinsic outcomes. Importantly, the achievement of the specific goal does not exhaust the
range of costs and benefits that are also anticipated consequences of interaction. I focus on
two incentives: normative acceptability and intrinsic enjoyment.
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First, the normative acceptability of an action refers to how the action is expected to
comport with what an SMO’s members believe is just or right. For Jasper (1997), all actions
have a moral component. They contribute to the story of our lives, the development of
character, a continual process of affirmation, innovation, and transgression that helps guide
our choices in life. In this sense, the action and its associations can be the benefits (building
or affirming character) or the costs (transgressing and suffering guilt). Normative
acceptability ranges from moral proscription to moral indifference to moral prescription.
For the former, actions are written off as unacceptable, because they violate fundamental
values and norms. Some actions have a relatively neutral moral hue to them. However, for
some SMOs, some actions may be morally prescribed, meaning not to engage in them
would be morally repugnant. The most obvious example involves violence. For some,
violence may be efficacious or counter-efficacious, but it may also be morally repugnant or
morally prescribed. For this work, normative acceptability is primarily important for what
it may proscribe, such as violence.
Second, the intrinsic enjoyment of an action refers to how much the members of an
SMO are expected to enjoy participating in the action itself. Opp (1989) finds no support
for a hypothesized positive relation between the intrinsic benefits of participating in
protest and the propensity to participate in collective action. However, by shifting the
question I suggest that the degree of intrinsic enjoyment that SMO members expect to
obtain by engaging in some actions over others can affect the choice in tactics. Intrinsic
enjoyment ranges from highly unpleasant to indifference to highly enjoyable. Some actions
can be highly unpleasant, meaning they produce negative expectations regarding
participation in the action itself. For example, some may find high-risk activism, including
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violence, to be intrinsically unpleasant (dangerous, stressful), while others may feel the
opposite. Participation in some actions as opposed to others may also include the joys of
political expression, socializing with friends, and the thrill of danger. Enjoyment is thus a
composite term. Wettergren (2005, 143) finds that participants in culture jamming find it
highly enjoyable. I thus hypothesize:
H12.1: CJOs generally perceive their own tactics as highly enjoyable relative to other
tactics.
12.1.2. Resource Constraint
All collective actions require the consumption of some level of time, labor, and a
variety of other resources as an investment in either extrinsic or intrinsic outcomes.
Because SMOs are limited in the resources they possess they are constrained in the tactics
they choose. Tactics can be distinguished by the amount of resources that they require
organizers and participants to consume. Actions that derive their force from withdrawing
support like boycotts, long-term occupations, and strikes are defined especially by the
opportunity costs incurred by participants. Other actions may differ in their size or scope.
Actions that are labor- or money-intensive like mobilizing for large-scale demonstrations
are presumably more expensive than actions that involve smaller mobilizations.
In previous chapters I suggest familiarity reduces the transaction costs incurred by
some actions. However, the only resources that familiarity directly involves are skill sets
and social networks. Recall the sets of hypotheses describing the organizational structures
and strategic orientations of my sample of CJOs. Most of the groups were organizationally
small and possessed few resources. These lead me to hypothesize:
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H11.7: CJOs generally perceive their own tactics as low cost. 90
In general, the lower the cost of the action, the higher the probability it will be chosen.
12.1.3. A Note on Organizational Structures
Before proceeding, I briefly consider the importance of organizational structures in
relation to tactical choice. In Chapter Eight, I develop hypotheses that anticipate a pattern
of organization in my sample of CJOs. I describe such groups as small, informal,
decentralized, exclusive, and composed of pre-existing friendships. The literature suggests
that variation in organizational structure should help explain variation in tactical choice.
One promising expectation is that decentralized organizations tend to utilize more
unconventional and disruptive tactics, whereas centralized organizations tend to utilize
more conventional tactics (Staggenborg 1989). Whatever the hypothesized mechanisms
involved, they are typically internal to the organization. Some of the incentives considered
below, especially intrinsic enjoyment and resource expenditure, are closely related to the
structure of organization. First, Wettergren (2005) finds that the predominant form of
organization among culture jammers, especially the emphasis on exclusivity and
friendship, generates intense feelings of commitment. I argue that this commitment has a
discriminatory effect on the evaluation of tactics; some tactics benefit disproportionately
from these intimate social relations, especially with respect to the intrinsic enjoyment
derived from the action discussed below. Some actions may generate more intrinsic
enjoyment than others. Enjoyment may derive, in part, from engaging in fun, thrilling, or
intellectually or creatively stimulating actions. These may be determined in part by one’s
company, especially one’s friends. While it may be reasonable to assume that just about
This hypothesis is basically a recasting of H8.5, except here the emphasis on contentious collective actions
as opposed to the manifold operations of an organization.
90
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any contentious collective action is made more attractive by the participation of friends (a
minimal homogenous benefit across the set of tactics), it seems plausible that the character
of some actions may generate more intrinsic enjoyment than others as a consequence of
the mobilization of friendship networks. In part, this may involve actions that exploit
particular homogeneous interests across the group distinct from the collective interest.
Such individual intrinsic interests may involve engaging in the utilization of skill sets, such
as art or violence.
Next, most attention in the literature has fallen on decentralization and
formalization. At least two factors are relevant. First, decentralized structures appear to
increase the diversity of inputs into the decision-making process by increasing the
proportion of decision-makers (Staggenborg 1989). However, in itself this does not
necessarily imply that decentralized structures are associated with disruptive tactics.
Instead, it suggests that an increase in the degree of centralization is associated with a
narrowing of the repertoire of tactics. In this case, decentralized structures would be more
likely to incorporate disruptive or nonconventional tactics simply because increased input
diversity increases the probability of more inclusive tactical repertoires. Second,
formalization tends to increase the likelihood for adopting conventional tactics by
increasing the incentives for efficiently apportioning resources. In other words, the more
that procedures and divisions of labor are clearly delineated and recorded, the more actors
within SMOs are compelled to identify clear objectives and performance metrics in order to
advance the organization’s interests and their own within the organization. The reason
may be simple (Morris 1984, 35-36). Social disruption and tactical experimentation
involve greater degrees of uncertainty, both internally and externally, than conventional or
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more institutional tactics. Through incentives to increase efficiency and clarity and thus
produce clear results, formalization reduces the uncertainties that actors within SMOs may
be willing to bear.91 Such incentives and structures may also decrease the capacity of an
organization to quickly respond to new opportunities, an incapacity that may favor
institutionalized tactics (Staggenborg 1991, 72).
I do not develop hypotheses here, however; instead, I consider the relevant sets of
intrinsic incentives further below.
12.1.4. States and Corporations
Extrinsic incentives refer to motivational factors external to the action or to the SMO
itself. I consider three sets relevant to this dissertation: facilitation, repression, and artistic
experimentation. I also consider effectiveness in light of these developments. In Chapter
Ten I consider the relation of opportunity structures, especially political institutions and
actors, to the attribution of effectiveness. There, the generalized sense of the strategic
significance of these relations, or ideology, is the result of the accumulation of experiences
and information from direct and indirect interactions with these actors and institutions.
Here, I consider more specific dynamic relations between political and economic actors and
institutions and CJOs, especially repression and facilitation.
As with other contentious collective actors, the state and corporations respond to
the actions of CJOs with one or more of three basic postures: repression, toleration, and/or
facilitation. Repression is “any action by another group which raises the contender’s cost
Morris also argues that these internal forces coincide with isomorphic processes (the word is DiMaggio and
Powell’s 1983) derived from the field of organizations that an SMO finds itself within, which includes political
parties and interest groups. However, his argument regarding the civil rights movements rests on the
observation that such organizations preceded the onset of contention. He thus argues that their inability to
develop disruptive mass strategies results in the founding of more flexible informal organizations. I make no
assumption about the temporal priority of formal decentralized organizations.
91
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of collective action,” whereas facilitation refers to an “action that lowers a group’s cost of
collective action” (Tilly 1978, 100). In a democratic regime, toleration refers to the
permissive posture of political actors with respect to the extensive set of possible SMO
actions that do not elicit facilitation or repression. My amendment to these definitions
simply stresses that facilitation and repression are intended courses of action. In practice,
they may yield unintended consequences with possible adverse effects.
I treat states and corporations simply. The state is both the set of legal and
regulatory institutions governing a social system, especially property and speech rights in
this account, and those collective actors with the authority and the resources to change and
enforce these institutions. The importance of the (democratic) state can be summarized:
“Legality matters because laws state the costs and benefits which governments are
prepared (or at least empowered) to apply to one form of action or another” (Tilly 1978,
102). Of course, even democratic governments may utilize illegal or covert forms of
response to contentious collective action, but for the purposes of this model the state and
state actors perform roughly within the parameters of legal institutions. Corporations are
collective actors with enormous resources that pursue the maximization of profit.
I assume that states and corporations are motivated to repress when they perceive
potential benefits from increasing the costs of a group’s collective action.92 For the state,
these benefits hinge on the strength of the threat to social groups posed by the group’s
tactics and goals and the strength of these social groups in determining political outcomes.
For corporations, benefits primarily accrue from avoiding the opportunity costs of
These benefits may accrue from positive support derived from repressive action, or they may derive from
the avoided opportunity costs of choosing toleration or facilitation, i.e. a loss of support. I refer to this
approach as simplistic, because I do not consider the host of incentives that can differentially affect political
actors like the police, courts, legislators, etc.
92
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toleration or facilitation: negative publicity and thus lower profits. Thus, the choices that
SMOs make in how they will pursue their goals can affect the probability of whether states
and corporations choose to engage in repressive action. In contrast, I assume that states
and corporations are motivated to facilitate when they perceive potential benefits from
increasing the benefits of collective action. For the state, these benefits hinge on the
strength of the social group the SMO is perceived to represent. For corporations, these
benefits hinge on the perceived capacity of the SMO to increase the corporation’s profits.
12.1.5. Repression
I begin with repression. An extensive literature on the relation between repression
and mobilization eventually arrived at the conclusion - following the failure to identify a
specific curve that fits the data - that repression is better conceptualized as a multidimensional and highly contextual explanatory instrument (Hoover and Kowalewski 1992;
Johnston and Mueller 2001). This difficulty is not alien to the question of strategy. Regime
responses are always strategically selective; consequently, not all actions suffer the same
level or type of repression. Here, I distinguish four forms of repression potentially relevant
to CJOs: violence, arrest, litigation, and harassment. Violence refers to the actual or
threatened physical harm of personal property or the body. Arrest refers to the actual or
threatened deprivation of liberty and/or economic sanctions. Litigation refers to the
process of conducting a lawsuit, a set of actions associated with potentially high economic
and opportunity costs for defendants. Harassment refers to actions that are typically
repetitive and/or disruptive such as surveillance, interrogation, verbal abuse, etc.
With respect to CJOs, occasions for state and corporate actors to repress are
constrained. Though I quote Tilly on the importance of law, my definition of the state
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includes not only institutions but actors as well. Tilly (1978, 103) notes that legal practice
– the actual practical interpretation and application of the law in concrete circumstances –
is crucial to understanding the constraints on state actors; in other words, the law is
effectual partly as a function of enforcement. Culture jamming as a form of action operates
across the tolerant and repressive space of state and corporate strategies. The reason is
two-fold. First, the very nature of culture jamming as defined in Chapter One risks
infringing on the intellectual property rights of corporations. Often this risk is low, because
parody and satire are protected forms of speech. However, in actual practice legality may
be insufficient to deter certain limited forms of repression. Second, culture jamming
actions may unfold within the private property of corporations. This risks a strategic
response from corporate or state actors aimed at removing the action or the actors from
the territory. With perceptions of vandalism or suspicious collective action even
performances in public space risk repression.
These considerations lead to an elaboration of the relations between types of
repression and CJOs. First, I consider violence and harassment as the least likely responses
to the tactic of culture jamming. The modern democratic state both establishes broad
institutionalized procedures for the processing of demands and possesses an
overwhelming monopoly on violence (Rucht 1990). Consequently, violence as a tactic, like
other highly disruptive actions, is extremely costly in part because it dramatically increases
the probability that effective violence will be used as a tactic of repression by state actors.
For CJOs, however, violence is unlikely to be encountered, because state actors are unlikely
to perceive such groups as posing a threat or as opportunities for violence. This is the case
because CJOs are composed of extremely small memberships with extremely few resources
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that instigate small collective actions without intentions of violence; they thus typically
involve low levels of social disruption. Corporate actors may perceive them to be a threat,
but corporations are highly constrained by the legal institutions of the state and public
opinion. If violence is utilized by private actors it is likely to be arbitrary, minimal, and
extremely short-lived, as when a security guard takes the initiative.
Unlike violence, harassment typically involves repetitive or disruptive responses to
culture jammers. As such, in many cases it requires the perception of a level of threat
sufficient to maintain contact with the CJO beyond an initial offending collective action. It
also poses high risks, because repetition courts anticipation and thus possible data
collection on the harassment. The information can then be used against the corporate or
state actors in the courts or in the media as an effective tactical response. If CJOs meet with
harassment, it is likely to come from state actors. The police or the FBI, for example, not
only possesses significant resources and actors proficient at modes of harassment like
surveillance; they are also mandated to develop and utilize the skills and technologies of
harassment. However, a more prevalent form of harassment is transient and weak, as
when a group is forced to abort an action in public space by security guards or police.
The nature of culture jamming as an oppositional tactic suggests that litigation and
arrest are the more likely forms of repression to be meted out by state and corporate
actors. Although political speech is given powerful protections in democratic states,
corporations may still significantly increase the costs for using culture jamming by filing
lawsuits to protect their intellectual property rights and their brand image. Because of the
significant resource asymmetry between CJOs and corporations, corporations may engage
in litigation because drawing the conflict into the judicial system heavily favors the types of
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resources they possess. Even if they ultimately lose the case, the drain on the resources of
the CJO can significantly curtail their activities, though culture jamming is not a resourceheavy activity. Thus, like many SMOs and other collective actors, CJOs are forced to expand
their tactical repertoire to include litigation when private actors sue them and possibly
fund-raising activities in order to support the financial challenges of a lawsuit. However,
like all forms of repression, litigation may backfire. As endowed as a corporation is in the
legal game, the case may draw other experienced actors on the side of the defendants, such
as the ACLU, or the corporation may lose quickly and swiftly (though corporations
presumably know the risks better than CJOs), or the case may draw undesired media
attention. What is important to note here is that a legal response by corporations shifts the
objectives of CJOs such that more institutional tactics are perceived as more effective.
With respect to occupation of physical property, state actors may utilize arrest as a means
to defuse situations, while corporate actors may file criminal charges to bolster the costs of
this form of repression. In the event of arrest, CJOs may voluntarily engage in litigation if
they perceive sufficient opportunities for victory, though the costs may deter them.
This discussion suggests culture jamming is susceptible to some state and corporate
strategies that intentionally increase costs. Ceteris paribus, this makes a variety of other
actions more attractive options, especially institutionalized modes of action and the wide
spectrum of unambiguously tolerated non-institutionalized actions.
12.1.6. Facilitation
Corporate or state actors may also facilitate collective action by lowering its costs.
These lowered costs are not obtained by symmetrical material exchange. In other words,
SMOs that purchase aid as a matter of simple financial transaction are not facilitated. Such
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actions do not constitute a lowering of costs, but rather a redistribution of costs. In the
case of culture jamming, significant facilitation is less likely than repression for the simple
reason that neither states nor corporations may find particularly significant advantages in
supporting CJOs. There are at least two notable exceptions, however. First, if my argument
that culture jamming is associated with the development of art is true it seems plausible to
conjecture that CJOs may receive art grants and other forms of related support from state
actors. Such forms of facilitation typically provide material resources such as money and
facilities, freeing up other resources like time and labor to focus on the production of
contentious politics. In the United States, such grants may come from federal agencies like
the National Endowment for the Arts, state agencies, and universities, but they may also
come from private arts organizations and corporations. Grants and fellowships from
federal, state, university, and private arts organizations are unlikely to provoke a negative
response from CJOs. However, considering the general antagonism to economic elites
established in Chapter Seven, private corporate grants are far less likely to be accepted,
because they may be perceived as a form of co-optation or compromise. Corporations may
utilize strategies to ensure the effectiveness of their marketing strategies. One way they do
so is by mining minority, subcultural, or countercultural trends for possible mainstream
appeal (Klein 2000). Another approach involves hiring contemporary artists to counsel
and develop tactics, especially those with risky (for a corporation) approaches to
consumerism. It is likely that CJOs will tend to avoid these forms of facilitation.
12.1.7. Artistic Experimentation
In Chapter Five I outline the structure and development of the field of cultural
production, especially of artistic production. One of its more notable processes is the
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permanent state of revolution. I note that the totality of the relations of dominance – in
other words, the unequal distribution of capital - and the strategies that they favor in this
field and it’s relation to other fields produces a particular set of incentives for those
entering the subfield of restricted production. In order to compete, an effective strategy for
new entrants (typically younger generations) with low resources is to generate their own
cultural capital or artistic prestige by staking positions of difference, new positions
“beyond the positions presently occupied, ahead of them, in the avant-garde” (Bourdieu
1993, 106). These new positions are staked by virulent heterodoxy, by “imposing new
modes of thought and expression which break with current modes of thought and hence
are destined to disconcert by their ‘obscurity’ and their ‘gratuitousness’” (Bourdieu, 1996,
239-240). In Chapter Six I re-consider this process by suggesting that though Bourdieu
focuses on the revolutionary principle of autonomy, twentieth century movements like
Dada and the Situationists eventually subverted this principle by politicizing the institution
of art despite their pioneering efforts to aestheticize everyday life.
This discussion suggests that artists face competing incentives for artistic
production. I distinguish between incentives for producing pieces with mass popular
appeal in order to maximize popular success (the heteronomous principle) and incentives
for producing pieces with highly restricted appeal in order to maximize some highly
valuable cultural capital (the autonomous principle). For Bourdieu, one’s initial resource
endowment heavily constrains the relative force of each incentive. In particular, higher
education in the arts endows actors with the capacity to produce and consume works of
restricted artistic production. For producers, this aesthetic disposition allows in principle
for the exploitation of opportunities for the accumulation of cultural capital through artistic
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innovation. Within the game of art, the incentives for innovation – a product of the
structure and the history of field – may be crudely construed here as a distribution of
incentives for the production of a set of possible art works. In Figure 12.1, I suggest that
these incentives are distributed unevenly across this set of works. I argue that works can
be described in relation to existing works by placing them on a spectrum from no
experimentation to pure experimentation. Below I consider what tactical experimentation
entails. For now, I reject the use of the term ‘innovation’ for experimentation principally
because the latter suggests more of a groping effort and the former suggests too clean of a
break from existing practice.93 Experimentation is a testing, an uncertain employment, yet
experiments are performed with existing materials. In this sense, an artistic experiment is
never strictly “new,” but instead ‘plays’ with what is already existent. Here, experimentation refers to two dimensions: the degree of difference from existing works and the
degree of popularity or diffusion of the work. Low experimentation thus refers to an
extremely minimal difference from existing works that are highly popular and familiar.

Incentives

+
0

_

Experimentation
Figure 12.1. Incentives for Artistic Experimentation
93

Importantly, I consider experimentation to entail the list of strategies of distinction offered in Table 6.1.
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High experimentation refers to comparatively significant differences from existing works
that are marginal and recognizable by only a small audience. A summary of Figure 12.1
begins by emphasizing its most salient characteristic: artists derive expected benefits from
producing artistic experiments.94 However, these incentives diminish as the degree of
experimentation wanes. Moving down the slope, positive incentives give way to
disincentives for the production of works that increasingly rest on popular works.95
Insofar as CJOs both construe their contentious political activity as artistic practice
and possess the capacity to effectively navigate the artistic field – in other words, insofar as
they play the game of art as the game of contentious politics - this basic incentive should
increase the probability that they will choose tactics that are relatively experimental.
12.1.8. Shifting Effectiveness
In addition to repression or facilitation, CJOs may find that the tactics they use do
not generate the degree of effectiveness that they seek. This perception may result from
any number of phenomena, including a change in the perception of how audiences react, a
change in the perception of the marketing strategies of corporations, or a change in the
field of conflict, i.e. from the streets to the courts. However, because of the constraining
effects of the initial schemas, new information obtained from interactions is less likely to
fundamentally alter the selected tactics. Moreover, tactics vary in their modularity
(Tarrow 1998), meaning they vary in their capacity to travel from one context to another
and retain basic core features. Even minimal modularity suggests that the perceived
effectiveness of a tactic may remain basically unscathed, because the particularities of a
One may conjecture that the only other social activities that reward experimentation as fiercely as the field
of art are the fields of science and technology.
95 While the extreme values on the experimentation dimension are logically coherent, the highest extreme
does not correspond to any conceivable or possible artistic work.
94
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specific undertaken action may not have yielded the optimal utility capable of the tactic. In
other words, because tactics can be employed in a variety of ways (terrains, materials,
modes, etc.), declines in effectiveness following bad results are likely to be marginal. If it
doesn’t work the first time, try it differently the second time. Below I consider the range of
responses by SMOs to updated expectations to more fully flesh out this discussion.
12.2. Tactical Interaction
Finally, I consider the dynamics of tactical interaction. In the static model, CJOs
select an action from a set of recognized tactics under a variety of constraints. Because
expectations are not dynamic, all estimates represent a stable state of the world according
to the CJO. In this preliminary dynamic model, expectations include estimates of the costs
and benefits generated by extrinsic constraints, including repression, facilitation, and
artistic experimentation. Once an action is made, outcomes unfold, and information is
received about the actions and the outcomes, including the effects of extrinsic constraints
on outcomes. This information is used to either modify or confirm the expectations used to
initially select a tactic. To clarify, information about the process and the outcomes of the
initial action generates new sets of expectations regarding the set of recognized tactics.
These new expectations are, like the initial expectations, both retrospective and
prospective; they establish estimates of costs and benefits as well as levels of confidence
about future possible actions based on previous actions and the environmental cues that
help establish the second decision context.
12.2.1. Confirmed Expectations
Above, I note the information generated by outcomes may confirm or modify initial
expectations. Confirmation refers to any updating of expectations that yields a repetition
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of the initial selection. This should not be taken too literally, however, for repetition is
never perfect. Repetition may either be maximally repetitive or marginally variable.
Maximum repetition coasts on increased confidence and satisfactory outcomes. In
contrast, owing to differences in circumstances or specific changes in expectations, a tactic
may be reproduced with marginal variations. In this case, the tactic may be regarded as
basically sound but require some minor adjustments. Minor or marginal adjustments
include such changes as shifting the time of the action from morning to noon, adding more
public speakers at rallies, making larger signs, etc. They involve preparations and
executions that in no way fundamentally alter the basic nature of the collective action.
However, such adjustments involve a process analogous to searching as described in
Chapter Three in that they involve the accumulation of information. The resulting
expectations are marginally adjusted to account for these marginal variations. Similar but
more pronounced processes occur with modification.
12.2.2. Modification
Modification connotes any updating of expectations that yields a change in the
selection of a tactic. When the updated expectations about the set of recognized tactics
shifts the distribution of costs and benefits such that the initial tactic no longer yields the
most efficient response to opponents, the SMO will select that tactic which does yield the
highest benefits at the lowest cost. Change in the selection of a tactic refers to at least two
possible outcomes: new selection or experimentation.
Before proceeding, it is useful to consider the conditions under which expectations
may be sufficiently updated to generate modification. I focus on two: unexpected negative
outcomes and circumstantial change independent of outcomes. Recall the consideration of
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the tendency towards certainty in Chapter Three. There I present two objections: the
fundamental uncertainty of contentious politics and the terminal decision to act. In order
to elaborate on the conditions productive of modification I elaborate on the first objection.
First, unexpected responses by other actors to the initial action may force new
expectations. For example, although initial expectations may estimate repression as
notably costly but unlikely, vigilant responses by opponents may increase the expected
likelihood of repression in further interactions, thus making that particular iteration of the
tactic less attractive. Second, expectations may shift, because the circumstances of action
may change independent of outcomes. For example, this may refer to a change in public
opinion on an issue of relevance to a movement, such as the the accident at Three Mile
Island and the environmental movement. I consider this further below, but both conditions
may constitute threats or opportunities for action.
The tendency towards perfect certainty is a consequence in part of the static model
assumption that information increases certainty. I modify this important assumption by
suggesting that the information generated from interactions may lead to more uncertainty,
and not through the consumption of strategic or inaccurate information. This may hold for
at least two reasons. One, while one may assume that information about an initial
interaction can aid an SMO in reducing the uncertainty about future actions, the initial
failure may haunt the second effort to predict the actions of other actors - haunt the very
act of prediction itself - such that expectations are saddled with higher uncertainty. Two,
outcomes may sufficiently alter the distribution of resources and motivations across the
field of actors - the state of affairs from Chapter Three – such that the information
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generated by these outcomes may be insufficient to maintain the same sense of certainty
into the second selection from the set of recognized tactics.
12.2.3. Tactical Experimentation
McAdam (1983) argues that the pace of insurgency – the dramatic shifts in
mobilization associated with the trajectories of social movements – is a function of a
process of tactical interaction. In his model, challengers sustain their campaigns either
through institutionalization or tactical experimentation. The latter involves the diffusion of
tactical innovations that provide challengers with newfound political advantages – social
disruption - and thus increased mobilization. However, though initially caught off guard,
authorities eventually develop tactical adaptations that neutralize the tactic and depress
protest participation. In this model, tactical innovation is indistinguishable from tactical
diffusion; innovations are tactical experiments that successfully diffuse. In a later
iteration, McAdam et al (2001, 8) define innovation contextually as unprecedented or
forbidden means of contention within a particular regime. Olzak and Uhrig (2001, 700)
argue persuasively that measuring innovation is nearly impossible and almost always
erroneous; what appear to be innovations tend to be iterations of previous actions.
An alternative approach concerns tactical experimentation. Tactical
experimentation refers to the production of tactics that involve more than marginal
adjustments to recognized tactics. In the preceding analysis of incentives for artistic
experimentation, I define a dimension of experimentation in which art works range from
no experimentation to pure experimentation. Here, I clarify this dimension by suggesting
that experimentation only occurs beyond marginal changes to existing tactics. In other
words, experimentation is a property of actions that yield positive incentives in Figure
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12.1. However, experimentation is highly constrained and relies on existing schemas to
develop variations on existing actions, as in processes like bricolage or more generally
transposition.
However, they are not unrecognizable, meaning that SMOs can produce a minimally
confident set of expectations regarding their application. This is so because they can still
be grouped into existing clusters of tactics. Recall Chapter Three’s discussion regarding the
clustering of tactics. Clusters are assigned singular expectations. However, these clusters
vary in their degree of homogeneity of tactics. In Chapter Three I argue that the more
familiar an SMO is with the everyday correlates of a set of tactics, the more homogeneous
the cluster. More homogeneous clusters are the result of a capacity and an interest in
making finer distinctions among tactics, especially for the purposes of choosing a particular
tactic. Without this level of discrimination SMOs would not be able to discern any
significant variation between a tactical experiment and an established tactic.
Under what conditions do SMOs experiment tactically? In line with my emphasis on
motivational variables, I argue that the probability that SMOs will experiment increases
under at least two basic motivational conditions: low utility ambivalence and the elusive
high benefit opportunity. First, SMOs may experiment when, under the condition that their
previous tactic now provides low expected utility, they perceive the set of recognized
tactics to likewise produce low expected utility. In this condition, SMOs perceive only
marginal differences among their previously preferred tactics in their capacity for
generating desired outcomes. This state of ambivalence thrusts an SMO into searching for
more information. Like those characteristic of marginal variations, these searches also
involve finding ways to change existing tactics in order to increase effectiveness, exploit
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some set of positive incentives, or reduce the force of some negative incentives.
Experimentation is thus one of many possible ways that an SMO may deal with
ambivalence.
The second condition is the perception of a high benefit opportunity. Recall the
definition of opportunities: “the probability that social protest actions will lead to success
in achieving a desired outcome” (Goldstone and Tilly 2001, 181). Opportunities refer here
to constraints in the environment that increase or decrease the perceived effectiveness of a
tactic or sets of tactics. The process of search that follows an initial interaction may yield
crucial information that dramatically decreases the utility a tactic provides for an SMO.
This may generate a condition of low utility ambivalence. However, information may
dramatically increase the expected utility that a tactic provides for an SMO, including the
perceived effectiveness of the tactic or lowered expectations for repression. This is an
opportunity, a result of the information derived from direct and/or indirect interactions.
This information may also yield updated perceptions of threats, though I do not suggest
here that threats distinguish among tactics.
Why would such opportunities increase the probability of tactical experimentation?
Might we simply expect the tactics that experience the increase in effectiveness to be
chosen?96 I suggest that certain opportunities may be sufficiently novel – that is, they may
be phenomena that are relatively distinct qualitatively – that the process of search yields
sufficient modifications to an existing tactic(s) that the modification is chosen.
One way to consider this qualitative novelty is to refer again to the mechanism of
transposition. Transposition here refers to the employment of a set of schemas from one
McAdam (1983) does find evidence that the increased use of previously successful tactics follows the
diffusion of tactical innovations.
96
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field or decision context to another. While strictly speaking SMOs choose from among a set
of contentious tactics, tactics themselves may be decomposed into sets of schemas that can
originate in a variety of other contexts.97 The use of the sit-in in the early civil rights
movement, for example, relied on sets of schemas involving such disparate phenomena as
the extensive set of normal social interactions operative inside of business establishments
in the South; the possible responses of authorities, white customers, and business owners
and employees to transgression of the rules and norms of these interactions (the mixing of
races, silence, disobedience, refusal to respond with violence); the legal order regulating
these interactions; the responsiveness of mass media to social disruption, including local
media; business-customer relations; the wide array of commitments and ideals partly
constitutive of the relations among participants (typically friends); and many more.
If tactics are composed of sets of schemas, then experimentation may be regarded as
the generation of new sets of associations between schemas or between elements of them.
Note already my use of the term experimentation in two different contexts: artistic
production (field of art) and tactical production (contentious politics). Here, I focus on the
transposition of three general sets of schemas: art, protest, and everyday life.
Three points are relevant. First, as noted in Chapters Five and Six, the field of art
paradoxically refuses and reinforces a distinction between everyday life and art. Second,
the subfield of restricted production heavily incentivizes experimentation. A consequence
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Ganz (2000; 2009) makes a similar observation when he describes the importance of creativity in
generating effective strategy. He defines the creativity of a leadership team as a practice joining varieties of
salient contextual knowledge – skills and know-how regarding some specific sphere of activity - and learning
processes and experiences. Together, they allow for a greater capacity to adapt to new circumstances by recontextualizing or synthesizing diverse experiences and data. In my terminology, creativity or
experimentation involves the variable capacity to generate new sets of associations between schemas or
between elements of schemas. Ganz thus implicitly assumes that tactics can be decomposed into elements
from diverse contexts. Transposition is thus a mechanism involving the creative use of schemas.
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of this structural arrangement is that the universe of schemas available to artists for
experimentation is effectively total. Any object, discourse, or practice outside of the field of
art immediately offers an incentive - a high benefit opportunity - to experiment by
aesthetically appropriating it. Third, I argue in Chapter Six that the same structure of
incentives also generates a tendency towards the politicization of the aesthetic disposition.
Consequently, SMOs that operate within the field of artistic production - organizations that
play both the game of art and contentious politics - encounter significant incentives to
experiment aesthetico-politically.
12.2.4. Tactical Adaptation
Once an SMO acts, other actors respond. If an actor’s response decreases the utility
expected of the initial tactic in future interactions such that modification is in play –
whether by increasing costs or reducing benefits (including effectiveness) – the initial
tactic may be regarded as neutralized. This pattern of response is equivalent to McAdam’s
tactical adaptation. I argue that one way to consider this dynamic in the context of culture
jamming is to analyze the processes of détournement and recuperation.
In Chapter Six I discuss two forms of resistance formalized by the SI: the dérive and
détournement. Détournement refers to the appropriation of materials in the cultural
environment – comics, street signs, toys, movies, clothing, cars, etc. - in such a manner as to
invert, lead astray, or detour its initial meaning in order to subvert the article and the
spectacle as a whole. At its most general, it is synonymous with the conception of culture
jamming utilized in this work. Debord and Wolman (2007, 15) described it thus:
Any elements, no matter where they are taken from, can be used to make new
combinations. The discoveries of modern poetry regarding the analogical structure of
images demonstrate that when two objects are brought together, no matter how far apart
their original contexts may be, a relationship is always formed…The mutual interference of
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two worlds of feeling, or the juxtaposition of two independent expressions, supersedes the
original elements and produces a synthetic organization of greater efficacy. Anything can be
used.

This process of détournement, of juxtaposing distinct elements in order to build new and
critical meanings and relationships, was conceived as an almost universally applicable
tactic. In principle, everything and anything can be détourned, can be made to expose its
role in power relationships; “all goods proposed by the spectacular system, from cars to
televisions, also serve as weapons for that system” (Debord 1995, 28).
Because détournement involves the appropriation of the spectacle (or whatever
ensemble of representation is targeted), and because it plays on the same terrain with the
same weapons, it is constantly in danger of being recuperated back into the service of the
spectacle. Recuperation is, “the process whereby the spectacle ―take[s] up and use[s] [the
vocabulary of revolutionary discourse] to support the existing networks of power” (Plant
1992, 76). This process involves, like détournement, the re-purposing of some object,
practice, or discourse. However, while détournement is a tension between multiple
representations – a critical tension that aims to disrupt the power of an original
representation through association – recuperation seeks to resolve this tension. It is the
de-politicization, re-commodification, the effective neutralization of subversive weapons.
“Words forged by revolutionary criticism are like partisan weapons; abandoned on the
battlefield, they fall into the hands of the counterrevolution” (Khayati 2007, 225).
Situationist propaganda thus required a perpetual vigilance against and cognizance of the
spectacle’s ability to neutralize oppositional practices. Recuperations are legion: the
working class movement, Dada, ‘revolution,’ punk rock, hip-hop, and even forms of culture
jamming itself. Plant (1992, 77-78) observes:
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Dada’s anti-art and surrealism’s subversions have both assumed the mantle of
institutionalised art, with their works exhibited, consumed, and reproduced in contexts
which relieve them of all critical content. Forty years after their adventures, the dadaists
looked in dismay at the fate of their agitations…Not merely are the actual works of such
movements transplanted into foreign soil, but the forms, techniques, and the magic they
worked are also used to ends entirely different from those with which they were developed.

The result of recuperation is the renewed vitality of the system of power relationships.
Because recuperation points to the capacity of this system to neutralize a nearly limitless
variety of insurgent meanings and practices, “the only historically justified tactic is
extremist innovation” (Debord and Wilson 2007, 14). Thus, détournement is born and an
incessant dynamic of criticism and neutralization proceeds
Generically, this model of détournement and recuperation mirrors McAdam’s (1983)
dynamic model of tactical interaction. Détournement represents the creative capacity of
insurgents to generate novel experiences of disruption for audiences. In turn, recuperation
connotes the eventual effort of opponents to adapt to and neutralize this disruptive
process.
12.3. Analysis
12.3.1. Intrinsic Incentives
In the analysis below I relate the theoretical developments above to the sample of
CJOs introduced in Chapter Four. A preliminary observation conjures a particular difficulty
haunting any effort to distinguish these incentives from a sense of effectiveness regarding
intrinsic goals and/or objectives. In Chapter Three I state that intrinsic goals can have
intrinsic and extrinsic incentives. However, a particular intrinsic goal (or objective) may
involve intrinsic enjoyment or normative acceptability. For example, an SMO may pursue
the practice of alternative morality as an expression of resistance to existing dominant
moral practice. My effort below attempts to distinguish a sense of effectiveness from
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distinct motivations. For example, the Yes Men (2012b) observe: “It’s not only that we
should get attention for these kinds of things, but it’s really fun.” Elsewhere, the group
considers ‘fun’ strategically (meaning effectiveness). But here, they stress that such actions
are fun regardless of the goals. I seek to preserve this narrow distinction below.
I begin with two intrinsic incentives: normative acceptability and intrinsic
enjoyment. Perhaps the most glaring observation regarding the ethics of tactical
alternatives is that tactics are rarely described by CJOs in explicitly moral terms. Straightforward ethical pronouncements are made by the AMF’s Lasn. He suggests that with
culture jamming, “Once you start thinking and acting this way, once you realize that
consumer capitalism is by its very nature unethical, and therefore it’s not unethical to jam
it” (Lasn 1999, xv). He further insinuates that an ethical rage manifests in culture jamming:
There is an anger, a rage-driven defiance, that is healthy, ethical, and empowering. It
contains the conviction that change is possible…Learning how to jam our culture with this
rage may be one of the few ways left to feel truly among the quick in the Huxleyan
mindscape of new millennium capitalism (Lasn 1999, 143).

The CAE (2012b, 15) also define their actions as ethical: “CAE has been able to provoke a
direct confrontation with the instances of political power…The ethical act opens the
possibility of a counter-public sphere that is not merely formal, since it is directly
constituted by those who occupy it.” It is thus clear that for the CAE instances of resistance
are by definition ethical in that they open spaces of freedom and dialogue. Yet, it is unclear
if, in the case of the CAE, distinguishing normative acceptability from effectiveness is
legitimate. Beyond these paltry examples, CJOs in the sample refrain from coloring their
tactics or others in strong moral tones.
Much more is expressed regarding the intrinsic enjoyment of tactics. Above I
hypothesize (H12.1) that CJOs generally perceive their own tactics as highly enjoyable
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relative to other tactics. The AMF’s Lasn demonstrates above that culture jamming is not
only ethical, but healthy and emotionally satisfying. The RBC emphasize that their art
interventions are “fun!” (D. and Talen 2011, 13). The Yes Men “enjoy both the mischief and
fun” of exposing the ills of their adversaries (Bonanno 2004), and emphasize that such
actions perform a prefigurative function; they show “people that life can be fun”
(Bichlbaum 2012a). Haugerud (2013, 200-01) testifies that the Billionaires derive
considerable joy from their creative actions. In the case of the BLF, however, distinguishing
intrinsic enjoyment from effectiveness is untenable. The group describe their billboard
escapades as “a lot of fun, mostly. It's exciting, it's adventurous,” (BLF 1999) but as BLF
Member Kalman (2008) argues the group emphasizes the “simple joy of changing a
billboard.” This joy is the moment of dialogue between advertisers and billboard bandits,
the point of resistance itself.
Joy is not the only intrinsic incentive offered by culture jamming. Haugerud’s (2013,
200-01.) list extends to “social connection, affective solidarity, and a path to self-knowledge
and psychic well-being,” to which I can add a sense of political efficacy and freedom. Such
diverse motivations are frequently expressed, but many of them are regarded as intrinsic
objectives or goals. For example, the IST regards its projects as investigations, research
projects that aim to develop an imminent and spontaneous awareness of the opaque
trappings of social situations. Member D’Ignazio describes the possible overarching
interest of the group as a consideration of the question: “How are you invited as a citizen to
participate in the public realm?” (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview,
August 27, 2012). Thus, the spontaneity of the group’s actions is itself a measure of their
effectiveness.
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The hypothesis stipulates that CJO tactics are perceived relative to other tactics.
Implicit comparisons abound in the discussions of groups like the Billionaires and the Yes
Men. These concern the relatively difficult long-term mass movement organizing
instrumental to social change and culture jamming, which performs ancillary but possibly
crucial functions. The most overt consideration is offered by the Billionaire’s Boyd
(emphasis added, n.d.) consideration of planning for electoral activism: “You have to figure
out what is your relationship with elections and maybe have an outside strategy where you
are doing some of the boring, painful compromising work of running an election.”
Thus, while there is ample evidence supporting the charge that CJOs view their own
actions as intrinsically fun and pleasurable apart from their effectiveness, only a hint of
data suggests that other actions are not as fun or enjoyable. Of course, there is no evidence
for an opposing hypothesis. No CJO described actions other than culture jamming as fun or
pleasurable. I thus offer extremely tentative support for the hypothesis, but note the
emphasis on culture jamming as an enjoyable practice.
12.3.2. Resource Constraints
I hypothesize (H12.2.) that CJOs generally perceive their own tactics as low cost.
Some support is available. The IST’s Rasovic notes:
We are the consumers, so we operate at that level. We’re not Yes Men. We do not have an
HBO Special. We also don’t have weapons and listening equipment and everything else so
we can fight the govt. Let’s be realistic: you wanna change the laws, you have to do a lot of
work, and to do that you need millions of dollars, and you need a different infrastructure.
We concentrate on…direct democracy.

The Billionaires’ Boyd (2002), who describes the Billionaires as a grass-roots concept,
highlights the advantages of such approaches: “Cheap and fast are generally good qualities
for a grass-roots movement.” Implicit references to low cost actions abound. Groups like
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the AMF, AAA, BLF, BIL, SCP, and TYM provide simple how-to guides and workshops for
replicating their actions. The IAA offers a contrasting example. They note that making
contestational robots is not easy, because it requires specific mechanical skills and lots of
money (Brusadin et al n.d.). Though data are not ideal, overall the hypothesis is supported.
12.3.3. Repression
The remaining constraints and incentives are extrinsic in nature. First, I consider
repression. Nearly every group in the sample acknowledges or experiences various forms
of repression (BLF, CTM, CAE, NGL, RBC, SCP, TYM). I take a number of approaches to
considering the relation of repression to tactical choice. First, I describe how the CJOs treat
the four relevant types of repression. Second, I focus on the relationship between
effectiveness and repression. Finally, I present data on the means by which CJOs deal with
repression. All of these analyses are oriented by an emphasis on the ways that antagonists
and authorities respond to different tactics.
Above I suggest that violence is the least likely form of repression that CJOs face in
response to their contentious performances. Only two groups suggest the threat of
violence (SCP, TYM). In one attempted action, a private security guard sufficiently
threatened the SCP such that they aborted the performance. The SCP’s Brown (Art Toad)
describes the guard as large and aggressive. The guard “showed himself willing to use
physical force to prevent the show from going on” (SCP 2006, 43). The Yes Men (n.d.(b))
describe the anxiety of their early Salzburg action: “We were sure to be confronted with
outrage. But would we face physical danger?” These slim examples exhaust the range of
violent repression presented by CJOs in the sample.
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Harassment is somewhat more prevalent. Three groups emphasize their
encounters with surveillance, interrogation, verbal abuse, etc. (CAE, SCP). When asked
about the typical reactions to the CAE’s actions, member Kurtz responds, “Mostly
condemnations and threats from police, lawyers, churches, political ﬁgures, the FBI and
just about any disciplinary agency you can think of” (Hirsch 2005, 32). In the documentary
Strange Culture, the group describes possible instances of harassment following the FBI’s
bio-terrorism case against Kurtz (Leeson 2006). These actions include surveillance and
attempts to provoke members of the group into engaging in illegal activity. The SCP (2006,
40, 49) describes various forms of harassment from the NYPD, including phone calls preempting performances. Short-term and mild harassment is somewhat more prevalent for
several groups (BIL, CTM, RBC, SCP, TYM). The CTM’s Gach (2007) sketches a portrait of
such repression: “Inevitably we would be shut down by the authorities, whether police,
private security. If you do anything vaguely interesting in public space that’s not
consumerist or not transportation, at some point you’re likely to get shut down.”
While I argue above that violence and repetitive harassment are not the most
common forms of repression for CJOs, I do suggest a different conclusion for arrest and
litigation. At least four groups express some concern or experience with arrest or similar
law enforcement measures (BLF, CAE, RBC, TYM). The RBC’s Reverend Billy has been
arrested and/or fined countless times by authorities across the United States. Typical
charges include trespass, harassment, and disturbing the peace. The most noteworthy
incident involved the Reverend reciting the First Amendment to an officer. The officer
promptly arrested him for “Harassment of a Public Official” (Carlson 2007). The CAE’s
Kurtz was arrested in 2004 under multiple charges, including most controversially
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bioterrorism (Hirsch 2005; Leeson 2006). The ensuing legal entanglement lasted four
years. More generally, the group often stresses the enormous discretion that law
enforcement officers possess in the execution of their general duties.
As we all know you don’t have to break the law to go to jail. Just exercising one’s rights is all
it takes. There are plenty of laws on the books that are there so that arrest remains
discretionary—creating a false public emergency for example—and it’s often a way to
disguise that the people being arrested are in fact political prisoners (Hirsch 2005, 30).

Thus, while the CAE emphasizes the legality of its actions they have come under scrutiny.
The Yes Men’s Bichlbaum (2009) was arrested in an act of creative civil disobedience while
his fellow participants were ticketed for trespassing. Finally, although the BLF have never
been caught in action, they do acknowledge the risks of arrest when they counsel securitymindedness when ‘improving’ billboards (Thornhill and DeCoverly 2006).
Litigation is a particularly notable form of repression because it can dramatically
increase the costs of engaging in protest and it dramatically changes the field of action. The
RBC is clear on this point: “For a group like ours, there are too many unknowns in lawsuits,
too much of the work is in the hands of other people and experts, and being tied up in court
depletes our resources and keeps us of the street” (D. and Talen 2011, 134). At least three
groups encountered some form of litigation (CAE, NGL, RBC, TYM). The CAE’s four year
legal battle dramatically affected the group, especially Kurtz. Negativland (1995) suffered
two lawsuits: one from the rock band U2’s record label for trademark violation and another
from NGL’s record label. Both lawsuits spurred the group to further pursue reform of
intellectual property law. In 2009, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce sued the group for
trademark and copyright infringement following the start-up of the Yes Men’s fauxChamber website and a corresponding well-publicized impersonation of the group at the
National Press Club (Mulkern 2009).
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With these descriptions of CJO’s encounter with repression in tow, I now consider
how repression can be an indirect indicator of effectiveness. Two groups argue that the
degree of repression an action elicits demonstrates the degree to which that action
threatens antagonists (CAE, RBC). The CAE (1996, 12) argue, “The assumption here is that
key indicators of power-value are the extent to which a location or a commodity is
defended, and the extent to which trespassers are punished. The greater the intensity of
defense and punishment, the greater the power-value.” This is the primary argument of
much of the CAE’s attribution of effectiveness. It constitutes the group’s primary disregard
for the “streets” as a site of political action. The RBC’s Talen makes a similar argument in
regards to their interventions. He notes, “One of the ways in which we are so sure that
there is power in Backing Away [from the Product] is that police and journalists and their
camera people come running with such dedication when we practice it” (Talen 2006, 89).
Once repression is anticipated (either through initial expectations generated by
collective identities and ideology or through information gleaned from contemporary
events, i.e. opportunity structures), CJOs develop a number of responses intended to either
reduce the effect of repression or re-purpose repression into aiding in the cause of the CJO.
Several groups attempt the former. The SCP (2006, 40) often have lawyers present at their
actions. The BLF have “an attorney on retainer and a legal strategy in place” (McManis
2003). Napier elaborates:
Not only do we not permanently damage these billboards, but, in fact, we improve them…
Look at it from an advertising point of view. Any sophomore in an advertising program
understands that any product exposure at all increases unit sales. Look at the Apple
Computer improvements we made. There was a photo on the front page of The Chronicle.
Our legal counsel tells us that not only should we not be fined for what we're doing but that
we should be paid for what we've done (McManis 2003).
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BLF member Amanda argues, “We might be able to plead the parody defense because what
we do is not malicious, profane or offensive" (McManis 2003). The BLF also utilize various
security measures in thei billboard actions (Thornill and DeCoverly 2006). The CTM’s Gach
(2007) describes the advantages of using art as a critical medium: “When you gain support
from them [art institutions] in a town, they are usually connected to upper economic
structure of town. So when you roll into a town, and the cops stop you, you get sort of carte
blanche because of this.”
Some groups see at least some repression as a means to further their goals. For
example, TYM’s Bichlbaum (2009) describes the repercussions of his arrest:
Sleeping on concrete was a challenge, but I met a lot of interesting people, and my arrest
meant major prime-time news coverage we wouldn't have otherwise had…Civil
disobedience is a great way to put pressure on leaders to do things we need them to do either direct heat they can feel, or via public opinion, which they also feel.

The group describes a more general sentiment: “Anytime anyone has done something
about us—saying they ‘deplore’ us, complaining that we're a Political Action Committee,
whatever—they've looked ridiculous to the press” (TYM n.d.(b)). The CAE go a step further
and design some of their actions to instigate public displays of repression. For example, in
one of their actions a member of the group plays with a train in a public space:
Security would eventually tell the performer to “move along.” The performer would ignore
the command, and act as if he were oblivious to the people around him. Security would
then threaten the performer with arrest if he did not move. This is the moment when the
most interesting dialogue began, and the greatest understanding of public management
emerged. The spectators were suddenly confronted with the reality that a person was
about to be arrested simply for playing with toy cars (CAE 1996, 52-54).

The RBC took the initiative – in my language an opportunity arose - after the arrest of
Reverend Billy for his recital of the First Amendment. The reverend voluntarily pursued
the case into the legal field and sued the city (Hartocollis 2007).
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With data constraints in mind, this consideration of repression suggests that CJOs do
not typically face grave repression. Violence is exceedingly unlikely. However, CJOs do
experience the other costly form of repression, litigation, along with arrest and some minor
forms of harassment. Both governments and corporations are the primary purveyors of
repressions. Notably, the most severe cases of repression – countless arrests - occur in
response to the RBC’s confrontational tactical approach.
12.3.4. Facilitation
Another means by which authorities and antagonists pursue their goals with respect
to SMOs is facilitation. I argue above that facilitation is more likely to come from
governments and private arts organizations than corporations and that it comes primarily
in the form of grants and fellowships. In Chapter Eight I note that many CJOs derive
various forms of support from a variety of organizations, including especially arts
organizations. For example, the AAA began as a $35,000 grant (Creative Work Fund 2004).
Co-optation is one possible approach by which a corporation may attempt to facilitate
critical activity on the part of a CJO. However, like so many active efforts to instigate
activity it comes at a price, namely the immunity of the facilitating corporation and a
harmed reputation. The AAA’s Lambert describes the quandaries of co-optation for anticorporate artists:
But what if [activist] Neckface’s Van’s billboard paid for a round of chemo for his
grandmother?...There’s a measurement and you need to see who comes out ahead. On the
artists’ side, they get a space and get to work in the daylight, but how does working with a
company compromise what they are saying or could say? Do they leave with their integrity?
The corporation invariably comes out ahead, it gets borrowed legitimacy and credibility
with customers. Whatever money the artists gets, the company makes more (Wolf 2007).

No corporation successfully facilitated any group in the sample. The most striking example
of such an attempt is offered by Negativland. Member Hosler observes:
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Yeah, Weiden & Kennedy, an ad agency based in Portland. They're gigantic. They do the ad
campaigns for Microsoft and Nike. They're considered to be a "cutting edge" advertising
firm. When we were working on the Dispepsi project, both [Negativland member] Don
Joyce and myself pretty much simultaneously got phone calls from them. They wanted to
hire Negativland to create these radio ads for Miller Genuine Draft Beer. We were right in
the middle of doing the Dispepsi project on advertising, so it was a depressing, sort of
shocking, but very healthy kind of wake-up call. The degree to which these people try to
appropriate and absorb the people that are appropriating and critiquing them… it knows no
bounds. These ad people thought it would be really cool to hire Negativland. They wanted
to give us their ads to cut up and do things with and mock them and manipulate and do our
Negativland "thing" to. Since they were offering us a lot of money - $25,000 or so - both Don
and myself immediately thought, "Wow, we'd like that money, that sounds great. Is this an
opportunity we could do something with?" Because over the years when weird things have
happened to us, like when we've gotten in trouble, we've looked at these things as
opportunities, not problems…
And I've heard people say, "Well, you were stupid to turn them down- you could have just
taken the money and used it for your own projects." I think that's the rationale a lot of
people would use. But I think for us, given some of the content of our work and how we're
perceived, if we had taken that money, I feel like it would make our work and our point of
view seem like a farce, and I don't see how we'd be seen as having any integrity anymore.
Another thing is, I just feel like somebody has to say "no" to these kinds of guys, you know?
We aren't going to sell out to them (NGL 2003)!

Corporations do seek to facilitate culture jamming, but for some CJOs such offers are
tainted.
12.3.5. Experimentation
I argue above that incentives associated with artistic experimentation may drive
some groups to engage in tactical experimentation. Moreover, I suggest that this process
may look like the dynamic between détournement and recuperation. This final section
considers the data relative to these theoretical developments.
In Chapter Eleven I present data identifying four groups in the sample that clearly
exhibit experimental repertoires (AAA, CTM, CAE, IST). In Chapter Seven I present data
regarding the possession of an aesthetic disposition among the groups in the sample. Table
12.1 reproduces this data but highlights the four cases of experimental repertoires. Some
observations are worth noting. First, of the three groups with sufficient data that clearly
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Table 12.1 Experimental Repertoires and the Arts

AMF
AAA
BLF
BIL
CTM
CAE
IAA
IST
NGL
RBC
SCP
TYM
1

- mixed

Education or
Occupation
Yes
Yes

1

Aesthetic
Perception
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

2

2

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

2
1
1

2

2

Organizational
Settings
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Political
Perception
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Total
3
2
1
1.5
3.5
3.5
1
4
3
4
4
2

– insufficient data

possess all four indicators of an aesthetic disposition (IST, RBC, SCP) only one utilizes an
experimental repertoire (IST). In fact, the three groups register across a spectrum of
tactical variation; while the SCP has a very narrow repertoire, the RBC has a relatively wide
repertoire. Second, two of the experimental groups (CTM, CAE) nearly accomplish
possession of all four indicators but are handicapped by a mixed classification on education
or occupation. In order to compare CJOs with experimental and non-experimental
repertoires I develop an admittedly crude measure if the aestheti disposition – an additive
index of each group’s values on the four indicators. In this variable, I code No and
insufficient data as zero, a mixed value as .5, and Yes as one. The Total column presents the
data. The mean across the entire sample of twelve groups is 2.7, while the mean for the
four experimental groups is 3.25, a difference of .55. If the IAA is excluded (a mixed tactical
repertoire but sorely lacking in sufficient data with respect to the aesthetic disposition),
then the mean shifts to 2.86, sharpening the difference to roughly .4. No test of significance
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is provided; the sample is small and the measures are crude, but some sense of the relation
of experimentation to the aesthetic disposition may be gleaned from Table 12.1, however
minimal and insecure. If anything, this analysis suggests the possibility that an aesthetic
disposition is not sufficient for experimental repertoires, but that it may increase the
probability that a group possesses such a repertoire.
Beyond this penchant for experimentation, how do CJOs construct their dynamics of
tactical experimentation? Some acknowledge the process of recuperation. Above I note
the AAA recognition of recuperation through co-optation. Perhaps most clearly, the CAE’s
determination to develop effective tactics runs directly into the finesse of capitalism. They
caution that “the rate at which strategies of subversion are co-opted indicates that the
adaptability of power is too often underestimated” (CAE 1994, 12). Their warning is dire:
“Once named and defined, any movement is open to co-optation. Should tactical media
become popularized, its recuperation is almost inevitable” (CAE 2001, 5). Yet it is the
interval between subversion and co-optation that the CAE recognizes itself and others as
occupying when it notes, “credit should be given to the resisters, to the extent that the
subversive act or product is not co-optively reinvented as quickly as the bourgeois
aesthetic of efficiency might dictate” (CAE 1994, 12). Negativland (2003) describe their
experience with the cutting-edge advertising agency:
Over the years when weird things have happened to us, like when we've gotten in trouble,
we've looked at these things as opportunities, not problems. In this case, my brain was
doing the same thing: "Can we somehow subvert these guys and do something interesting
with this, and turn the tables on them?" And what I then realized was, "Wait a minute, they
called us because they want me to be thinking exactly what I'm thinking right now! That's
what they want the ad to be." So then I realized that we'd been had, we were fucked. There
wasn't any way you could out-think them.
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Most troubling for the group is member Hosler’s charge that, “[I]nstead of just absorbing
different fringey, oppositional ideas, they’re absorbing the very idea of opposition, no
matter what form it takes” (Hosler and Savan 1998). This pessimism about the capacity of
antagonists to recuperate seems to gnaw at some of these groups. The BLF (1999)
expresses a less melancholic take on recuperation:
I know some of the advertising agencies are already keeping an eye on the billboard
hackers to see what they can use to sell their product. The first time I ran across it I found it
annoying, and then I thought I can either be pissed off about this or I can do something
about it. BLF 1999

The AMF’s Lasn (2002) is more optimistic: “Instead of saying, ‘Oh no, our images are being
sucked up by the system – our images are being neutralized by their images.’ I don’t believe
in that kind of cynicism! I’ve seen enough images, jams, and detournements work to not be
afraid of that.” Still, a careful analysis of several years of Adbusters magazine by Nomai
2008, 164) strongly supports the argument that the group’s subvertisements increased in
technical sophistication in response to advertising campaigns that often mimicked the style
of the AMF and other culture jammers.
Thus some CJOs appear to recognize an imperative to avoid recuperation. However,
only one of the groups noted here utilizes experimental repertoires (CAE). The data are
consistent with an explanation of experimental repertoires (AA, CTM, IST) as the result of
CJOs playing the game of art while playing contentious politics. Yet, considering this
relationship further as one of tactical interaction, of détournement and recuperation, is not
generally supported.
If this represents a general pattern, one way to explain it is that the dynamic of
détournement and recuperation as tactical experimentation functions less on the level of
the CJO – individual CJOs experiment tactically, witness or anticipate recuperation of the
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tactic, and respond with more tactical experiments – and more as a set of incentives
characterizing the field of contention. This is how McAdam explains tactical interaction.
Individual SMOs don’t develop tactics and themselves immediately respond to
neutralizations of their actions. Instead, SMOs respond to the actions of other SMOs and
their perceived opponents. The process can be largely indirect and mediated, like much of
my emphasis on opportunity structures. Thus, while some CJOs may perceive their
individual enterprise as a continually shifting game of détournement and recuperation (like
the CAE), what may be at play is the more general struggle of the two in the field of conflict.
12.4. Conclusion
In this chapter, I refrain from developing a complete dynamic model. In its place, I
provide some theoretical direction for an empirical analysis of some of the incentives that
CJOs face in choosing tactics. First, I develop theoretical analyses of intrinsic and extrinsic
incentives and generate hypotheses and propositions regarding the relationship between
particular incentives, resource constraints, and tactical choice. Second, I elaborate on
theoretical developments in previous chapters by considering the dynamics of tactical
interaction. In so doing, I draw on the concepts of détournement and recuperation
presented in Chapter Six. Third, I present data drawn from the sample of CJOs to illustrate
these dynamics.
One of the more interesting findings of this chapter is that CJOs describe their own
actions as intrinsically enjoyable. In the previous chapter I note that groups pursuing
extrinsic goals tend to see culture jamming as part of a broader struggle. In fact, the more
directly effective means for achieving these goals include institutional and conventional
tactics, civil disobedience, and mass movements. While culture jamming is effective at
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performing certain important objectives within wider projects of social change, it is also
clear that for members of CJOs these actions are highly enjoyable. Wettergren (2005, 143)
makes an astute observation about her sample of CJOs: “the notion of fun and joy seem to
be closely connected to the jammers’ evaluation of a project, more than judgment of
efficiency in changing the system.” In the language of incentives and preferences, CJOs may
choose tactics that they perceive as less effective (a less preferred tactic) because they
offset the loss in anticipated benefits by increasing the intrinsic benefits (fun and joy).
Wettergren (2005, 142) observes elsewhere: “a fundamental component of culture
jamming is the idea that human beings share a capacity towards ingenuity and creativity
[see Chapter Seven’s description of protaganists and the public]…The act of protest is
conceived as something that creates and reinforces autonomy as unpredictability and
refusal to follow consumer impulses.” Part of this unpredictability involves risk-taking.
Repression is not too costly in the case of CJOs, as this chapter demonstrates. I can thus
contribute one possible explanation of why CJOs appear somewhat risk-tolerant in the
preceding chapter; risk-tolerance or risk-seeking can be construed as an intrinsic incentive,
part of the thrill of being free and developing political agency. As a final word, this chapter
suggests that tactical choices are made under resource constraints that make actions like
culture jamming more attractive, including their skill sets, organizational memberships,
and financial resources. Tactical choice in the case of CJOs may thus involve assessments of
effectiveness, intrinsic enjoyment, and resource constraints, including the aesthetic
disposition.
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CONCLUSION
Throughout this dissertation I endeavored to provide an empirical analysis of
culture jamming organizations and to develop a theoretical approach to explaining
repertoire change and tactical choice. The primary thesis mediating these empirical and
theoretical concerns is that a close relation exists between the development of twentieth
century art in advanced Western democracies and culture jamming. Developing this
argument and addressing these concerns entailed three basic tasks: the conceptualization
of culture jamming, the development of a theoretical explanation of repertoire change and
tactical choice, and an empirical analysis of twelve CJOs and their social, political, and
historical contexts.
Each of these tasks highlights some of the key contributions of this dissertation to
the study of protest and social movements. In response to the lack of an adequate concept,
I developed a rigorous conceptualization of culture jamming as a form of ironic framing, a
contentious collective action that involves the disruption of the dominant ensemble of
representations in a given social system. Explicit in this conceptual analysis is the
argument that culture jamming is a means of engaging in contentious politics. The
empirical analysis that follows demonstrates this insight: CJOs operate in a contentious and
oppositional manner. The analysis of repression in Chapter Twelve is especially
supportive. While repression is not overwhelming in the case of culture jamming, many
CJOs engage in activities that elicit repressive responses from the state and corporate
actors. The most dramatic example is the RBC, a group whose confrontational style is
frequently met with arrest and fines. Other CJOs experienced varying efforts intended to
handicap their capacity to dissent, including the use of litigation and harassment.
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In order to account for the decision to culture jam and to help explain the
development of culture jamming as a set of tactics, I present an approach to theory that
begins to integrate the macro- and micro-levels of analysis. While synthetic approaches to
social movement theory are not uncommon, my contribution is novel in several ways.
First, I bring eminent sociologists Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu into dialogue on
questions of social structure and contentious politics. Although certainly not the first effort
to engage both scholars, it appears this dissertation is the first to open this discussion to
collective action theory. While both scholars were famously hostile to rational choice
theory, I argue that bounded rationality offers a possible means of reconciling these
disparate research programs. Second, while social movement theory primarily focuses on
explaining changes in mobilization, I deploy the tools of social movement theory to advance
the beginnings of a theory of tactical choice. Of particular interest is my use of rational
choice theory, an approach whose myopic focus on mobilization has, as of yet, produced
hardly a handful of reasonable efforts to explain why actgors choose one means of protest
over others. Third, emphasizing the boundedness of rationality in a collective action theory
account allows for an analysis of the variable information and resource endowments
possessed by actors. I relate these endowments to the language of familiarity, a concept
whose use by Tilly and Bourdieu is both generous and cavalier. Here, I develop the notion
of familiarity as sets of constraints and incentives that vary across actors, everyday
activities, and sets of tactics. The key resource of interest is Bourdieu’s concept of the
aesthetic disposition, the set of skills developed in the field of art. Fourth, the core of my
theoretical approach lies in relating social contexts associated with artistic production to
the choice to engage in culture jamming. My emphasis on the field of art provides a crucial
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link between context and action. I argue that the aesthetic disposition is imparted through
experience with sets of educational and occupational networks. As familiarity with certain
social activities over others, dispositions contribute to the definition of the set of
expectations and their degrees of uncertainty that distinguishes tactical alternatives. My
emphasis on art is not necessarily the limit of the argument, however. Rather, my general
emphasis is on skill sets or dispositions and their relation to tactical choice. Finally, I claim
to link collective identity and ideology to an SMO’s attribution of effectiveness. While many
scholars sense an opposition between identity and strategy explanations of tactical choice, I
construe the variety of ways that actors define effectiveness as an expression of the
relation between goals (and objectives) – intrinsic or extrinsic, political or cultural, club
good or public good, materialist or post-materialist, and moderate, radical or autonomy and actions. Such an approach accommodates identity and strategy by opening collective
action theory to non-material incentives.
This study also makes a number of methodological contributions to the study of
culture jamming. First, the sample of CJOs utilized in the study is nearly twice as large as
the nearest study (Wettergren 2005). While a sample of twelve cases is not groundbreaking, it does offer a number of opportunities to compare and contrast a wider selection
of activities. Such an analysis is more likely to detect overly simplified generalizations. For
example, while much of the academic literature on culture jamming emphasizes the mass
media and multinational corporations as targets of CJOs, I find that many of these groups
target government as well (if not the government alone) and, to a lesser extent, interest
groups, political parties, and the military. Second, the methodological constraints of this
project, especially data and sample limitations, are recognized and incorporated into my
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effort to make substantive knowledge claims about culture jamming. Such claims are
constrained by a number of conditions: selecting on the dependent variable, small sample
size, the lack of a representative sample, ignoring the element of time in the data, and the
prolific use of Internet sources. In the analysis of the sample, other important concerns
arise, especially missing or insufficient data. Third, data collection was comprehensive and
involved a wide variety of primary and secondary sources, including two in-depth
interviews.
While novel, the general thrust of the arguments of this dissertation is not at
variance with a great deal of social movement theory. The broadest theoretical
contribution of this project lies in merely synthesizing and filling-in-the-blanks of a far
larger body of work. However, rival explanations of repertoire change and tactical choice
are available. I briefly focus on two apparent rivals here: what I call a mischief hypothesis
and Wettergren’s (2005) emotional hypothesis.
I argued in this dissertation that culture jamming is related to the development of
art in the twentieth century. However, this argument appears to run directly counter to the
observation that this phenomenon has a history preceding the twentieth century. Though
Dery (1993) restricts culture jamming to a post-Dada world the notion that ironic dissent is
a recent addition to the repertoire of contention flies in the face of the evidence. Satirical
performances and artfacts are plentiful throughout history. I do not claim here to identify
the particular conditions and mechanisms that drove individuals and groups to engage in
satire or related actions (for example, the disuptive antics of Diogenes of Sinope). Instead,
I argue that to posit the historical continuity of this phenomenon is to suggest that some
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constant condition is available to individuals or groups.98 For simplicity’s sake, and
without any presumption of strictly psychological determinants, I call this condition,
mischief. Thus, a mischief hypothsis posits that culture jamming is an expression of some
durable characteristic of the human condition. I will not critique this hypothesis. It seems
to me that some durable factors are likely accountable for the continuity of such forms of
action across time. However, we lack data on the prevelance of this phenomenon.
Impressionistic accounts are necessary, but insufficient to make the case concretely. More
to the point is my charge that the argument of this dissertation is not that culture jamming
is a uniquely twentieth century development, but that the culture jamming repertoire of
contention as we see it in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is shaped by the
development of twentieth century art. This relationship takes two related forms. First, the
historical trajectory of the field of art described in Chapters Five and Six highlights some of
the incentives available to those associated with the field of artistic production to engage in
culture jamming actions. These include especially a general tendency towards
experimentation. These effects are more widespread today across the population due to
the increasing size of the art field relative to the social system as a whole. Second, and
more importantly, the skills associated with the aesthetic disposition, itself more widely
distributed across the population than artistic skills in previous centuries, provide
numerous incentives to engage in culture jamming. I argue in Chapter Eleven that such
skills are especially important the more technically sophisticated the culture jamming

I am referring here to the simple instance of such phenomena across time, not to the ebbs and flows of
ironic dissent. An example of an explanation of the latter is provided by Haugerud’s (2013, 188) argument
that such activism is more prevalent under one of two conditions: the repression of traditional dissent (a
hostile political opportunity structure) or the inadequacy of “conventional political categories, modes of
expression, and organization” to task of capturing social reality.
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action. Thus, the focus of this project is, again, not on the rise of a new type of repertoire,
but a shift in the incentives available to contentious actors that in some cases favor the
actions under study here. Howeverm clearly, such an argument implies the hypothesis that
culture jamming is more common today than in previous historical periods. Again,
comparable data on this question are not available.
This discussion clearly suggests that the mischief hypothesis can be construed as
more than a strict alternative to my explanation; it can be regarded as a potential
supplementary hypothesis. I make a similar argument with respect to Wettergren’s
emotional hypothesis. Wettergren explains culture jamming in part as conditioned by the
emotional culture or regime of late capitalism, the sets of prescribed and proscribed
emotions and behaviors that maintain the hedonic structure of consumerism. In order to
resist this structure, culture jammers seek to develop an alternative emotional regime
based on genuine or authentic pleasure and freedom. In explaining the choice to engage in
culture jamming as the means to fashion this regime, Wettergren relies on a variant of the
micro-foundational approach Flam (2000) calls, in contrast to homo economicus and homo
sociologicus, the “emotional man.” Collins’ (2004) theory of interaction ritual chains serves
as the theoretical template for Wettergren’s (2005: ch. 8) analysis. In this theory,
individuals and groups accrue or expend emotional energy through social interactions.
Such energy can range from a high of confidence and happiness to lows of depression and a
lack of initiative. Because collective actions can vary in the amount of emotional energy
they will provide, tactics are chosen over others principally for their contribution to an
individual or group’s level of emotional energy.
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While Wettergren does find strong evidence that members of CJOs derive significant
positive emotional energy from engaging in their actions, she makes the additional
argument that CJOs engage in second-order interaction rituals. First-order interaction
rituals are immediate and direct forms of interaction. In the case of CJOs this points to
participation in the action itself. Second-order rituals involve the the circulation of
symbols, “in which individuals re-circulate the symbols in other contexts and groups than
the original, or through the mediation of television and so on” (Wettergren 2005, 143). She
argues that “[t]he innovation and dispersal of symbols is itself an activity that generates
solidarity and [emotional energy] because it includes an imagined and internalized
community of the lik-eminded that will admire and acknowledge the meaning of these
symbols” (Wettergren 2005, 144). What Wettergren is arguing here is that CJOs engage in
culture jamming in part due to the intrinsic enjoyment of expressing collective
identification and establishing reputations (social positions) among their fellow activists,
artists, and pranksters.
An initial draft of Chapter Eleven involved an analysis of what I identified as
symbolic identification with a collective identity. Whereas intrinsic enjoyment refers to
direct benefits like social interaction, identification refers to a broader sense of self that
expresses solidarity with others not directly implicated in the action. Although
identification is sometimes utilized as a more general explanation of mobilization (McAdam
and Paulsen 1993; Rochon 1998), I suggested that SMOs believe that some tactics are more
indicative of collective identity than others. Such incentives are typically expressed
through the use of frames or tactics that establish a symbolic connection between the
action and a wider community of activism or sympathizers. Thus, it seems plausible to
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suggest that CJOs derive benefits from utilizing tactics associated with actors under the
condition that the SMO strongly identifies with these actors. The inverse proposition – that
CJOs may derive costs from utilizing tactics that they associate with their antagonists or
those they identify negatively – seems less plausible in part because the nature of a conflict
may generate a tendency towards the use of similar tactics, especially when the conflict is
drawn into a highly institutionalized field like the courts, legislatures, or elections.99
My reasons for omitting this variable from Chapter Eleven involve the arguments
close relation to Wettergren’s argument (considered in this Conclusion) and the difficulty
of providing direct evidence to support it. This is made obvious in Wettergren’s study.
Her explanation of culture jamming as first and second-order interaction rituals follows her
empirical analysis. It draws its force primarily from the logic of the theoretical argument.
The evidence supports it, but it is not conclusive. Even the data she summons in her
discussion of these effects falls short (Wettergren 2005, 145). She quotes the AMF’s Lasn
and a member of the French Adbusters, but they express strongly individual values of anticommercialism and autonomy.
Broader theoretical concerns are at stake. The emotional man approach is a clear
rival to theories based on rationality assumptions. I do not have the space to engage these
approaches in an extended dialogue. However, I do want to note some points of interest
regarding the mutual application of each to the subject of culture jamming. First, the
expectation of an emotional hypothesis– that both first and second-order interaction
rituals increase the probability that these actors will engage in culture jammers – is not
Of course, the literature on isomorphic processes in organizational fields suggests a set of incentives that
may produce pressures for organizational (and presumably tactical) homogeneity even in conventional
political activity (DiMaggio and Powell 1987). This process is most pronounced in more institutionalized
spheres of activities like the market or many professions.
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strictly opposed to a hypothesis utilizing the language of incentives. In other words, both
approaches can generate the expectation that, in the case of CJOs, the circulation of symbols
as a form of collective identification is associated with an increased probability of tactical
adotion of culture jamming. From this singular perspective, data can provide no reason to
reject or accept either approach against the other. However, from a theoretical standpoint,
Collins’ theory is marginally more satisfying in that the concept of emotional energy is at
home in the theory of interaction rituals. In contrast, a collective action theory account of
collective identification must rely on distinct theoretical approaches. In other words, while
the concept of emotional energy is endogenous to the theory of collectivce identification,
ratoinal choice theory possesses no endogenous theory of collective identification. For
example, I employed Bourdieu and Tilly to fill-in-the-gaps of a rationalist account. Here, it
would require a supplementary explanation of collective identity, an account I argued
Bourdieu offers in his concepts of habitus and field. Moreover, some may suggest that an
emotional model of action is more descriptively accurate than one based on bounded
rationality. However, at their core each model is a radically simplified model of motivation.
For the emotional man action is a consequence of the balance of emotional energies
derived from actions, while for the rational man action is a consequence of the balance of
incentives derived from actions. Within the emotional perspective incentives can be
reduced to their emotional register. Within the raional perspective the lack of a
presumption of conscious reasoning opens the door to incorporating emotions, including
pleasure, into the language of incentives. However, Bourdieu’s sociology, which is part of
the exogenous background (the filling in the blanks) of my collective action theory account,
abandons a distinction between rationality and emotion by positing a complex psychology
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of investment in social activity (Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005, 482-483). As a reflection of
his somewhat structural bias (structures are more determinate than agency) Bourdieu is
less inclined to posit a pervasive cynicism and more mindful of the level of practice
operating below consciousness and clear intention. Ultimately (and hopefully),
descriptively and empirically satisfying theories of action will arrive with greater advances
in psychology and the neuro and cognitive sciences.
This last comment obviously suggests a rather daunting task for future researchers.
In concluding this dissertation I point to modest proposals for further study that highlight
some of the difficulties experienced throughout this project. First, the theoretical
consideration of uncertainty in Chapter Three draws on a wide literature and several
concepts including economic theory, ambiguity aversion, bounded rationality, and
contentious politics. There is no extensive theoretical or empirical treatment of risk and
uncertainty in social movement theory despite the fact that politics is a fundamentally
uncertain social activity (Downs 1957) and that forms of action outside of institutions are
potentially more uncertain. Such an analysis should consider a variety of questions. How
can the literatures on uncertainty in psychology, economics, and to a lesser extent political
science and sociology contribute to a more robust understanding of uncertainty in
contentious politics? What kind or level of uncertainty do the various actors in contentious
politics encounter? How do actors utilize uncertainty strategically? How does uncertainty
vary across SMO strategies and tactics? What are the risk orientations of actors?
Answering these questions and others should bring the field closer to an understanding of
the nature of contentious politics.
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Second, I noted in Chapter Eleven that effectiveness presents theoretical and
methodological difficulties because SMOs may rationalize their actions as effective. In
other words, they may choose an action due to some reason or incentive other than
effectiveness and yet produce a justification for their choice that stresses how the tactic
contributes to the achievement of the group’s goals and objectives. Any micro-level theory
of tactical choice must determine how an SMO attributes effectiveness to their actions and
the actions of others and the nature of the distribution of effectiveness across the set of
tactics. This problem is compounded by the fact that SMO’s do not merely pursue a goal(s)
but a variety of objectives. Such an account of effectiveness must recognize the process of
rationalization as a possible confounding factor.100
Third, social movent theory is nearly void of micro-level theoretical accounts of
tactical choice. If this dissertation should sound one resounding call in the area of theory, it
would be the necessity of developing such approaches and providing clearly articulated
implications for testing them. The question of mobilization absorbs much of the energy of
the field, and rightfully so as it represents the crucial testing ground for a methodical
approach to studying social movements. However, a proper balance has not been struck.
Social movements not only emerge and die off they choose to act in different ways. The
implications for such choices are widespread and affect outcomes, mobilization, and the
tactical and strategic choices of other actors. Moeover, while I utilized a theoretical
approach associated with formal modeling, the methodological approach taken here was
modest in its more traditional qualitative emphasis. Formal modeling can offer a means to
develop rigorous theories and derive hypotheses for testing and illustration. It is not
Of course, it seems too obvious to mention, but as a general suggestion all theories of choice must
ultimately include a theory of rationalization.
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merely applicable to theories based on strong assumptis of rationality. It can be used to
develop any kind of theory insofar as such theories are logically consistent. Yet, as this
project makes clear even a theoretical approach that utilizes assumptions of rationality
need not utilize such methods. However, a particularly interesting suggestion for future
research is the formalization of existing social movement theories in an effort to not only
determine their logical consistency, but also to derive testable implications and identify
clear differencs of prediction across theories. Such an effort could also formalize the
theoryof tactical choice provided in this dissertation.
In this conclusion I present a consideration of the contributions of this study to the
field of social movements, some alternatives to my explanation of tactical choice, and some
avenues for further research. Such a conclusion is necessarily incomplete, but it should
provide a general sense of the possible implications of this study for the study of political
behavior.
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APPENDIX 1. INTERVIEW SURVEY
I conducted three interviews for this study. Two of these interviews involved
engagements with members of culture jamming organizations that are part of the final
sample of twelve groups (IST, SCP). Each interview was semi-structured. Below I present
the baseline set of questions developed prior to any of the three interviews. In each
interview, some questions were deleted because existing sources of information provided
sufficient answers. Other questions were not answered because of a lack of time.
Survey Questions
Warm-Up:
Description of Organization
Role in Organization
Issues and Goals
What are the general and specific issues that your group engages?
If you see your actions and your organization as opposing something or someone,
how would you define it or them?
Generally, what do you hope to achieve with your actions?
History
When and how was the group formed?
How did these early members know each other?
Why did the group form when it did?
What kind of environment did the group form within? Activism?
What kind of groups or individuals inspire the organization?
Structure of Group:
Nature of Membership
What does it mean to be a part of the group?
What responsibilities do you and others have?
Is the group inclusive or exclusive with respect to membership?
Decision-Making Practices
How do you go about making decisions as a group?
How are conflicts resolved?
Resources
How do you meet and communicate? Internet?
How do you finance the organization and your actions?
How do you find time for the group amidst your other responsibilities?
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What resources are most important to the group?
Do you receive any support from outside sources?
Relations to other Actors
Are you or any other member of your group part of another similar group?
What organizations are you or other members of the group involved with that are
not like this organization, such as unions or book clubs?
Has your group worked with or collaborated with individuals that were not
considered part of the group?
What about other groups like yourself?
Are there are any recurring relationships which you would classify as alliances?
Audiences
Who is your audience?
How do you intend your actions to affect them?
What about the media?
Mass media? Activist media?
Political institutions?
Strategies and Tactics
How would you describe your actions?
What kinds of actions do you do?
How do you promote or present your group?
Where did the ideas for these actions come from?
Have your tactics changed over time? How?
Alternative Options: Costs, Benefits, Effectiveness, Normativity
What are the other ways that you believe you could act politically? Voting?
Marches? Violence?
Have you engaged in any of them?
Why do you not choose the ones you have not engaged in?
Which of these do you find to be the most effective for addressing your concerns and
issues?
In general, which actions do you believe require you to expend most of your energy
and effort and resources? Which require the least?
In general, which actions do you believe provide you with the most benefit, whether
intrinsic or extrinsic?
Biography: Work, School, Family
Did you and/or the other members of the group have any experience outside of the
group with art or cultural production (as in theatre, film, visual arts, writing)
at work, school, your family, or as a general hobby or interest , etc.?
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APPENDIX 2. INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD EXEMPTION

495

APPENDIX 3. MEASURING ARTS EDUCATION AND OCCUPATIONS
In order to measure the relative increase in arts education and occupations across
the third quarter of the twentieth century, I employ a series of indicators graphically
displayed in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 and Table 5.1. In this appendix I detail the construction of
these variables.
In order to provide as much leverage over the question at hand, I develop two
measures of arts education. The first, Fine Arts, is a conservative indicator expressing the
annual percentage change in the number of Master’s and Doctorate degrees in the Fine Arts
minus degrees in Music and the Dramatic Arts. Conceptually, this emphasizes the visual
arts. It is also distinguishable from Crane’s (1987, 9-10) broader measure of Master of Fine
Arts degrees which includes Music and the Dramatic Arts, though it is more inclusive in
that it also incorporates Doctorate degrees. Such a measure should under-represent the
absolute level of arts education. Using these raw numbers, I calculated a new variable
measuring the annual percentage change in Fine Arts degrees.
The second, All Arts, is a more inclusive measure expressing the annual percentage
change in the number of Master’s and Doctorate degrees in the Fine Arts (including Music
and the Dramatic Arts), English, and Architecture. In part, this indicator draws on
Bourdieu’s insistence on the significance of the literary field, though I exclude foreign
languages. While the conservative measure of arts education is likely to under-represent
absolute levels of art education (though not necessarily annual percentage change), this
measure is more likely to over-represent absolute levels of art education, because English
degrees may involve emphases on grammar as opposed to creative writing.
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In constructing this indicator, I encountered the changing categorizations of degrees
in the Census. From 1949 to 1955, the Fine Arts, Speech and Dramatic Arts, and Music are
discrete categories. From 1956 to 1966, the Fine Arts category is inclusive of Speech and
Dramatic Arts and Music, though these are distinct subcategories. Beginning with the 1967
data, these categories exclude music education and speech correction, the latter of which
clearly over-represents arts education. However, there appears to be no distortion in the
data from this shift as the downward trajectory it heralds continues through successive
years. Finally, from 1976 on, the categories for English and Journalism are replaced by
Letters and Communication. I chose to substitute Letters for English.
Occupations data presented the most difficult problems. First, for 1940 and 1950,
the Census provides detailed occupations data inclusive of a diversity of arts-related
occupations across both the experienced labor force and employed persons. By 1960, only
the experienced labor force data on occupations remains, and by 1970 this diversity is
aggregated into one category: Writers, Artists, and Entertainers, though which of the
previous discrete categories is included is unclear. As demonstrated in Table 6.1, in order
to maximize the comparable data over five decades (1940 to 1990), I utilize one composite
measure of multiple categories of arts occupations, one measure derived from a single
category of arts occupations, and a single measure obtained from the National Endowment
of the Arts. The first variable is the sum of the values of four categories: Art and Art
Teachers, Musicians and Music Teachers, Actors and Actresses, and Authors, Editors, and
Reporters. The second is derived from the single inclusive category: Writers, Artists, and
Entertainers, while the third is also a single Category measure. The 1960 and 1970 data
overlap and thus allow a comparison of two indicators at a time, from which I conclude that
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the singular Census measure is a more conservative measurement of arts occupations.
From this data, I calculated percentage changes to generate some tangible metric of
comparison. Despite the limitations of this approach, I argue that these procedures allow a
general sketch of change in the arts labor market relative to the larger labor market, and
thus provide some measure of confidence in reaching the conclusions of Chapter Six and
beyond.
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